FRANCIS  VINTON 


MAJOR  GENERAL,  U.S.V. 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Class 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

AND  THE 

MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


THE 

REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

AND  THE 

MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


BY 

FRANCIS    VINTON    GREENE 

ii 

GRADUATE   OF  THE   U.   8.   MILITARY  ACADEMY 
MAJOR-GENERAL  OF  VOLUNTEERS  IN  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

AUTHOR   OF 

The  Russian  Army  and  Its  Campaigns  in  Turkey  in  1877-78  (1879).     Army  Life 

in   Russia  (1880).     Improvements  in  the  Art  of  War  (1882).     The 

Mississippi  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War  (1883).    General 

Greene  :    Great   Commanders   Series    (1885). 

The  United  States  Army  (1901) 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S   SONS 
1911 


LIBRARIAN'S  FUED 

COPYRIGHT,  1911,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  May,  1911 


m 

TO   THE 

OFFICERS  AND  MEN 
TBOSE   NOW   LJVJNQ   AND  THOSE   WHO  HAVE   GONE   BEFORB 

OF  THE 
UNITED   STATES  ARMY 

WHO   HAVE 

CARRIED  ITS   COLORS  TO  VICTORY 

ON   MANY   FIELDS   AND   IN   MANY   CLIMES 

HAVE   COMPELLED   THE   SURRENDER  OF  ITS  ARMED   FOES 

AT 

SARATOGA  AND   YORKTOWN 
VERA  CRUZ  AND  THE   CITY   OF  MEXICO 

DONELSON,  VICKSBURQ,   APPOMATTOX  AND   DURHAM'S   STATI 
*  SANTIAGO   AND   MANILA 

AND  WHO 
IN  THE  INTERVENING   YEARS  OF  PEACE 

HAVE 

SUBDUED  THE  SAVAGE 

EXPLORED  THE  WILDERNESS 

PREPARED  THE  GREAT  WEST   FOR  THE 

TEEMING   MILLIONS  WHO  NOW  INHABIT  IT 

CONTRIBUTED  TO  THE  ADVANCEMENT  OF  SCIENCE 

ABATED  THE  TROPICAL  PESTILENCE 

DIRECTED  THE   NATION'S  PUBLIC  WORKS 

CONSTRUCTED  THE  PANAMA    CANAL 

THIS  BOOK 
is 

WITH  TROFOUND   ADMIRATION   AND   WARM-HEARTED  AFFECTION 
RESPECTFULLY    DEDICATED 


PREFACE 

THE  purpose  of  the  book  of  which  this  is  the  first  volume 
is  to  present,  within  the  limited  space  of  three  small  volumes, 
the  essential  facts  in  our  military  history,  and  to  make  such 
analyses  of  these  facts  and  such  comments  upon  them  as  may 
be  useful  for  the  future  and  interesting  for  the  present. 

The  army  has  always  been  a  factor  of  prime  importance 
in  our  national  life.  It  was  due  to  the  skill  of  Washington 
at  Trenton  and  Yorktown,  and  the  fortitude  of  his  officers 
and  men  at  Valley  Forge  and  elsewhere  during  eight  long 
years,  that  the  labors  of  Samuel  and  John  Adams,  Patrick 
Henry  and  Thomas  Jefferson  did  not  prove  fruitless,  and  that 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  became  an  immortal  docu 
ment  instead  of  passing  into  the  waste-basket  of  forgotten 
revolutionary  pronunciamentos.  The  success  of  Scott  on  the 
Niagara  frontier  in  aid  of  the  wonderful  victories  of  the  navy 
in  the  second  war  with  Great  Britain  compelled  the  British 
to  relinquish  their  control  over  our  commerce  through  the 
right  of  search  and  acknowledge  our  rightful  lines  of  frontier. 
The  territorial  expansion  on  the  Gulf  and  the  Pacific  would 
have  been  impossible  if  the  armies  of  Scott  and  Taylor  had 
failed.  The  Union  would  have  been  disrupted  and  slavery 
perpetuated,  in  spite  of  the  eloquence  of  Webster  and  Phil 
lips  and  Sumner  and  the  consummate  genius  of  Lincoln,  if 
Grant  and  Sherman  had  not  understood  the  art  of  war. 
Finally,  it  wras  not  alone  the  unanimous  resolution  of  Congress 
that  made  Cuba  free  and  incidentally  brought  us  Porto  Rico 
and  the  Philippines,  a  commanding  position  in  the  Orient 
and  the  recognition  of  our  greatness  as  a  world  power,  but 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 

also  the  skill,  valor  and  endurance  of  the  officers  and  men, 
ashore  and  afloat,  who  carried  our  arms  to  victory  on  both 
sides  of  the  globe  in  a  few  short  months  of  1898. 

From  the  beginning,  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  years  ago, 
the  army  has  been  the  willing  and  faithful  subordinate  of  the 
civil  power,  and  the  indispensable  instrument  for  carrying 
into  effect  the  will  of  the  people  as  expressed  by  their  chosen 
representatives.  In  recent  wars  it  has  become  an  efficient  in 
strument  for  that  purpose.  In  1812-15  we  paid  the  deserved 
penalty,  at  Detroit  and  Sacketts  Harbor,  Bladensburg  and 
Washington,  of  twelve  years'  deliberate  neglect  of  the  military 
service,  due  to  the  popular  belief  that  a  well-trained  army 
was  not  a  necessary  factor  in  our  scheme  of  government.  It 
is  not  likely  that  we  shall  again  make  that  mistake.  Our 
army  is  to-day  no  larger  in  proportion  to  population,  and 
much  smaller  in  proportion  to  wealth,  than  after  the  close  of 
any  of  the  wars  of  the  last  century;  but  there  is  a  constant 
effort  to  make  it  efficient;  and  while  much  remains  to  be 
done  for  the  improvement  of  the  militia,  yet  it  is  better  organ 
ized  and  equipped  than  ever  before  in  its  history.  The  value 
of  military  instruction  was  never  so  widely  recognized  as  it 
is  to-day.  The  prejudice  against  a  "standing  army,"  which 
our  ancestors  brought  over  from  England  nearly  three  centu 
ries  ago,  and  which  so  long  survived  any  reason  for  its  exis 
tence,  is  at  last  almost  extinct.  The  good  conduct  of  the 
army,  regulars  and  volunteers,  and  the  inestimable  value  of 
their  services,  have  nearly  overcome  this  prejudice.  We  shall 
always  have  an  army.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
it  will  be  efficient.  To  be  so,  it  must  study  its .  past  history 
and  draw  from  it  the  lessons  which  are  applicable  to  the 
future. 

In  the  hope  of  aiding  to  some  extent  in  this  study,  the 
following  pages  have  been  written. 

A  few  words  about  the  making  of  this  book  may  not  be 
out  of  place. 


PREFACE  ix 

1st.  As  to  Purpose. — I  have  had  it  in  mind  to  write  such 
a  book  for  more  than  twenty-five  years,  but  various  circum 
stances  have  caused  constant  postponement.  I  had  originally 
intended  to  condense  the  entire  history  of  our  military  opera 
tions,  from  Lexington  to  Pekin,  into  one  volume  of  not  over 
400,000  words.  Experience  has  shown  that  such  extreme 
condensation  would  crush  the  life  out  of  the  book,  and  it  is 
now  evident  that  three  volumes  will  be  necessary.  Under 
these  circumstances  I  have  decided  to  publish  the  first  volume 
without  waiting  for  the  others. 

2d.  As  to  Text. — My  private  library  includes  nearly  all  the 
books  named  in  the  two  lists  of  authorities.  Those  which 
are  out  of  print  and  unpurchasable  have  been  obtained  from 
the  Library  of  Congress,  the  State  Library  at  Albany,  the 
New  York  City  Public  Library,  and  the  Library  of  Colum 
bia  University.  I  desire  to  express  my  thanks  to  the  officers 
in  charge  of  these  libraries  for  the  facilities  which  they  have 
afforded  to  me  in  the  use  of  their  ample  resources. 

The  book  has  been  written  with  these  authorities  at  hand, 
and  citation  is  given  for  every  fact.  The  opinions  are  my 
own,  although  I  confess  to  being  influenced  by  the  simple, 
clear  style  and  accurate  thinking  of  the  late  John  Fiske,  and 
also  in  a  minor  degree  by  the  brilliant,  sympathetic  and  at 
tractive  history  of  Sir  George  Otto  Trevelyan. 

3d.  As  to  Maps. — All,  except  one,  of  the  maps  in  this  vol 
ume  have  been  previously  published  in  Avery's  "  History  of  the 
United  States  and  Its  People,"  and  it  is  to  the  courtesy  of  my 
fellow-graduate  in  the  Class  of  1870  at  West  Point  and  life 
long  friend,  Mr.  Charles  William  Burrows,  President  of  The 
Burrows  Brothers  Publishing  Company,  of  Cleveland,  that  I 
am  indebted  for  the  great  privilege  of  making  use  of  them. 
They  are  the  only  maps  of  the  Revolution  that  are  accurate. 
They  have  been  prepared  in  the  only  way  in  which  accurate 
maps  can  be  made — viz.,  by  using  careful  topographical  sur 
veys  (in  this  case  those  of  the  United  States  Geological  Survey) 


x  PREFACE 

as  the  basis,  and  placing  on  these  the  positions  of  the  troops 
as  stated  in  the  official  reports  of  the  commanding  generals, 
reconciling  the  discrepancies  between  different  reports  as  well 
as  possible.  Most  of  them  were  drawn  by  Lieutenant  Joseph 
Baer,  United  States  Army,  while  on  duty  in  the  Department 
of  Drawing  at  West  Point  in  1904. 

The  only  map  not  taken  from  Avery's  History  is  the  map 
of  Harlem  Heights,  which  was  drawn  under  the  direction  of 
Professor  Henry  P.  Johnston  for  his  admirable  monograph 
on  "The  Battle  of  Harlem  Heights."  It  is  used  by  per 
mission  kindly  given  by  him  and  by  the  Columbia  University 
Press. 

Prepared  in  this  way  all  the  maps  have  been  engraved  and 
printed  at  the  Matthews-Northrup  Works  in  a  manner  that 
leaves  nothing  to  be  desired. 

4th.  As  to  Proof-Reading  and  Indexing. — I  am  indebted 
to  Captain  Frederick  W.  Lewis,  29th  Infantry,  for  valuable 
assistance  in  reading  the  proofs  and  comparing  the  texts  with 
the  maps.  The  Index  has  been  prepared  by  the  Publishers. 

FRANCIS  VINTON  GREENE. 
May  1,  1911. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I— THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

CHAPTER  PAQB 

I.— BOSTON,  1775-76 1 

Lexington,  April  19 3 

Bunker  Hill,  June  17 7 

Siege  of  Boston,  July,  1775-March,  1776 13 

Dorchester  Heights,  March  4 18 

Evacuation  of  Boston,  March  17 19 

Invasion  of  Canada,  September,  1775-July,  1776    ....  21 

II.— NEW  YORK,  1776 28 

British  Plans  for  the  Campaign  of  1776 28 

Washington  Marches  to  New  York,  April 31 

Howe  Arrives  at  New  York,  July-August 33 

Battle  of  Long  Island,  August  27 35 

^  Washington  Retreats  from  Long  Island,  August  29  ...  42 

Action  at  Kip's  Bay,  September  15 46 

v  Battle  of  Harlem  Heights,  September  16 49 

Howe's  Flank  Movement  through  Westchester,  October  .  .  51 

Battle  of  White  Plains,  October  28 52 

,  Battle  of  Fort  Washington,  November  16 57 

Retreat  through  New  Jersey,  November-December  ...  62 

Washington  Crosses  the  Delaware,  December  25  ....  66 

Battle  of  Trenton,  December  26 67 

Battle  of  Princeton,  January  3,  1777 70 

Winter  Quarters  at  Morristown,  January  7 72 

III.— PHILADELPHIA,  1777 75 

Howe's  Plans  for  1777 76 

Burgoyne's  Plan,  Approved  by  the  King    .......  78 

The  Danbury  Raid,  April  25 SO 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

The  Middlebrook  Manoeuvres,  May,  June 80 

Howe  Sails  for  the  Chesapeake,  July  1 82 

Washington  Confronts  Him  When  He  Lands,  August  25      .  83 

Battle  of  the  Brandywine,  September  11 85 

Paoli  Massacre,  September  21 88 

Howe  Takes  Philadelphia,  September  25 88 

Battle  of  Germantown,  October  4 90 

Defence  of  Fort  Mercer,  or  Red  Bank,  October  22      ...  93 

Capture  of  Fort  Mifflin,  November  15 94 

Evacuation  of  Fort  Mercer,  November  20 94 

Washington  at  Valley  Forge,  December  19 95 

IV.— THE  HUDSON,  1777 96 

Burgoyne  Arrives  at  Montreal,  May  14 100 

Capture  of  Ticonderoga,  July  6 103 

Battle  of  Hubbardton,  July  7 104 

Engagement  at  Skenesborough,  July  7 104 

Action  at  Fort  Ann,  July  8 105 

St.  Leger's  Expedition  from  Oswego,  July-August ....  106 

Battle  of  Oriskany,  August  6 107 

Siege  of  Fort  Schuyler  (or  Stanwix),  August  4-22   ....  108 

Defeat  of  St.  Leger,  August  22 108 

Schuyler  Retreats  Down  the  Hudson,  July-August ....  109 

Battle  of  Bennington,  August  16 113 

Battle  of  Freeman's  Farm,  September  19 116 

Capture  of  Forts  Montgomery  and  Clinton,  October  6     .     .  121 

Battle  of  Bemis'  Heights,  October  7 123 

Surrender  of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga,  October  17 127 

V.— THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE,   1778-81 132 

Valley  Forge : 132 

Conway  Cabal 134 

Greene  Appointed  Quartermaster-General 136 

Steuben  Appointed  Inspector-General 137 

British  Peace  Commission 138 

Skirmish  at  Barren  Hill,  May  20,  1778 140 

Evacuation  of  Philadelphia,  June  18 141 

Battle  of  Monmouth,  June  28 144 

Court-Martial  of  Charles  Lee,  July  4-August  12 148 

Arrival  of  the  French  Fleet,  July  14 149 

Newport,  August  29 153 


CONTENTS  xlii 

CHAPTER  PAQB 

Stony  Point,  July  16,  1779 158 

Paulus  Hook,  August  19 160 

Penobscot  Expedition,  July  25 161 

Springfield,  June  23,  1780 164 

West  Point— Arnold's  Treason,  September  21 167 

New  London,  September  7,  1781 170 

Movements  of  d'Estaing,  1779 171 

Arrival  of  the  Second  French  Expedition,  July  10,  1780  .     .  172 
French  Army  and  Navy  Blockaded  at  Newport,  July,  1780, 

to  July,  1781 173 

The  Revolution  Nearly  Exhausted 174 

Mutiny  of  the  Pennsylvania  Line,  January  1,  1781  .     .     .     .  176 

Mutiny  of  the  New  Jersey  Line,  January  20 177 

John  Laurens's  Mission  to  Paris,  February  13 178 


VI.— BRITISH  CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH,  1778-80    .    .  180 

British  Plans  for  Dividing  the  Colonies 182 

Militia  Conflicts 183 

Great  Bridge,  Va.,  December  9,  1775 183 

Moore's  Bridge,  N.  C.,  February  27,  1776 183 

Defence  of  Charleston,  June  28 186 

Capture  of  Savannah,  December  29,  1778 191 

Conquest  of  Georgia,  January  29,  1779 192 

Action  at  Beaufort,  February  3 193 

Engagement  at  Kettle  Creek,  February  14 194 

Battle  of  Briar  Creek,  March  3 195 

Battle  of  Stono  Ferry,  June  20 198 

Siege  of  Savannah,  September  23 202 

Assault  at  Savannah,  October  9 203 

D'Estaing  Returns  to  France,  October  20 205 

Clinton's  Expedition  to  the  South,  October  26 206 

Siege  of  Charleston,  April  10,  1780 208 

Surrender  of  Charleston,  May  12 210 

Action  at  the  Waxhaws,  May  29 212 

Action  at  Ramsour's  Mill,  June  20 213 

Action  at  Williamson's,  July  12 213 

Action  at  Hanging  Rock,  August  8 213 

Action  at  Rocky  Mount,  July  30 214 

Action  at  Green  Spring,  August  1 214 

Action  at  Hanging  Rock,  August  12 214 


xiv  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Gates  Takes  Command,  July  25 215 

Battle  of  Camden,  August  16 218 

Action  at  Fishing  Creek,  August  18,  1780 219 

VIL— BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH,  1781-82  ...  220 

Greene  Takes  Command,  December  4,  1780 222 

Battle  of  King's  Mountain,  October  7 224 

Action  at  Fish  Dam,  November  9 225 

Action  at  Blackstocks,  November  20 225 

Battle  of  the  Cowpens,  January  17,  1781 229 

Retreat  to  the  Dan,  January,  February 232 

Passage  of  the  Catawba,  February  1 233 

Passage  of  the  Yadkin,  February  8 234 

Passage  of  the  Dan,  February  15 235 

Action  at  Wetzell's  Mill,  March  6 237 

Battle  of  Guilford,  March  15 239 

Cornwallis  Retreats  to  Wilmington,  April  7 242 

Greene  Marches  to  South  Carolina,  April 244 

Battle  of  Hobkirk's  Hill,  April  25 246 

Rawdon  Evacuates  Camden,  May  10 248 

Capture  of  Fort  Motte,  May  12 248 

Capture  of  Orangeburg,  May  11 249 

Capture  of  Fort  Granby,  May  15 249 

Siege  and  Capture  of  Augusta,  May  22-June  5 249 

Siege  of  Ninety-Six,  May  22-June  19 250 

Battle  of  Eutaw  Springs,  September  8 255 

Evacuation  of  Savannah,  July  11,  1782 257 

Evacuation  of  Charleston,  December  14,  1782 257 

VIII.— YORKTOWN,  1781 259 

Cornwallis  Marches  to  Virginia,  April 260 

Situation  in  Virginia,  May 261 

Lafayette  Retreats  from  Richmond,  June 262 

Steuben  Retreats  from  Charlottesville,  June 262 

Arrival  of  Wayne,  June  10 263 

Battle  of  Jamestown,  July  6 263 

Clinton's  Instructions  to  Cornwallis,  June-July 266 

Cornwallis  at  Yorktown,  August  2 267 

Allied  Army  Moves  Toward  New  York,  June 268 

Allied  Army  Marches  to  Virginia,  August 270 

Movements  of  French  and  English  Fleets,  August      .     .     .  270 


CONTENTS  xv 

PAGE 

Naval  Battle  off  the  Chesapeake,  September  5 273 

Clinton  Sails  to  Relief  of  Cornwallis,  October  19  .     .     .     .273 

Siege  of  Yorktown,  September  28 274 

Capitulation  at  Yorktown,  October  19 275 

End  of  the  War,  November  25,  1783 278 

Washington's  Ability  as  a  Soldier 279 


PART  II— THE  MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES 

Ancient  Origin  of  the  Prejudice  against  a  Standing  Army       .     .     .  286 

Formation  of  the  Continental  Army,  1775 288 

Washington's  Opinions  on  the  Defects  of  the  System  in  Use  During 

the  Revolution, 292 

The  Constitutional  Powers  of  Congress 295 

The  Manner  of  Raising  Troops  for  the  War  of  1812 297 

Secretary  Calhoun's  Reports,  1818-20 299 

Volunteers  and  Militia  for  the  Florida  War,  1835 301 

Calling  Out  Troops  for  the  Mexican  War,  1846 305 

The  Enormous  Levies  for  the  Civil  War,  1861-65 307 

Reduction  of  the  Army  after  the  Civil  War 311 

Report  of  the  Burnside  Committee  in  1878 312 

New  Methods  Adopted  for  Raising  Troops  in  the  War  with  Spain,  1898  315 

United  States  Volunteers  for  the  Philippines,  1899 319 

Secretary  Root's  Reports  and  Resulting  Legislation,  1901-03  ...  320 

Organization  and  Duties  of  the  General  Staff 325 

The  Militia  Act  of  1903 327 

The  Necessity  for  a  Definite  Military  Policy  to  Meet  Existing  Con 
ditions 331 

APPENDIX 337 

INDEX  343 


MAPS 

PACING  PAGH 

Lexington  and  Concord,  April  19,  1775 4 

Bunker  Hill,  June  17,  1775 6 

Boston,  July,  1775-March,  1776 12 

Invasion  of  Canada,  September,  1775-July,  1776 20 

Arnold's  March,  September  5-November  13,  1775       22 

Quebec,  December  31,  1775 24 

New  York,  April-November,  1776 28 

Long  Island,  August  27,  1776 36 

Harlem,  September-October,  1776 48 

White  Plains,  October  28,  1776 52 

Movements  of  Nathan  Hale,  September  10-22,  1776 52 

Fort  Washington,  November  16,  1776 56 

Retreat  through  New  Jersey,  November-December,  1776     ....  GO 

Trenton,  December  25,  1776 86 

Trenton  and  Princeton,  January  2-4,  1776 86 

Philadelphia,  August-December,  1777 76 

Fort  Washington,  November  16,  1776 80 

Danbury  Raid,  April  25-26,  1777 80 

Brandywine,  September  11,  1777 84 

Fort  Mercer,  October  22,  November  20,  and  Fort  Mifflin,  November 

15,  1777 84 

Germantown,  October  4,  1777 92 

Arnold's  Naval  Engagement,  October  11-13,  1776 96 

The  Hudson,  July-October,  1777 96 

Ticonderoga,  July  6,  1777 102 

Hubbardtown,  July  7,  1777 102 

Bennington,  August  16,  1777 102 

Freeman's  Farm,  September  19,  1777 116 

Bemis  Heights,  October  7,  1777 122 

Fort  Schuyler,  August  3-22,  1777 126 

xvii 


xviii  MAPS 

FACING  PAGE 

Forts  Montgomery  and  Clinton,  October  6,  1777 126 

Surrender  of  Burgoyne,  October  17,  1777 126 

Valley  Forge,  December  19,  1777-June  17,  1778 132 

Philadelphia  Evacuated,  June  18,  1778 132 

Barren  Hill,  May  20,  1778 146 

Monmouth,  June  27,  1778 146 

The  French  Alliance,  Movements  between  New  Jersey  and  Newport, 

1778-1781 150 

Springfield,  June  23,  1780 152 

Penobscot,  July  25,  1779 152 

New  London,  September  7,  1781 152 

Newport,  August  29,  1778 152 

Sullivan's  Indian  Campaign,  1778-1779 156 

Stony  Point,  July  16,  1779 158 

Tryon's  Raid,  July  5-8,  1779 158 

Arnold's  Treason.    Andre's  Capture,  September  20-25,  1780   ...  166 

Boston  to  Savannah,  1776-1781 186 

Sullivan's  Island  (Charleston),  June  29,  1776 186 

South  Carolina,  1779-1780 192 

Savannah,  October  9,  1779 - 202 

Charleston,  April  10-May  12,  1780 202 

King's  Mountain,  October  9,  1780 218 

Camden,  August  16,  1780 218 

Campaign  of  1781       226 

Retreat  to  the  Dan,  January-February,  1781 232 

Cowpens,  January  17,  1781 238 

Guilford,  March  15,  1781 238 

Hobkirk's  Hill  (Camden),  April  25,  1781 246 

Ninety-Six,  May  22-June  5,  1781 246 

Eutaw  Springs,  September  8,  1781 254 

Virginia,  1781 258 

Petersburg,  April  25,  1781 260 

Chesapeake,  September  5,  1781    .     .    „ 260 

Richmond,  January  6,  1781 260 

Yorktown,  September  30-October  19  1781 274 


AUTHORITIES 

A.— THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1.  Force's  "American  Archives,"  4th  series,  6  vols.;  5th  series,  3  vols., 

1774-76  (Amer.  Archives). 

2.  Journals  of  Congress,  edition  of  1823,  4  vols.,  1774-83  (Jour.  Cong.). 

3.  Journals  of  the  Continental   Congress,  edition  of   1906,    15  vols., 

1774-79  (Jour.  Cont.  Cong.). 

4.  Sparks 's  "Writings  of  Washington,"  12  vols.  (Sparks). 

5.  Sparks 's  "Letters  to  Washington,"  4  vols.  (Sparks,  Letters). 
These  44  volumes  correspond  in  some  measure  (though  much  less 

complete)  to  the  Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 
They  contain  the  greater  part  of  all  the  original  documents  that 
have  been  published  on  the  American  side,  except  such  as  have 
been  brought  out  in  memoirs  and  biographies  of  the  minor  char 
acters  of  the  Revolution. 

6.  Dawson's  "Battles  of  the  United  States,"  vol.  I  (Dawson). 

7.  Lossing's  "Field-Book  of  the  Revolution,"  2  vols.  (Lossing). 
Dawson  is  valuable  on  account  of  the  copious  references  he  makes 

to  original  documents.  Lossing  visited  every  battle-field  of  the 
Revolution  between  1847  and  1850. 

8.  E.  J.  Lowell's  "The  Hessians  in  the  Revolution"  (Lowell).     This  is 

founded  upon  original  German  authorities. 

9.  Eelking's  German  Allies  in  the  American  Revolution   (Eelking). 

10.  Heitman's  "Officers  of  the  Continental  Army"    (Heitman).     This 

contains  a  brief  account  of  every  regiment  and  every  officer  of 
the  Continental  army,  as  shown  by  the  records  of  the  War 
Department. 

11.  Frothingham's  "Siege  of  Boston"  (Frothingham). 

12.  H.   P.    Johnston's  "Campaign   of  1776   Around   New   York    and 

Brooklyn"  (Johnston,  1776). 

13.  H.  P.  Johnston's  "Battle  of  Harlem  Heights"  (Johnston,  Harlem). 

14.  H.  P.  Johnston's  "Stony  Point"  (Johnston,  Stony  Point). 

15.  H.  P.  Johnston's  "Yorktown  Campaign"  (Johnston,  Yorktown). 

16.  Stryker's  "Trenton  and  Princeton"  (Stryker). 

17.  Moore's  "Treason  of  Charles  Lee"  (Moore). 

18.  Keim's  "Rochambeau"   (Keim). 

19.  I.  N.  Arnold's  "March  to  Quebec"    (Arnold's  March). 

20.  I.  N.  Arnold's  "Benedict  Arnold"  (Arnold). 

21.  Kapp's  "Steuben"  (Kapp,  Steuben). 

22.  Kapp's  "Kalb"  (Kapp,  Kalb). 

23.  D.  Schenck's  "North  Carolina  1780-81"  (Schenck). 

These  nineteen  books  are  exhaustive  memoirs  which  contain  probably 
every  original  fact  and  figure  which  is  known  concerning  the  respec 
tive  events  of  which  they  treat. 

xix 


xx  AUTHORITIES 

24.  Howe's  "Narrative,  1781"  (Howe). 

25.  Burgoyne's  "Narrative,  1780"  (Burgoyne). 

26.  "Clinton-Cornwallis   Controversy,"   B.  F.   Stevens,   1888  (Clinton- 

Corn  wallis). 

27.  Tarleton's  "Campaigns  of  1780  and  1781"  (Tarleton). 

28.  Riedesel's  "Memoirs,"  2  vols.  (Riedesel). 

29.  Hansard's  "Parliamentary  History  of  England,"  vols.  XVII-XXIII, 

1775-83  (Hansard). 

These,  together  with  Force  and  Dawson,  are  the  chief  sources  of 
British  official  reports  and  maps.  Stevens's  compilation  of  the 
documents  relating  to  the  campaign  of  1781  is  unique. 

30.  Stedman's  "American  War,"  2  vols.,  1794  (Stedman). 

This  was  written  by  a  very  competent  officer  who  served  in  the 
British  army  from  Boston  to  Yorktown.  Its  maps  are  valuable 
as  historical  documents  although  inaccurate  as  to  topography. 

31.  Winsor's  "Reader's  Handbook  of  the  American  Revolution,"  1  vol., 

1879  (Winsor). 

In  this  full  bibliography  the  librarian  of  Harvard  University  gives 
a  chronological  list  of  the  events  of  the  Revolution  and,  as  to 
each  event,  a  reference  to  the  volume  and  chapter  of  every  book 
and  every  map  of  any  value  which  had  been  published  in  re 
lation  thereto.  He  properly  styles  it  "a  continuous  foot-note  to 
all  histories  of  the  American  Revolution." 

The  standard  histories — Gordon,  Ramsay,  Botta,  Hildreth,  Bancroft, 
Fiske,  Avery  and  (most  brilliant  and,  I  believe,  most  accurate 
of  them  all)  Trevelyan;  the  contemporary  journals  of  Moultrie 
Henry  Lee,  Thacher  and  Simcoe;  the  earlier  biographies — 
Sparks's  "American  Biographies,"  Marshall's  "Washington," 
Irving's  "Washington,"  Johnson's  "Greene,"  G.  W.  Greene's 
"  Greene,"  Drake's  "  Knox,"  Reed's  "  Reed,"  Bowen's  "  Lincoln, "  » 
Stark's  "  Stark";  all  these  are  well  known.  Probably  no  orieJiae- — ^ 
read  them  all;  certainly  I  have  not.  I  have,  however,  consulted 
each  of  them  as  to  their  opinions  on  certain  important  events. 
They  are  all  founded  on  the  original  documents  above  listed, 
or  on  personal  recollections,  but  are  not  in  themselves  original 
authorities.  In  addition  to  these  there  are,  of  course,  hundreds 
of  other  books  on  the  Revolution,  the  bibliography  of  which  is 
very  voluminous. 

B.— MILITARY  POLICY 

1.  Force's  "American  Archives,"  4th  series,  6  vols.;  5th  Series,  3  vols., 

1774-76  (Amer.  Archives). 

2.  "American  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,"  7  vols. 

These  stout  quartos,  16  volumes,  about  1600  pages  per  volume, 
18,000,000  words  in  all,  were  published  by  Peter  Force,  under 
authority  of  Congress,  in  the  years  1837  to  1853.  They  are  the 
chief  repository  of  facts  and  figures  relating  to  military  affairs 
from  1774  to  1830. 

3.  "Journals  of   Congress,"  edition  of  1823,  4  vols.,  1774-83  (Jour. 

Cong.). 


AUTHORITIES  xxi 

4.  "  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,"  edited  by  Worthington  C. 

Ford,  and  published  by  authority  of  Congress  in  the  years  1904 
to  1909.  They  number  15  volumes  and  contain  a  verbatim  copy, 
including  interlineations,  erasures  and  corrections,  of  the  original 
journals  in  the  archives  of  the  State  Department  for  the  years 
1774  to  1779.  The  copying  and  printing  of  the  journals  for  the 
succeeding  years  is  now  in  progress  (Jour.  Cont.  Cong.). 

5.  Sparks's  "Writings  of  Washington/'  12  vols.,  1858  (Sparks). 

6.  Sparks's  "Letters  to  Washington,"  4  vols.,  1853  (Sparks,  Letters). 

7.  "Military  Laws  of  the  United  States."  Compiled  by  J.  F.  Callan, 

1862  (Mil.  Laws). 

8.  "Military  Laws  of  the  United  States."    Prepared  by  Lt.-Col.  Geo. 

B.  Davis,  Dep'y  Judge  Advocate  General,  U.  S.  Army,  1897 
(Mil.  Laws,  1897). 

9.  "Military  Laws  of  the  United  States,"    4th  edition,  1901.     With 

supplement  to  March  4,  1907,  prepared  by  Major  John  B.  Por 
ter,  Judge  Advocate,  U.  S.  Army  (Mil.  Laws,  1907). 

10.  Henry  Adams's  "History  of  the  United  States,  1801-1817,"  9  vols., 

1890  (Adams). 

11.  Provost  Marshal  General's  Report.     War  of  the  Rebellion.     Official 

Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies  (War  Records). 
This  report  contains  complete  statistics  on  all  matters  relating  to 
the  recruiting  of  the  Northern  armies  and  the  enforcement  of  the 
Conscription  Laws  of  1863. 

12.  Reports  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions  (Com.  Pensions). 

13.  Upton.     "Military  Policy  of  the  United  States."    Written  in  1880. 

Published  (after  General  Upton's  death)  by  the  War  Department 
in  1904  (Upton). 

14.  Burnside  Committee  Senate  Report  555.    45th  Congress,  3d  Session, 

Dec.  12,  1878  (Burnside). 

15.  "Messages  of  the  Presidents."     Compiled  and  published  by  J.  D. 

Richardson,  9  vols.  (1898),  under  authority  of  Congress  (Mess. 
Presidents). 

16.  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States.     1878  (Rev.  Stat.). 

17.  Army  Registers.     1860  to  1910  (Army  Reg.). 

18.  Register  of  the  Graduates  of  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy  (Grad. 

U.  S.  M.  A.). 

19.  Cullum's  Biographical  Register  of  the  Graduates  of  the  U.  S.  Mili 

tary  Academy  (Cullum). 

20.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  1898  (Sec.  War). 

21.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army,  1898  (Adjt.-Gen.). 

22.  Reports  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (Chf.  Staff). 

23.  Reports  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  1899-1903,  reprinted  in  one  volume, 

1904  (Sec.  War) 


PART  I 
THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

"The  problem,  that  a  nation  can  be  defended  against  a  perma 
nent  force,  by  temporary  armies,  by  occasional  calls  of  the  hus 
bandman  from  his  plough  to  the  field,  was  completely  disproved; 
and,  in  demonstrating  its  fallacy,  the  independence  of  America  had 
nearly  perished  in  its  cradle." 

— JOHN  MARSHALL. 


CHAPTER  I 
BOSTON1 

THE  relations  between  England  and  her  American  coi-  1775 
onies,  which  had  been  growing  more  and  more  strained  concord  and 
during  the  twelve  years  following  the  close  of  the  French 
war  in  1763,  reached  a  crisis  on  an  April  morning  when  APni  19 
the  royal  troops  were  sent  out  from  Boston  to  destroy 
military  stores  at  Concord — and  incidentally  to  arrest 
Samuel  Adams  and  John  Hancock,  on  the  way,  at  Lex 
ington.  The  political  consequences  of  that  day  were  stu 
pendous.  In  a  military  sense  its  importance  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  grenadiers  and  light  infantry,  ex 
celled  by  none  in  the  British  army  for  training,  discipline 
and  military  experience,  after  killing  eight  farmers  on 
the  Lexington  Common,  met  such  a  sturdy  resistance 
from  the  rustic  militia  at  Concord  that  they  beat  a  hasty 
retreat  to  Boston;  and  on  the  way  back,  although  rein 
forced  by  a  brigade  of  regulars  under  command  of  the 
eldest  son  of  the  Duke  of  Northumberland,  were  so  sur 
rounded,  ambushed,  outflanked  and  assaulted  by  the 
hordes  of  gathering  militia,  that  they  barely  escaped 

1  The  story  of  Lexington  and  Concord  and  Bunker  Hill  has  been  told 
many  thousand  times  in  books  and  orations.  The  one  exhaustive  and  com 
plete  account,  vivid  in  narrative  and  replete  with  official  documents,  is  that 
given  in  The  Siege  of  Boston,  by  Richard  Froth ingham,  published  by 
Little  &  Brown  in  1849  and  reprinted  in  1903.  The  notes  and  references 
in  that  book  to  the  original  authorities  are  so  copious  that  a  general  ref 
erence  to  Frothingham  only  is  necessary  here.  The  original  authorities 
are  quoted  there  in  every  instance. 

3 


4  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1775  complete  capture,  and  left  73  killed,  174  wounded  and  26 
missing  on  the  road;  a  total  loss  equal  to  15  per  cent  of 
their  strength. 

Within  a  week  the  British  troops  were  shut  up  and 
besieged  in  Boston  by  a  force  of  nearly  20,000  "  minute- 
men" — that  portion  of  the  Massachusetts  militia,  one  in 
four;  who  were  designated  to  answer  any  call  at  a  minute's 
notice.  But  the  minute-men,  determined  as  they  were 
and  actuated  by  intense  patriotism,  came  and  went  ac 
cording  to  their  own  estimate  of  the  relative  importance 
of  their  agricultural  and  military  duties;  the  Massa 
chusetts  Congress  thereupon  began  the  formation  of  an 
"army,"  whose  strength  they  thought  should  be  30,000 
men,  of  which  their  own  colony  should  furnish  13,600. 
The  adjoining  colonies  were  asked  to  contribute  their 
quota,  and  New  Hampshire,  Connecticut  and  Rhode 
Island  promptly  responded.  The  troops  were  enlisted 
until  the  end  of  the  year,  were  organized  into  regi 
ments,  and  Artemas  Ward  was  appointed  general  and 
commander-in-chief. 

The  British  The  garrison  of  Boston,  which  remained  closely  be 
sieged  until  its  evacuation  nearly  a  year  later,  consisted 
at  this  time  of  eleven  infantry  regiments,  many  of  which 
became  famous  under  Wellington's  command  nearly  forty 
years  later,  some  artillery  and  a  few  marines  from  the 
squadron  of  several  men-of-war  then  lying  in  the  harbor 
under  command  of  Admiral  Graves.  It  numbered  about 
3,500  men,  organized  into  three  brigades,  under  Brigadiers 
Earl  Percy,  Pigott  and  Jones.  The  commander-in-chief 
was  Major-General  Thomas  Gage,  who  had  been  a  lieu 
tenant-colonel  under  Braddock,  had  served  through  the 
French  war  and  then  been  promoted  and  assigned  to 
command  all  the  troops  in  America.  He  had  visited 


LEXINGTON  AND  CONCORD 
April  19,  1775 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company,  Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States  and  Its  People 


BOSTON  5 

England  in  1773  and  returned  in  the  spring  of  1774  as        1775 
Governor  of  Massachusetts,  in  addition  to  his  military 
duties. 

Six  months  after  his  arrival  he  reported  to  the  Secretary 
for  the  Colonies  that  "if  the  misunderstandings  proceed 
to  the  last  extremity,  to  begin  with  an  army  of  20,000 
men  will  in  the  end  save  Great  Britain  both  blood  and 
treasure."  But  the  minister  considered  what  was  trans 
piring  in  Massachusetts  to  be  "the  acts  of  a  rude  rabble, 
without  plan,  without  concert,  without  conduct";1  and 
he  thought  a  smaller  force  quite  sufficient,  if  used  promptly 
and  vigorously.  Later,  however,  he  so  far  changed  his 
mind  as  to  send  out  three  major-generals,  Burgoyne, 
Howe  and  Clinton,  all  of  whom  had  had  military  experi 
ence  and  were  also  sitting  as  Members  of  Parliament. 
They  brought  with  them  several  additional  regiments,  May  25 
carrying  the  total  strength  of  the  garrison  to  about 
10,000  men. 


Gage  had  previously  thrown  up  some  earthworks  near  The 

_.  >T      .  i          •  i»       i          •  -T-.  o,  tion  at  Boston 

Boston  Neck,  on  the  site  of  what  is  now  Dover  Street, 
commanding  the  road  over  the  narrow  causeway  which 
connected  Boston,  then  almost  an  island,  with  the  main 
land.  As  soon  as  Ward's  regiments  began  to  arrive,  they 
also  undertook  the  construction  of  field-works,  covering 
all  the  roads  leading  to  the  west  and  south  of  Boston, 
and  designed  to  prevent  any  further  incursions  of  the 
British  troops  like  that  of  Concord.  These  works  were 
skilfully  located,  planned  and  constructed  under  the 
direction  of  Colonel  Richard  Gridley,  chief  engineer,  who 
was  now  sixty-four  years  old,  but  had  lost  none  of  the 
great  reputation  he  had  acquired  at  the  siege  of  Louis- 
burg,  thirty  years  before.  The  works  were  not  fully 

1  Sparks,  III,  506-507. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1775 


Lack  of 
Cannon 


April  29 


May8 


Capture  of 
Ticonderoga 
and  Crown 
Point 


completed  until  several  months  later,  but  ultimately 
they  comprised  nineteen  distinct  groups  of  redoubts  and 
trenches  covering  a  space  of  nearly  twelve  miles,  from  the 
Mystic  River  on  the  left  to  Dorchester  on  the  right;  the 
centre  was  at  Cambridge,  where  Ward  now  had  his  head 
quarters,  and  where  Joseph  Warren  directed  the  sessions 
of  the  Provincial  Congress  and  the  Committee  of  Safety. 
But  cannon  were  lacking  to  man  these  field-works. 
There  were  only  twenty-three  small  pieces  of  artillery  in 
the  colony.  Therefore  a  proposition  of  Captain  Benedict 
Arnold  was  eagerly  accepted.  He  had  arrived  at  Cam 
bridge  with  a  fine  company  from  New  Haven,  and  re 
ported  to  the  Committee  of  Safety  that  the  forts  at  the 
southern  end  of  Lake  Champlain  were  feebly  garrisoned 
and  in  bad  condition,  but  that  they  contained  more  than 
100  cannon  of  various  sizes  from  4-pounders  to  20- 
pounders.1  He  asked  permission  to  attack  and  capture 
these  forts.  The  committee  quickly  acceded,  made  him 
a  colonel,  authorized  him  to  raise  400  men  and  sent  him 
on  his  errand.  When  he  reached  the  vicinity  of  Lake 
Champlain  he  found  a  party  of  about  200  men,  "  Green 
Mountain  Boys,"  under  command  of  Colonel  Ethan 
Allen,  bent  on  the  same  mission,  by  permission  of  the 
Connecticut  Assembly.  Arnold's  men  had  not  arrived, 
so  he  joined  Allen  as  a  volunteer,  and  by  a  brilliant 
coup  they  captured  Ticonderoga  at  dawn  on  May  10, 
and  Crown  Point  two  days  later.  Arnold  made  a  care 
ful  return  of  the  ordnance  stores  and  the  cannon,  of 
which  there  were  197,  and  he  reported  87  of  them 
serviceable.2  Some  of  the  lighter  calibres  were  speedily 
sent  to  Cambridge,  according  to  Colonel  Gridley's  in 
structions,  but  the  larger  guns  had  to  wait  for  next 

1  Amer.  Archives,  4,  II,  450.  2  Ibid.,  4,  II,  646. 


Plan  of  the 
Redoubt  on  Breed's  Hill 

a-b-c-d    Flankn 
e  Bastion 


Plan  of  the  Fort  ereoiod  by  the 


British  on  liuiiker  Hill 


Note:  The  figures  indicate  paces  about 

3  feet  each 

The  Banquette  about  4ft.  wi 
The  Merlons  at  the  6  Gun  Battery 

raised  about  V2.  feet  high 
«  ,(  were  two  Magazines,  now  made 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


BUNKER  HILL 
June  17,  1775 


BOSTON  7 

winter's  snow  and  sledges  before  they  could  be  trans-        1775 
ported.    They  then  arrived  in  time  to  compel  the  evacu 
ation  of  Boston. 

While  these  fortifications  were  progressing,  Gage  issued  June  12 
an  insulting  proclamation,1  said  to  have  been  draughted 
by    Burgoyne,    and    the    Massachusetts   Committee   of 
Safety  responded   by  a   resolution1   that  Bunker  Hill,  June  is 
which  commanded  Boston  on  the  north,  ought  to  be 
occupied.    Gage  was  also  planning  to  occupy  this  hill, 
and  news  of  his  intention  had  reached  the  Colonial  army. 
Both  sides  were  eager  to  fight,  the  Americans  to  answer 
Gage's  proclamation  and  the  British  to  avenge  the  dis 
aster  at  Lexington.    A  bloody  battle  was  the  result. 

On  the  evening  of  June  16,  Colonel  Prescott  was  sent  Battle  of 
from  Cambridge  with  three  regiments  and  a  fatigue  party 
to  fortify  Bunker  Hill.  Either  through  mistake,  or  from 
a  desire  to  place  his  redoubt  as  near  Boston  as  possible, 
he  passed  over  Bunker  Hill  and  selected  Breed's  Hill. 
Colonel  Gridley,  chief  engineer,  laid  out  a  square  redoubt 
about  40  yards  on  a  side,  and  the  work  began  about  mid 
night.  Before  daylight  the  parapets  were  6  feet  high, 
with  banquettes  of  wood  and  earth  from  which  the  men 
could  fire.  A  breastwork  of  similar  height,  about  100 
yards  long,  extended  from  the  north-east  angle  of  the  re 
doubt  toward  the  Mystic  River.  The  site  of  the  redoubt 
is  that  on  which  Bunker  Hill  monument  now  stands. 

The  operations  had  been  conducted  so  quietly  that  case's  pian  of 
they  had  not  been  detected  by  the  British.    At  dawn, 
about  4  A.  M.,  the  redoubt  was  observed,  and  fire  was  June  17 
opened  on  it  by  one  of  the  men-of-war  and  by  the  battery 
on  Copp's  Hill,  in  Boston.    Gage  called  a  council  of  war, 
and  rejecting  the  advice  of  Clinton,  determined  to  assault 

1  Amer.  Archives,  4,  II,  968,  1354 


8  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1775  the  works  in  front,  instead  of  cutting  them  off  in  the  rear. 
The  assaulting  party  was  to  be  under  the  command  of 
General  Howe,  and  to  consist  of  the  grenadier  and  light 
infantry  companies  of  ten  regiments  supported  by  four 
full  regiments,  5th,  38th,  43d  and  52d.  The  47th  Regi 
ment  and  a  battalion  were  to  assemble  at  the  North  Bat 
tery  prepared  to  cross,  if  necessary.  While  the  troops 
were  crossing  the  river  and  forming  for  attack,  a  furious 
cannonade  was  to  be  opened  from  the  works  at  Boston 
Neck  in  the  hope  of  creating  a  diversion,  and  preventing 
reinforcements  being  sent  to  Bunker  Hill  from  Cam 
bridge. 

These  movements  were  all  made  as  planned.  About 
noon  the  troops  embarked  at  Long  Wharf  and  North  Bat 
tery,  and  were  rowed  to  Morton's  Point  and  landed  with 
out  opposition,  under  cover  of  the  guns  of  Copp's  Hill  and 
the  six  men-of-war,  which  at  a  range  of  800  to  1,000 
yards  swept  the  ground  on  all  sides  of  the  redoubt  but 
without  doing  much  damage.  About  2  o'clock  the  boats 
were  sent  back  to  North  Battery  and  there  embarked  the 
47th  and  the  marines,  landing  them,  however,  near  the 
present  navy-yard,  about  500  yards  to  the  left  of  Howe's 
main  body. 

Prescott  meanwhile  completed  the  work  on  his  forti 
fications  and  strengthened  a  rail-fence  and  hedge  extend 
ing  from  the  end  of  his  breastwork  to  the  shore  of  the 
Mystic,  with  a  re-entrant  angle  which  gave  cross-fire  in 
its  front.  He  also  asked  for  reinforcements,  and  Ward 
sent  him  two  additional  regiments  from  Cambridge,  and 
a  little  later  portions  of  several  other  regiments.  With 
them  came  as  volunteers  Generals  Putnam,  Pomeroy  and 
others  who  fought  with  muskets,  and  just  before  the  at 
tack  opened  Joseph  Warren,  President  of  the  Provincial 


BOSTON  9 

Congress,  the  active  spirit  of  the  Committee  of  Safety,        1775 
who  had  been  appointed  a  major-general  by  the  Provin 
cial  Congress  three  days  before,  also  arrived  and  took 
his  place  within  the  redoubt.    The  command,  however, 
remained   with   Colonel   Prescott,    a  most  gallant  and 
capable  soldier. 
Howe's  men  were  in  dress  uniform,  with  knapsacks,  Howe's 

.  .    .  Formation 

three  days  rations,  cartridge-box,  ammunition  and  mus-  for  Assault 
ket,  the  total  load  being  estimated  by  Stedman1  at  125 
pounds;  doubtless  it  weighed  less,  but  it  probably  seemed 
as  much  in  the  excessive  heat  of  the  cloudless  summer  day. 
Howe  leisurely  formed  his  command  in  three  lines  at  a 
distance  of  600  yards,  and  at  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
began  the  attack.  Personally  he  advanced  with  the  right 
wing  against  the  rail-fence,  while  Brigadier  Pigott  with 
the  left  wing  marched  against  the  breastwork.  The 
houses  in  Charlestown  were  set  on  fire  by  carcasses  from 
Copp's  Hill,  but  a  gentle  breeze  from  the  north  blew  the 
dense  smoke  to  one  side  so  that  it  did  not  conceal  the 
attacking  troops.  These  came  forward  in  fine  order,  the 
advance  being  covered  by  the  fire  of  their  artillery,  and 
the  infantry  occasionally  firing,  but  without  effect.  The 
Americans  were  restrained  by  their  officers  from  firing 
until  the  British  lines  were  within  forty  yards  from  the 
redoubt  on  one  side  and  the  rail-fence  on  the  other. 
Then  they  opened  fire,  deliberately,  with  careful  aim  and 
with  terrible  effect.  The  British  loss  was  enormous, 
particularly  among  the  officers,  who  led  their  men  with 
great  gallantry  and  at  this  short  range  could  easily  be 
distinguished.  The  line  hesitated,  recoiled  and  then 
turned  in  hasty  retreat  back  almost  to  the  point  whence 
it  had  started. 

1  Stedman,  I,  127. 


10 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1775 

Second  As 
sault 


Third  Assault 


American  Re 
treat 


Howe  reformed  his  men  and  led  them  forward  a  second 
time,  in  the  same  manner,  firing  as  they  advanced,  and 
stepping  over  the  bodies  of  those  who  had  fallen  in  the 
first  assault.  This  time  the  Americans  held  their  fire 
until  the  British  were  within  twenty  yards  (for  powder 
was  scarce  and  precious)  and  then  delivered  it  with  the 
same  fatal  effect.  The  British  stood  it  for  a  few  minutes, 
returning  the  fire  with  spirit,  but  the  losses  were  so  great 
that  they  were  again  compelled  to  retreat.  Clinton,  who 
had  been  observing  the  battle  from  Copp's  Hill,  now 
crossed  the  river  with  a  second  battalion  of  marines  and 
some  other  troops  and  aided  in  rallying  the  regiments  as 
they  retreated  to  the  beach. 

Howe  was  determined,  notwithstanding  his  enormous 
losses,  to  renew  the  assault,  and  in  spite  of  reluctance  on 
the  part  of  some  of  his  officers  and  men,  he  formed  them 
for  a  third  attack.  The  men  were  ordered  to  throw  off 
their  knapsacks,  to  move  forward  in  column,  reserve  their 
fire  and  rely  on  the  bayonet.  Again  in  person  Howe  led 
the  grenadiers  and  light  infantry  against  the  breastwork 
and  rail-fence  on  his  right,  while  Pigott  accompanied  by 
Clinton  assaulted  the  redoubt  on  his  left.  This  time  he 
succeeded.  The  Americans  had  fired  about  thirty  rounds 
in  the  two  preceding  assaults,  and  now  had  only  two 
rounds  left,  made  up  by  tearing  open  what  remained  of 
the  artillery  cartridges.  They  reserved  their  two  rounds 
to  the  last,  but  when  these  had  been  fired  they  were  help 
less,  for  they  had  no  bayonets.  The  British  came  over 
the  parapet  of  the  redoubt  from  three  sides  at  once,  there 
was  a  hand-to-hand  fight,  and  then  the  Americans  were 
forced  out  of  the  redoubt,  Warren  being  killed  just  after 
the  retreat  began.  It  continued  in  fairly  good  order, 
Putnam  covering  the  rear  with  his  Connecticut  regiment; 


BOSTON  11 

the  principal  losses  on  the  American  side  occurred  during  1775 
the  retreat  over  Bunker  Hill,  the  British  keeping  up  a 
vigorous  fire  to  which  the  Americans  could  not  reply  for 
lack  of  ammunition.  About  5  o'clock  the  British  halted 
their  pursuit  at  Charlestown  Neck,  and  the  battle  was 
over.  The  Americans  filed  into  their  lines  on  Prospect 
Hill  and  Winter  Hill,  expecting  to  be  attacked  there; 
but  Howe  decided  that  such  an  attack  would  be  unwise. 

In  the  eight  years  of  the  Revolution  there  was  no  bat-  Results  of  the 
tie  more  bloody,  none  more  important.  The  Americans, 
without  proper  organization,  equipment  or  supplies,  had 
fought  the  best  regular  troops  of  Europe,  and  had  re 
pulsed  them  until  their  ammunition  gave  out.  All  the 
advantages  of  victory  were  on  their  side,  and  they  were 
convinced  that  they  could  do  it  again  and  that  regular 
organization  was  not  necessary — a  conviction  which  they 
tenaciously  held  throughout  the  Revolution;  and  then 
transmitted  it  to  their  descendants,  who  have  believed 
in  it  almost  to  this  day.  On  the  British  side,  as  soon  as 
news  of  the  battle  reached  England,  Gage  was  recalled  in 
disgrace  and  disappears  from  history.  Howe,  who  had 
showed  the  greatest  personal  gallantry  and  exposed  him 
self  perhaps  unnecessarily,  was  said  to  have  been  com 
pletely  unnerved.  Of  the  eleven  officers  on  his  staff,  all 
were  wounded,  and  ten  died  of  their  wounds  within  a  few 
days  or  weeks.  The  memory  of  the  carnage  on  that  hot 
summer's  afternoon  never  left  him.  He  failed  to  press 
home  his  victory  at  Long  Island;  he  was  slow  in  pursuing 
Washington  through  New  Jersey;  he  was  cautious  and 
timid  in  his  manoeuvres  at  Middlebrook;  he  did  not  reap 
the  full  advantage  of  his  victories  at  Brandywine  and 
Germantown;  and  he  made  no  effort  to  attack  Wash 
ington  at  Valley  Forge.  While  his  personal  courage 


12  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1775  did  not  flinch,  he  lacked  moral  courage,  initiative  and 
vigor  throughout  the  two  years  in  which  he  exercised 
supreme  command  after  Gage's  departure. 

Gage's  report  says  that  he  sent  2,000  men  into  action 
and  that  his  losses  were  1,054,  or  53  per  cent.  Doubtless 
he  underestimated  the  number  engaged,  for  the  losses 
were  in  14  regiments  of  infantry,  1  of  artillery  and  2 
battalions  of  marines.  Their  numbers  could  hardly  have 
been  less  than  3,500.  There  were,  according  to  his  own 
report,  228  killed  and  826  wounded,  and  about  1  in  10 
were  officers.  On  the  American  side  all  or  parts  of  15 
regiments  were  engaged,  12  from  Massachusetts,  2  from 
New  Hampshire  and  1  from  Connecticut.  Their  numbers 
were  never  accurately  ascertained,  but  were  estimated  at 
from  1,500  to  5,000;  probably  there  were  about  3,500, 
the  same  as  the  British.  Their  losses  were  441:  140 
killed,  271  wounded  and  30  prisoners.  Five  out  of  six 
pieces  of  artillery  were  lost. 

Military  criti-  On  both  sides  there  is  ground  for  criticism  of  the  mili 
tary  movements.  In  the  unorganized  condition  of  the 
Massachusetts  army  it  was  most  unwise  to  bring  on  a 
general  engagement;  the  British  were  shut  up  in  Boston, 
and  every  road  leading  into  the  country  was  well  guarded 
and  fortified.  The  proper  course  to  pursue  was  that  fol 
lowed  by  Washington  after  he  arrived,  viz.,  to  await 
attack  within  their  lines.  In  such  an  attack  all  the 
advantages  would  have  been  on  the  American  side. 

On  the  other  hand,  Gage's  plan  of  attack  was  most 
faulty.  He  had  the  co-operation  of  the  navy,  with  7 
vessels  and  200  guns.1  The  Mystic  and  Charles  Rivers 
were  navigable  for  these  ships,  and  they  enveloped  the 
Charlestown  peninsula,  which  was  then  connected  with 

1  Stedman,  I,  123. 


BOSTON  13 

the  main-land  by  a  narrow  causeway.  Had  Gage  landed  1775 
his  troops  near  this  causeway,  in  Prescott's  rear  and  under 
the  protection  of  the  fleet  with  such  a  vast  preponderance 
of  artillery,  the  capture  or  annihilation  of  the  American 
force  would  seem  to  have  been  inevitable.  In  place  of 
that  he  decided  on  an  open  assault,  the  first  in  a  long  list 
in  our  history  of  direct  assaults  over  an  open  country 
against  field  intrenchments.  Some  of  these  assaults  have 
succeeded,  but  the  most  have  failed.  In  this  case  it  was 
unjustifiable  because  unnecessary — other  and  better  plans 
being  available. 

Both  sides  were,  in  fact,  spoiling  for  a  square  stand-up 
fight,  and  this  overruled  all  other  considerations.  Like 
Bull  Run,  eighty-six  years  later,  Bunker  Hill  cleared  the 
air,  and  showed  to  all  concerned  that  there  was  a  desper 
ate  struggle  ahead.  The  Americans,  more  than  ever — if 
that  were  possible — conscious  of  the  justice  of  their  cause, 
were  now  confident  of  their  ability  to  win  it.  And  the 
British  were  equally  amazed  and  depressed  by  the  obsti 
nate  and  masterful  resistance  which  they  had  encountered. 

While  these  events  were  in  progress  at  Boston,  the  congress 
Continental  Congress,  in  session  at  Philadelphia,   was  control, 
arranging  to  assume  control  of  the  contest  on  behalf  of  all 
the  colonies.    It  took  over  the  armies  of  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut,  New  Hampshire  and  Rhode  Island,  assem 
bled  at  Boston,  as  the  "Army  of  the  United  Colonies/' 
appointed  Washington  its  commander-in-chief,  adopted 
rules  and  regulations  for  its  government  (the  first  edition  June  15 
of  the  Articles  of  War),  called  upon  the  other  colonies  to 
raise  reinforcements  for  the  army,  adopted  measures  for 
the  manufacture  of  saltpetre  and  gunpowder  and  the 
casting  of  cannon,  appointed  a  Board  of  War,  authorized 


14 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1775 


Appointment 
of  General 
Officers 


The  Major- 
Generals. 


the  raising  of  $2,000,000  by  bills  of  credit  and  took  other 
steps  to  carry  on  the  contest,  including  the  appointment 
of  four  major-generals  and  eight  brigadiers.1 

The  selection  of  Washington  was  due  in  part  to  the 
reputation  he  had  gained  in  his  service  under  Braddock, 
but  perhaps  even  more  to  the  fact  that  he  was  the 
most  influential  man  in  Virginia.  His  appointment  was 
brought  about  by  John  Adams2  in  the  hope  that  it  would 
bring  Virginia  and  other  Southern  colonies  to  the  aid 
of  New  England.  No  one  could  then  foresee  that  in 
the  next  few  years  Washington  would  display  those  pre 
eminent  qualities  as  soldier,  leader  and  statesman  which 
have  made  him  immortal. 

The  major-generals  were  Artemas  Ward,  Charles  Lee, 
Philip  Schuyler  and  Israel  Putnam.  Ward  was  selected 
out  of  deference  to  Massachusetts,  whose  troops  he  com 
manded;  he  remained  through  the  siege  of  Boston  and 
then  resigned.  Lee  was  supposed  to  be  an  accomplished 
soldier  of  large  experience,  but  proved  to  be  an  advent 
urer,  a  charlatan  and  a  traitor.  Schuyler  was  one  of  the 
most  prominent  men  in  New  York,  had  served  with  credit 
in  the  Indian  wars,  and  was  a  capable  soldier,  ultimately 
forced  out  of  the  army  by  the  intrigues  of  Gates.  Putnam 
had  served  at  Ticonderoga  and  Montreal  and  Havana, 
and  had  a  great  reputation  for  intrepid  daring  as  well  as 
for  his  popular  manners.  Although  at  the  time  of  his 
appointment  he  only  commanded  a  regiment,  he  held  a 
commission  as  brigadier-general  from  Connecticut. 

The  brigadiers  were  Seth  Pomeroy,  William  Heath  and 
John  Thomas,  of  Massachusetts;  Richard  Montgomery, 
of  New  York;  John  Sullivan,  of  New  Hampshire;  David 


1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  II,  91,  93,  99. 

*  Morse's  Life  of  John  Adams,  92,  100;  Sparks,  III,  479-480. 


BOSTON  15 

Wooster  and  Joseph  Spencer,  of  Connecticut;  and  Na-  1775 
thanael  Greene,  of  Rhode  Island.  Geographical  and  po-  The 
litical,  as  well  as  military  considerations,  controlled  these 
selections.  The  youngest  of  them,  Greene,  then  thirty- 
three  years  old,  was  without  military  experience,  but  was 
destined  to  become  the  most  famous  soldier,  after  Wash 
ington,  of  the  Revolution.  He  was  at  Boston  in  com 
mand  of  the  Rhode  Island  "army"  of  three  regiments. 
Pomeroy,  Wooster  and  Spencer  were  between  sixty  and 
seventy  years  old,  veterans  of  former  wars.  Pomeroy 
declined  his  appointment,  being  dissatisfied  that  Putnam 
should  be  chosen  over  his  head  to  be  a  major-general;  but 
a  year  later  he  went  out  with  the  militia  to  the  Hudson 
River,  and  died  there  of  sickness  contracted  in  camp. 
Wooster  served  for  a  while  in  Canada,  but  was  considered 
inactive  and  inefficient,  and  resigned.  He  also  went  out 
with  the  militia  in  the  following  year,  and  was  mortally 
wounded  in  a  skirmish  near  Danbury,  Conn.  Spencer's 
service  was  inconspicuous,  and  he  resigned  in  the  spring  of 
1778  to  go  to  Congress.  Thomas  was  also  a  veteran.  He 
rendered  good  service  at  Boston,  and  after  Montgomery's 
death  was  sent  to  command  the  troops  in  Canada,  and 
died  there  in  1776.  Montgomery,  Sullivan  and  Heath 
were  all  under  forty  years  of  age  when  they  received  their 
appointments.  Montgomery  had  been  an  officer  in  the 
British  army,  had  fought  under  Wolfe,  and  had  resigned 
and  emigrated  to  America  three  years  before.  He  was  a 
splendid  soldier,  and  his  death,  in  the  assault  on  Quebec, 
in  the  first  year  of  the  war,  was  a  great  loss.  Sullivan  and 
Heath  were  too  young  to  have  served  in  the  previous 
wars,  and  had  no  military  experience  when  appointed. 
But  they  soon  learned  their  trade,  and  rendered  good 
service  throughout  the  war. 


16 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1775 

The  Adjutant- 
General. 


The  Quarter 
master-Gen 
eral. 


Arrival  of 
Washington, 
July  10 


At  the  same  time  that  these  appointments  were  made, 
Horatio  Gates,  of  Virginia,  was  appointed  adjutant- 
general.  He  also  had  been  an  officer  in  the  British  army, 
had  served  with  Braddock,  and  on  the  conclusion  of  the 
last  war  had  settled  in  Virginia.  He  intrigued  Schuyler 
out  of  his  command,  received  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne 
after  Arnold  had  done  all  the  hard  work,  tried  without 
success  to  displace  Washington,  made  a  complete  failure 
of  his  Southern  campaign  and  then  disappeared  from 
public  life.  Mifflin,  of  Pennsylvania,  who  accompanied 
Washington  to  Cambridge,  was  made  quartermaster- 
general.  He  was  thirty-one  years  old,  a  merchant  in 
Philadelphia,  and  successful  in  politics,  both  before  and 
after  the  Revolution.  But  he  was  not  a  soldier,  was  a 
failure  as  quartermaster-general  and  joined  Gates  in  his 
intrigues  against  Washington. 

On  the  whole,  remembering  that  the  Colonies  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Revolution  had  no  military  organiza 
tion,  these  first  appointments  to  the  chief  places  in  the 
army  were  very  judicious.  Excepting  Lee,  who  had  no 
standing  except  such  as  was  created  by  his  own  gascon 
ade,  all  were  men  of  importance  in  their  respective  com 
munities,  and  eleven  of  the  fifteen  had  been  in  active 
campaigns  as  regulars  or  volunteers.  Two  of  them — the 
commander-in-chief  and  the  youngest  brigadier — were 
destined  to  place  their  names  forever  in  the  list  of  great 
soldiers;  and  it  is  pleasing  to  remember  that  from  the 
day  they  first  met  at  Boston  there  was  never  jealousy, 
discord  or  ill  feeling  between  them,  but  always  loyalty, 
friendship  and  sympathy,  growing  ever  stronger  and 
firmer  until  the  death  of  Greene  eleven  years  later. 

Washington  arrived  at  Cambridge  on  July  3,  inspected 
the  troops,  examined  the  lines  and  made  his  report  to 


BOSTON  17 

Congress.  The  army  numbered  20,242  officers  and  men,  1775 
of  whom  17,215  were  present  for  duty.  There  were  35  The  conti 
regiments,  of  which  26  were  from  Massachusetts  and  3 
from  each  of  the  other  New  England  colonies.  These 
men  knew  how  to  shoot,  from  long  practice,  but  they  had 
no  other  military  knowledge;  they  were  of  high  character, 
intensely  patriotic,  fiercely  independent  and  extremely 
impatient  of  the  restraints  of  discipline.  Their  terms  of 
enlistment  would  all  expire  within  six  months.  Powder 
was  extremely  scarce,  there  were  only  a  few  pieces  of 
artillery,  there  was  no  cavalry  and  hardly  any  organized 
supply  departments.  The  fortified  lines,  previously  de 
scribed,  were  only  partially  constructed. 

For  the  next  eight  months  Washington's  task  was  to 
organize  this  army;  to  replace  it,  within  cannon-shot  of 
the  enemy,  by  another  army,  when  the  enlistments  ex 
pired  at  the  end  of  the  year;  to  extend  and  complete  his 
fortifications;   to  be  prepared  at  every  moment  to  repel 
an  attack  by  the  British  should  Howe  decide,  as  every 
one  supposed  he  would,  to  venture  forth  from  Boston. 
Public  opinion,  ignorant  of  the  difficulties  with  which 
he  was  surrounded,  demanded  that  Washington  attack 
Boston;    and  he  himself  shared  the  longing  to  do  so. 
Four  times  Washington  called  his  generals,  Ward,  Lee,  sept,  n 
Putnam,  Thomas,  Heath,  Sullivan,  Spencer,  Greene  and  Oct.  is 
Gates,  in  council  of  war,  and  submitted  the  question 
whether  Boston  should  be  attacked,  and  each  time  in        1776 
such  a  manner  as  to  suggest  an  affirmative  answer.    But  Jan.  ie 
each  time  they  advised,  unanimously,  against  it.    There  Feb.  IG 
can  be  no  question  that  their  advice  was  judicious. 

Finally,  however,  in  March — when  Washington  had  en 
listed  and  organized  a  new  army,  and  had  procured  the 
temporary  services  of  ten  regiments  of  militia;  when 


18  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  Knox  had  dragged  the  heavy  cannon  through  the  snow 
from  Ticonderoga;  when  the  privateers  had  captured  an 
abundance  of  powder  from  the  incoming  British  supply 
ships;  when  the  fortifications  were  completed  so  as  to 
furnish  rallying-points  in  case  of  defeat — the  tune  for 
taking  the  offensive  under  favorable  conditions  had 
arrived,  and  Washington  eagerly  seized  the  opportunity. 
His  plan  was  to  send  Thomas  with  2,000  men,  supplied 
with  intrenching  tools,  fascines,  etc.,  from  the  Roxbury 
lines  to  seize  and  fortify  Dorchester  Heights — what  is  now 
seizure  of  called  Telegraph  Hill,  in  Thomas  Park,  South  Boston. 
Heirghtess  el  These  heights,  at  an  elevation  of  about  ninety  feet,  com 
manded  the  channel  and  the  south-eastern  side  of  Boston. 
If  occupied,  with  the  large  guns  from  Ticonderoga,  they 
made  Boston  and  its  connections  with  the  sea  untenable. 
Howe  knew  this,  and  had  long  contemplated  an  attempt 
to  seize  these  heights.  That  he  did  not  venture  during 
all  the  long  months  of  the  siege  to  put  his  thought  into 
execution  shows  the  paralysis  which  had  been  inflicted 
upon  him  and  his  troops  by  the  losses  at  Bunker  Hill. 
The  movement  was  carried  out  exactly  as  planned.  For 
March  2  two  nights  the  batteries  at  Cobble  Hill,  Lechmere's  Point 
March  3  and  Roxbury  kept  up  a  furious  cannonade  against  the 
March  4  British  lines,  and  on  the  third  night,  about  8  o'clock, 
Thomas  moved  out,  occupied  the  Dorchester  Heights,  and 
under  protection  of  advanced  guards  sent  out  toward 
Nook's  Hill  and  Dorchester  Point  to  protect  him  against 
possible  attack  from  Boston  or  Castle  Island,  his  men 
under  Gridley's  direction  dug  up  the  frozen  ground,  and 
before  daylight  had  finished  two  very  substantial  redoubts. 
Howe  was  amazed.  He  wrote  to  Lord  Dartmouth  that 
it  must  have  required  the  work  of  12,000  men  (the  fatigue 
party  in  fact  numbered  800),  and  is  said  to  have  remarked 


BOSTON  19 

that  his  whole  army  could  not  have  done  as  much  in  a        me 
month.    But  the  forts  were  there,  and  his  only  alterna 


tive  was  to  attack  and  capture  them  or  to  evacuate  British 

Boston.    He  immediately  decided  on  the  former,  and  as-  Attack11 

sembled  2,400  men,  under  Earl  Percy,  to  embark  in  trans 

ports,  rendezvous  near  Castle  Island,  and  the  next  night 

attack  the  Dorchester  Heights  from  the  east.    His  prep 

arations   were  plainly  visible   from  the   heights  where 

Washington  had  gone  in  person.    To  meet  them  Wash 

ington  ordered  a  reinforcement  of  2,000  men  for  Thomas, 

and  simultaneously  assembled  2  brigades  at  Cambridge, 

about  2,000  men  each,  carefully  selected,  under  Sullivan 

and  Greene,  and  ordered  them  to  embark  in  boats  which 

had  been  previously  collected  in  the  Charles  River,  cross 

the  back  bay,  force  their  way  through  Boston  to  the  works 

at  Boston  Neck,  which  were  too  strong  to  be  assaulted  in 

front,  attack  them  from  the  rear,  open  the  gates  and  let 

in  the  troops  from  Roxbury.    But  a  furious  gale  came 

up  during  the  afternoon  and  continued  through  the  night 

and  the  next  day,  so  that  neither  plan  could  be  carried  March  5 

out,  and  Percy's  troops  returned  to  Boston.    Howe  then  Evacuation  of 

decided  to  evacuate  the  town.    Ten  days  elapsed,  how 

ever,   before  the  embarkation  was  complete.    In  the 

meantime,  Washington  kept  up  an  almost  constant  can 

nonade  from  all  his  batteries,  strengthened  his  works  on 

Dorchester  Heights,  and  after  several  unsuccessful  at-  March  is 

tempts,  finally  succeeded  in  building  batteries  on  the 

north-eastern  side  of  the  Dorchester  peninsula,  and  also 

on  Nook's  Hill,  nearly  a  mile  nearer  to  Boston  than  Dor 

chester  Heights.    The  next  morning  Howe  completed  his  March  17 

embarkation,  and  accompanied  by  the  men-of-war  his 

transports  dropped  down  to  Nantasket  Roads,  and  a 

few  days  later  sailed  for  Halifax.    Washington's  troops 


20  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776        entered  Boston  by  Charlestown  Neck  and  Boston  Neck 
within  a  few  hours  after  Howe  had  embarked. 

Howe  took  away  with  him  about  11,000  soldiers  and 
seamen  and  1,000  loyalist  refugees.  He  left  behind  a 
prodigious  amount  of  supplies  and  military  stores  of  all 
kinds,  in  excellent  condition  and  most  welcome  to  Wash 
ington's  straitened  army;  he  threw  most  of  his  powder 
into  the  bay,  and  he  abandoned  159  cannon,  most  of 
which  had  been  rendered  useless  by  spiking  or  breaking 
the  trunnions.  Washington's  force,  as  shown  by  his 
morning  report  of  March  9,  numbered  1,254  officers  and 
15,767  men  present  for  duty  in  the  infantry  regiments, 
640  in  the  artillery  and  6,838  in  the  Massachusetts  mili 
tia.  He  returned  the  militia  to  their  homes  and  ordered 
five  regiments  to  march  for  New  York  the  day  after  he 
entered  Boston.  The  rest  of  the  army,  except  five  regi 
ments  left  as  a  garrison  under  General  Ward,  followed  as 
soon  as  the  British  fleet  left  Nantasket  Roads.  Wash- 
April  4  ington  himself  started  for  the  same  point  in  less  than 

three  weeks  after  the  evacuation. 

Results  of  The  first  year  of  the  war  (less  one  month)  had  thus 

the  war  terminated.  It  had  the  same  characteristics  as  the  suc 
ceeding  years.  On  the  one  side  were  the  best  regular 
troops  of  Europe,  commanded  and  led  by  generals  of 
wide  experience  and  personal  courage,  but  of  not  more 
than  average  ability,  well  equipped  and  supplied  from 
the  ample  resources  of  a  wealthy  nation,  whose  animat 
ing  motives  were  a  sense  of  duty,  allegiance  to  the  king 
and  contempt  for  what  they  called  the  rustic  rabble 
which  had  broken  out  in  rebellion.  On  the  other  side 
was  an  irregular  force,  enlisted  for  a  short  period  and 
constantly  changing,  without  military  training  or  dis 
cipline,  without  arsenals,  factories  or  depots  of  supplies, 


7.1"  \ 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company,  Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 
From  Avery's  History  of  The  United  States  and  Its  People 


INVASION  OF  CANADA 
Sept.,  i775-July>  1776 


BOSTON  21 

and  without  money  or  financial  credit;  but  animated 
with  a  fiery  passion  for  liberty,  a  profound  belief  in  the 
righteousness  of  their  cause  and  a  firm  determination  to 
redress  their  grievances  at  any  sacrifice;  commanded  by 
a  soldier  and  statesman  of  lofty  character,  inflexible  in 
purpose  yet  diplomatic  in  argument  and  free  from  any 
thing  like  intolerance,  with  varied  military  experience 
and  military  instincts  and  ability  of  the  highest  order, 
capable  of  pursuing  a  Fabian  policy  with  infinite  patience 
so  long  as  conditions  imposed  it,  and  then  striking  with 
extraordinary  rapidity  and  sagacity  when  the  conditions 
were  favorable  for  the  offensive;  gaming  and  holding  the 
confidence  of  his  followers  in  an  almost  unrivalled  degree. 
What  one  side  lacked,  the  other  possessed.  The  odds 
were  about  even,  and  the  contest  was  not  unequal.  It 
took  eight  long  years  to  decide  it,  of  which  nearly  seven 
were  filled  with  active  hostilities. 


The  operations  at  Boston  were  not  the  only  military 
events  of  the  first  year.    A  daring  offensive  campaign 
had  been  carried  on  in  Canada.    Benedict  Arnold,  whose 
career  ended  in  infamy  but  whose  military  ability,  en 
ergy  and  reckless  daring  cannot  be  denied,  had  written        1775 
from  Ticonderoga  to  the  Continental  Congress,1  suggesting  May  23 
an  invasion  of  Canada;  to  which  Congress  responded  by 
requesting  Governor  Trumbull,  of  Connecticut,  to  appoint 
"a  person  in  whom  he  can  confide"2  to  command  at 
Ticonderoga,  and  by  passing  a  resolution  that  no  expedi- 

1  In  J.  N.  Arnold's  Life  of  Benedict  Arnold  and  in  Justin  H.  Smith's 
Arnold's  March  to  Quebec  there  are  voluminous  references  to  and  ex 
tracts  from  journals  and  other  original  documents;  so  that  no  reference  is 
necessary  for  the  next  six  pages  further  than  to  say  that  the  statements  of 
facts  herein  made  are  founded  on  those  documents. 

2  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  II,  74. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1775  tion  ought  to  be  made  into  Canada.  But  shortly  Con 
gress  changed  its  mind  in  consequence  of  news  that  the 
tory  governor  of  New  York  was  trying  to  engage  the  Ind 
ians  in  the  Mohawk  Valley  to  attack  the  posts  on  Lake 
Champlain.  Congress  thereupon  appointed  Schuyler  to 

June  27  command  the  Northern  army,1  to  take  personal  com 
mand  at  Ticonderoga  and  to  invade  Canada,  if  practicable 
"and  not  disagreeable  to  the  Canadians."  Schuyler  pro- 

juiy  is  ceeded  to  Ticonderoga.  His  own  colony  was  dilatory  in 
raising  troops,  but  he  found  there  1,352  men,  mostly 
from  Connecticut,  under  command  of  Colonel  Hinman. 
They  were  as  deficient  in  every  military  requirement  as 
those  at  Cambridge.  But  Schuyler  began  immediately 
the  construction  of  boats  and  advised  Washington  of  his 

July  si  intention  to  cross  the  lake  and  invade  Canada.    Mont- 

Aug.  n  gomery  reported  to  him  as  second  in  command,  and  by 
the  end  of  August  the  expedition  was  ready  to  start. 

Arnold's  pian  Meanwhile  Arnold  had  returned  to  Cambridge  and  had 
laid  before  Washington  a  plan  to  invade  Canada  by  way. 
of  the  Maine  wilderness  and  capture  Quebec  by  surprise. 
It  was  a  most  daring — almost  foolhardy — project.  Yet 
it  came  astonishingly  near  to  success.  Arnold  had  learned 
that  in  all  Canada  there  was  only  one  regiment,  and 
the  greater  part  of  this  was  with  Governor  Carleton  at 
or  near  Montreal.  Quebec  was  entirely  undefended. 
Washington  carefully  considered  the  project,  and  finally 
adopted  it  and  gave  detailed  instructions  for  the  conduct 

sept.  5  of  it.2    A  detachment  was  made  up  for  Arnold  of  1,050 

men,  infantry  from  New  England  and  riflemen  from 
Pennsylvania  and  Virginia,  all  selected  for  their  knowl 
edge  of  woodcraft,  and  none  ordered  except  those  who 
had  volunteered.  Among  the  officers  were  Christopher 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  II,  109.  2  Dawson,   113-115. 


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Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


ARNOLD'S  MARCH 
Sept.  5-Nov.  13,  1775 


BOSTON  23 

Greene,  Daniel  Morgan,  Aaron  Burr  and  Henry  Dearborn.        1775 
The  expedition  marched  from  Cambridge  to  Newbury-  sept,  n 
port,  there  embarked  in  ten  small  transports,  sailed  to 
the  Kennebec  and  up  that  river  almost  to  Bath,  disem 
barked  and,  provided  with  200  boats  for  the  portages, 
plunged  into  the  wilderness. 

At  that  date  Schuyler  was  confined  to  his  bed  in  Ticon-  sept.  25 
deroga  with  a  bilious  fever,  but  the  expedition  under 
Montgomery,  about  1,200  men  and  four  12-pounders,  had 
crossed  Lake  Champlain,  descended  the  Sorel  (or  Richelieu) 
River  and  laid  siege  to  St.  John,  a  fortified  town  garrisoned  sept,  i 
by  a  portion  of  the  26th  Regiment  under  Major  Preston.1 
While  the  siege  was  in  progress  Montgomery  was  rein 
forced  by  several  hundred  men  from  New  Hampshire  and 
New  York  and  by  a  battalion  of  Canadian  patriots  under 
command  of  his  wife's  kinsman,  Colonel  James  Living 
ston.    Ethan  Allen  with  a  small  force  was  sent  to  gain 
recruits  in  Canada,  and  while  so  engaged  undertook  to 
capture  Montreal.    In  the  skirmish  which  resulted,  Allen 
and  about  half  his  party  were  taken  prisoners,  and  Allen  sept.  25 
himself  put  in  irons  and  sent  to  England.    A  little  later 
another  expedition  was  sent  out  which  captured  Fort  Oct.  is 
Chambly,  lower  down  on  the  Sorel,  with  its  garrison  of 
168  men;  among  the  spoils  were  six  tons  of  powder,  the 
most  valuable  commodity  on  the  continent.    A  few  weeks 
later  St.  John  surrendered,  with  400  regulars  and  100  NOV.  3 
Canadians.     Montgomery   immediately   pressed   on   to  capture  of 
Montreal,  which  was  without  defence,  and  was  surren 
dered  by  a  committee  of  its  citizens;  Carleton  escaping  NOV.  12 
in  a  small  boat  on  the  St.  Lawrence  to  Quebec. 

On  the  day  that  St.  John  surrendered  Arnold  was  about 

1  See  Operations  in  Canada.  Appendix  to  Sparks's  Letters,  I,  460-549. 
This  contains  the  official  reports  and  correspondence  of  Schuyler,  Arnold, 
Montgomery,  Wooster,  Sullivan  and  Gates. 


24  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1775        30  miles   from   Quebec,   after  a  march   of    incredible 
Arnold's          hardships  and  hunger  through  200  miles  of  what  is  still 
the  wilderness  a  mountain  wilderness,  the  best  hunting  ground  for  big 
game  east  of  the  Rocky  Mountains.    He  had  sent  a 
Oct.  13  letter  to  Schuyler  by  an  Indian,  but  the  letter  was  given 

to  Governor  Carleton,  who  thus  first  learned  of  Arnold's 
approach,  and  immediately  began  to  remove  all  the 
boats  in  the  river  so  as  to  prevent  Arnold's  crossing.  But 
NOV.  10  Arnold  pushed  on  and  when  he  arrived  at  the  river  he 
collected  canoes  and  dugouts,  and  although  delayed  three 
days  by  a  severe  gale  and  by  the  presence  of  a  frigate 
and  a  sloop  of  war,  he  succeeded  in  crossing  on  the  fourth 
NOV.  13  night;  and  landing  at  the  same  place  where  Wolfe  had 
landed  sixteen  years  before,  he  climbed  the  cliffs  to  the 
Plains  of  Abraham  and  marched  toward  the  western 
gates  of  the  city.  He  had  about  650  half-naked  men, 


Quebec  the  rest  having  perished  in  the  wilderness;  and  they  had 

barely  400  unbroken  muskets  between  them,  and  five 
rounds  of  ammunition.  Arnold  promptly  demanded  the 
surrender  of  the  city;  but  he  was  in  no  condition  to 
enforce  his  demand,  for  the  place  was  strongly  fortified, 
had  an  abundance  of  heavy  guns  and  was  garrisoned  by 
about  1,900  men,  regulars,  irregulars  and  seamen,  who 
had  within  ten  days  been  gathered  for  its  defence.  Had 
Arnold  arrived  two  weeks  earlier,  or  had  his  letter  to 
Schuyler  not  been  delivered  to  Carleton,  it  is  quite  pos 
sible  he  would  have  surprised  and  captured  the  place. 
Situated  as  he  was,  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  fall  back 

NOV.  19  about  twenty  miles,  up  the  river,  to  Point  aux  Trembles, 
and  await  the  arrival  of  Montgomery,  to  whom  he  had 
already  written. 

When  Montgomery  received  his  letter  he  made  instant 
preparation  to  march  to  his  assistance.    After  leaving 


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detachments  at  St.  John  and  Montreal,  and  sending  home        1775 

men  whose  enlistments  had  expired,  he  could  only  take 

300  men  with  him,  but  with  these  he  set  out  in  transports  NOV.  24 

which  he  had  captured  at  Montreal,  and  made  his  way  Dec.  3 

down  the  river,  joining  Arnold  at  Point  aux  Trembles,  Montgomery 

and  handing  over  for  his  ragged  and  half-clothed  men 

a  year's  supply  of  clothing  which  he  had  found  in  the 

military  depots  at   Montreal.    Their  combined  forces 

numbered  less  than  1,000  men,  but  they  forthwith  laid 

siege  to  Quebec.    The  Canadian  winter  was  already  upon 

them,  and  in  a  few  weeks  the  enlistment  of  most  of  their 

men  would  expire.    They  were  more  than  300  miles  from 

their  own  base  of  supplies.    Their  only  chance  was  in 

a  vigorous   assault.    Montgomery's   plan  was  to  send 

Livingston's  Canadian  battalion  to  make  a  feint  on  the 

upper  town  while  the  main  assaults  were  to  be  made  on 

the  lower  town  by  Arnold  and  himself;  he  following  the 

road  under  the  cliff  from  Wolfe's  Cove  to  Cape  Diamond, 

and  Arnold  coming  by  the  St.  Roque  road  from  the 

opposite  direction.    If  they  gained   possession  of  the 

lower  town  with  all  its  magazines,  they  hoped  to  induce 

Carleton  to  surrender  the  upper  town  without  further 

resistance. 

The  troops  moved  out  at  2  o'clock  on  a  winter  morn-  Dec.  31 
ing,  the  weather  intensely  cold  and  a  driving  snow-storm 
in  their  faces.    On  reaching  Cape  Diamond,  Montgomery 
at  the  head  of  sixty  men  attempted  to  carry  a  stockade 
with  a  rush.    He  was  instantly  killed,  together  with  his  Assault  on 
aide  and  ten  others;   the  rest  of  his  party  fled.    Arnold 
reached  the  Palace  Gate,  on  the  other  side  of  the  town, 
just  before  daybreak.    He,  too,  led  the  storming  party, 
and  fell  at  the  first  fire,  severely  wounded  in  the  leg. 
Had  the  wound  only  been  mortal,  his  name  would  have 


26 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1775  gone  down  in  history  side  by  side  with  that  of  Wolfe 
and  Montgomery,  instead  of  being  forever  the  synonym 
of  treason.    Morgan,  with  the  main  body,  was  close 
behind  Arnold,  but  in  the  narrow,  crooked  streets  his 
retreat  was  cut  off  and  he  was  compelled  to  surrender 
with  426  men.    The  remnants  of  the  two  columns  made 
their  way  back  to  camp. 

Arnold  was  carried  to  a  hospital,  from  which  he  directed 
the  command  of  the  few  hundred  men  still  left  to  him,  but 
he  wrote  to  Schuyler  for  reinforcements  and  he  ordered 
no  retreat;  nor  did  Carleton  attack  him  while  his  little 

1776  band  remained  shivering  in  their  camp  to  the  west  of  the 
April  i  city.    The  reinforcements  arrived  three  months  later, 

and  with  them  General  Wooster,  who  assumed  command. 
A  sort  of  siege  was  undertaken,  but  it  was  not  effective. 

May  i  He  was  soon  superseded  by  General  Thomas.  And  then 

reinforcements  began  to  arrive  for  the  garrison — the  first 
detachment  of  the  British  and  Hessians  who  had  just 
arrived  from  Europe  under  command  of  Burgoyne. 
Thomas  raised  the  siege  and  retreated  to  theSorel,  (Riche 
lieu),  marching  up  its  banks  to  Chambly,  where  he  died  of 
small-pox.  General  Sullivan,  who  had  already  been 
ordered  to  supersede  Thomas,  arrived  a  few  days  later. 
Reinforcements  brought  his  strength  up  to  2,500  men, 
and  he  made  an  attack  on  Three  Rivers,  but  was  de 
feated.  Sullivan's  army  numbered  5,000  on  paper,  but 
less  than  half  that  number  fit  for  duty;  they  were  com 
pletely  discouraged  and  demoralized,  "the  small-pox, 
famine  and  disorder  had  rendered  them  almost  lifeless." 
Burgoyne,  who  had  commanded  in  person  at  Three 
Rivers,  was  daily  receiving  reinforcements.  There  was 
no  alternative  for  Sullivan  but  a  hasty  retreat,  and  he 

juiy  i  brought  the  remnants  of  his  force  to  St.  John  and  Isle- 


Retreat  from 

Quebec 


May  30 


June  7 


BOSTON  27 

aux-Noix,  and  thence  across  Lake  Champlain  to  Crown        me 
Point,  where  Montgomery  had  set  forth  just  ten  months 
before. 

In  the  lack  of  proper  returns  and  the  disorder  of  the  Results  of  the 
retreat,  it  is  impossible  to  say  just  how  many  men  were  to 
sent  on  this  expedition,  and  how  many  were  lost.  But 
it  appears  that  from  first  to  last  not  less  than  8,000  men 
served  in  Canada,  and  barely  3,000  returned  fit  for  duty. 
It  was  a  bold  expedition,  possibly  beyond  the  resources 
of  the  Colonies  at  that  period;  but  Washington  considered 
it  with  the  utmost  care,  gave  it  his  full  approval  and 
felt  confident  of  its  success.  And  Montgomery  and  Ar 
nold  showed,  in  its  earlier  stages,  how  apparently  insur 
mountable  difficulties  can  be  overcome  by  a  judicious 
combination  of  skill,  energy  and  daring.  Had  Mont 
gomery  lived,  or  had  Arnold  been  left  in  command  when 
the  reinforcements  came  to  Quebec  in  April,  perhaps  it 
might  have  succeeded.  But  the  generals  who  were  sent 
in  succession  to  take  command,  Wooster,  Thomas  and 
Sullivan,  were  none  of  them  equal  to  an  enterprise  of  this 
character.1  Had  it  succeeded,  it  would  probably  have 
united  Canada  to  the  Thirteen  Colonies,  and  changed  the 
whole  course  and  outcome  of  the  war. 

1  See  the  interesting  analysis  of  Sullivan's  character  in  Washington's 
letter  of  17  June,  1776,  to  the  President  of  Congress.  Sparks,  III,  426; 
IV,  364. 


CHAPTER  II 


NEW  YORK 

1776  THE  war  had  begun  in  an  attempt,  from  the  British 

British  pians    stand-point,  to  put  down  a  local  insurrection  in  Massa- 

onrtherrwarg     chusetts;    but  when  the  news  of  Bunker  Hill  and  the 

siege  of  Boston  reached  London,  it  was  evident  that 

there  were  thirteen  colonies  to  subdue,  occupying  more 

than  a  thousand  miles  of  sea-coast,  and  a  hundred  miles 

or  more  into  the  interior.    To  carry  out  this  subjugation 

more  men  were  needed  and  a  more  comprehensive  plan 

for  their  operation. 

Parliament  had  provided  in  December,  1774,  for  an 
army  of  only  18,000  men,1  and  when  it  met  in  the  follow 
ing  year  more  than  two-thirds  of  this  force  was  cooped 
up  in  Boston.  It  now  provided  for  12,000  additional 
seamen  and  an  army  of  55,000  men.2  But  as  this  largely 
increased  force  could  not  be  raised  immediately,  and  as 
allies  were  not  to  be  had,  George  III  and  his  ministers 
arranged  to  buy  soldiers  for  cash.  Treaties  were  made 
with  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  the  Landgrave  of  Hesse- 
Cassel  and  other  petty  German  rulers  by  which  they 
undertook  to  furnish  a  large  body  of  troops,  to  serve 
under  their  own  officers  in  America.  For  each  soldier 
killed  England  was  to  pay  $35,  and  for  each  wounded, 
$12;  England  was  also  to  pay  all  expenses  of  every  char 
acter,  and  in  addition  to  pay  to  the  Landgrave  personally 
$550,000  per  annum,  and  to  the  other  princes  in  propor- 

1  Amer.  Archives,  4,  I,  1479.  2  Ibid.,  4,  VI,  143. 

28 


1775 
Oct.  26 


1776 


Jan.  9 


The  Hessians 


NEW  YORK.  CAMPAIGN 
or   1776 


American  Troops 

American  Works  of  Defense.    »^ 

British  Troops 

Hessian  Auxiliaries 

Encampments  of  British  Forces 


Strategic  movements  are  sho~w 
in  broken  blue  (American)  and 
red  (British)  lines,  the  direction 
being  indicated  by  arrow  heads. 


The  dates  arc  all  of  the  year  1776 


k     /-•'     LyC^Tb»lrylMe;  ^iO^O'"""  ,V"'"'         AuB-?-'»8Sv3Y 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company 
Publishers.  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


NEW   YORK 
April-Nov.,  1776 


NEW  YORK  29 

tion.  While  the  employment  of  mercenaries  was  an  me 
ancient  practice,  yet  there  were  special  features  in  these 
treaties1  which  made  this  bargain  quite  unique  in  its 
infamy  and  degradation.  The  number  of  such  troops 
sent  to  America  was  29,867,  of  whom  about  1,200  were 
killed  or  mortally  wounded,  6,354  died  of  other  causes, 
5,000  deserted,  and  17,313  returned  to  their  homes  nearly 
eight  years  later.2  About  60  per  cent  came  from  Hesse, 
and  these  mercenaries  were  thus  known  under  the  gen 
eral  name  of  Hessians. 

The  last  of  the  6  treaties  relating  to  these  transactions 
was  ratified  by  Parliament  and  the  first  contingent, 
numbering  about  17,000  men,  together  with  7  British 
regiments,  were  ready  to  sail  early  in  the  year,  and  more 
were  to  be  ready  in  the  spring.  A  British  regiment  at  Feb.  5 
that  tune  consisted  of  2  battalions,  12  companies,  about 
50  officers  and  672  men.  One  company  in  each  battalion 
remained  at  home,  and  a  regiment  took  something  under 
600  men  to  America. 

The  preparations  ojvere  thus  made  to  send  out  about 
20  regiments  or  12,000  men  from  England,  and  17,000  British  Force 
Hessians,  which,  added  to  the  19  regiments  that  Howe  campaign 
had  at  Boston  and  the  3  in  Canada,  would  make  a  force 
of  about  42,000  men — which  was  thought  to  be  ample 
for  the  purpose.    The  first  detachment  under  Burgoyne 
(who  had  gone  to  England  on  leave  in  December)  ar 
rived  in  the  St.  Lawrence  in  April,  and  pushing  its  way 
through  the  ice  reached  Quebec  in  time  to  drive  back  the 
Americans  there  under  Sullivan,  as  we  have  seen.3 

In  preparing  a  plan  for  the  operation  of  their  troops, 
the  British  generals  were  mindful  of  the  topographical 

1  Printed  in  full,  Amer.  Archives,  4,  VI,  271-278. 

2  Lowell,  20,  300.  3  Ante,  p.  26. 


30  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  features  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  which  had  already 
determined  the  line  of  military  operations  during  the 
wars  with  the  French  while  the  latter  still  possessed 
Canada.  The  valley  of  the  Hudson  and  the  northern 
lakes  pierces  the  range  of  mountains  which  extends  from 
New  Hampshire  to  Georgia,  and  affords  a  natural  low- 
grade  line  of  communication  from  Montreal  to  New  York. 
The  Hudson  played  the  same  part  in  the  Revolution  as 
the  Mississippi  in  the  Civil  War.  If  the  British  could 
take  and  hold  this  line  it  would  cut  off  New  England  from 
the  other  colonies.  In  the  former  the  war  had  its  origin 
plan  of  and  its  most  ardent  supporters;  in  the  latter  were  three- 

fourths  of  the  population  and  the  seat  of  government. 
While  New  York  itself  did  not  then  possess  the  relative 
importance  it  now  has — the  colony  being  seventh  in 
population  and  the  city  being  exceeded  in  the  number 
of  its  inhabitants  by  Philadelphia,  and  almost  equalled 
by  Boston1 — yet  the  harbor  was  unrivalled,  the  river 
was  navigable  for  the  ships  of  the  day  almost  to  Albany, 
and  Great  Britain  had  complete  control  of  the  sea,  the 
incipient  American  navy  consisting  only  of  a  few  small 
privateers.  Howe  and  Burgoyne  had  long  resented  the 
humiliation  of  being  shut  up  in  Boston,  which  was  not 
easy  of  defence  and  whence  no  offensive  movements  could 
be  undertaken  to  advantage.  They  desired  to  transfer 
the  seat  of  war  to  New  York,  capture  that  city,  and  seize 
and  hold  the  line  of  the  Hudson.  The  new  campaign 
was  planned  on  that  basis. 

The  British  did  not  follow  out  this  general  plan,  of  the 
soundness  of  which  there  can  be  no  question,  but  allowed 
themselves,  as  we  did  later  in  the  Civil  War,  to  be  drawn 
into  diversions,  in  the  hope  of  restoring  their  authority 

1  A  Century's  Growth  of  Population.     Census  Bureau,  1909,  pp.  9-11. 


NEW  YORK  31 

in  certain  localities,  forgetting  that  the  way  to  gain  solid        me 
results  in  war  is  to  destroy  the  opposing  army  and  not 
merely  to  occupy  territory.    They  thus  planned  a  side  side  issues 
issue  against  Charleston,  in  South  Carolina,  where  Clinton 
had  been  sent  with  2,000  men  from  Boston  and  where  he        1775 
was  to  be  joined  by  a  reinforcement  of  7  regiments  under  Dec.  10 
Cornwallis,  convoyed  by  a  fleet  under  Admiral  Parker.1 
Similarly,  the  imminent  danger  in  Canada  led  to  sending 
Burgoyne  to  reinforce  Carleton  at  Quebec.    Clinton  failed 
at  Charleston  and  then  joined  Howe  at  New  York.    Bur 
goyne,  however,  instead  of  reinforcing  Howe  and  thus 
concentrating  a  force  of  such  strength  as  would  crush  all 
opposition,  moved  on  along  an  eccentric  line  to  Montreal, 
and  in  the  following  year  crossed  Lake  Champlain  to 
Ticonderoga,  intending  thence  to  move  down  the  Hudson. 
He  could  not  act  in  concert  with  Howe,  being  separated 
from  him  by  hundreds  of  miles  of  wilderness.    The  result 
of  acting  on  such  widely  divergent  lines,  instead  of  con 
centrating  every  available  man  at  New  York,  was  that 
Burgoyne  lost  his  entire  army. 

On  his  way  to  Charleston,  Clinton  had  stopped  at  New  Movement  of 
York,  and  as  soon  as  Washington  heard  of  this  he  sent  Army  to 

New  York 

Lee  to  collect  such  militia  as  he  could  in  Connecticut, 
New  York  and  New  Jersey  and  organize  the  defence  of        me 
New  York.2    A  resolution  of  Congress4  then  sent'  Lee  to  Jan.  s 
command  the  newly  formed  Southern  Department;  but 

1  Post,  p.  184. 

2  Two  exhaustive  monographs  have  been  published  by  Prof.  Henry  P. 
Johnston  of  the  New  York  City  College,  one  on  the  campaign  of  1776 
around  New  York,  having  special  reference  to  the  battle  of  Long  Island,  and 
the  other  on  the  Battle  of  Harlem  Heights.     Like  Frothingham's  Boston 
and  Arnold's  March,  they  are  filled  with  references  to  original  documents 
and  copies  of  a  great  many  of  them.    These  documents  have  been  followed 
in  this  chapter  and  it  seems  unnecessary  to  make  specific  references. 

4  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  IV,  180. 


32 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1776 

Mar.  1 

March  16  to 
April  13 

Lee's  Plan 


April  29 


May  12 


Fortifications 
of  New  York 


June  10 


Washington  soon  arrived  with  his  army,  which  had  left 
Boston  as  soon  as  Howe's  fleet  had  sailed  from  Nan- 
tasket  Roads. 

Lee  had  reported  that  the  situation  of  New  York,  sur 
rounded  by  deep  water,  afforded  no  possibility  of  defence 
against  an  enemy  having  complete  command  of  the  sea. 
His  plan  of  defence  was  to  build  a  few  small  batteries  at 
salient  points  on  North  and  East  Rivers,  but  to  concen 
trate  the  main  defence  in  an  intrenched  camp  on  Brooklyn 
Heights,  which  commanded  the  navigation  of  the  East 
River.  Washington  approved  this  plan,  and  ordered 
Greene's  brigade  to  occupy  these  heights  and  the  brigades 
of  Heath,  Spencer  and  Stirling  to  be  stationed  just  out 
side  of  what  then  constituted  the  city  of  New  York,  viz., 
from  the  Battery  to  St.  Paul's  Church.  These  positions 
were  taken  up  early  in  May  and  all  hands  worked  hard 
to  complete  the  fortifications.  After  deducting  the  5 
regiments  left  in  Boston  and  16  sent  to  Canada,  Wash 
ington  had  only  19  left  for  New  York.  Their  returns 
showed  a  strength  of  589  officers  and  9,963  men,  of  whom 
7,952  were  present  for  duty.1 

The  plans  of  the  fortifications  were  somewhat  modified 
and  enlarged  after  Washington's  arrival,  and  their  con 
struction  was  carried  out  and  the  guns  placed  in  them 
under  direction  of  Colonel  Henry  Knox,  who  had  been 
Gridley's  assistant  at  Boston  and  now  commanded  the 
Regiment  of  Artillery.  As  finally  completed  the  works 
consisted  of  no  less  than  21  redoubts  with  121  guns,  one- 
quarter  of  which  were  32-pounders  (the  largest  siege-gun 
then  in  use)  and  one-half  larger  than  9-pounders.  These 
guns  had  come  from  Ticonderoga,  from  Boston,  from  the 
Bahamas  (where  they  had  been  captured  by  Commodore 

Sparks,  III,  493. 


NEW  YORK  33 

Ezek  Hopkins)  and  from  the  gun  foundries  in  various        me 
colonies.    While  Congress  had  erroneous  views  about  the 
length  of  enlistment  and  the  organization  of  armies,  it 
displayed  extraordinary  energy  in  the  manufacture  of 
cannon,  small-arms  and  powder. 

The  two  works  on  Governor's  Island  and  Red  Hook, 
with  12  guns,  guarded  the  approach  from  the  Bay  to  the 
East  River.  A  battery  on  Paulus  Hook,  with  8  guns, 
was  intended  to  protect  the  Jersey  shore  of  the  North 
River.  On  Manhattan  Island  there  were  11  redoubts, 
with  79  guns,  situated  on  slight  eminences  adjacent  to  the 
water,  from  the  vicinity  of  Chambers  Street  around  the 
Battery  and  up  the  East  River  to  86th  Street  opposite 
Hell  Gate.  On  Long  Island,  in  front  of  Brooklyn  (then  a 
hamlet  of  a  dozen  houses,  just  east  of  the  present  Borough 
Hall),  there  were  7  redoubts,  mounting  29  guns,  stretching 
across  the  ridge  which  extends  from  Greenwood  Cemetery 
to  the  Brooklyn  Reservoir,  and  which  at  the  point  fortified 
was  about  a  mile  in  width  between  the  swamps  of  Wall- 
about  Bay  on  the  north  and  Gowanus  Creek  on  the  south. 

The  first  squadron  of  the  British  fleet  arrived  from  Arrival  of  the 
Halifax,  bringing  Howe  and  his  Boston  troops;  next 
came  Clinton  and  Cornwallis,  who  had  been  defeated  at 

;  Aug.  1 

Charleston;  and  finally  Lord  Howe,  the  naval  commander-  Aug  12 
in-chief,  with  the  Hessians,  and  the  Household  troops 
from  London.  It  was  an  imposing  array,  more  than  400 
transports  and  32,000  soldiers  the  largest  expedition  that 
England  had  ever  sent  abroad;  convoyed  by  10  line- 
of-battle  ships  and  20  frigates,  manned  by  more  than 
10,000  seamen,  and  armed  with  about  1,200  guns,  many 
of  them  64-pounders  and  74-pounders,  which  completely 
outclassed  the  guns  which  had  been  collected  with  so 
much  difficulty  by  Knox. 


34 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1776 


July  12 


June  3 


July  2 


Disposition  of 
the  Troops  at 
New  York 


As  the  successive  detachments  arrived  they  went  into 
camp  on  Staten  Island  just  inside  the  Narrows.  Wash 
ington  viewed  their  arrival  with  no  little  anxiety;  which 
was  increased  when  two  of  the  men-of-war  sailed  up  the 
North  River,  under  a  furious  cannonade  which  failed 
either  to  stop  them  or  do  them  any  serious  damage. 
These  ships  anchored  in  the  broad  Tappan  Zee,  forty 
miles  above  New  York,  thus  cutting  off  all  communica 
tion  by  water  with  the  Northern  army.1  His  position 
was  indeed  precarious.  Heroic  efforts  had  been  made 
to  increase  his  force.  Sullivan  had  brought  back  his 
Continental  regiments,  or  what  was  left  of  them,  from 
Ticonderoga,  and  Congress  had  passed  a  resolution  call 
ing  out  13,800  militia  for  the  defence  of  New  York.2  By 
the  returns  at  the  end  of  August,3  Washington  had  25 
regiments  of  Continentals  and  parts  of  75  regiments  of 
militia,  with  a  paper  strength  of  33,363,  of  whom  there 
were  "present  fit  for  duty"  20,328.  Opposed  to  these 
hastily  collected  and  untrained  troops  was  the  greater 
part  of  the  military  and  naval  force  of  England,  supple 
mented  by  all  the  mercenaries  that  it  could  hire. 

Washington,  however,  did  not  lose  confidence.  He 
issued  an  impassioned  address  to  his  troops,4  telling  them 
that  "the  fate  of  unborn  millions  will  now  depend,  under 
God,  on  the  courage  and  conduct  of  this  army/' and  called 
upon  them  to  "resolve  to  conquer  or  die";  and  he  dis 
posed  his  troops  to  the  best  advantage.  They  were  di 
vided  into  five  divisions  under  Putnam,  Heath,  Spencer, 
Sullivan  and  Greene  (all  of  whom  were  now  major-gener 
als);  and,  as  the  enemy  had  complete  command  of  the 

1  Sparks,  III,  469,  475.  2  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  IV,  412. 

3  Sparks,  III,  493;  Amer.  Archives,  5,  II,  450,  451. 

4  Sparks,  III,  449. 


NEW  YORK  35 

water  and  could  choose  his  point  of  landing,  three  divisions  me 
were  stationed  near  the  southern  part  of  Manhattan  Isl 
and,  one  in  the  northern  part  from  Fort  Washington  to 
Kingsbridge,  and  one  on  Long  Island.  Greene  com 
manded  the  latter,  and  for  four  months  had  not  only  di 
rected  the  construction  of  the  redoubts,  but  had  recon 
noitred  every  foot  of  the  ground  by  which  they  could  be 
approached,  and  had  compelled  strict  discipline  and  vig 
ilance  on  the  part  of  his  troops.  Unfortunately,  early  in 
August  he  succumbed  to  the  malarial  fever,  with  which  so 
many  of  his  men  were  prostrated,  contracted  in  the  swamps 
of  Wallabout  and  Gowanus,  adjacent  to  his  works.  He 
endeavored  to  direct  his  command  from  his  bed  in  camp, 
but  finally,  a  few  days  before  the  battle,  he  was  at  the 
point  of  death,  and  had  to  be  carried  to  a  house  on  Man 
hattan  Island.  Sullivan  was  sent  to  take  Greene's  place,  Aug.  20 
and  four  days  later,  when  it  seemed  probable  that  the  Aug.  24 
attack  would  be  made  on  the  Long  Island  side,  Putnam, 
the  senior  major-general,  was  sent  to  take  command. 
Neither  of  these  officers  had  an  opportunity  to  become 
familiar  with  the  situation  before  the  attack  was  made. 

It  was  made  in  overwhelming  force.  Under  cover  of  Battle  of 
the  navy,  Howe  embarked  20,000  men  and  40  pieces  of 
artillery  in  small  boats  at  Staten  Island  and  landed  them  Aug.  22 
on  the  beach  of  Gravesend  Bay.  It  was  eight  miles  from 
the  Brooklyn  lines,  and  Washington  was  in  no  position 
to  prevent  or  hinder  the  movement.  Howe  then  sent 
Cornwallis  with  the  Guards  and  Hessians  to  the  hamlet 
of  Flat  bush,  just  south  of  what  is  now  Prospect  Park, 
and  at  the  foot  of  a  long  ridge,  which  beginning  at  the 
bay  (near  Greenwood  Cemetery)  extends,  in  a  direction 
north  of  east,  through  Prospect  Park  to  the  Brooklyn 
Reservoir  and  many  miles  beyond.  The  rest  of  Howe's 


36  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  troops  were  in  rear  and  to  the  left  of  Cornwallis,  and  in 
this  position  they  remained  for  three  days;  during  which 
Howe  received  from  the  tory  farmers  of  Long  Island 
complete  information  as  to  Washington's  position.  On 
the  other  hand,  Howe's  inaction  left  Washington  in  doubt 
whether  the  landing  on  Staten  Island  might  not  be  a 
feint  with  a  part  of  his  troops,  whereas  the  main  landing 
might  be  on  Manhattan.  Washington,  however,  each 
day  sent  reinforcements  to  Long  Island,  in  all  10  regi 
ments,  bringing  the  strength  up  to  about  7,000  men,  or 
more  than  one-third  of  his  effective  force,  and,  as  pre- 

Aug.  24          viously  stated,  sent  Putnam  to  assume  chief  command. 

Aug.  25  He  examined  the  lines  in  person  with  Putnam,  and  on 
returning  to  his  head-quarters  wrote  a  sharp  letter  to  the 
latter  in  regard  to  the  lack  of  vigilance  and  discipline 
among  the  troops,  but  he  did  not  give  him  specific  instruc 
tions  as  to  the  placing  of  them.  Washington's  exact  lan 
guage  was  as  follows:1  "I  would  have  you  form  proper 
lines  of  defence  around  your  encampment  and  works  on 
the  most  advantageous  ground.  .  .  .  The  wood  next  to 
Red  Hook  should  be  well  attended  to.  ...  The  militia 
.  .  .  will  do  for  the  interior  works,  whilst  your  best  men 
should  at  all  hazards  prevent  the  enemy's  passing  the 
wood  and  approaching  your  works.  The  woods  should 
be  secured  by  abatis  where  necessary,  to  make  the  en 
emy's  approach  as  difficult  as  possible." 

It  is  hardly  possible  that  Washington  intended  to 
spread  out  his  small  force  along  the  entire  ridge,  seven 
miles  long,  from  the  river  road  to  Jamaica  pass.  Putnam, 
however,  seems  to  have  so  understood  it,  although  he 
gave  no  definite  orders  to  carry  such  a  plan  into  effect. 

Aug.  23          He  appears  to  have  acquiesced  in  the  dispositions  made 

1  Sparks,  IV,  63. 


Marine*  landed  from 
Ad.  Howes  fleet  ^~ 

to  re-eit/orce.  — 
Gen. 


Flatbush 


Howe] 

aw  Lots 


Encampment  of 

British  Forces, 

Aug.  22-2. 


English  Statute  Miles. 


Gravesen4 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company,  8 

Publishers,  Cleveland  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its"  People 


LONG  ISLAND 
Aug.  zy,  1776 


NEW  YORK  37 

in  Sullivan's  orders;   2  regiments  "to  possess  the  Flat-        me 
bush  road/7  2  others  "to  take  possession  of  the  Bed 
ford  road,"  and  2  others  of  "the  road  near  the  river." 
The  Jamaica  pass,  five  miles  to  the  east  of  Flatbush,  was 
not  guarded. 

Howe's  plan  was  to  make  a  feint  along  the  coast  road  Howe's  piaQ 
and  in  front  of  the  Flatbush  pass,  while  a  turning  column 
of  fully  half  his  strength  was  to  make  a  night  march  to 
the  eastward  and  come  in  by  the  Jamaica  pass,  march 
west  by  the  Jamaica  road  and  come  squarely  in  rear  of 
all  the  American  positions  outside  of  their  fortifications. 
The  movement  was  carried  out  in  accordance  with  this 
plan.  Major-General  Grant  with  2  brigades,  about  5,000 
men,  moved  forward  along  the  coast  road;  Lieutenant- 
General  de  Heister  with  3  brigades,  about  6,000  men,  Battle  of 
moved  toward  the  Flatbush  pass  (Prospect  Park);  while 
Clinton,  Percy  and  Cornwallis  with  5  brigades,  about 
10,000  men,  made  the  turning  movement.  At  3  o'clock  Aug.  27 
in  the  morning  Grant  and  de  Heister  were  skirmishing  with 
the  American  outposts  and  Stirling  was  hurried  forward 
with  5  regiments  to  meet  Grant.  A  sharp  action  ensued 
in  the  hills  near  what  is  now  Greenwood  Cemetery,  in 
which  Stirling  held  his  own  against  superior  numbers  and 
inflicted  on  the  enemy  the  greatest  losses  of  the  day. 

As  early  as  9  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  turning  column  Howe's  Fiank 
was  squarely  in  his  rear,  and  in  the  rear  of  Sullivan,  who, 
with  6  regiments  was  defending  the  Flatbush  pass  against 
the  feigned  attack  of  the  Hessians;  and  the  head  of  the 
column  was  nearer  the  fortified  lines  and  main  camp  of 
the  Americans  than  either  Sullivan  or  Stirling.  This 
turning  column — light  dragoons,  Guards,  Highlanders,  in 
fantry  regiments  and  ten  pieces  of  artillery,  in  all  10,000 
men,  under  Clinton,  Cornwallis  and  Percy,  with  Howe 


38 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1776 


Aug.  26 


Aug.  27 


8.30  A.  M. 


Aug.  27 


Stirling's 
Heroic  Attack 


himself  in  personal  command — had  left  Flatbush  at  9 
o'clock  the  night  before,  and  piloted  by  tory  guides,  had 
marched  to  the  east  and  then  to  the  north,  and  before 
dawn  had  reached  the  Half  Way  House  (Howard's  Tav 
ern)  on  the  Jamaica  road  on  the  eastern  side  of  the 
Jamaica  pass  (Atlantic  and  Vesta  Avenues),  about  five 
miles  from  the  American  fortifications.  The  American 
army  was  absolutely  without  cavalry,  and  for  such 
scouting  and  outpost  duty  as  is  usually  performed  by 
cavalry  it  had  to  rely  upon  small  parties  of  officers  who 
owned  horses.  Such  a  party,  five  in  number,  was  ob 
serving  this  Jamaica  pass.  It  was  surrounded  and  capt 
ured  by  Clinton's  dragoons  about  3  o'clock  in  the  morn 
ing.  The  Jamaica  road  (East  Fulton  Street)  was  thus 
open,  and  after  resting  his  troops  at  the  pass  until  day 
light,  Howe  marched  along  that  road,  coming  in  the 
rear,  first  of  Sullivan  and  then  of  Stirling,  without  warn 
ing.  One  regiment  was  posted  nearly  three  miles  out 
on  Sullivan's  left  flank  in  the  direction  of  the  Jamaica 
pass,  but  it  was  in  the  woods  and  not  on  the  road,  and 
the  British  soon  surrounded  it  and  compelled  the  sur 
render  of  the  colonel  and  most  of  his  men,  while  the 
others  scattered  and  escaped.  The  three  regiments  at 
the  Bedford  pass,  about  a  mile  to  the  left  of  Sullivan, 
were  next  uncovered,  and  after  a  short  skirmish  began  a 
hasty  retreat  toward  the  forts.  The  British  moved  more 
quickly  on  the  road  than  these  fugitives  in  the  woods, 
and  Sullivan  found  himself  attacked  by  Clinton  in  his 
rear  and  the  Hessians  in  his  front  at  the  Flatbush  pass 
(Prospect  Park).  He  quickly  ordered  a  retreat,  which 
soon  turned  to  a  flight,  and  Sullivan  himself  was  captured. 
With  all  this  firing  on  his  left  and  rear,  Stirling  saw  that 
his  position  was  untenable.  About  11  o'clock  he  started 


NEW  YORK  39 

to  retreat  by  the  coast  road  to  the  Gowanus  road  and  me 
thence  to  the  forts,  but  he  had  not  gone  far  when  he 
saw  that  he  was  surrounded.  On  his  left  were  the  Gow 
anus  marshes,  supposed  to  be  impassable,  on  his  right 
the  main  body  of  the  British  turning  column,  and  squarely 
in  front  of  him  was  Cornwallis  with  the  Highlanders  and 
the  Second  Battalion  of  the  Guards.  These  were  posted 
at  the  Cortelyou  house  on  the  Gowanus  road  where  it 
climbs  the  hill  skirting  the  Gowanus  marsh  (Third  Street 
and  Fifth  Avenue). 

Stirling  promptly  decided  upon  a  heroic  measure.  He  Aug.  27, 
took  Major  Gist  and  part  of  the  Maryland  regiment  and 
advanced  to  attack  Cornwallis,  ordering  the  rest  of  his  five 
regiments  to  make  their  escape  across  the  swamps  and 
thus  gain  the  forts.  While  Stirling  and  his  handful  of 
men  kept  up  a  stubborn  fight  for  half  an  hour,  or  more, 
the  greater  part  of  his  men  did  actually  escape  through 
the  swamps,  with  only  six  or  eight  drowned.  The  Mary- 
landers  were  finally  driven  back  and  dispersed,  and 
Stirling  himself  was  captured. 

About  this  time  Washington  in  person  arrived  at  Cobble  Arrival  of 
Hill,  one  of  the  forts.  As  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  action  12  M. 
he  had  ordered  6  regiments  across  from  New  York,  but 
the  mischief  was  done  long  before  they  could  arrive. 
They  began  filing  into  the  forts  about  noon,  and  by  2 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  remnants  of  the  12  regiments 
that  had  been  in  the  battle  had  succeeded  in  reaching 
these  works.  Inside  the  works  were  as  many  more  regi 
ments  which  had  not  been  engaged.  Howe's  troops  were 
fatigued  with  an  all-night  march  and  more  or  less  fighting 
during  a  considerable  part  of  the  day.  He  had  20,000 
men,  less  his  losses;  inside  the  works,  about  a  mile  long, 
with  both  flanks  protected  by  swamps,  were  about  8,000 


40  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  men,  half  of  whom  had  been  in  action  and  defeated. 
Should  Howe  assault  the  works?  His  men,  it  is  said, 
were  eager  for  it,  and  in  his  own  report  Howe  says  it 
required  repeated  orders  to  prevent  it.  If  he  succeeded 
in  an  assault,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Washington's  army, 
Aug.  27,  with  a  deep  river  at  its  back,  could  have  escaped  capture 
Howe'becides  or  dispersal.  Howe  says  that  he  thought  he  would  have 
succeeded,  but  would  have  sustained  heavy  loss;  and  he 
was  satisfied  that  he  would  be  able  to  gain  the  works, 
almost  without  loss,  by  siege  operations.1  He  therefore 
did  not  assault. 

The  battle  was  over.  On  the  British  side  it  was  a 
Responsibility  brilliant  victory,  skilfully  planned  and  well  executed. 
On  the  American  side  it  was  a  humiliating  defeat.  Who 
was  responsible  for  it?  Volumes  have  been  written  on 
this  question,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  answer  it  in  a 
sentence. 

In  the  first  place,  no  one  exercised  general  command. 
The  part  played  by  Putnam,  the  commanding  general, 
was  insignificant.  Sullivan  defended  the  pass,  where  he 
had  gone  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  firing,  as  long  as  it  could 
be  defended,  but  Putnam  had  arrived  and  superseded 
him  in  the  chief  command  three  days  before,  and  it  is 
unjust  to  hold  Sullivan  responsible  for  the  conduct  of 
the  battle.2  Stirling  had  five  regiments  and  fought  splen 
didly  with  them,  and  there  his  responsibility  ended. 
Putnam,  in  spite  of  his  well-earned  reputation  for  gal 
lantry  at  Ticonderoga,  eighteen  years  before,  and  later 
at  Concord  and  Bunker  Hill,  did  practically  nothing  as 
a  commanding  general;  and  Washington  never  again 
placed  him  in  a  position  of  high  responsibility. 

1  Howe's  Report;  Dawson,  156;  Howe's  Narrative,  4,  5. 

2  Sparks,  IV,  517,  518. 


NEW  YORK  41 

Secondly,  the  American  army  was  surprised,  because        me 
it  had  no  cavalry;  and  was  attacked  and  outflanked 
by  an  army  of  regular  troops  of  nearly  three  times  its 
numbers. 

Thirdly,  Greene's  illness  was  a  terrible  misfortune. 
He  knew  his  troops  and  knew  the  ground,  and  (as  he 
showed  later  on)  he  possessed  extraordinary  skill  and  re 
sourcefulness  in  similar  situations. 

Finally,  Washington  was  commander-in-chief;  it  was 
for  him  to  give  orders;  he  had  more  than  once  examined 
the  ground;  and  Long  Island  was  one  of  the  points  from 
which  he  had  been  expecting  an  attack  for  four  months. 
His  letter  of  August  251  to  Putnam  is  quite  long,  but  it 
does  not  give  specific  instructions  in  regard  to  the  dis 
position  of  the  troops.  It  does,  however,  instruct  Put 
nam  "at  all  hazards"  to  prevent  the  enemy's  approach 
ing  his  works.  Was  Washington  wise  in  allowing  the 
troops  to  remain  outside  of  their  works,  in  the  passes 
two  or  three  miles  distant  where  he  had  seen  them  on 
his  visit  of  the  24th?  Considering  the  quality  of  his 
untrained  troops,  who  had  never  been  in  a  battle  in  the 
open,  but  who  had  shown  wonderful  resistance  behind 
trenches,  it  seems  that  he  made  a  grave  error  in  not  keep 
ing  his  men  in  their  redoubts,  and  repeating  the  per 
formance  of  Bunker  Hill,  as  they  probably  would  have 
done. 

Howe's  report2  gives  an  itemized  list  of  his  losses — 63 
killed,  283  wounded  and  31  missing — and  of  the  prisoners 
taken,  1,097  in  all,  including  91  officers;  and  there  is  no 
sufficient  ground  to  doubt  the  accuracy  of  his  figures. 
The  dead  and  wounded  Americans  were  practically  all 

1  Sparks,  IV,  65. 

'Dawson,  I,  148,  156;  Johnston,  1776,  pp.  202-206. 


42 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1776 


Precarious 
Situation  on 
Long  Island 


Aug.  28 


Aug.  28 

Preparations 
for  With 
drawal 


Aug.  29 


left  within  the  British  lines;   their  exact  number  is  not 
known.    Washington  reported  them  at  "  about  1,000."  1 

Washington  may  have  made  a  mistake  in  accepting 
battle  in  the  open,  but  his  next  movement  was  an  oper 
ation  unsurpassed  in  military  skill.  It  was  no  longer  a 
question  of  defending  his  forts  on  Long  Island.  With 
their  garrison  demoralized  by  defeat  there  might  be  doubt 
as  to  the  outcome  of  an  assault;  but  there  was  no  need 
for  Howe  to  make  an  assault.  On  the  afternoon  follow 
ing  the  battle  he  began  a  siege,  breaking  ground  for  his 
first  parallel  about  600  yards  in  front  of  Fort  Putnam 
(Washington  Park).  With  complete  command  of  the 
sea  and  an  overwhelming  superiority  in  artillery,  he  could 
land  troops  to  take  the  works  in  reverse,  cut  off  all  com 
munication  between  New  York  and  Long  Island  and 
compel  a  surrender.  Washington  saw  that  his  troops 
must  be  withdrawn  from  Long  Island  without  a  mo 
ment  's  delay  and  joined  to  those  on  Manhattan;  and  he 
acted  with  that  extraordinary  rapidity  which  was  char 
acteristic  of  him  in  such  an  emergency. 

The  morning  after  the  battle  he  brought  over  from  New 
York  three  regiments,  one  of  them  the  "  Fourteenth 
Regiment  of  Foot"  in  the  Continental  Line,  commanded 
by  Colonel  John  Glover,  and  made  up  almost  entirely  of 
Marblehead  fishermen.  There  were  no  handier  men  in 
a  boat  than  these  in  all  the  world;  and  they  rendered 
great  service  here  in  the  next  two  days,  as  well  as  later 
on  at  Trenton.  Washington  then  sent  orders  to  collect 
all  the  small  boats  in  the  Harlem  River  and  the  East 
River  as  far  as  Flushing.  In  order  not  to  discourage 
his  men  with  notice  of  a  retreat,  he  issued  a  general  order 

1  Sparks,  IV,  71. 


NEW  YORK  43 

saying  that  General  Mercer  had  arrived  and  that  he  had  me 
fresh  troops  from  New  Jersey  which  were  expected  that 
afternoon;  that  the  sick  were  an  encumbrance  to  the 
army  and  were  to  be  removed  to  New  York;  that  these 
troops  of  Mercer's  were  to  take  the  place  of  some  of  those 
on  Long  Island;  and  therefore  all  regiments  were  ordered 
to  parade  "with  their  arms,  accoutrements  and  knapsacks 
at  7  o'clock  at  the  head  of  their  encampments  and  there 
wait  for  orders."  Having  made  all  his  preparations, 
late  in  the  afternoon  Washington  called  a  council  of  war 
of  the  eight  general  officers  present  and  laid  the  facts 
before  them.1  They  unanimously  advised  a  retreat;  and 
at  dark  it  began.  First  the  sick  were  carried  down  to 
the  ferry;  then  followed  the  militia;  and  after  them  the 
Continental  regiments.  Six  of  the  latter,  specially  selected 
under  command  of  Mifflin,  were  left  to  man  the  works 
until  dawn.  As  the  others  reached  the  ferry  they  found  The  Troops 
a  great  number  of  boats,  of  all  sizes  and  shapes  and  de 
scriptions,  manned  by  the  men  of  Glover's  regiment,  and 
some  from  Colonel  Hutchinson's  Twenty-seventh  Foot, 
which  came  from  Gloucester.  General  McDougall,  who 
had  raised  the  first  New  York  regiment  and  had  lately 
been  made  a  brigadier,  had  charge  of  the  embarkation; 
and  Washington  spent  the  night  riding  along  the  mile  or 
more  of  road  which  is  now  Fulton  Street,  from  the  ferry 
to  the  fortified  lines,  everywhere  encouraging  the  men 
and  directing  their  movements. 

It  was  a  very  dark  night,  with  torrents  of  rain  and  a  Aug.  29 
north-east  gale,  which  at  first  made  it  almost  impossible 
even  for  the  Marblehead  sailors  to  handle  their  boats. 
Toward  midnight  the  rain  ceased  and  the  wind  sub 
sided;    the  crossing  then  went  on  rapidly.    About  2 

1  Amer.  Archives,  5,  I,  1246. 


44  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  o'clock  in  the  morning  a  blunder  was  made  which  might 
possibly  have  wrecked  the  whole  movement.  An  aide- 
de-camp,  mistaking  his  orders,  started  Mifflin's  entire 
command  for  the  ferry.  Fortunately  Washington  met 
them  on  the  road,  and  led  them  back  to  the  works. 

Just  before  dawn,  by  good  fortune,  a  dense  fog  settled 
down  over  the  river  and  the  works.  Under  cover  of  this, 
Mifflin's  regiments  were  withdrawn  without  being  noticed 
by  the  British  in  their  trenches  close  by.  They  reached 
the  ferry  and  were  all  carried  over,  Washington  himself 
accompanying  the  last  of  them,  in  the  early  morning. 

Aug.  so  A  more  skilful  operation  of  this  kind  was  never  con 

ducted. 

Washington's        The  troops  landed  near  what  is  now  Fulton  Street 

of  His  Troops  in  New  York,  and  joined  their  comrades  in  the  city  and 
its  suburbs.  In  a  few  days  the  army  was  reorganized 
into  three  divisions  under  Putnam,  Spencer  and  Heath, 
and  posted  at  various  points  along  the  East  and  Har 
lem  Rivers,  from  the  Battery  to  Kingsbridge,  watching 
keenly  to  see  where  Howe  would  cross.  The  troops  were 
greatly  discouraged,  and  the  militia,  as  Washington  said 

sept.  2  in  his  letter  to  the  President  of  Congress,  were  going  off 

"in  some  instances,  almost  by  whole  regiments,  by  half 
ones  and  by  companies  at  a  time."  l  This  spread  dis 
affection  among  the  Continentals,  and  Washington  did 
not  hesitate  to  say  that  his  condition  was  "still  more 
alarming."  In  the  midst  of  his  cares  he  found  time  to 
write  to  Congress  those  excellent  recommendations, 
which  will  hereafter  be  quoted,  about  the  formation  of  a 
permanent,  regular  army.2  He  was  not  dismayed,  nor 
did  he  neglect  any  precautions.  He  anticipated  that 
Howe  would  move  to  Westchester  and  attack  across  the 

1  Sparks,  IV,  72.  2  Ibid.,  IV,  72,  80,  89. 


NEW  YORK  45 

Harlem  River,  and  he  therefore  posted  nearly  half  of  his        me 
force  in  the  vicinity  of  Kingsbridge;    he  ordered  the 
fortifications  at  Fort  Washington  to  be  completed,  and 
others  to  be  built  at  Fort  Lee  on  the  opposite  Jersey 
shore;  and  he  called  a  council  of  war  and  asked  the  ad-  shaii  New 
vice  of  his  generals  as  to  whether  New  York  should  be  or°Evacuated? 
evacuated.    Greene,  then  convalescent  from  his  fever,  sept.  ? 
in  a  strong  and  ably  written  opinion  advised  that  the  city 
be  immediately  evacuated  and  burned,1  so  that  it  should 
not  become  a  head-quarters  and  depot  of  supplies  for  the 
British.    Washington  had  asked  the  instructions  of  Con 
gress  on  this  point,  and  they  had  instructed  him  to  "have 
especial  care  taken,  in  case  he  should  find  it  necessary  sept.  3. 
to  quit  New  York,  that  no  damage  be  done  to  the  said 
city  by  his  troops  on  their  leaving  it;    the  Congress 
having  no  doubt  of  being  able  to  recover  the  same,  though 
the  enemy  should,  for  a  time,  obtain  possession  of  it."  2 
The  other  generals  were  divided  in  opinion,  some  being 
in  favor  of  evacuating;  some  of  defending  the  city;  and 
some  of  the  middle  course,  which  was  adopted,  of  leaving 
part  of  the  army  in  the  city,  part  near  Kingsbridge  and 
part  at  intermediate  points.3    Within  a  week  Greene  sept.  12 
headed  a  petition  asking  for  a  reconsideration  of  the 
question,  and  at  a  new  council  it  was  decided  by  ten  to 
three  to  evacuate  immediately.4    A  considerable  part  of 

1  Sparks,  IV,  86. 

2  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  V,  733.    The  expectations  of  Congress  were  not 
realized.     New  York  was  the  base  of  operations  for  the  British  throughout 
the  war,  and  they  held  it  until  November  25,  1783.     If  it  had  been  de 
stroyed  in  1776,  the  course  of  the  war  might  have  been  quite  different.    On 
the  other  hand,  the  propriety  of  destroying  a  city,  even  to  gain  so  great  a 
military  advantage,  might  well  have  been  questioned,  but  apparently  it  was 
not.    Such  an  act  is  now  forbidden  by  the  Hague  Conventions  of  1899 
and  1907. 

» Sparks,  IV,  91. 

4  Amer.  Archives,  5,  II,  326,  329. 


46 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1776 


Sept.  6 

British  Ships 
in  the  East 
River 


Sept.  15 

British  Land 
at  Kip's  Bay 


the  stores  had  already  been  moved  to  Fort  Washington 
and  the  removal  of  the  rest  was  hastened. 

Meanwhile  the  British  ships  had  assembled  near  Gov 
ernor's  Island  (which  had  been  abandoned),  and  one  of 
the  ships  had  passed  up  the  East  River  without  being 
seriously  injured,  and  this  was  soon  followed  by  others. 
Howe  had  spread  his  men  along  the  shore  of  the  East 
River  as  far  as  Hell  Gate,  leisurely  making  his  prepara 
tions  to  cross.  The  crossing  was  finally  made  on  a 
Sunday  morning  from  Newt  own  Creek  to  Kip's  Bay 
(34th  Street),  the  navy  covering  the  landing  with  a  heavy 
cannonade.  The  Americans  posted  on  the  shore  could 
not  stand  the  grape-shot.  They  retired,  and  84  boat 
loads  of  Guardsmen  and  Hessians,  with  Clinton  and 
Cornwallis  and  Donop  in  the  lead,  landed  without  diffi 
culty.  Two  brigades  which  were  posted  as  a  support  on 
Murray  Hill  joined  in  the  retreat  toward  the  Blooming- 
dale  road.  Washington  heard  the  cannonade  and  gal 
loped  from  his  head-quarters,  nearly  four  miles  away,  at 
the  Morris  House.1  He  rushed  in  among  the  fugitives, 
used  strong  language,  drew  his  sword  and  fired  his  pistols 
— all  to  no  purpose.  He  could  not  rally  them.  In  the 
melee  he  narrowly  escaped  capture,  and  some  thought 
that  he  courted  death,2  as  it  was  with  difficulty  that  his 
staff  dragged  him  away. 

The  retreat  was  general — and  speedy;  it  soon  degen 
erated  into  a  panic  and  rout,  affecting  even  regiments 
that  had  most  distinguished  themselves  at  Bunker  Hill, 
and  were  hereafter  to  show  intrepid  courage  at  Trenton 
and  the  Brandy  wine.  Putnam's  division  came  up  by 
the  road  nearest  the  North  River,  and  but  for  the  patri 
otic  hospitality  of  Mrs.  Murray,  who  detained  Howe  and 

1  Sparks,  IV,  93.  3  IUd.t  IV,  95. 


NEW  YORK  47 

his  principal  generals  at  lunch,1  a  large  part  of  it  would       me 
have  been  captured.    By  nightfall  the  remnants  of  the  Americans 
flying  army  were  gathered  on  the  heights  north  and  west  amwn  to 
of  Harlem,  near  what  is  now  130th  Street  and  Manhattan 
Avenue.    The  losses  of  the  day  were  17  officers  and  350 
men.    At  dark,  Howe's  troops  were  posted  across  the  Howe  Pursues 
island  from  Bloomingdale  (97th  Street  and  Broadway) 


through  McGowan's  Pass  (Central  Park),  to  Horn's  Hook  sept,  is 
(86th  Street  and  East  River). 

Naturally  Howe  was  elated  and  Washington  depressed 
by  the  events  of  the  day;  and  the  spirits  of  the  American 
troops  were  not  improved  by  the  heavy  rain  as  they 
arrived  after  sunset  on  the  heights  north  of  the  "  Hollow 
Way,"  and  there  bivouacked  on  the  wet  ground  without 
tents.  But  Washington  arranged  them  in  some  order, 
Putnam's  and  Spencer's  division  in  the  rear  (147th  Street) 
and  Greene's  division  (which  had  been  commanded  by 
Heath  during  Greene's  illness)  in  front  (127th  to  135th 
Streets  west  of  Manhattan  Avenue).  Before  he  went  to 
bed  Washington  had  given  orders  for  Colonel  Knowlton 
and  his  "Rangers"  to  reconnoitre  in  the  morning,  and  sept.  IG 
find  out  the  dispositions  of  the  enemy.  These  "  Rangers  " 


were  a  special  corps,  recently  organized,  of  five  picked 
companies  from  New  England  regiments,  all  good  shots; 
and  they  were  to  do  constant  scouting,  in  the  absence  of 
cavalry.  Their  officers  were  splendid  young  fellows, 
among  them  Nathan  Hale,  who  at  this  moment  was  ab 
sent  at  his  own  request,  working  his  way  through  Con 
necticut  across  to  Long  Island  and  thence  to  Manhattan, 
seeking  to  gain  information  for  Washington  as  to  the 
position  and  movements  of  Howe's  troops.  He  was  des 
tined  to  be  hanged  as  a  spy  about  a  week  later,  and  to  be 

1  Thacher,  60. 


48  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  immortalized  by  the  beautiful  statue  which  now  stands 
in  City  Hall  Park. 

Knowlton  started  on  his  reconnoissance  before  dawn, 
crossed  the  " Hollow  Way,"  climbed  the  Claremont  Hill 
(where  Grant's  monument  stands)  and  moved  along  the 
edge  of  the  bluff  for  more  than  a  mile  before  he  met  any 
thing.  He  then  ran  into  the  British  pickets  and  the  ad 
vance  of  Leslie's  brigade  near  the  Jones  house  (105th 
Street  near  Riverside  Drive).  There  was  a  sharp  skir 
mish  lasting  half  an  hour,  and  then  Knowlton,  having 
accomplished  his  object  and  developed  a  force  greater 
than  his  own,  retreated  to  the  "Hollow  Way"  (130th 
Street  under  Riverside  Drive). 

Washington  was  up  at  daylight,  writing  to  Congress1 
an  account  of  the  " disgraceful  and  dastardly"  retreat  of 
the  previous  day,  and  had  just  finished  his  report  when 
he  heard  the  firing.  He  promptly  rode  to  the  front  and 
there  met  Putnam,  Greene  and  Reed  (who  had  succeeded 
Gates  as  adjutant-general  a  few  months  before).  Reed 
had  been  with  Knowlton.  They  made  their  report  to 
Washington  to  the  effect  that  the  party  which  had  fol 
lowed  Knowlton  as  he  retired  did  not  exceed  300  men. 
Washington  seized  the  opportunity,  in  the  hope  of  re 
deeming  the  disgrace  of  the  previous  day,  and  reinspiring 
his  discouraged  men.  He  planned  to  capture  this  de 
tachment  which  was  in  plain  view  across  the  little  valley, 
sounding  their  bugles  with  the  fox-hunting  calls,  as  at 
the  end  of  a  hard  run.  He  reinforced  the  Rangers  with 
the  Third  Virginia  regiment,  just  arrived  from  the 
vicinity  of  Mt.  Vernon,  and  ordered  Knowlton  to  try  to 
get  in  rear  of  the  British  party,  while  a  feint  was  made 
nearer  the  river  by  part  of  one  of  Greene's  Rhode  Island 

1  Sparks,  IV,  95. 


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POSITION 

V     f  of  the 

AMERICAN  AND  BRITISH  ARMIES 

near 

HARLEM 

from  Sept.  16  to  Oct.  12,  1776 

REFERENCES 

i  up  by  the  Americans 

during  the  Battle  of  Harlem  Heights-1 17th  St. 
b  b-  Second  and  stronger  line  about  155th  St.  built  later 
c  c  -  Third  line,  -161st  St.  unfinished 


British 


American 


THE   M.-N.    WORKS,    BUFFALO,    N.V 
TTLE   OF   HAftLEM    HEIGHTS,    BY   HENRY   ?.    JOHNSTON 


EM 

,     1776 


NEW  YORK  49 

regiments1  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Clary.  This  feint  me 
had  the  desired  effect.  The  British  detachment  came 
down  the  Claremont  Hill  to  meet  them.  Before  the 
Rangers  could  get  in  their  rear  the  British  began  to  re 
treat,  followed  by  Clary  on  their  front  and  Knowlton  fir 
ing  on  their  flank.  In  climbing  the  rocks  (about  123d 
Street  and  Morningside  Park)  Knowlton  was  instantly 
killed,  and  Leitch,  the  major  of  the  Virginia  regiment,  re 
ceived  a  wound  from  which  he  died  within  two  weeks. 
The  British  continued  to  retreat  until  they  reached  a  buck-  Battle  of  H 
wheat  field  (120th  Street,  between  Broadway  and  River-  s^t?!?  * 
side  Drive),  where  they  were  reinforced  and  made  a 
stand.  Washington  had  also  sent  in  reinforcements,  the 
greater  part  of  Greene's  division,  so  that  there  were  about 
1,800  Americans  engaged.  Putnam,  Greene,  George  Clin 
ton  and  Reed,  were  all  in  the  action  and  all  displayed 
great  courage,  which  animated  the  men.  More  rein 
forcements  came  up  to  the  British,  including  the  42d 
Highlanders  and  some  of  Donop's  Hessians.  There  was 
a  sharp  engagement  in  the  buckwheat  field  lasting  an 
hour  and  a  half.  There  were  no  intrenchments  on  either 
side.  It  was  a  fight  in  an  open,  almost  level,  field,  the 
two  lines  being  not  more  than  a  hundred  yards  apart. 
Again  the  British  and  Hessians  retreated,  through  an 
orchard  about  a  third  of  a  mile  in  the  rear,  where  they 
made  a  short  stand;  and  then  finally  to  the  vicinity  of 
the  Jones  house  (105th  Street),  more  than  a  mile  from 
the  "Hollow  Way/'  where  the  action  had  begun  at  11 
A.  M.  It  was  now  about  3  P.  M.,  and  Howe  had  brought 
up  nearly  the  whole  of  Cornwallis's  division  and  the 
Hessians,  probably  5,000  men.  Washington  had  no 
intention  of  bringing  on  a  general  engagement  and  sent 

1  Sparks,  IV,  98,  99. 


50  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776        an  aide  to  order  a  retreat.    The  troops  marched  back  to 
Harlem  Heights  in  good  order  and  without  being  mo 
lested.    Washington's  loss  was  about  30  killed  and  100 
wounded,  and  Howe's  14  killed  and  157  wounded. 
Results  of  It  was  not  a  great  battle;   yet  the  numbers  engaged 

were  about  equal  to,  and  the  losses  incurred  were  greater 
than,  those  at  Bennington,  Stony  Point,  King's  Moun 
tain  or  Cowpens.  Its  importance  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  same  troops  which  had  fled  in  a  disgraceful  panic  on 
the  previous  day  at  Kip's  Bay  recovered  their  courage; 
drove  the  British  and  Hessian  regulars  before  them  for 
more  than  a  mile;  fought  them  in  the  open  at  40  yards' 
range;  and  finally,  when  the  object  of  the  movement  was 
accomplished,  retreated  in  good  order  and  without  mo 
lestation  to  their  own  lines.  All  this  had  a  wonderful 
effect  in  restoring  the  morale  of  the  Continental  army. 
It  completely  checked  Howe's  advance.  He  made  no 
offensive  movement  for  nearly  four  weeks,  contenting 
himself  with  fortifying  the  hills  from  Bloomingdale 
through  McGowan's  Pass  to  Hell  Gate,  while  Washing 
ton  was  fortifying  the  opposing  heights  north  and  west 
of  Harlem.  There  were  three  distinct  lines  of  trenches 
and  redoubts,  extending  from  the  Hudson  River  to 
the  Harlem  Plain,  one  on  the  present  site  of  147th  Street, 
the  next  at  153d  Street  and  the  third  at  162d  Street. 
On  the  hill  at  182d  Street  a  large  pentagonal  bastioned 
redoubt  (Fort  Washington)  was  constructed,  the  re 
mains  of  which  are  still  visible.  It  was  capable  of  hold 
ing  2,000  men;  it  was  200  feet  above  the  water;  it  com 
manded  a  fine  stretch  down  the  river  as  well  as  across 
it;  and  in  connection  with  Fort  Lee  on  the  opposite 
Jersey  shore  and  a  line  of  sunken  vessels,  booms  and 
chains  in  the  river,  it  was  intended  to  prevent  the  British 


NEW  YORK  51 

men-of-war  and  transports  from  passing  up  the  Hudson.        me 
Great  was  Washington's  disappointment  when  it  was 
shown  that  these  works  could  not  effect  that  purpose. 
Two  frigates  sailed  up  the  river  with  a  favorable  breeze; 
and  although  bombarded  by  the  guns  of  the  forts  on  both  Oct.  9 
sides,  they  passed  the  obstructions  without  serious  injury. 
Howe's  next  plan  was  to  move  past  Washington's 


flank  —  a  movement  quite  similar  to  that  which  Grant  Howe's 
made  on  a  much  larger  scale  in  1864.  The  lines  which  through^ 
Washington  had  built  on  Harlem  Heights  were  very 
strong,  and  they  were  defended  by  14,750  *  men,  who 
had  shown  in  the  engagement  of  September  16  that  they 
were  still  full  of  fight.  Howe  wisely  decided  not  to 
assault  these  works.  His  own  lines  were  now  strong 
enough  to  be  held  by  a  small  force,  which  would  make 
New  York  safe  from  recapture.  Leaving  Lord  Percy's 
division  in  these  works  he  embarked  the  rest  of  his  army 
in  small  boats  at  86th  Street  and  moved  them  through 
the  Sound  to  Throg's  Neck.  This  movement  threatened  Oct.  12 
Washington's  communications,  but  it  was  not  effectual. 
Throg's  Neck  is  connected  with  the  main-land  by  a  cause 
way  and  bridge  crossing  Westchester  Creek.  Washing 
ton  sent  a  few  regiments  to  destroy  this  bridge  and  take 
position  on  the  west  side  of  the  creek.  Howe  could  not 
have  forced  the  crossing  without  great  loss;  he  therefore 
put  his  men  in  boats  again  and  moved  them  across  the 
water  to  Pell's  Point,2  south  of  New  Rochelle.  Washing 
ton  met  this  movement  by  extending  Spencer's  division  Oct.  is 
along  the  hills  behind  the  Bronx,  with  their  outposts  out 
on  the  shore  of  the  Sound  in  touch  with  Howe's  landing 
parties.  Three  days  later  Washington  arrived  at  White 

J  Sparks,  III,  493;  Amer.  Archives,  5,  II,  910. 
2  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  185. 


52  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776        Plains/  about  eight  miles  north  of  New  Rochelle,  with 

Oct.  21  Heath's  division;    and  a  few  days  afterward  he  was 

joined  by  Sullivan's,  Stirling's  and  Lee's  divisions.  He 
then  had  at  White  Plains  about  13,000  men — his  entire 
army  except  about  2,000  men  left  at  Fort  Washington, 
and  4,500  at  and  near  Fort  Lee,  which  were  under 
the  command  of  Greene.2  Howe  had  a  slightly  larger 
number. 

Battle  of  Washington  selected  a  position  near  White  Plains, 

fortified  it  by  two  lines  of  intrenchments  and  there 
awaited  Howe's  attack.  The  trenches  were  on  slightly 
rising  ground,  the  left  protected  by  swampy  ground  and 
the  right  resting  on  the  Bronx  River.  Beyond  the  right 
was  a  piece  of  high  ground,  called  Chatterton's  Hill, 
which  commanded  the  plain  over  which  Howe  would 
have  to  advance.  It  was  occupied  by  Haslet's  Delaware 
regiment,  with  two  guns  of  Captain  Alexander  Hamilton's 
battery,  and  supported  by  McDougall's  Brigade;  in  all 
about  1,600  men.3 

Although  Howe  outnumbered  Washington  he  deemed 
it  unwise  to  attack  the  main  position  until  he  had  gained 
possession  of  this  Chatterton's  Hill.  He  therefore  sent 

Oct.  28  Leslie  with  his  own  brigade  and  three  regiments  of  Hes 

sians,  about  4,000  men  in  all,  to  dislodge  Haslet.  They 
forded  the  Bronx  and  advanced  up  the  hill,  their  attack 
preceded  by  a  sharp  artillery  fire  from  thirteen  guns  posted 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Bronx.  Such  effective  resistance 
was  made  by  two  excellent  regiments  in  McDougall's 

10 A.M.  brigade  and  by  Hamilton's  two  guns  that  the  first  at 
tack  failed.  Later  it  was  renewed  in  front,  while  Rail, 
with  one  of  the  Hessian  regiments,  made  his  way  around 

Sparks,  IV,  524.  *  Ibid.;  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  663. 

1  Dawson,  179,  184. 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


WHITE   PLAINS,  Oct.  28,  1776 
Movements  of  Nathan  Hale,  Sept.   10-22,  1776 


NEW  YORK  53 

Haslet's  right  flank;  and  this  attack  succeeded.  Me-  1773 
Dougall  retreated,  bringing  off  the  guns  and  joined 
Washington's  main  position.  The  British  loss  was  28 
killed,  and  126  wounded;  5  officers  being  among  the  killed, 
and  5  among  the  wounded;  the  Hessians  lost  77. *  The 
American  loss  was  not  reported  in  detail  but  was  esti 
mated  at  less  than  200. 

Howe  thus  gained  Chatterton's  Hill,  but  he  did  not  Oct.  so 
attack  the  main  lines  that  day  nor  the  next.    On  the  third 
day  he  was  reinforced  by  two  brigades  of  Percy's  division, 
which  he  had  ordered  up  from  New  York;   and  by  the 
second  division  of  Hessians  under  Knyphausen  which  had 
just  arrived  from  Europe.    This  brought  his  strength  up 
to  about  20,000  men,  and  he  determined  to  attack  on  the  Oct.  si 
following  day.    A  storm  delayed  the  movement  and,  NOV.  i 
under  cover  of  the  storm  during  the  next  night,  Wash 
ington   withdrew   five   miles   to   a  strong  position   on 
the  heights   of  North   Castle.      Howe   did  not  follow 
him.2 

The  chief  object  of  Howe's  manoeuvre — to  get  in  rear 
of  Washington,  and  by  occupying  a  line  from  Long  Island 
Sound  to  the  Hudson  to  surround  him  and  cut  off  his  com 
munications  with  New  England — had  thus  failed.  He 
had,  nevertheless,  succeeded  in  dividing  Washington's 
small  force  into  three  bodies,  one  in  New  Jersey,  at  or  near 
Fort  Lee,  one  on  Manhattan  Island,  at  or  near  Fort  Wash 
ington  and  the  third  at  North  Castle.  The  main  body,  at 
North  Castle,  and  the  most  important  post,  at  Fort 
Washington,  were  twenty-five  miles  apart;  and  Howe 
was  between  them.  Moreover,  his  ships  had  shown  that 
they  could  ascend  the  river;  he  could  obtain  his  sup- 
Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  184-185;  Lowell,  301. 
3  Dawson,  186. 


54  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776        plies  by  water  and  could  concentrate  his  troops  at  any 
point  along  the  river. 

This  faulty  disposition  of  Washington's  troops  invited 
disaster,  which  was  not  long  in  arriving.  It  was  due  to 
the  unanimous  desire  of  Congress  that  the  last  remaining 
point  on  Manhattan  Island — Fort  Washington — should 
not  be  abandoned.  Congress  sent  Washington  resolu- 

oct.  11  tions1  to  this  effect,  and  these  unfortunately  influenced 

the  better  judgment  of  Washington,  and  also  of  his  gen 
erals. 

Early  in  November  there  were  in  service  106  regiments, 
of  which  about  one-third  were  Continentals  and  two-thirds 
militia.  They  numbered  on  paper  about  2,400  officers 
and  40,000  men;2  but  the  "rank  and  file,  present,  fit  for 
duty,"  were  only  about  19,000.  Gates  at  Ticonderoga 
had  about  6,000;  Heath,  in  the  Highlands,  with  head 
quarters  at  Peekskill,  had  about  3,000;  Lee,  at  North 
Castle,  on  the  Croton  River,  had  5,000;  and  there  were 
2,700  at  Fort  Washington,  and  an  equal  number  at  Fort 
Lee,  both  under  command  of  Greene.  Howe,  with 
nearly  20,000  men,  was  at  Dobb's  Ferry  on  the  Hudson, 
about  midway  between  Lee  and  Greene;  he  had  fully 
10,000  more  at  New  York  and  Staten  Island.3  Carleton, 
with  nearly  10,000  men,  was  at  Crown  Point,  and  had 
just  defeated  Arnold  in  a  spirited  naval  engagement  on 

oct.  11          Lake  Champlain.4    After  that  he  retired  to  Canada  and 

NOV.  2  went  into  winter  quarters. 

As  previously  stated,  when  Washington  withdrew  from 

NOV.  i  White  Plains  to  North  Castle,  Howe  did  not  follow  him. 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VI,  866. 

8  Returns  of  November  3,  November  9,  November  13.  Amer.  Archives, 
5,  III,  499,  663,  702. 

3  Sparks,  V,  542. 

4  Sparks,  IV,  155;  Dawson,  167-174. 


NEW  YORK  55 

On  the  same  day  he  sent  a  detachment  from  his  troops        me 
at  New  Rochelle  to  occupy  the  heights  north  of  Spuyten 
Duyvil;   and  a  few  days  later  he  moved  his  main  body  NOV.  5 
from  White  Plains  to  Dobb's  Ferry.    Washington  imme 
diately  saw  what  Howe's  plan  was.     "That  they  will  in 
vest  Fort  Washington  is  a  matter  of  which  there  can 
be  no  doubt.1  ...  I  think  it  highly  probable,  and  al 
most  certain,  that  he  will  make  a  descent  with  a  part  of 
his  troops  into  Jersey."  2    He  prepared  to  meet  this  situ 
ation  as  fully  as  the  force  at  his  disposal  would  permit. 
Greene  had  written  asking  for  instructions  in  regard  to  Oct.  si 
Fort  Washington,  and  Washington  had  replied  leaving  the 
matter  to  Greene's  discretion,  only  reminding  him  of  the 
previous  intention  to  hold  the  fort  to  the  last.    While 
Howe  was  transferring  his  base  from  the  Sound  to  the 
Hudson  River  he  ordered  vessels  to  come  up  to  meet  him 
at  Dobb's  Ferry.    A  frigate  and  two  transports  broke  NOV.  5 
through  the  obstructions  and  passed  up  the  river.    Greene 
reported  this  to  Washington,3  and  on  the  same  day  NOV.  7 
Washington  advised  Greene  of  Howe's  movements,  and 
his  interpretation  of  them,  and  said  that  he  should  prob 
ably  come  in  person  with  "the  troops  designed  for  the 
Jerseys." 4    When  Washington,  on  the  following  day, 
received  Greene's  report  of  the  passage  of  the  British 
ships  up  the  river,  he  began  to  doubt  the  advisability  of 
attempting  to  hold  Fort  Washington  any  longer.    He 
immediately  wrote  to  Greene,5  expressing  such  doubts,  NOV.  s 
and  saying:  "I  am  therefore  inclined  to  think  that  it  will 
not  be  prudent  to  hazard  the  men  and  stores  at  Mount 
Washington;  but  as  you  are  on  the  spot,  leave  it  to  you 

1  Sparks,  IV,  163.  '  Ibid.,  IV,  159. 

1  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  556.  « Ibid.,  5,  III,  557. 

5  Amer,  Archives,  5,  III,  602;  Sparks,  IV,  164. 


56  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  to  give  such  orders  as  to  evacuating  Mount  Washington 
as  you  judge  best,  and  so  far  revoking  the  order  given  to 
Colonel  Magaw  to  defend  it  to  the  last." 

Washington  had  by  this  time  come  to  have  great  con 
fidence  in  Greene's  judgment.  Greene  was  himself  the 
soul  of  loyalty.  Had  Washington  given  him  an  order  it 
would  have  been  promptly  obeyed,  whatever  his  own 
opinion  might  have  been.  Washington  not  only  did  not 
give  an  order,  but  he  did  not  intend  to  give  one.  He  in 
tended  to — and  did — advise  Greene  that  the  views  he  had 
previously  entertained  and  had  expressed  the  last  time 
he  saw  Greene  had  been  modified  by  subsequent  events, 
and  without  giving  any  positive  orders  he  left  it  to 
Greene's  discretion  to  act  as  he  thought  best.  Judged  by 
the  result,  Greene  decided  wrongly. 

Oct.  11  Congress  had  passed  urgent  resolutions  that  the  fort 

Oct.  id  should  be  held.1    At  a  council  of  war,  where  sixteen  gen 

eral  officers  were  present — including  every  prominent 
officer  in  the  army  except  Greene  himself,  who  was  ab 
sent  in  New  Jersey — it  was  unanimously  "agreed,  that 
Fort  Washington  be  retained  as  long  as  possible." 2 
Colonel  Robert  Magaw,  of  Pennsylvania,  who  commanded 
in  Fort  Washington,  and  was  considered  one  of  the  best 
regimental  commanders  in  the  Continental  service,  advised 
Greene  that  he  could  hold  the  fort  until  the  end  of  the 
year.3  Greene  concurred  in  this  view,  believing  that  the 
garrison  would  make  as  vigorous  a  defence  as  at  Bunker 
Hill.  He  therefore  exercised,  unwisely,  the  discretion 
vested  in  him  by  deciding  not  to  withdraw  the  garrison. 
NOV.  10  When  Washington  arrived  the  responsibility  of  de- 


1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VI,  866. 

3  Amer.  Archives,  5,  II,  1117;  Sparks,  IV,  155. 

8  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  619. 


2 

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From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States  and  Its  People 


NGTON 

776 


NEW  YORK  57 

ciding  the  question  rested  on  him.    He  had  left  White        me 
Plains,  taking  Putnam  and  Mercer  and  a  small  body  of 
troops  with  him,  had  crossed  the  Hudson  at  King's  Ferry  NOV.  12 
(Stony  Point — Verplanck's  Point),  and  riding  down  on  the 
Jersey  side  in  advance  of  his  troops,  reached  Greene's  NOV.  is 
camp  at  Fort  Lee.    The  matter  was  fully  discussed,  but, 
as  Greene  said,  "finally  nothing  concluded  on77;1  and  as 
Washington  said,2  when  three  years  later  Charles  Lee 
criticised  his  leadership,  the  discussion  "  caused  that  war 
fare  in  my  mind,  and  hesitation,  which  ended  in  the 
loss  of  the  garrison." 

Being  still  in  doubt,  two  days  later  Washington  de 
cided  to  cross  the  river  and  examine  the  position  in  per 
son.  In  company  with  Putnam  and  Greene  and  Mercer,  NOV.  IG 
he  was  rowed  across  early  in  the  morning,  but  just  as  they 
landed  the  cannonade  began,  and  the  attack  soon  fol 
lowed.  Greene's  description  is  quite  graphic.3  "  There 
we  all  stood  in  a  very  awkward  situation.  As  the  dis 
position  was  made  and  the  enemy  advancing,  we  durst 
not  attempt  to  make  any  new  disposition;  indeed,  we  saw 
nothing  amiss.  We  all  urged  his  excellency  to  come  off. 
I  offered  to  stay.  General  Putnam  did  the  same,  and  so 
did  General  Mercer;  but  his  excellency  thought  it  best 
for  us  all  to  come  off  together,  which  we  did,  about  half 
an  hour  before  the  enemy  surrounded  the  fort."  This 
was  certainly  a  humiliating  position  for  the  commander- 
in-chief  and  his  principal  officers  to  be  in. 

The  battle  took  place  in  this  wise.    Howe  moved  his  LOSS  of  Fort 
main  body  southward  from  Dobb's  Ferry,  and  the  Hes 
sians  westward  from  New  Rochelle;   he  formed  his  prin 
cipal  line  on  the  heights,  north  and  east  of  Harlem  River, 

1  Greene  to  Knox,  Knox,  33.  3  Sparks,  VI,  329. 

» Ibid.,  34. 


58  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  between  the  Hudson  and  the  Bronx.  In  advance  of 
them,  the  Hessians  occupied  a  position  south  of  Harlem 
River  at  Kingsbridge,  and  Cornwallis  another  position 
(University  Heights)  east  of  the  river,  both  of  which  they 
fortified;  while  Percy  brought  part  of  his  division  from 
McGowan's  Pass  up  to  the  " Hollow  Way"  (125th  Street 
and  Manhattan  Avenue).  The  Americans  were  thus 
surrounded  by  something  more  than  13,000  men1 — 12 
British  and  15  Hessian  regiments.  Thirty  flatboats  were 

NOV.  14  brought  up  the  Hudson  from  New  York,  and  during  the 
night  succeeded  in  passing  Fort  Washington  and  through 
Spuyten  Duyvil  into  the  Harlem  River  south  of  Kings- 
bridge.  Howe  was  fully  posted  as  to  the  American  posi 
tion  by  the  adjutant  of  Magaw's  regiment,2  who  had 
deserted  two  weeks  before  and  given  Howe  plans  of  all 
the  works  and  the  strength  of  the  garrison. 

Magaw,  on  the  American  side,  commanded  three  regi 
ments:  his  own  and  Sheets  (now  under  Cadwalader)  from 
Pennsylvania,  and  Rawlings'  of  Maryland;  and  detach 
ments  from  the  so-called  "  Pennsylvania  Flying  Camp," 
under  Colonel  Baxter,  equal  to  about  three  more  regi 
ments.  Cadwalader  was  in  the  lines  from  165th  Street 
south  to  the  " Hollow  Way";  Rawlings  was  in  those  on 
the  heights  near  the  Hudson,  south  of  Inwood,  Baxter 
at  Laurel  Hill  (Fort  George)  on  the  Harlem,  and  Magaw 
in  Fort  Washington.3 

NOV.  i8,  The   attack  began   almost  simultaneously  on  three 

sides,  Knyphausen  and  Rail  leading  the  Hessians  in  two 
columns  against  Rawlings,  Cornwallis  landing  from  the 
thirty  boats  and  scaling  the  heights  of  Fort  George 
against  Baxter,  and  Percy  crossing  the  "Hollow  Way" 

1  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  1058.  *  Lossing,  II,  619. 

'Dawson,  189. 


NEW  YORK  59 

and  attacking  Cadwalader.  The  attack  was  preceded  and  me 
covered  by  a  heavy  artillery  fire  from  the  east  side  of  the 
Harlem  River.1  Cadwalader  made  only  a  feeble  resistance 
and  fell  back  toward  Fort  Washington;  but  Rawlings  de 
fended  his  position  with  great  vigor,  and  it  was  only  after 
two  hours  of  hard  fighting  and  heavy  losses  that  the 
Hessians,  with  their  enormous  superiority  of  force,  were 
able  to  drive  him  back.2  Baxter  was  mortally  wounded, 
and  his  men  retired  before  Cornwallis.  Learning  that 
Cadwalader  was  retreating,  Howe  ordered  a  fourth  attack, 
which  had  originally  been  intended  as  a  feint,  to  be 
made  vigorously  by  the  42d  Highlanders,  crossing  the 
Harlem  in  boats  and  climbing  a  steep  hill  near  the 
Morris  House  (165th  Street),  and  trying  to  intercept 
Cadwalader.  Magaw  sent  a  detachment  to  oppose  this, 
and  the  Highlanders  lost  heavily;  but  they  finally  car 
ried  the  hill  and  captured  the  detachment.  They  were, 
however,  so  delayed  that  they  were  unable  to  intercept 
Cadwalader,  and  he  succeeded  in  reaching  Fort  Wash 
ington.3 

Early  in  the  afternoon  all  the  Americans,  more  or  less 
demoralized,  had  been  driven  from  their  outlying  works 
into  Fort  Washington.  After  some  parleying  Magaw  sur 
rendered  the  entire  body  to  Knyphausen.4 

Howe  at  first  followed  up  his  victory  with  energetic  NOV.  is 
pursuit  of  the  troops  in  New  Jersey.    Leaving  the  Hes 
sians  with  their  prisoners,  he  sent  Cornwallis  with  twelve  NOV.  19 
regiments  across  the  Hudson  at  Yonkers,  and  marching 
down  behind  the  Palisades  he  arrived  in  rear  of  Fort 
Lee.    Greene  had  detected  the  movement;  and  sending 

1  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  194. 

2  Ibid.,  195;  Lowell,  80-84;  Eelking,  51. 

3  Sparks,  IV,  180.  «  Dawson,  191,  195. 


60  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  report  of  it  to  Washington  (who  was  at  Hackensac,  as 
sembling  the  men  he  had  brought  from  North  Castle) 
Greene  brought  off  the  garrison  of  Fort  Lee  during  the 

NOV.  20  night,  and  reached  the  Hackensac  bridge  only  a  few  hours 
before  Cornwallis.  Here  he  was  joined  by  Washington, 
and  a  brief  stand  was  made  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the 

NOV.  23  troops  at  Hackensac  village,  behind  the  Passaic.  Then 
the  retreat  was  continued  to  Newark.1 

Howe's  losses  at  Fort  Washington  were  78  killed,  374 
wounded  and  6  missing.  About  three-fourths  of  the 
losses  were  in  the  Hessian  regiments  under  Knyphausen, 
which  attacked  Rawlings  from  the  north.  The  American 
loss  was  59  killed  and  2;818  prisoners,  of  whom  96  were 
wounded.  Adding  105  captured  at  Fort  Lee,  the  total 
loss  of  the  Americans  was  approximately  3,000  men. 
The  British  chief  of  artillery  made  an  itemized  report 
of  the  artillery,2  ammunition  and  stores  taken  in  the 
two  forts;  it  included  146  pieces  of  artillery,  over  12,000 
shot,  shell  and  case,  2,800  small-arms  and  400,000  musket 
cartridges.  The  Continental  treasury  and  the  limited 
resources  of  the  Colonies  in  gun  factories  were  in  no  con 
dition  to  stand  such  a  loss. 
From  every  point  of  view  it  was  a  terrible  disaster. 

Results  of  the  Had  Howe  pursued  Washington  with  the  same  relent- 
less  energy  and  well-directed  skill  that  Grant  pursued 
Lee  eighty-eight  years  later,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the 
Continental  army  could  have  escaped  destruction.  Howe 
had  nearly  30,000  regular  troops,  as  good  as  any  in  the 
world.  He  had  captured  the  city  of  New  York  and  the 
line  of  the  Hudson  for  forty  miles  above  it — and  that 
comprised  about  all  there  was  of  the  State  of  New  York 

1  Sparks,  IV,  187,  189.  3  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  1058,  1059. 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


RETREAT  THROUGH   NEW  JERSEY 
Nov. -Dec.,  1776 


NEW  YORK  61 

at  that  time,  the  settlements  around  Albany  being  little  me 
more  than  Indian  trading-posts.  He  had  complete  com 
mand  of  the  river,  with  over  300  transports  protected  by 
nearly  80  vessels  of  war.  Properly  handled,  these  could 
have  prevented  any  of  Lee's  division  from  crossing  the 
Hudson  to  join  Washington,  and  with  their  aid  a  com 
paratively  small  land  force  could  either  have  captured 
Heath  at  Peekskill  and  Clinton  at  Fort  Montgomery,  or 
driven  them  away  from  their  posts,  and  given  Howe  the 
much-desired  command  of  the  Hudson  to  Albany.  By 
controlling  the  Hudson  and  remorselessly  following  Wash 
ington's  few  remaining  regiments  wherever  they  went, 
and  keeping  the  field  as  long  as  they  kept  it,  notwith 
standing  the  season,  he  could  have  ended  the  war  before 
spring. 

Perhaps  he  did  not  know  the  despondency  prevailing  American 
on  the  American  side.    John  Adams,  the  most  important 
man  in  Congress — President  of  the  Board  of  War  and 
member  of  the  committee  to  seek  aid  from  foreign  na 
tions — had  gone  home  to  spend  three  months  with  his  Oct.  is,  1776, 
family  in  Massachusetts.1    Congress  was  ready  to  pass 
the  resolutions,  which  it  did  pass  a  few  weeks  later,2  to  NOV.  23 
make  Washington  dictator,  and  adjourn  to  Baltimore — 
where  there  would  probably  have  been  no  quorum,  if 
Washington  had  failed  at  Trenton.    Washington  him 
self  wrote  to  Congress3  from  Newark  that  "the  situation 
of  our  affairs  is  truly  critical,"  and  to  his  brother,4  a  little 
later:  "In  a  word,  if  every  nerve  is  not  strained  to  recruit  Dec.  is 
the  new  army  with  all  possible  expedition,  I  think  the 
game  is  pretty  nearly  up." 

1  Morse,  Life  of  John  Adams,  146;  Familiar  Letters  of  John  Adams,  233. 

2  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VI,  1027. 

3  Sparks,  IV,  190.  «  Ibid..  IV,  231. 


62  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  Howe  missed  his  chance.    Instead  of  driving  Wash- 

Howe  Goes      ington  to  Philadelphia  and  dispersing  his  army  as  its 

into  Winter  ,.  •       t    i       i     i       -,  ^f  n*     •  * 

Quarters         enlistments  expired,  he  halted  Cornwallis,  first  at  Bruns 
wick,  and  then  at  Trenton;  and  went  into  winter  quar 
ters,  saying  (to  Lord  George   Germain)1   that  his  in- 
Dee.  20          tention  did  not  extend  beyond    getting    and   keeping 
possession  of  East  Jersey.    Instead  of  seizing  and  hold 
ing  the  Highlands  of  the  Hudson  he  sent  Sir  Henry  Clin 
ton,  with  6,000  troops  and  a  large  part  of  the  navy,  to 
Dec.  s  Newport,  intending  in  the  spring  to  capture  Providence 

and  thus  penetrate  into  New  England.2  There  was  no 
enemy  at  Newport,  and  the  place  was  captured  without 
resistance;  the  advance  to  Providence  was  never  made, 
and  the  British  troops  which  spent  the  next  three  years 
at  Newport  made  the  inhabitants  miserable  but  accom 
plished  no  military  purpose. 

Howe,  having  thus  completed  his  plans  for  a  quiet 
winter,  Washington,  by  a  supreme  effort  of  genius  and 
daring  at  Trenton,  changed  the  whole  situation.  No 
second  opportunity  like  that  of  December,  1776,  ever 
came  to  Howe  or  his  successor. 

Washington  Washington  had  been  only  a  few  days  at  Newark  when 
Delaware0  e  Cornwallis  appeared  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river; 
NOV.  29  simultaneously  the  Hessians  crossed  the  Passaic  above 
Dec.  3  his  left  flank,  and  it  was  rumored  that  Howe  was  em 

barking  men  for  Staten  Island,  to  turn  his  right  by  way 
of  Amboy.3  Washington  therefore  retreated  to  Bruns 
wick  and  a  few  days  later  to  Trenton,  and  took  position 
behind  the  Delaware,  having  taken  the  precaution  to 
secure  all  the  boats  on  the  river  for  70  miles  above  Phil 
adelphia.4  His  force  was  reduced  to  about  3,000  men,5 

1  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  1316.       3  Sparks,  IV,  220.       3  Ibid.,  IV,  194. 
4Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  1027,  1120,  1152.  *  Ibid.,  5,  III,  1035. 


NEW  YORK  63 

whose  enlistments  would  expire  at  the  end  of  the  month.  me 
With  his  soldierly  instinct  he  felt  sure  that  Howe  would 
pursue  him  with  his  entire  force,  attempt  to  cross  the 
Delaware  above  or  below  him,  crush  him  in  action  and 
push  on  to  Philadelphia.  So  convinced  was  he  that 
Howe  would  adopt  this  plan  that  he  wrote  to  Congress1  Dec.  s. 
that  "the  object  of  the  enemy  cannot  now  be  doubted  in 
the  smallest  degree."  He  therefore  suggested  that  Phila-  Dec.  9 
delphia  should  be  fortified,  and  sent  Putnam  there  to 
take  charge  of  the  works,  and  Mifflin  along  with  him  to 
take  charge  of  the  stores  and  aid  in  raising  the  militia, 
with  whom  he  had  great  influence.  Congress,  after  con 
ferring  with  Putnam  and  Mifflin,  passed  a  resolution,2 
"That  the  Continental  general  commanding  at  Phila 
delphia  be  directed  to  defend  the  same  to  the  utmost 
extremity,"  and  adjourned,  to  meet  later  in  Baltimore.  Dec.  12 

There  was  no  stampede  on  Washington's  part.  What 
ever  he  might  write  privately  to  his  brother,  he  showed 
no  lack  of  confidence  to  those  around  him,  in  his  letters 
to  public  officials  and  in  his  orders  to  his  subordinates. 
At  no  time  in  his  whole  career  did  he  act  with  more  in 
tense  energy  than  during  these  three  weeks  in  December, 
writing  almost  daily  letters3  to  the  governors  of  States 
and  to  Congress,  suggesting  measures  for  raising  troops 
and  apologizing  for  those  which  he  himself  had  taken  if 
they  should  seem  to  exceed  his  authority.  "A  char-  Letter  to 
acter  to  lose,  an  estate  to  forfeit,  the  inestimable  bless-  Dec.  20  ' 
ings  of  liberty  at  stake,  and  a  life  devoted,  must  be  my 
excuse."  4 

On  leaving  White  Plains  he  had  given  Lee  formal 
and  explicit  orders  in  writing  as  to  what  Lee  should 

1  Sparks,  IV,  206-208.  2  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VI,  1026,  1027. 

5  Sparks,  IV,  200-264.  *  Ibid.,  IV,  235. 


64  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776        do  in  certain  contingencies,  and  the  most  important  part 
NOV.  10          of  these  orders  directed  Lee/  in  case  the  enemy  should 
cross  the  Hudson,  to  follow  "with  all  possible  despatch." 
NOV.  16          After  the  loss  of  Fort  Washington  he  sent  orders  to  Lee 
to  bring  his  entire  force  to  join  him.2    While  at  Newark, 
Congress  authorized  him3  to  call  upon  Schuyler  for  the 
Pennsylvania  and  Jersey  troops,  and  the  instant  he  re 
ceived  the  resolution  he  wrote  to  Schuyler4  to  send  them. 
Lee's  Dilatory       All  of  these  instructions  were  promptly  carried  out  ex- 

M'trc^i 

cept  in  the  case  of  Lee.  That  officer  had  recently  re 
turned  from  the  South,  much  inflated  in  his  own  estima 
tion,  as  well  as  that  of  more  judicious  men  like  Jay  and 
Duer,5  by  the  victory  at  Charleston,  the  credit  of  which 
in  reality  was  due  to  Moultrie  and  not  to  himself.  The 
succession  of  disasters  and  retreats,  from  Long  Island  to 
White  Plains  and  from  Fort  Washington  to  Newark, 
filled  his  traitor's  mind  with  the  thought0  that  perhaps 
people  could  be  induced  to  believe  that  Congress  had 
made  a  mistake  in  the  selection  of  a  commander-in-chief 
sixteen  months  before,  and  that  a  soldier  who  had  seen 
service  under  the  King  of  England,  the  King  of  Poland, 
and  the  Empress  of  Russia  might  be  selected  as  his  suc 
cessor.  He  was  therefore  in  no  hurry  to  join  Washington  ; 
to  the  latter 's  repeated  instructions  to  hasten  his  march 
he  returned  frivolous  replies,  meanwhile  writing  to  his 
friends,7  Reed  and  Rush  and  Gates,  wondering  if  Wash 
ington  was  such  a  great  man  as  had  been  thought.  Fi 
nally,  however,  Washington's  orders  became  so  imper 
ative  that  he  dared  not  disobey,  and  he  put  his  com 
mand  in  motion  ten  days  after  he  had  received  the  first 

1  Sparks,  IV,  170.  *  Ibid.,  IV,  186,  187,  192,  193. 

3  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VI,  977.  «  Sparks,  IV,  192. 

5  Moore,  37.  6  Ibid.,  49,  50. 

T  Ibid.,  38,  42;  Reed,  I,  255;  Sparks,  IV,  535. 


NEW  YORK  65 

order.    He  crossed  the  Hudson  at  King's  Ferry  (Stony        m& 
Point — Verlpanck's  Point),  and  had  to  make  a  detour  by  Dec.  2 
way  of  Morristown  in  order  to  avoid  Cornwallis.    He 
marched  as  slowly  as  possible — 40  miles  in  8  days — and 
one  night,  while  sleeping  at  a  tavern  at  Baskinridge,  3  Dec.  12 
miles  from  his  command,  he  was  captured  by  Cornwallis's 
dragoons  and  carried  a  prisoner  to  Howe.1    The  latter  at  capture  of 
first  thought  of  treating  him  as  a  deserter  from  the 
British  army;   and  for  this  or  other  reasons  Lee  under 
took  to  advise  Howe  as  to  the  strength  and  position  of 
the  American  army  and  the  best  means  of  compassing 
its  destruction.    He  even  went  so  far  as  to  hand  to 
Howe,  in  his  own  handwriting,  a  plan  for  the  next  cam 
paign,2  which  Howe  put  away  among  his  papers,  where 
it  was  not  discovered  till  nearly  eighty  years  later. 

Of  all  this,  of  course,  Washington  knew  nothing;   he 
did  know,  although  he  could  not  account  for  it,  that  Lee 
was  very  slow  in  joining  him.    His  troops  did  finally 
arrive  under  Sullivan,  and  Heath  and  Gates  arrived  Dec.  20 
almost  at  the  same  time. 

Washington  seems  to  have  had  a  very  good  service  of 
information;3  for  his  letters  show  that  at  this  time  he  had 
learned,  to  his  surprise,  that  Howe  had  gone  into  winter 
quarters,  instead  of  intending  to  attack  him  and  try  to 
capture  Philadelphia.  As  soon  as  he  learned  this,  Wash 
ington  determined  on  his  counter-stroke.  The  rein 
forcements  he  had  received  had  been  partly  counter 
balanced  by  expiration  of  enlistments  and  the  melting 
away  of  the  militia,  but  he  had  with  him  now  30  small 
Continental  regiments,  containing  4,160  men,  present  for 
duty.  They  were  organized  into  8  brigades  and  2  divi- 

1  Moore,  52-59;  Sparks,  530-541.  »  Moore,  84. 

8  Sparks,  VI,  39,  255. 


66  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  sions,1  under  command  of  Sullivan  and  Greene.  They 
were  posted  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Delaware,  guarding 
all  the  fords  for  20  miles  above  the  big  bend  of  the  river 
at  Bordentown.  Lower  down  the  river,  at  Bristol,  was 
Colonel  John  Cadwalader  with  a  regiment  of  Penn 
sylvania  militia.  Washington's  head-quarters  were  in 
rear  of  the  centre  of  his  line,  at  a  hamlet  called  Newtown." 
Howe's  orders3  for  winter  quarters  had  placed  6  bri 
gades,  probably  15  regiments,  in  Princeton  and  Bruns 
wick,  and  6  regiments  of  Hessians4  under  Donop,  on  the 
Delaware  from  Bordentown  to  Burlington,  3  of  them  be 
ing  at  Trenton  under  Colonel  Rail.  The  total  force  was 

Dec.  g  about  12,000  men.    Cornwallis  had  attempted,  two  weeks 

before,  to  turn  Washington's  left  flank  by  crossing  the 
Delaware  at  Cory  ell's  Ferry,  but  finding  no  boats  had 

Dec.  20  given  up  the  attempt;  and  when  the  troops  went  into 
winter  quarters  had  returned  to  New  York,  intending  to 
go  to  England  on  leave  of  absence  until  spring.  He  had 

Dec.  23          turned  over  the  command  to  Major-General  Grant.5 

Washington    wrote    to    Cadwalader    at    Burlington,8 

Washington      "Christmas  day  at  night,  one  hour  before  day,  is  the 

Delaware e  time  fixed  for  our  attempt  upon  Trenton.  For  Heaven's 
sake,  keep  this  to  yourself.  ...  I  have  ordered  our  men 
to  be  provided  with  three  days'  provisions  ready  cooked, 
with  which,  and  their  blankets,  they  are  to  march;  for 
if  we  are  successful  ...  we  may  push  on."  Washing 
ton's  plan  was  to  cross  the  Delaware  at  McKonkey's 
Ferry,  nine  miles  above  Trenton;  then  march  down  the 
east  bank  in  two  columns,  Sullivan's  division  on  the  river 

1  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  1401;  Sparks,  IV,  244. 

2  Sparks,  IV,  232,  243. 

"Howe  to  Germain,  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  1317. 

4  Lowell,  87;  Eelking,  59. 

5  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  1318.  6  Sparks,  IV,  241. 


OSKa 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company,  Publishers,  Cleveland 
From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States  and  Its  Pepole 


TRENTON  AND   PRINCETON 
Jan.  2-4,  1776 


NEW  YORK  67 

road,  and  Greene's  division  (which  Washington  accom-  me 
panied  in  person)  on  the  Scotch,  about  two  miles  to  the 
left.  The  two  roads  entered  the  village  of  Trenton  from 
the  south-east  and  north-west,  and,  uniting,  formed  its 
main  street.  Artillery,  to  the  number  of  eighteen  pieces, 
was  distributed  through  the  two  columns.  Knox  was  to 
have  charge  of  the  crossing,  and  the  boats  were  to  be 
manned  by  Glover's  Marblehead  regiment.  "A  pro 
found  silence  to  be  enjoined,  and  no  man  to  quit  the 
ranks  on  the  pain  of  death."  l 

The  movement  began  soon  after  dark.    "The  floating  Dec.  25 
ice  in  the  river  made  the  labor  almost  incredible.    How-  Knox's  Letter 
ever,    perseverance  accomplished  what  at  first  seemed 
impossible.    About  2  o'clock  the  troops  were  all  on  the 
Jersey  side;   we  were  then  nine  miles  from  the  object. 
The  night  was  cold  and  stormy;    it  hailed  with  great 
violence;    the  troops  marched  with  the  most  profound 
silence  and  good  order."  2    The  Hessians  had  duly  cele 
brated  Christmas  and  were  sound  asleep.    The  troops 
"arrived  by  two  routes  at  the  same  time,  about  half  an 
hour  after  daylight,  within  one  mile  of  the  town.    The 
storm  continued  with  great  violence,  but  was  in  our 
backs,  and  consequently  in  the  faces  of  the  enemy. 
About  half  a  mile  from  the  town  was  an  advanced  guard 
on  each  road,  consisting  of  a  captain's  guard.    These  we  Battle  of 
forced,  and   entered  the   town   with   them  pell-mell."  Trenton 
Rail  and  his  officers  were  rudely  awakened  in  the  gray  Dec.  26 
dawn  of  this  cheerless  morning — but  by  a  distinguished 
company.    Washington  was  with  the  head  of  column, 
Greene  by  his  side,  and  the  advance  party  was  a  company 
of  the  Third  Virginia,  whose  officers  were  Captain  William 

1  Washington's  order  of  December  25,  Stryker,  114. 

2  Knox,  36. 


68  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  Washington  and  Lieutenant  James  Monroe,  then  less 
than  eighteen  years  old,  afterward  President  of  the  United 
States.  Knox  was  directing  the  artillery,  and  among  its 
officers  was  Captain  Alexander  Hamilton,  whose  twentieth 
birthday  would  come  in  a  few  days.  The  artillery  was 
being  brought  into  position  to  fire  down  King  (now 
Warren)  Street,  and  Greene  was  moving  his  infantry 
down  a  parallel  street,  and  extending  his  right  to  connect 
with  Sullivan,  who  simultaneously  began  the  attack. 
The  Hessians  attempted  to  bring  two  guns  into  action, 
but  the  Virginia  company  charged  them  and  captured 
the  guns,  both  Captain  Washington  and  Lieutenant 
Monroe  being  badly  wounded  in  the  melee.1 

It  had  been  a  part  of  Washington's  plan  that  Ewing, 
with  a  small  brigade  of  militia  was  to  cross  at  Trenton 
ferry,  just  below  the  village,  and  Cadwalader  with  his 
Pennsylvania  militia  at  Bristol  ferry,  about  ten  miles 
lower  down;  but  neither  of  them  could  cross  on  account 
of  the  ice.  The  river  road  from  Trenton  to  Bordentown 
was  thus  left  open,  and  when  the  Hessians  turned  out 
into  the  streets  in  some  confusion,  a  portion  of  them, 
about  500  in  number,  who  were  attacked  by  Sullivan, 
made  their  escape  by  this  road.  Rail  tried  to  form  the 
rest  in  the  streets  at  the  north  end  of  the  village,  but 
these  were  commanded  by  artillery,  and  he  therefore 
moved  out  of  the  village  to  the  east,  intending  to  escape 
to  Princeton.  The  movement  was  detected,  and  Greene 
quickly  threw  out  Hand's  regiment  of  riflemen  on  his 
left  flank  as  far  as  Assanpink  Creek,  cutting  off  all  es 
cape  in  that  direction.  Rail  then  called  upon  his  gren- 

1  The  monograph  by  W.  S.  Stryker  on  the  Battles  of  Trenton  and  Prince 
ton  is  of  the  same  character  as  those  of  Frothingham  and  Johnston;  and 
one  general  reference  to  it  seems  to  be  sufficient. 


NEW  YORK  69 

adiers  to  follow  him  in  attack  at  the  head  of  King  Street;  1776 
but  he  fell  mortally  wounded,  and  the  rest  thereupon 
surrendered.  They  numbered  32  officers  and  886  men, 
and  about  30  had  been  killed.  The  American  loss  was 
2  privates  frozen  to  death  during  the  night  march  and 
2  officers  and  1  private  wounded.1 

Washington  thought  best  not  to  push  on  immediately 
to  Princeton  (as  it  is  said  Greene  and  Knox  advised),2 
but  to  retire  to  the  west  bank  of  the  river  with  his  prison 
ers,  which  he  did  the  same  evening.  The  Hessians  who 
had  escaped  to  Bordentown  so  alarmed  Donop  that  he 
immediately  retreated  to  Amboy,  and  Cadwalader,  who 
had  succeeded  in  crossing  at  Bristol,  occupied  Borden-  Dec.  27 
town.  He  had  with  him  about  1,800  militia,3  and  more 
were  on  their  way  to  join  him  from  Philadelphia,  where 
they  had  been  raised  by  the  exertions  of  Mifflin. 

The  terms  of  enlistment  of  Washington's  entire  force  Washington 
expired  in  three  days,  but  by  promising  them  a  bounty  offensive 
of  ten  dollars  in  addition  to  their  regular  pay  he  per 
suaded  them  to  remain  six  weeks  longer.  He  then  wrote4 
to  the  commanding  officer  at  Morristown  authorizing 
him  to  make  the  same  arrangements  with  the  four  regi 
ments  at  that  place,  and  to  Heath5  at  Peekskill  instructing 
him  to  march  to  Morristown,  as  he  was  satisfied  that  Howe 
would  not  attempt  anything  against  the  Highlands  in 
the  dead  of  winter.  He  then  made  his  plans  to  take  the 
offensive — a  most  daring  plan  considering  the  weather, 
his  deficiency  in  equipment  and  transportation,  the  ab 
sence  of  any  cavalry  in  his  command  and  the  fact  that 
the  enemy  largely  outnumbered  him  and  was  composed 

1  Sparks,  IV,  247.  3  G.  W.  Greene,  I,  300. 

'  Dawson,  204;  Sparks,  IV,  255.  4  Sparks,  IV,  253. 

*IUd.,  IV,  249. 


70  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  of  regular  troops.    Washington  recrossed  the  Delaware, 
Dec.  so          the  operation  requiring  two  days,  owing  to  the  large 
Dec.  si  masses  of  floating  ice  in  the  river.    At  the  same  time  he 

ordered  Mifflin1  and  Cadwalader,  whose  combined  forces 
of  militia  now  amounted  to  3,600  men,  to  join  him,  and 
he  took  a  position  on  the  hills  behind  Assanpink  Creek, 
just  east  of  Trenton,  facing  west. 

1777  Cornwallis,  as  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  affair  at  Trenton, 
Jan.  2            abandoned  his  idea  of  a  leave  and  hastened  back  to  his 

main  command  at  Brunswick.2    He  immediately  pushed 

forward  toward  Trenton,  and  with  the  greater  part  of  his 

Jan.  2,  force,  probably  6,000  men,  arrived  in  front  of  the  Assan- 

4  P    M 

pink  position.  There  was  a  vigorous  cannonade  on  both 
sides,  but  the  creek  was  not  fordable,  the  bridge  was 
well  guarded  and  the  day  was  near  its  close.  Cornwallis 
decided  to  postpone  his  attack  until  the  next  day,  when 
two  brigades  which  were  bivouacking  that  night  on  the 
road  between  Princeton  and  Trenton  would  join  him. 
As  in  the  retreat  from  Long  Island,  so  now  in  the  advance 
to  Princeton,  Washington  displayed  that  marvellous  ce 
lerity  which  he  always  showed  in  a  critical  situation.  At 
dusk  he  sent  his  baggage  down  the  river  to  Burlington; 
large  camp-fires  were  lighted  and  kept  burning  all  night, 
and  by  their  light  men  could  be  seen  working  at  the  in- 
trenchments.  At  midnight  his  entire  force  withdrew, 

Battle  of  Sullivan  in  the  lead,  and  making  a  wide  detour  to  the 
east,  marching  about  eleven  miles  during  the  night,  early 
in  the  morning  he  struck  Colonel  Mawhood's  brigade  of 
three  regiments,  on  the  road  just  south  of  Princeton.3 
They  had  broken  camp  and  were  just  starting  for  Tren- 

jan.  3  ton  to  join  Cornwallis.    Mawhood  turned  his  leading 

1  Sparks,  IV,  258.  2  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  210. 

3  Sparks,  IV,  259. 


NEW  YORK  71 

regiment  (17th)  and  made  a  violent  attack  upon  Mer-  1777 
cer's  brigade,  which  was  at  the  head  of  Sullivan's  col 
umn.  After  the  first  discharge  of  guns  on  both  sides 
the  British  charged  with  the  bayonet,  and  as  few  of  Mer 
cer's  men  had  any  bayonets,  they  fell  back  in  some  con 
fusion.  Then,  as  at  Kip's  Bay,  Washington  rushed  into 
the  thick  of  the  fight,  and  this  time  he  succeeded  in  ral 
lying  the  fugitives.1  It  was  a  fight  at  very  close  quar 
ters  for  about  fifteen  minutes;  General  Mercer,  Colonels 
Haslet  and  Potter,  and  several  other  officers  were  killed. 
Washington  escaped  unharmed,  and  bringing  up  Hand's 
and  Hitchcock's  and  Poor's  and  Patterson's  and  Reed's 
regiments,  all  veterans  of  every  engagement  since  Bunker 
Hill,  he  overpowered  the  17th  Regiment.  After  losing 
nearly  half  its  strength,2  the  rest  of  this  regiment  fought 
its  way  through  to  the  road  leading  south  toward 
Trenton  and  escaped.  The  other  two  regiments,  40th 
and  55th,  were  thus  cut  off  from  the  17th  and  from 
their  brigade  commander.  They  made  a  stout  resist 
ance;  but  Washington,  bringing  up  his  entire  strength, 
drove  them  back  through  the  village  and  the  college 
grounds  at  Princeton  to  and  across  a  small  stream 
called  Millstone  River.  They  continued  their  retreat  to 
Brunswick;  while  Washington  after  giving  a  few  hours' 
rest  to  his  men,  who  had  been  marching  and  fighting  for 
nearly  forty  continuous  hours,  turned  to  the  left  and 
marched  a  few  miles  up  the  river  and  halted  for  the  night.3 
Cornwallis  had  discovered  early  in  the  morning  that 
Washington  had  evacuated  his  lines  at  Trenton,  and  he 
turned  back  on  the  same  road  over  which  he  had  ad 
vanced  on  the  previous  day,  and  marched  rapidly  toward 

1  Marshall,  I,  132;  Lossing,  II,  32. 

2  Howe's  Report;  Dawson,  211.  s  Sparks,  IV,  261. 


72 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 


Jan.  4 


Jan.  7 


Washington 
Arrives  at 
Morristown 


Howe 
Withdraws 
from  New 
Jersey 


Princeton.  Washington  had  not  neglected  to  destroy 
the  bridges  over  Stony  Creek  and  Millstone  River, 
and  Cornwallis  was  delayed  so  long  in  repairing  these 
that  the  whole  day  was  spent  in  covering  the  ten  miles 
to  Princeton.  The  next  day  Washington  marched  seven 
teen  miles  in  the  direction  of  Morristown,  crossing  the 
Raritan  near  Bound  Brook,  and  selecting  a  good  position 
for  the  night  in  the  hills  near  Pluckamin.  Remaining 
there  two  days,  he  marched  to  Morristown  and  went  into 
winter  quarters  with  the  troops  already  there,  and  with 
Heath's  troops  from  the  Highlands  and  Lincoln's  militia 
from  New  England,  who  soon  joined  him.1  Cornwallis 
did  not  follow  or  molest  him  either  at  Pluckamin  or 
Morristown.  On  the  contrary,  Washington  sent  out  de 
tachments  which  had  skirmishes  with  convoys  on  the 
lines  of  communication  of  both  the  British  and  Hessians, 
in  which  they  were  successful.  Howe  was  apparently  so 
stupefied  at  Washington's  audacity  that  he  withdrew 
entirely  from  Jersey,  except  for  a  few  miles  along  the 
Raritan  from  Brunswick  to  Amboy,  and  made  no  move 
ments  of  any  importance  for  nearly  six  months. 

Washington's  losses  at  Princeton  were  never  accurately 
reported,  but  they  included  10  officers,  most  of  them  of 
high  rank,  and  30  men  killed,  and  probably  100  wounded.2 
Howe  reported 3  his  loss  at  19  killed,  58  wounded  and  1,000 
missing;  but  of  the  latter  about  100  were  killed  and  300 
or  more  subsequently  found  their  regiments — so  that  his 
actual  loss  was  probably  about  700,  or  five  times  as  great 
as  Washington's. 

To  military  students  no  page  in  history  is  more  inter 
esting,  more  worthy  of  study  in  every  detail,  than  that 


Sparks,  IV,  264,  272. 

Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  208;  Stryker,  458. 


Dawson,  208. 


NEW  YORK  73 

which  records  the  events  of  those  fourteen  days  in  Jersey,        1777 
from  Christmas,  1776,  to  Wednesday,  January  7,  1777. 
Washington  had  in  very  truth  "  snatched  victory  out  of  Results  of 
the  jaws  of  defeat."    The  planning  of  such  an  audacious  Princeton 
stroke,  the  skill  with  which  every  feature  of  it  was  exe 
cuted  with  ill-trained,  half-clad,  and  barefooted  troops, 
the  personal  gallantry  of  the  commanding  general  at  a 
critical  moment — all  denote  the  great  soldier.    Wash 
ington's  reckless  exposure  in  the  hand-to-hand  encoun 
ter  on  Stony  Creek  was  on  a  par  with  that  of  Napoleon 
at  Lodi  and  of  Skobeleff  at  Plevna;  it  was  designed  with 
the  same  purpose,  and  it  produced  the  same  effect,  of 
endearing  him  to  his  men. 

The  astounding  but  well-deserved  results  of  the  whole 
movement  at  once  and  forever  established  Washington's 
reputation  as  a  soldier.1 

1  Lossing  makes  the  statement  (II,  33)  that  Frederick  the  Great  said: 
"The  achievements  of  Washington  and  his  little  band  of  compatriots  be 
tween  the  25th  of  December  and  the  4th  of  January,  a  space  of  ten 
days,  were  the  most  brilliant  of  any  recorded  in  the  annals  of  military 
achievements."  Stryker  copies  this  (p.  464)  but  without  giving  any 
authority. 

There  is  also  a  mythical  story,  widely  believed,  that  Frederick  sent  a 
sword  to  Washington  with  an  inscription  engraved  upon  it,  "  From  the  old 
est  soldier  in  Europe  to  the  greatest  soldier  in  the  world." 

Both  stories  are  entirely  without  foundation.  They  have  been  exhaust 
ively  examined  and  disproved  by  the  State  Historian  of  New  York  (Preface 
to  New  York  and  the  War  with  Spain,  1903),  Moncure  D.  Conway  (Cen 
tury  Magazine,  April,  1901),  Leland  Ha  worth  (American  Historical  Re 
view  for  April,  1904,  IX,  460-478),  Edward  J.  Lowell  (Hessians,  53-55). 
These  researches  prove  that  Frederick,  while  despising  his  relatives  for 
selling  their  subjects  "to  the  English  as  one  sells  cattle  to  be  dragged  to 
the  shambles,"  showed  no  sympathy  for  the  Americans  in  their  struggle, 
and  expressed  no  opinion  about  Washington.  In  a  letter,  dated  June  23, 
1777,  to  his  brother,  Prince  Henry,  he  said,  "I  purpose  to  draw  out  this 
negotiation  [with  the  American  agent,  Arthur  Lee]  in  order  to  fall  in  with 
the  side  for  which  Fortune  shall  declare  herself"  (Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  IX, 
466). 


74  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  Nor  were  the  political  effects  less  important.    It  not 

only  stopped  all  of  Howe's  operations  for  six  months,  but 
it  laid  the  foundation  for  the  French  alliance. 


CHAPTER  III 
PHILADELPHIA 

FROM  his  position  at  Morristown,  Washington  threat-        1777 
ened  Howe's  flank  in  case  the  latter  moved  either  toward  Advantages  of 

,,        TT     T  T-I-  •  Washington's 

Philadelphia  or  up  the  Hudson.    His  own  commumca-  Positional 

.....  __          _       .        ,  ,  Morristown 

tions  were  open  via  Peekskill  to  New  England  and  via 
Trenton  to  Philadelphia.  He  continued  during  the  winter 
to  send  out  small  parties  to  harass  the  British  troops  on 
the  Raritan  and  prevent  their  obtaining  supplies,  so  that 
speedily  Howe  and  his  staff  as  well  as  his  soldiers,  al 
though  in  possession  of  the  best  harbor  and  one  of  the 
largest  cities  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  were  reduced  to  the 
salt  provisions  that  they  obtained  from  England. 

Washington  then  addressed  himself  to  the  annual  task  Raising  a 

...  -  T  .   ,     -,  ,        . ,  t         New  Army 

of  raising  a  new  army,  for  which  Congress  by  its  resolu 
tion1  at  Baltimore  had  given  him  practically  unlimited 
powers.    In  spite  of  extraordinary  energy  on  Washing-        ms 
ton's  part,  recruits  came  in  slowly.    The  88  battalions  Dec.  27 
authorized  by  one  resolution2  and  the  16  battalions  of  sept.  ie 
infantry,  3  regiments  of  artillery  and  3,000  light  horse 
authorized  by  another,8  amounted  in  all  to  nearly  76,000  Dec.  27 
men.    Months  after  these  resolutions  had  passed  Wash-        1777 
ington  reported  to  Congress4  that  his  force  in  Jersey  was  March  H 
less  than  3,000  fit  for  duty,  all  but  981  of  whom  were 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VII,  1043-1046;  Sparks,  IV,  550. 
a  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  V,  762. 

» Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VII,  1043-1046;  Sparks,  IV,  550. 
« Sparks,  IV,  364. 

75 


76  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  militia.  About  1,000  at  a  time  were  being  passed  through 
the  hospitals  for  inoculation  against  small-pox,  for 
Washington  had  wisely  determined  that  his  army  should 
not  be  destroyed,  as  the  army  in  Canada  had  practically 
been,  by  that  dreaded  disease.  Later  on,  however,  the 
new  regiments  began  to  come  forward,  and  he  had  43 
regiments,  from  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware, 

May  24  Maryland  and  Virginia.    They  were  organized  into  10 

brigades  and  5  divisions,  under  Sullivan,  Greene,  Stirling, 
Stephen  and  Lincoln.  They  numbered  8,378  officers 
and  men.1  Other  regiments,  from  New  York  and  New 
England,  were  assembled  under  Putnam  at  Peekskill, 
whence  they  could  move  toward  Albany  or  Morristown, 
as  circumstances  might  require. 

The  difficulty  about  arms,  which  at  one  time  was  very 
serious,  because  the  men  as  their  enlistments  expired 
carried  their  guns  home  with  them  and  refused  to  give 
them  up,  had  been  fortunately  solved  by  the  arrival  of 
vessels  from  France  bringing  23,000  muskets2  and  1,000 
barrels  of  powder,  in  addition  to  blankets  and  other 
military  stores. 

Howe's  pians  As  the  months  wore  along  Washington  gave  incessant 
thought  to  what  Howe's  plans  would  probably  be;  and 
he  was  convinced  that  Howe  would  bring  the  troops  from 
the  St.  Lawrence  to  join  him  at  New  York,  attack  Wash 
ington  with  all  his  strength,  and  if  he  succeeded  push  on 
to  Philadelphia. 
1776  While  this  was  obviously  the  proper  military  plan  for 

NOV.  so  Howe  to  follow,  yet  Howe  had  different  ideas  in  mind. 
He  conveyed  these  to  Lord  George  Germain  in  a  long 
letter,  which  expressed  the  "hope  of  finishing  the  war  in 
one  year."  He  assumed  that  the  army  in  Canada  would 

1  Sparks,  IV,  432;  Marshall,  I,  145.  2  Sparks,  IV,  338,  375. 


PHILADELPHIA  77 

advance  against  Albany,  and  for  his  own  troops  he  pro-  me 
posed  the  following: 1  "1st,  an  offensive  army  of  10,000 
men,"  to  move  from  Providence  and  attack  Boston; 
"2d,  an  offensive  army  of  10,000  men,"  to  move  up  the 
Hudson  to  Albany,  leaving  5,000  to  defend  New  York; 
"3d,  a  defensive  army  of  8,000  men,"  to  be  stationed  in 
Jersey.  After  the  movements  against  Boston  and  Albany 
had  succeeded  the  entire  force  was  to  be  united  in  Jersey 
for  an  attack  on  Philadelphia — the  campaign  to  end  the 
following  winter  in  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas.  To  carry 
out  this  programme  he  asked  for  10  additional  ships  of 
the  line,  and  reinforcements  of  15,000  more  troops,  sug 
gesting  that  they  might  "be  had  from  Russia  or  from 
Hanover,  and  other  German  states." 

A  few  weeks  later  Howe  modified  his  views,  and  wrote  Dec.  20 
to  Germain2  saying  that  sentiment  was  changed  in  Penn 
sylvania,  that  the  people  were  anxious  for  peace;  he 
therefore  proposed  to  abandon  the  operations  against 
Boston  and  Albany;  to  leave  2,000  men  in  Newport, 
4,000  men  at  New  York,  3,000  on  the  Hudson,  and  with 
his  main  body  of  10,000  effectives  to  act  offensively  in 
Jersey  and  take  Philadelphia.  Charles  Lee  had  been  a 
prisoner  in  Howe's  hands  for  five  days  prior  to  the  date 
of  this  despatch.  Under  the  threat  of  being  treated  as  a 
deserter,  he  had  told  Howe  all  he  knew — and  more.  The 
news  of  the  alleged  change  of  sentiment  in  Pennsylvania 
quite  probably  came  from  him. 

When  these  despatches  reached  London,  Burgoyne  was 
again  there  on  leave  of  absence,  and  he  offered  his  advice. 
His  plan3  was  for  a  movement  across  Lake  Champlain; 

1  Howe's  Narrative,  9;  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  926. 

2  Howe's  Narrative,  10,  11;  Amer.  Archives,  5,  III,  1317. 

3  Burgoyne,  Appendix,  iii-xii. 


78 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 
Feb.  28 

Burgoyne's 
Plan 


March  27 


March  9 


April  2 


March  29 


a  movement  from  Oswego  across  Oneida  Lake  and  down 
the  Mohawk  River;  and  a  movement  up  the  Hudson — 
all  three  to  be  directed  against  Albany.  This  plan  was 
submitted  to  King  George,  who  wrote  on  it  an  endorse 
ment  in  his  own  hand,1  giving  it  his  general  approval; 
he  rejected  the  suggestion  that  the  troops  in  Canada 
might  be  brought  to  join  Howe  at  New  York,  saying,  "I 
greatly  dislike  that  idea7';  he  also  said  explicitly:  "The 
force  from  Canada  must  join  him  (Howe)  at  Albany."2 
This  plan  was  therefore  the  one  adopted  so  far  as  the 
London  authorities  were  concerned;  Burgoyne  was 
selected  to  command  the  two  expeditions  from  Canada; 
and  he  left  London,  carrying  a  despatch  to  Sir  Guy 
Carleton,3  the  Governor  of  Canada,  to  that  effect.  No 
definite  instructions  were  sent  to  Howe,  but  he  was  in 
formed  by  a  despatch,4  which  reached  him  before  the 
orders  were  given  to  Burgoyne,  that  it  was  not  thought 
necessary  to  send  him  so  large  a  reinforcement  as  15,000 
men;  that  a  smaller  number  would  be  sent;  and  no 
objection  was  made  to  his  plan  to  proceed  against 
Philadelphia. 

Howe's  despatch  of  December  20  (above  quoted)  had 
stated  his  intention  to  attack  Philadelphia  by  the  direct 
route  through  Jersey;  but  later  he  changed  his  mind  and 
devised  a  third  plan.  He  outlined  this  in  a  confidential 
despatch5  to  Germain,  written  four  days  after  Charles  Lee 
had  put  in  his  hand  a  written  memorandum  of  the  con 
ditions  as  Lee  thought  they  existed  in  the  Central  and 
Southern  States,  and  a  plan  of  campaign  based  on  these 

1  The  King's  endorsement  in  full  is  given  in  Fonblanque's  Burgoyne,  487. 
1  Ibid. 

3  Germain  to  Carleton,  Burgoyne,  Appendix,  xii-xvii. 

4  Germain  to  Howe,  Howe's  Narrative,  12. 

5  Howe  to  Germain,  Ibid.,  13. 


PHILADELPHIA  79 

assumptions.    Lee  argued  *  that  there  was  a  strong  tory        1777 
sentiment  in  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland,  and  that  the  Lee's  pian 
proper  line  of  attack  upon  Philadelphia  was  by  way 
of  the  Chesapeake.    While  this  written  proposition  of 
Lee's,  as  previously  stated,  never  came  to  light  until 
eighty  years  afterward,  and  was  not  referred  to  in  any 
way  by  Howe,  it  seems  to  have  been  the  basis  of  the  plan 
which  he  adopted. 

The  extraordinary  spectacle  was  thus  presented  of  a 
subordinate  general  going  to  London  and  getting  the 
King's  approval  to  one  plan  of  campaign;  of  the  King's 
minister  sending  full  instructions  to  one  general  and  none 
to  the  other  who  was  to  co-operate  with  him;  and  of  this 
other  general  making  his  own  independent  plan  on  the 
advice  of  a  prisoner,  who  had  turned  traitor  to  the  coun 
try  whose  uniform  he  then  wore.  This  confusion  of 
plans  led  to  the  complete  surrender  of  one  British  army, 
and  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  other;  it  was  a  factor  of 
the  highest  importance  in  the  ultimate  success  of  the 
American  cause. 

The  military  situation  was,  in  a  striking  degree,  similar  Military  situa- 
to  that  in  front  of  Washington  eighty-five  years  later.  Beginning  of 
When  McClellan  left  Johnston  at  Manassas  and  went  by 
a  circuitous  route  to  the  Peninsula  he  found  Johnston 
facing  him  on  his  arrival;  and  when  Howe  left  Washing 
ton  in  Jersey  and  travelled  400  miles  to  the  Head  of  Elk 
he  found  Washington  drawn  up  to  meet  him.  At  the 
Head  of  Elk,  Howe  was  70  miles  from  Philadelphia, 
whereas  he  had  been  only  60  miles  from  it  at  Bruns 
wick;  and  the  same  enemy  and  same  commander  op 
posed  him,  after  he  had  consumed  two  months  of  the 
best  season  of  the  year  in  making  the  change.  Had 

1  Moore,  88-89. 


80 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 


April  24 

Raid  into 
Connecticut 


Washington 
Moves  to 
Middlebrook 


May  29 


Howe  adopted  a  plan  similar  to  that  of  Grant's  in  1864, 
and  insisted  on  the  troops  in  Canada  being  sent  to  join 
him  at  New  York;  and  with  the  combined  force  of  nearly 
35,000  regulars  had  he  attacked  Washington's  8,000 
newly  raised  Continentals  with  the  same  fierceness  that 
was  shown  in  the  Wilderness,  it  hardly  seems  possible 
that  Washington,  fertile  as  he  was  in  resources,  could 
have  saved  the  Revolution  from  being  crushed  in  the 
spring  of  1777.  But,  as  stated  on  a  previous  page, 
Howe  never  recovered  from  the  mental  paralysis  which 
he  received  at  Bunker  Hill. 

While  Washington  was  at  Morristown,  keenly  watching 
for  every  move  of  his  adversary,  Howe  made  a  raid  into 
Connecticut.  Governor  Tryon  (tory  governor  of  New 
York)  with  2,000  men  landed  at  Fairfield,  marched  up  to 
Danbury,  destroyed  a  large  amount  of  stores  which  the 
Americans  could  ill  afford  to  lose,  encountered  the  mili 
tia  under  Arnold  and  Wooster  in  a  sharp  engagement 
at  Ridgefield  (in  which  Wooster  was  mortally  wounded) 
and  then  returned  to  New  York.  This  raid  had  no 
effect  on  the  campaign,  and  it  cost  the  British  a  loss  of 
about  200  in  killed  and  wounded.1 

Washington  meanwhile  kept  his  eye  unceasingly  on 
Howe,  and  being  more  than  ever  convinced  that  the 
latter  would  move  toward  Philadelphia,  he  broke  up  his 
camp  at  Morristown  and  moved  about  twenty  miles 
south  to  the  Raritan  River,  so  as  to  be  nearer  Howe's 
line  of  march.  Here  he  occupied  a  strong  position, 
which  Greene  had  selected,  on  the  heights  of  Middle- 
brook,  just  back  of  Bound  Brook,  about  ten  miles  from 
Brunswick.  His  right  under  Sullivan  was  sent  out  as 
far  as  Princeton.  Then  followed  two  months  of  extremely 

1  Dawson,  213-219;  Sparks,  IV,  404-406. 


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Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


DANBURY   RAID 

April  25-26,  1777 


FORT  WASHINGTON 
Nov.  16,  1776 


10 


PHILADELPHIA  81 

interesting  manoeuvres,  carried  out  on  both  sides  with        1777 
excellent  skill.    First,  Howe  tried  to  manoeuvre  Wash-  Howe's 
ington  out  of  the  strong  Middlebrook  position,  and  get 
him  down  in  the  lower  open  country  where  he  could  at-  , 

r  J  June  22 

tack  him  to  better  advantage.  He  therefore  crossed  the 
Raritan  with  about  10,000  men  and  placed  himself  be 
tween  Washington  and  Princeton — on  the  road  to  Phila 
delphia.  Washington  did  not  leave  his  position.  He 
doubted,  as  he  wrote  Schuyler,1  whether  this  was  "a  June  IG 
real  move  toward  Philadelphia";  if  it  should  so  prove, 
he  intended  to  let  Howe  get  as  far  as  the  Delaware, 
where  he  would  meet  with  opposition  from  the  militia 
in  his  front,  and  then  follow  rapidly,  cut  his  communica 
tions  and  attack  his  rear.  Washington  having  correctly 
interpreted  Howe's  first  move,  it  failed.2 

Howe's  second  move  was  somewhat  more  successful.  June  23 
He  retreated  suddenly  to  Amboy,  hoping  thus  to  tempt  Howe's  second 
Washington  out  of  his  strong  position,  and  then  turn 
sharply  and  attack  him.    The  bait  was  too  tempting; 
Washington  sent  Greene  with  three  brigades  in  pur 
suit,  and  himself  followed  Greene  with  his  entire  force. 
Greene  did  not  advance  more  than  five  miles  beyond 
Brunswick,  not  wishing  to  get  too  far  from  the  main 
body,  but  Stirling  on  his  left  advanced  almost  to  Staten 
Island  Sound.3 

Then  Howe  made  his  third  manoeuvre.  He  had  taken  Howe's  Third 
part  of  his  troops  across  to  Staten  Island;  he  now  sud 
denly  recrossed  the  Kills,  drove  Stirling  back  in  some 
confusion,  and  marched  rapidly  to  Westfield,  several 
miles  west  of  Rah  way.  He  was  thus  on  Washington's 
left  flank,  threatening  his  communications  with  the  Hud 
son.  He  hoped  that  Washington  would  attack;  but 

1  Sparks,  IV,  462.  2  Ibid,  IV,  469.  3  Ibid.t  IV,  470,  473. 


82 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 


June  30 


Howe  Sails 
for  the 
Chesapeake 


July  7 
July  21 


July  24 


Washington 

Marches 

Southward 


Washington  returned  quickly  with  his  whole  force  to  the 
Middlebrook  lines.1 

The  third  manoeuvre  having  thus  failed,  Howe  re 
turned  to  Staten  Island,  put  his  troops  on  board  trans 
ports  and  men-of-war,  228  in  number,  and  proceeded  to 
carry  out  his  main  purpose  of  transporting  his  army  to 
the  south  of  Philadelphia. 

Washington  knew  that  the  troops  were  on  board  and 
that  the  ships  had  dropped  down  to  the  lower  bay;2  but 
he  could  not  learn  positively  that  they  had  sailed.  At 
the  same  time  came  reports  from  Schuyler  at  Albany 
and  Putnam  at  Peekskill  which  led  him  to  believe  that 
Howe  intended  to  move  up  the  Hudson.  Burgoyne  had 
crossed  Lake  Champlain,  captured  Crown  Point  and 
Ticonderoga  and  was  advancing  rapidly  on  Albany.  It 
might  be  that  Howe  would  suddenly  bring  his  ships  back 
from  the  lower  bay  or  from  outside  and  sail  up  the  Hudson 
to  join  Burgoyne  at  Albany.  Washington  therefore  or 
dered  Putnam  to  send  two  brigades  to  reinforce  Schuyler, 
made  arrangements  to  collect  shipping  to  move  his  own 
troops  up  the  Hudson,  if  necessary,  and  marched  in  that 
direction  himself;  first  to  Morristown,  then  to  Ramapo 
and  then  to  the  Clove  (near  Haverstraw  Bay),  and  he 
sent  two  divisions  (Sullivan's  and  Stirling's)  to  cross  the 
Hudson  at  Peekskill.  After  being  three  days  in  the  Clove 
he  received  positive  information  that  Howe's  fleet  had 
gone  to  sea.  He  rightly  surmised  that  their  destination 
was  the  Delaware,  and  he  promptly  put  his  army  in 
motion  to  the  southward,  recalling  Sullivan  and  Stirling 
to  Morristown.  The  new  battalions  had  been  gradually 

1  Sparks,  IV,  475. 

2  Washington's  despatches  to  the  President  of  Congress  and  others  de 
scribing  his  perplexities  during  these  anxious  seven  weeks  are  given  in 
Sparks,  IV,  479-505;  V,  1-44. 


PHILADELPHIA  83 

filling  up  and  his  force  numbered   now  about  14,000        1777 
men.1 

When  Washington  reached  the  Delaware  River  he  Juiyao 
halted  until  he  should  hear  of  Howe's  arrival  in  the  Del 
aware  Bay.    News  of  this  came  the  next  day,  and  he 
resumed  his  march  to  the  south,  pushing  on  himself  as  July  31 
far  as  Chester,  to  reconnoitre.    There  he  learned  that  Aug.  i 
Howe's  fleet  had  remained  only  a  day  in  the  Delaware 
and  had  put  to  sea  again.    He  halted  the  army  in  the 
vicinity  of  Philadelphia,  and  ordered  Sullivan's  and  Stir 
ling's  division  (which  had  remained  at  Morristown)  to 
march  back  to  Peekskill.    Nothing  was  heard  of  Howe's 
fleet  for  three  weeks.    During  this  time  Washington  had 
moved  northward  again  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Delaware; 
and  a  council  of  war  was  unanimously  of  opinion  that  Aug.  21 
Howe  had  gone  south  to  Charleston,  that  it  would  be 
useless  to  follow  him  there,  and  the  army  should  move  to 
the  North  River,  with  a  view  possibly  to  its  marching  to 
Albany.    But  the  next  day  came  authentic  information  Aug.  22 
that  Howe's  fleet  was  at  anchor  in  the  Chesapeake.2 
Washington  put  his  troops,  "harassed  by  marching  and  Washington 

.  .         „  ,  ,  .      ,        ,,         ,  .       .       Marches  South 

countermarching;,    as  he  wrote  to  his  brother,   again  in  through 

,1  ,1  i  i       i  xi  ^    T»T.-I    Ji    T--       Philadelphia 

motion  to  the  southward;  marched  through  Philadelphia 
with  colors  flying  and  drums  beating  on  a  Sunday  morn-  Aug.  24 
ing,  exciting  no  little  admiration  and  animating  the 
militia  to  turn  out,  and  reached  Wilmington  the  follow-  Aug.  25 
ing  day.    Taking;  Greene  and  Lafayette  (who  had  just  Howe's  Army 

6.        .J.  .      .J  k       .  J  Lands  at  Head 

arrived  from  France,  been  commissioned  a  major-general,  of  Eik 

1  Lossing,  I,  331. 

2  Howe  embarked  his  troops  (18,000  in  all)  July  5,  sailed  July  23, 
reached  the  capes  of  the  Delaware  July  30,  sailed  from  there  the  same 
day,  passed  the  capes  of  the  Chesapeake  August  16,  and  landed  at  Head 
of  Elk  August  25.    Howe's  Narrative,  23,  24. 

3  See  foot-note  2,  previous  page. 


84  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  although  a  few  days  less  than  twenty  years  old,  and 
joined  the  army)  and  a  small  escort,  Washington  rode 
forward  nearly  twenty  miles  on  a  personal  reconnoissance, 
and  from  a  high  hill  near  the  Head  of  Elk  saw  the  British 
camp.  He  decided  to  post  his  army  behind  a  small  creek 
about  eight  miles  south  of  Wilmington  and  accept  bat 
tle.  Howe,  after  making  a  feint  against  this  position, 

sept,  s  moved  past  Washington's  right  flank  with  the  intention 

of  crossing  the  Brandywine,1  seizing  the  high  ground  be 
hind  the  Brandywine  and  cutting  off  Washington's  com 
munications  with  Philadelphia  or  forcing  him  to  fight  at 
a  disadvantage.  But  Washington  promptly  detected  the 
movement,2  retreated  to  Wilmington,  crossed  the  Brandy- 
wine,  and  marching  twelve  miles  up  its  eastern  bank 

sept.  10  took  position  at  Chad's  Ford.  Greene  with  his  own 
division  and  two  other  brigades  was  in  the  centre,  op 
posite  the  ford;  Sullivan  with  his  division  and  those  of 
Stirling  and  Stephen  was  posted  about  two  miles  up  the 
creek  with  instructions  to  guard  the  fords  as  far  as  the 
forks  of  the  Brandywine;  and  Armstrong,  with  the 
Pennsylvania  militia,  guarded  the  fords  on  Greene's  left. 
The  total  force  was  about  11,000  men.3 

sept.  10  On  the  same  evening  Howe  halted  at  Kenneth  Square, 

about  eight  miles  south  of  Chad's  Ford. 

Howe's  pian  Howe's  plan  for  the  ensuing  battle  was  substantially 
the  same  as  at  Brooklyn,  and  if  Washington  had  not  been 
present  in  person,  with  Greene  at  hand  to  carry  out  his 
orders,  it  would  probably  have  succeeded.  He  directed 
the  Hessians  to  advance  to  Chad's  Ford  and  make  a 
feint  of  attacking  there,  while  the  larger  part  of  his  army 
under  Cornwallis  was  to  march  up  the  Brandywine, 

1  The  Brandywine  empties  into  the  Delaware  at  Wilmington. 
3  Sparks,  V,  56.  3  Dawson,  278. 


30255' 


British  Infy..     v~,TT~ 
driving  lack  ^  'V* 

vfyfr-sme 


BRANDYWINE 
Sept.   II,  1777 


E     N     N     S 


^PROVINCE   I.- 

CARPENTER'S  i.  4> 
i 


ereer*  *  <*  U>~a~r  e    ~R     * 


Cornwtinis  encamped 
Nov.  2T^ 

E      W          J     E     B      S 

EXPLANATION 

8  Battery  15  Chevaux  de  frige 

9  The  Fury  16  The  Somerset 

10  The  Vigilant  17  The  Roebuck 

11  The  Experiment  18  The  Iris 

12  British  Ships  19  The  Liverpool 

13  Chevaux  de  frise  20  Wreck  of  the  Merlin     26  Whitall  House 

14  Passage  21  Coruwallis  galley 


Redoubt 

2  Redoubt 

3  Batteries 

4  Battery 

5  Battery 

6  Battery 

7  Battery 


22  The  Pearl 

23  Wreck  of  the 

Augusta 

24  Battery 

25  Donop's  burial  place 


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From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


FORT  MERCER,  Oct.  22,  Nov.  20,  AND  FORT  MIFFLIN,  Nov.  15,  1777 


PHILADELPHIA  85 

cross  the  stream  at  the  forks  and  come  down  in  rear  of        1777 
the  American  position.1 

Howe's  army  moved  at  daybreak.  Knyphausen  with  sept,  u 
his  Hessians  and  two  British  brigades,  about  5,000  men 
in  all,  marched  on  the  direct  road  to  Chad's  Ford,  arriving  Battle  of  the 
there  about  10  A.  M.  He  drove  back  the  American  out 
posts  and  carried  on  quite  an  active  artillery  duel  with 
Greene's  batteries  posted  on  the  heights  behind  the  ford; 
Cornwallis  with  the  greater  part  of  the  British  troops  and 
some  Hessians,  about  10,000  men  all  told,  marched  twelve 
miles  up  the  Brandywine,  crossed  the  forks,  and  then 
turning  southward  came  squarely  in  rear  of  Sullivan's 
division,  posted  behind  Jones's  Ford,  almost  without 
firing  a  shot.2  In  the  four  hours  which  had  elapsed  since 
Knyphausen  began  skirmishing  at  Chad's  Ford,  Sullivan 
had  received  from  his  "light  parties"  and  had  transmitted 
to  Washington  contradictory  information  concerning  the 
enemy's  movements.  The  first  report3  was  that  a  large 
body  of  the  enemy  was  marching  to  the  westward  a  few  n  A.M. 
miles  from  the  Brandywine;  Washington  immediately 
ordered  Sullivan  to  cross  the  creek  and  attack  that  body 
in  flank,  while  he  in  person  joined  Greene  and  made 
preparations  to  cross  above  Chad's  Ford  and  cut  off 
Knyphausen  from  the  rest  of  Howe's  army.  Before 
these  plans  could  be  carried  into  effect,  Sullivan  received 
word  from  a  scouting  party  at  the  forks  of  the  Bran 
dywine  that  there  was  no  appearance  of  the  enemy 
in  that  neighborhood.  He  thereupon  discontinued  his 
movement,  and  so  reported  to  Washington,  who  coun- 

1  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  281. 

2  Ibid.,  282. 

8  Sullivan  was  much  criticised  for  his  conduct  at  the  Brandywine.  His 
defence,  accompanied  by  copies  of  the  reports  from  the  "light  parties,"  is 
given  in  full  in  Sparks,  V,  456^63. 


86  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777        termanded  the  orders  to  Greene.    Later  came  a  definite 
2  P.  M.  report  that  the  British  could  be  plainly  seen  forming  on 

Osborne's  Hill,  about  a  mile  or  more  in  rear  of  Sullivan 
and  to  his  right.  Sullivan  promptly  withdrew  his  divi 
sion  from  the  creek,  changed  front  to  the  right  and 
formed  line  across  the  main  road  at  the  Birmingham 
meeting-house.  His  troops  were  hardly  in  position  when 
Cornwallis  attacked  him  with  great  violence.  The  fight 
ing  around  the  stone  meeting-house  (which  is  still  stand 
ing)  was  very  fierce.  Sullivan  was  greatly  outnumbered, 
and  his  three  divisions  in  succession  gave  way,  Stirling 
making  the  most  stubborn  resistance.  Finally  both 
were  overwhelmed,  and  the  retreat  became  a  rout.  Two 
of  Sullivan's  aides  were  wounded,  and  Lafayette  got  a 
bullet  hole  in  his  leg  which  laid  him  up  for  several  weeks.1 
Washington  had  meanwhile  received  the  report  from 
Sullivan2  of  the  appearance  of  the  British  in  his  rear; 
he  ordered  Greene  to  leave  Wayne  to  defend  Chad's 
Ford,  and  with  his  other  brigades  (Muhlenberg's  and 
Weedon's)  to  go  to  Sullivan's  assistance.  Greene  lost  no 
time,  and  marching  his  men  four  miles  in  forty-five  min 
utes,8  he  formed  a  line  in  rear  of  Sullivan's  retreating 
5  p.  M.  troops,  opened  his  ranks  to  allow  them  to  pass  through 

and  then  opposed  the  British  with  such  vigor  as  to  halt 
their  advance.  His  position  was  a  strong  one,  on  both 
sides  of  a  narrow  pass  in  the  road,  and  flanked  by  thick 
woods.  Repeated  attacks  were  made  by  the  British, 
but  they  could  not  dislodge  him,  and  Greene  still  held 
the  position  when  night  put  an  end  to  the  firing.  Mean- 

1  Many  of  the  houses  on  the  Brandywine  battle-field  are  still  standing 
(1911)  just  as  they  were  at  the  time  of  the  battle;   and  the  Pennsylvania 
Historical  Society  has  erected  sign-posts  indicating  the  movements  of  the 
troops  as  well  as  the  spot  where  Lafayette  was  wounded. 

2  See  foot  note  3,  previous  page.  s  G.  W.  Greene,  I,  449. 


PHILADELPHIA  87 

while,  Wayne,  with  his  small  force,  was  unable  to  resist        1777 
the  advance  of  Knyphausen;    the  latter  had  crossed 
Chad's  Ford  as  soon  as  Greene's  main  body  had  gone  to 
Sullivan's  aid.    Wayne  effected  his  retreat  behind  the 
rear  of  Greene's  line  and  gained  the  road  to  Chester. 
During  the  night  Greene  retreated  in  good  order  and  sept.  12 
without  molestation.    In  the  morning  the  army  was  as 
sembled  at  Chester  and  marched  to  Germantown. 

The  British  losses  were  officially  reported  as  90  killed, 
480  wounded  and  6  missing.1  The  Americans  left  their 
dead  and  wounded  on  the  field,  and  no  accurate  report 
of  them  was  ever  made.  Their  loss  was  estimated  at  300 
killed  and  600  wounded.2 

In  this  battle  Washington  had  about  11,000  present 
and  Howe  between  15,000  and  18,000.3  The  disparity 
in  discipline,  arms  and  equipment  was  even  greater.  It 
has  been  often  questioned  whether  Washington  was  justi 
fied  in  fighting  a  battle  under  these  adverse  conditions. 
On  the  other  hand  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  public 
opinion,  in  and  out  of  Congress,  imperatively  demanded 
it;  and  had  Washington  retreated  without  a  battle  the 
effect  would  have  been  more  disastrous  than  the  defeat. 
It  was  indeed  a  defeat,  but  Washington  saved  it  from 
being  a  rout. 

Neither  the  army  nor  its  commander  was  discouraged. 
After  giving  his  men  only  one  day's  rest  at  Germantown, 
Washington  boldly  crossed  the  Schuylkill  with  the  in 
tent  of  attacking  Howe,  who  had  slowly  followed  him. 
The  two  armies  met  at  Warwick  Tavern,  about  twenty  sept.  ie 
miles  west  of  Philadelphia  and  fifteen  miles  from  Chad's 
Ford.  The  battle  did  not  take  place.  Something  hap- 

1  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  278. 

*  Marshall's  Washington,  I,  158.  »  Lossing,  II,  170,  178. 


88  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  pened  of  a  nature  which  military  commanders  no  longer 
have  to  take  into  account  in  making  their  plans.  The 
ammunition  in  Washington's  army,  and  a  large  part 
of  that  in  Howe's,  was  totally  ruined  *  by  a  violent  rain 
storm,  which  continued  unabated  during  the  greater 
part  of  two  days.  Washington  had  no  recourse  but  to 
retreat  across  the  Schuylkill  near  Perkiomen,  where  fresh 
supplies  could  be  obtained.  During  this  retreat  the  so- 

paoii Massacre  called  "Paoli  massacre"  occurred.  Wayne's  division, 
which  constituted  the  rear  guard,  was  encamped  for  the 

sept.  21,  night  at  Paoli  Tavern.  He  was  attacked  by  three  regi 
ments  under  General  Grey,2  who  reached  Wayne's  camp 
without  firing  a  shot,  and  used  the  bayonet  so  effectively 
that  they  claimed  to  have  killed  and  wounded  300  men 
and  to  have  taken  between  70  and  80  prisoners,  with  a 
loss  on  their  own  side  of  only  4  killed  and  4  wounded.3 
Wayne  managed  to  extricate  the  rest  of  his  division 
and  retreat  to  Chester.  He  was  court-martialled  but 
acquitted.4 

Howe  captures      After  this  affair  Howe   manoeuvred  against   Wash- 

Philadelphia        .  .         .    .  ,      n       ,  .          ,  .  .      ,, 

mgton  s  right  nank,  causing  him  to  move  farther  up 
the  Schuylkill;  and  then,  suddenly  countermarching,  he 
crossed  the  Schuylkill  at  Sweed's  Ford  (Norristown)  and 
placed  himself  between  Washington  and  Philadelphia. 
Washington  was  not  in  condition  to  give  battle,  and 
sept.  25  Howe  marched  down  the  Schuylkill  and  took  possession 
of  Philadelphia,  encamping  the  bulk  of  his  troops  at 
Germantown.  As  soon  as  Washington  had  obtained 
fresh  ammunition  he  followed  Howe  and  went  into  camp 

1  Sparks,  V,  66. 

2  Great-grandfather  of  Earl  Grey,  at  present  (1911)  Governor-General 
of  Canada. 

8  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  317. 
4  Sparks,  V,  166;  Dawson,  315. 


PHILADELPHIA  89 

on  Skippack  Creek,  about  twenty  miles  from  German-        1777 
town.1 

In  a  campaign  of  thirty-two  days  since  landing  at  the  Results  of  the 
Head  of  Elk,  Howe  had  met  and  defeated  his  enemy  and 
gained  possession  of  their  capital,  the  Congress  adjourn 
ing  to  York.  He  had  a  superiority  in  numbers  and  im 
mense  advantage  in  munitions  and  supplies.  His  move 
ments  were  well  conducted,  but  they  lacked  the  final 
element  of  success;  he  had  not  destroyed  his  adver 
sary's  army.  This  army,  in  fact,  speedily  came  forward 
to  attack  him,  on  a  bold  and  hazardous  plan,  which  came 
surprisingly  near  to  success. 

Upon  taking  possession  of  Philadelphia,  Howe  posted  2  Howe's 
the  greater  part  of  his  army  along  the  line  of  the  School 
House  Lane,  which  ran  through  the  market  square  of  the 
village  of  Germantown,  about  seven  miles  from  Phila 
delphia.  At  the  market  it  intersected  the  road  (Ger 
mantown  Avenue)  which  led  from  Philadelphia  through 
Chestnut  Hill  to  the  open  country  on  the  north-west,  and 
along  which  for  nearly  two  miles  stretched  the  ancient 
village  of  Germantown.  Howe's  line  was  about  three 
miles  long,  his  left  on  the  Schuylkill,  his  centre  at  the 
market,  and  his  right  on  a  small  stream  about  a  mile  to 
the  north  of  the  market.  In  front  of  a  large  part  of  his 
line  was  the  precipitous  gorge  of  the  Wissahickon,  nearly 
200  feet  deep.  His  outposts  were  about  two  miles  in  ad 
vance,  at  the  end  of  the  village  toward  Chestnut  Hill.  His 
force  numbered  about  9,000  men,3  and  he  had  3,000  or  more 
in  Philadelphia.  The  rest  of  his  army  had  been  detached 
across  the  Delaware  River  in  Jersey,  and  on  learning  this 
Washington  deemed  the  moment  auspicious  for  attack.4 

1  Sparks,  V,  73,  77;  Dawson,  318.  2  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  330. 

8  Lossing,  11.  4  Sparks,  V,  78. 


90  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  His  plan  was  somewhat  similar  to  that  which  had  sue- 

Washington's  ceeded  so  well  at  Trenton.  Leaving  his  camp  on  Skip- 
pack  Creek,  nearly  twenty  miles  from  the  Germantown 
market,  one  column  under  Sullivan,  consisting  of  his  own 
and  Wayne's  divisions  flanked  by  Conway's  brigade, 

Washington's  was  to  follow  the  main  road  and  attack  the  British  left; 
another  column  under  Greene,  with  his  own  and  Stephen's 
divisions  flanked  by  McDougalPs  brigade,  was  to  make  a 
detour  by  the  Lime-kiln  road  and  strike  the  British  right 
beyond  the  market;  the  Pennsylvania  militia  under 
Armstrong  was  to  follow  the  Manatawny  road,  on  the 
ridge  between  the  Schuylkill  and  Wissahickon,  and  cross 
ing  the  Wissahickon  at  its  mouth  to  get  in  rear  of  the 
British  left;  the  Maryland  and  Jersey  militia  under  Small- 
wood  and  Forman  were  to  follow  the  York  road,  a  mile 
or  more  on  Greene's  left,  and  fall  upon  the  rear  of  their 
right.  Stirling's  division  formed  the  reserve,  following 
Sullivan  on  the  main  road  through  Chestnut  Hill.  Wash 
ington  in  person  was  with  Sullivan's  column.  His  entire 
force,  including  some  troops  recently  arrived  from  Peeks- 
kill,  numbered  only  8,000  Continentals  and  3,000  militia. 
The  four  columns  were  to  march  all  night  on  separate 
roads  covering  a  width  of  about  seven  miles,  separated 
by  broken  country  and  deep  ravines.  These  columns 
were  to  converge  at  daylight  and  simultaneously  attack. 
It  was  indeed  a  bold  plan. 

Oct.  a,  Leaving  their  camps  at  dusk  the  night  march  was  car 

ried  out  as  directed,  and  about  sunrise  the  next  morning 
Conway's  brigade  passed  over  Chestnut  Hill,  and  drove  in 
the  British  pickets  at  Mount  Airy.1  These  fell  back  on 

Battle  of  their  supports,  consisting  of  a  battalion  of  light  infantry 
and  the  40th  Regiment.  Colonel  Musgrave  then  placed 

1  Sparks,  V,  78. 


PHILADELPHIA  91 

five  companies  of  the  latter  regiment  in  a  strong  stone        1777 
house  belonging  to  Chief- Justice  Chew.1    They  barricaded 
the  doors,  and  firing  through  the  windows  they  resisted 
every  effort  to  dislodge  them  by  infantry  and  artillery. 
They  held  this  position  throughout  the  entire  battle. 

Finding  it  impossible  to  capture  this  house,  Sullivan 
pushed  on,  dividing  his  command,  his  own  division  on  the 
right  of  the  road  and  Wayne's  on  the  left.  The  British 
contested  every  wall  and  garden,  but  were  slowly  forced 
back  toward  the  market.  The  Pennsylvania  militia,  in 
stead  of  gaining  the  rear  of  the  British  left,  did  not  cross 
the  Wissahickon,  but  contented  themselves  with  firing  a 
few  shots  across  the  ravine  and  then  retreated.  Nash's 
brigade  from  Stirling's  division  was  then  sent  to  protect 
Sullivan's  right.  The  Maryland  and  Jersey  militia  did 
not  come  into  action  at  all.2 

The  battle  had  been  in  progress  for  about  three-quarters 
of  an  hour  before  Greene  arrived  on  the  left.  He  had  a 
longer  road  to  march  than  Sullivan,  his  guide  lost  his 
way,  and  when  day  broke  there  was  a  heavy  fog  which 
soon  became  so  dense  that  it  was  impossible  to  see  more 
than  a  few  yards.3  When  he  did  come  into  action, 
Stephen's  division  on  the  right  of  the  Lime-kiln  road 
fired  into  Wayne's  division,  mistaking  them  for  the  enemy 
in  the  fog.  This  caused  confusion  and  led  to  the  retreat 
of  both  divisions,  uncovering  Sullivan's  left  and  Greene's 
right  flank.  The  battle,  however,  continued  for  nearly 
two  hours  longer;  Greene  fighting  his  way  along  the 
Lime-kiln  road  and  driving  the  British  back  until  he 
reached  the  market  house;  Sullivan  doing  the  same  on 

lfThis  house  is  still  standing  (1911)  in  excellent  preservation;  and,  I 
believe,  it  is  owned  by  the  lineal  descendants  of  Chief-Justice  Chew. 
2Lossing,  II,  111.  3  Sparks,  V,  79,  83,  102;  Dawson,  328,  329. 


92  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  the  right  of  the  road  from  Chestnut  Hill;  and  Maxwell's 
brigade  from  the  reserve  was  still  firing  on  the  Chew 
house,  nearly  two  miles  behind  Sullivan.  Cornwallis  was 
hastening  from  Philadelphia  with  reinforcements;1  Howe's 
main  body  had  been  driven  through  the  entire  length  of 
the  village,  and  it  is  said  that  he  was  making  prepara- 
oct.  4,  tions  to  retreat  to  Chester.2  Then  occurred  one  of  those 

TheGennan-  panics3  to  which  all  armies  are  subject,  and  which  are 
never  explained.  Possibly  it  was  the  fog;  possibly  the 
firing  back  at  the  Chew  house  which  led  the  Americans 
to  think  that  they  were  surrounded;  possibly  it  was  be 
cause  their  ammunition  was  exhausted.  Whatever  the 
cause,  the  retreat  began  suddenly  at  all  points  on  their 
line.  Seeing  this,  General  Grant,  who  commanded  on 
the  British  right,  rallied  his  disorganized  troops  and  made 
a  vigorous  attack.  In  spite  of  the  personal  efforts  of 
Washington,  who  was  again  in  the  midst  of  the  fight,4  the 
Americans  gave  way  at  all  points  and  hastily  retreated. 
By  nightfall  they  reached  their  camps  on  Skippack  Creek. 
They  had  saved  all  their  artillery.  Cornwallis  had  pur 
sued  them  for  five  miles,  skirmishing  with  the  rear  guard 
under  Pulaski,  and  then  abandoned  the  pursuit.5 

Howe  reported  his  losses  as  535  killed,  wounded  and 
missing,  of  whom  less  than  100  were  killed.  The  losses 
on  the  American  side  were  stated  by  the  Board  of  War  to 
be  152  killed,  521  wounded  and  400  missing.6  General 
Agnew  on  the  British  and  General  Nash  on  the  Ameri 
can  side  were  mortally  wounded,  and  died  a  few  days 
later.  General  Stephen  was  tried  by  court-martial  for 

1  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  330.  2  Sparks,  V,  83. 

'Sparks,  V,  79,  102;  Dawson,  325. 

4  Sullivan's  letter,  Sparks,  V,  467. 

*  Sparks,  V,  80;  Wayne's  letter,  Dawson,  329. 

6  Dawson,  324. 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


GERMANTOWN 
Oct.  4,  1777 


PHILADELPHIA  93 

"unofficer-like  conduct"  and  intoxication,  and  was  dis-        1777 
missed.1 

Washington  remained  in  the  camp  on  Skippack  Creek  Oct.  29 
for  three  weeks  and  then  moved  eastward  again  to  the 
hills  near  the  village  of  Whitemarsh,  about  four  miles 
from  Chestnut  Hill.    Howe  came  out  to  attack  him,  but 
after  an  inconclusive  skirmish  he  decided  that  Washing-  Dec.  5 
ton's  position  was  too  strong.2    He  returned  to  Phila-  Dec.  s 
delphia  and  went    into   winter    quarters.    Soon  after 
Washington  selected  the  camp  at  Valley  Forge,  twenty- 
five  miles  up  the  Schuylkill  from  Philadelphia,   and  Dec.  19 
moved  his  troops  there.3 

In  the  meantime  Howe  had  gained  possession  of  the  Destruction  of 
American  forts  on  both  sides  of  the  Delaware  near  Phila-  the  Delaware 
delphia.  These  works  consisted  of  one  redoubt,  Fort 
Mifflin,  on  the  Pennsylvania  side,  just  below  the  mouth 
of  the  Schuylkill;  another,  Fort  Mercer,  opposite  to  it, 
at  Red  Bank,  on  the  Jersey  shore;  and  a  third,  at  Billings- 
port,  about  three  miles  below,  on  the  Jersey  side.  In 
addition  to  the  redoubts,  the  channels  of  the  river  were 
obstructed  by  chevaux-de-frise.  The  redoubts  were  gar 
risoned  with  infantry  and  artillery  at  the  time  of  the 
battle  of  the  Brandywine.4  Immediately  after  that  battle 
Earl  Howe,5  commanding  the  British  fleet  in  America, 
sent  some  of  his  lighter  vessels  from  the  Chesapeake 
around  into  the  Delaware.  In  co-operation  with  a  British 
regiment  sent  across  the  river  at  Chester,  they  removed  Oct.  6 
the  obstructions  and  captured  the  garrison  atBillingsport.6 

The  next  attempt  was  made  against  Fort  Mercer,  and  Fort  Mercer 
here  a  gallant  and  successful  defence  was  made.    The 

1  Lossing,  II,  114.  2  Dawson,  368-373. 

8  Sparks,  522-525.  4  Dawson,  350;  Lossing,  II,  85-86. 

5  Brother  of  General  Howe.  6  Earl  Howe's  Report,  Dawson,  357. 


94  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  garrison  consisted  of  two  Rhode  Island  regiments  under 
command  of  Colonel  Christopher  Greene.  They  num- 

oct.  22  bered  not  more  than  400  men.  They  were  attacked  by 

Count  Donop  and  1,200  Hessians,  who  had  crossed  the 
river  at  Gloucester  (just  below  Camden).  These  made 
a  furious  assault  but  were  completely  repulsed.  Donop 
was  mortally  wounded,  10  other  officers  and  140  men 
were  killed  and  wounded  and  about  200  were  taken 
prisoners.  The  loss  in  the  garrison  was  only  14  killed  and 
23  wounded.1  This  brilliant  defence  brought  the  warm 
est  commendations  and  the  present  of  a  sword  from  Con 
gress  to  Colonel  Greene. 

Fort  Minim  Howe  next  turned  his  attention  to  Fort  Mifflin.  It  was 
garrisoned  by  a  Maryland  regiment  of  300  men  under 
Colonel  Smith,  afterward  reinforced  by  150  Pennsylvania 
troops  sent  from  Washington's  camp.  Instead  of  assault 
ing  this,  Howe  reduced  it  by  artillery.  He  erected  shore 
batteries  with  guns  taken  from  his  brother's  fleet — four 
32-pounders,  six  24-pounders  and  one  13-inch  mortar. 
With  these  he  kept  up  a  vigorous  cannonade  for  an  entire 

NOV.  10          day,  inflicting  heavy  losses  on  the  garrison.    Next  a 

NOV.  is  combined  land  and  naval  attack  was  made,  the  shore 
batteries  being  reinforced  by  6  men-of-war,  carrying  191 
guns,  besides  smaller  vessels.  The  redoubt  was  battered 
to  pieces,  about  250  of  the  garrison  were  killed  and 
wounded  (Colonel  Smith  being  among  the  latter)  and 
the  rest  made  their  escape  during  the  night  to  Fort 
Mercer. 

Fort  Mercer  Finally,  Howe  sent  a  strong  force  against  Fort  Mercer. 
It  was  commanded  by  Cornwallis  and  numbered  about 
5,500  men.  It  crossed  the  Delaware  at  Chester  and 

NOV.  20          marched  up  the  east  bank  of  the  river.    The  little  gar- 

1  Report  of  Colonel  Greene,  Dawson,  355;  Howe's  report,  Dawson,  356. 


PHILADELPHIA  95 

rison  was  unable  to  cope  with  an  opposing  force  of  this  1777 
magnitude  and  evacuated  the  fort.1  Cornwallis  took 
possession  and  dismantled  it.  Washington  heard  of  this 
movement  and  immediately  detached  Greene2  with  his 
division  to  cross  the  river  at  Burlington  and  march  down 
to  the  relief  of  Fort  Mercer;  but  it  was  too  late.  The  fort 
had  been  evacuated  the  day  Greene  left  Whitemarsh. 
After  some  unimportant  manoeuvring  by  Greene  and 
Cornwallis,  both  returned  to  their  respective  camps.3 

Howe  was  thus  in  possession  of  Philadelphia  and  in 
undisputed  communication  with  his  brother's  fleet.  His 
army  remained  there  for  seven  months,  absolutely  inac-  NOV.,  1777,  to 
tive,  gradually  deteriorating  in  discipline,  its  officers 
engaged  in  the  Mischianza  and  other  foolish  gayeties. 
Meanwhile  Washington  and  his  half-clad  soldiers  were 
shivering  and  almost  starving  at  Valley  Forge. 

1  Washington's,  Howe's  and  Earl  Howe's  Reports,  Dawson,  364-367. 

2  Sparks,  V,  167. 

» G.  W.  Greene,  I,  518-533. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  HUDSON 

1776  WHILE  Howe  had  been  carrying  on  his  Philadelphia 
origin  of  the     campaign,  Burgoyne  had  advanced  from  Canada  along 

the  line  of  the  Hudson,  and  had  surrendered  his  entire 
army  at  Saratoga. 

The  circumstances  under  which  this  campaign  origi 
nated,  and  the  lack  of  co-operation  between  Howe  and 
Burgoyne,  have  already  been  explained.1  Briefly,  Bur 
goyne  's  plan  contemplated  a  movement  of  tories  and 
Indians  from  Oswego  down  the  Mohawk  Valley,  and  an 
advance  of  British  regulars  and  Hessians  from  Montreal 
through  Lake  Champlain  and  the  upper  Hudson — both 
to  unite  at  Albany,  where  Howe  was  to  join  him  from 
New  York.2  No  instructions  having  been  sent  to  Howe,3 
that  part  of  the  plan  disappeared;  the  other  two  move 
ments  were  undertaken. 

1777  The  force  detailed  to  Burgoyne  consisted  of  3  British 
July  i            brigades,  3  Hessian  brigades,  38  pieces  of  light  artillery 

and  10  pieces  of  siege  artillery.  They  numbered  7,213 
rank  and  file.  In  addition  there  were  250  Canadians 
and  400  Indians;  so  that,  counting  the  officers,  Burgoyne 
had  something  over  8,000  men.  The  expedition  from 
Oswego  was  commanded  by  Colonel  St.  Leger,  and  con 
sisted  of  900  Indians  and  700  white  men;  the  latter  made 

1  Pp.  77-79,  ante. 

3  Burgoyne,  Appendix  IV,  13.  *  P.  78,  ante. 

96 


•  Continental  Village 
Fort  Clinton  T\f.Fort  Independence 

I'eekHkill 
^  ^. -^lancK!  Point 
Haversttraw 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company,  Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 
From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States  and  Its  People 


18 


ARNOLD'S  NAVAL  ENGAGEMENT 
Oct.  11-13, 


THE  HUDSON  97 

up  of  tories  under  Sir  John  Johnson,  and  detachments        me 
from  two  regular  regiments.1 

On  the  American  side,  the  " Northern  Department"  situation  on 
was  still  under  the  command  of  Schuyler.    When  Sullivan  side.  m 
retreated  from  Montreal  in  the  summer  of  1776,  Congress 
passed  a  resolution2  directing  Washington  to  send  Gates 
to  take  command  of  the  American  forces  in  Canada.    By 
the  time  Gates  arrived  the  American  forces  were  no  June  17 
longer  in  Canada,  but  had  been  driven  back  to  Crown 
Point  and  Ticonderoga.    Gates  interpreted  his  instruc 
tions  to  give  him  independent  command  of  the  troops  in 
the  field,  leaving  Schuyler  the  nominal  command  of  the 
department,  but  without  any  real  authority.    Schuyler 
submitted  the  question  to  Washington,  asking  the  de 
cision  of  Congress;  and  Congress  decided  that  Gates  was  Relations  be- 
not  to  be  independent  of  Schuyler.3    But  their  respective 
functions  were  never  clearly  defined,  and  much  friction 
resulted. 

There  were  no  military  movements  in  the  Northern 
Department  after  Gates's  arrival,  except  Arnold's  brilliant 
naval  battle  on  Lake  Champlain,  which,  although  fought  Oct.  n 
by  the  army,  was  a  naval  engagement.    When  Washing-  Oct.  is 
ton  was  hard  pressed  in  New  Jersey,  Gates  was  ordered,4 
with  seven  regiments,  to  join  him;  but  on  his  arrival  he  Dec.  20 
pleaded  ill  health  and  received  leave  to  go  to  Philadelphia. 
He  thus  was  not  present  at  Trenton  or  Princeton,  but 
spent  the  next  few  months  in  consultation  with  Congress. 

1  Burgoyne,  12-17;  Appendix  XI,  51. 

In  1780  Burgoyne  defended  himself  before  a  committee  of  Parliament, 
and  published  a  book  entitled  A  State  of  the  Expedition  from  Canada. 
It  consisted  of  his  narrative,  the  evidence  and  an  appendix  containing 
the  official  orders,  reports,  correspondence  and  returns. 

3  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  V,  448. 
8  Ibid.,  V,  526. 

4  Sparks,  IV,  192,  216,  222. 


98  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777        That  body  passed  a  resolution1  desiring  him  to  resume 

Feb.  20  the  duties  of  adjutant-general,  and  when  Washington 
heard  of  this  he  urged  him  to  accept.2  While  Gates  was 

March  25  considering  the  matter  Congress  passed  another  resolu 
tion3  directing  him  "  immediately  to  repair  to  Ticonderoga 
and  take  command  of  the  army  there." 

March  15  Congress  meanwhile  had  passed  a  resolution*  severely 

reprimanding  Schuyler  on  account  of  a  respectful  letter 
which  he  had  written  to  it  concerning  matters  affecting 
the  discipline  of  his  troops.  He  determined  to  proceed 
to  Philadelphia,  settle  his  accounts  and  retire  from  the 
service.  The  New  England  delegation  had  been  at  all 
times  opposed  to  him;  the  New  England  troops  had  ex 
pressed  an  unwillingness  to  serve  under  him  on  account 
of  the  controversy  between  New  York  and  New  Hamp 
shire  over  the  territory  which  became  the  State  of  Ver 
mont;  he  had  been  criticised  and  held  responsible  for 
the  failure  of  the  expedition  to  Quebec;  he  was  denounced 
as  an  aristocrat  and  his  loyalty  to  the  United  States  was 
questioned.5  Twice  before  he  had  advised  Washington  of 
his  intention  to  resign,6  but  had  yielded  to  Washington's 
urgent  entreaty  to  remain  in  service.7  He  was  now  con 
vinced  that  Congress  desired  to  displace  him  and  that 
his  opportunity  for  usefulness  was  gone. 

April  But  on  arriving  in  Philadelphia  and  presenting  his 

memorial  to  Congress  he  was  favorably  received,  was 
put  in  command  of  the  troops  there  in  place  of  Putnam, 
who  had  just  been  ordered  to  Peekskill,  his  accounts 

May  is          were  speedily  settled,  and  the  Board  of  War  made  a  re- 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VII,  136.  3  Sparks,  IV,  355. 

8  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VII,  202.  «  Ibid.,  VII,  180. 

8  Sparks,  III,  243,  535-540;  Irving,  217. 

6  Sparks,  Letters,  I,  109,  287. 

7  Sparks,  III,  191,209,243. 


THE  HUDSON  99 

port  recommending  that  he  be  directed  to  take  command        1777 
of  the  Northern  Department,  and  that  Gates  be  offered 
his  choice  of  resuming  the  duties  of  adjutant-general  or 
of  serving  under  Schuyler.1    Congress  adopted  the  first 
part  of  the  report,  passed  a  resolution  defining  the  limits  May  22 
of  the  Northern  Department  (including  Ticonderoga), 
assigning  Schuyler  to  the  command  of  it,  and  repealing 
the  resolution  adopted  two  years  before  by  which  his 
head-quarters  were  established  at  Albany.2 

Gates  did  not  accept  either  of  the  appointments  sug 
gested  by  the  Board  of  War.    He  was  unwilling  to  serve 
under  Schuyler,  and  obtained  leave  to  withdraw  from  juneQ 
the  Northern  Department,  and  proceeded  to  Philadelphia,  juiy  s 
where  he  continued  his  intrigues  with  Congress  until  that 
body  passed  a  resolution  directing  him  "to  repair  to 
head-quarters  and  follow  the  directions  of  General  Wash-  Apra  i 
ington."    St.  Clair,  meanwhile,  had  been  selected  for  APrU29 
service  at  Ticonderoga  and  directed  to  proceed  there 
forthwith. 

After  the  loss  of  Ticonderoga  (as  related  hereafter), 
Schuyler  again  fell  under  the  ban  of  Congress,  and  a  reso 
lution  was  passed  directing  him  to  report  at  head-quarters,  Aug.  i 
and  Washington  to  select  another  officer  to  command  his 
department.  Simultaneously  the  New  England  delega 
tion,  headed  by  John  and  Samuel  Adams,  sent  a  letter 
to  Washington  extolling  the  merits  of  Gates  and  asking 
that  he  be  appointed  in  Schuyler 's  place.  But  Washing 
ton  wrote  to  Congress  asking  to  be  excused  from  making 
the  appointment  and  suggesting  that  Congress  make  its 
own  selection.  Congress  then,  "by  the  vote  of  eleven  Aug.  4 
States,"  elected  Gates  "to  command  the  Northern  army."  Aug.  19 


1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VII,  300,  336,  349,  364. 

2  Ibid.,  VIII,  375. 


100  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  He  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mohawk  three  days  after 
the  victorious  battle  of  Bennington  and  relieved  Schuyler 
of  his  command.1 

These  events  have  been  related  in  detail  because  they 
were  so  scandalous,  and  had  such  an  important  relation 
to  the  military  operations  in  the  North,  to  the  effort  to 
displace  Washington  during  the  following  winter,  and  to 
the  subsequent  appointment  of  Gates  to  command  the 
Southern  army  —  where  his  career  came  to  an  inglorious 
end. 

The  force  which  Schuyler  had  at  his  disposal  to  oppose 
the  advance  of  Burgoyne  against  Ticonderoga  and  St. 
Leger  against  Stanwix  was  very  small.  St.  Clair,  who 
commanded  at  Ticonderoga,  had  2,546  2  Continentals  and 
900  militia.  Outside  of  this,  there  were  only  small  de 
tachments  of  militia  at  Skenesborough  (now  Whitehall), 
Fort  Ann,  Fort  Edward  and  Albany. 

May  6  Burgoyne  had  arrived  at  Quebec  as  soon  as  the  ice  was 

out  of  the  St.  Lawrence.    Sir  Guy  Carleton,  the  Governor 


of  Canada,  although  practically  superseded  by  Burgoyne, 

rendered  him  every  assistance.    Burgoyne  went  on  to 

Montreal  and  there  found  his  troops,  an  enormous  train 

of  siege  artillery  (in  addition  to  that  previously  men 

tioned)  and  an  ample  fleet  to  convey  his  force  across 

June  20          Lake  Champlain.1    Everything  was  speedily  assembled 

June  27          at  Cumberland  Point  (Plattsburg),  and  a  week  later  he 

landed  at  Crown  Point.3 

Topography  at  Ticonderoga  played  such  an  important  part  in  the 
French  and  Indian  wars,  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of 
1812,  and  will  have  such  an  essential  part  should  we 
ever,  unfortunately,  be  again  involved  in  hostilities  with 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VIII,  540;  VII,  217;  VIII,  596,  604;  Sparks,  V,  14. 
3  Carrington,  311;  Dawson,  231.  *  Burgoyne,  9-11. 


THE  HUDSON  101 

Great  Britain  or  Canada,  that  it  may  be  well  to  describe  1777 
somewhat  in  detail  the  topographical  features  which 
create  such  importance.  From  Montreal  to  New  York 
the  distance  (by  rail)  is  384  miles;  and  paralleling  the 
rail  and  other  roads  is  a  navigable  water  route  for  the 
greater  part  of  the  distance — 149  miles  from  New  York 
to  Troy  and  147  miles  from  Whitehall  to  St.  Johns. 
Between  Troy  and  Whitehall,  the  valley  of  the  Hudson 
is  followed  for  49  miles  to  Fort  Edward;  thence  to  White 
hall,  22  miles,  there  are  two  low  valleys  (through  which 
the  Champlain  canal  has  been  constructed),  the  one  lead 
ing  out  of  the  Hudson  and  the  other  into  Lake  Cham- 
plain  at  Whitehall;  and  the  highest  point  of  the  land 
between  them  is  only  147  feet  above  sea  level. 

This  long,  narrow  depression,  between  the  St.  Law 
rence  and  Sandy  Hook,  is  flanked  (in  its  northern  half)  by 
mountains  rising  to  a  height  of  2,500  feet  or  more — the 
Green  Mountains  of  Vermont  on  the  east  and  the  Adiron- 
dacks  on  the  west.  It  has  been  a  natural  highway  for 
the  early  explorers,  for  the  Indians,  for  military  opera 
tions  and  for  commerce;  it  has  rare  scenic  beauty. 

For  more  than  20  miles  at  its  southern  end,  Lake 
Champlain  has  a  width  of  half  a  mile  or  less,  and  lofty, 
rugged  hills  rise  on  either  side  from  the  water's  edge. 
Then,  as  it  widens  and  comes  into  a  more  open  country, 
it  passes  between  two  mountains,  Mount  Independence 
on  the  east  and  Mount  Defiance  on  the  west,  which  over 
look  the  country  for  a  long  distance  to  the  north;  and  at 
this  same  point  it  meets  the  outlet  of  Lake  George,  which 
discharges  its  water  through  a  narrow  gorge  about  3 
miles  long,  in  which  there  is  a  drop  of  about  220  feet. 

The  surrounding  hills  are  now  and  always  have  been 
densely  wooded. 


102 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 

Previous 
Operations  at 
Ticonderoga 


St.  Clair's 
Garrison 


Through  this  gateway  the  Colonial  militia  attempted, 
without  success,  to  force  their  way  in  their  first  encounter 
with  the  French  in  1690.  The  French  then  built  a  stone 
fort  on  the  point  at  the  edge  of  the  lake,  just  north  of 
Mount  Defiance  and  Mount  Independence,  which  they 
named  Fort  Carillon.  In  1758  Montcalm  and  Levis  sup 
plemented  this  by  intrenchments  of  wood  and  earth,  with 
entanglements  of  felled  timber  in  front.  Against  these 
Abercrombey  hurled  15,000  men  in  a  murderous  assault, 
losing  nearly  2,000 — the  bloodiest  battle  ever  fought  on 
this  continent  prior  to  the  Civil  War.  In  the  following 
year  Amherst  attacked  it  in  a  more  rational  manner,  by 
siege  operations;  and  the  French,  being  largely  outnum 
bered,  blew  up  the  stone  fort  and  abandoned  it.  The 
English  partially  rebuilt  the  ruin  and  named  it  Fort 
Ticonderoga.  They  maintained  a  garrison  there  until  it 
was  taken  by  Ethan  Allen  and  Benedict  Arnold  in  1775, 
as  we  have  seen.  It  was  the  starting-point  of  Mont 
gomery's  expedition  to  Quebec  in  that  year,  and  the  rally- 
ing-point  of  Sullivan's  retreat  in  the  following  year. 

During  the  winter  and  spring  its  works  had  been  some 
what  strengthened  and  new  works  had  been  built  on 
Mount  Independence.  To  man  them  properly  a  garrison 
of  10,000  men  was  required.  St.  Clair  was  authorized 
to  call  on  the  neighboring  States  for  militia,  and  could 
have  raised  them  if  he  had  had  provisions.1  But  his  sup 
plies  were  insufficient  for  the  men  he  had;  and  Burgoyne's 
advance  thus  found  him  with  a  garrison  of  barely  3,500 
of  whom  one-third  were  militia. 

They  were  posted  partly  at  Fort  Ticonderoga  and 
partly  in  the  trenches  and  works  on  the  sides  and  summit 
of  Mount  Independence.  A  bridge  had  been  built  across 

1  St.  Clair's  narrative,  240-250. 


REFERENCES: 
I  Stone  Redoubt 
Z  Block  Houses 

3  French  Redoubt 

4  Breast  Works 

5  Redoubts 

6  Old  French  Lines 

7  Additions  to  old  lines 

8  Block  House  burnt 

by  British 

9  Barbel  Battery 
10  Proposed  Lines 
u  Batteries 

12  Pickets 


TlCONDEROGA 

July  6,  1777 


A  -  Attack  of  Americans  upon  British  Advance  Corps 

B  -  Detachment  under  Earl  of  Balcarres 

C  •  American  Position  after  Gen.  Riedesel  arrived 

D  -  British  Position  after  the  action 

E  •  House  in  which  wounded  were  cared  for 

1=3   M  American  Forces 

C3   mm  British  Forces    ^3   c*  German  Auxiliaries 

HUBBARDTOWN 

July  7,  1777 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers.  Cleveland,  Ohio 


19 

BENNINGTON 
Aug.  16,  1777 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


THE  HUDSON  103 

the  lake  at  this  point.    The  commanding  hills  of  Mount        1777 
Hope,  on  the  north-west,  and  Mount  Defiance,  on  the 
south-west,  were   not  occupied,  because  the   force  was 
insufficient  and  because  Mount  Defiance  was  believed  to 
be  inaccessible. 

Burgoyne's  journal  *  shows  that  after  remaining  three 


days  at  Crown  Point,  to  bring  up  the  rear  of  his  army, 
he  advanced  in  two  columns;  Fraser's  brigade,  of  about  Jur 
3,000  men  and  10  guns,  on  the  west  side  of  the  lake,  and 
a  Hessian  detachment  on  the  east  ;  with  the  main  army 
behind  them  on  both  shores  and  on  frigates  and  gun-boats 
in  the  lake.  Two  days  later,  Phillips's  brigade  seized 
Mount  Hope,  which  commanded  the  outlet  of  Lake 
George,  and  thus  cut  off  St.  Clair  from  all  communica 
tion  in  that  direction.2  The  artillery  was  then  landed  juiy2 
and  a  reconnoissance  was  made  to  the  top  of  Mount 
Defiance,  which  was  found  not  to  be  inaccessible.  The 
British  dragged  their  artillery  to  its  summit,  which  com 
manded  within  easy  range  the  fortifications  not  only  at 
Ticonderoga  but  also  at  Mount  Independence.  As  soon 
as  these  guns  were  discovered  St.  Clair  called  a  council 
of  war3  of  his  principal  officers,  and  they  unanimously  juiy5 
decided  that  the  position  was  untenable,  that  Ticonderoga 
should  be  evacuated  that  night,  taking  the  cannon  and 
stores  to  Mount  Independence  if  possible,  and  that  an 
immediate  retreat  should  be  made  from  Mount  Inde-  Evacuation  or 
pendence  to  Skenesborough  (Whitehall).  The  heavy  ar 
tillery  —  128  pieces  —  was  abandoned;  a  few  lighter  pieces 
with  some  provisions  and  stores  were  placed  on  boats 
with  Long's  regiment  and  sent  up  the  lake  to  Skenes 
borough,  while  the  rest  of  the  force,  under  St.  Clair,  un- 

1  Burgoyne,  11,  Appendix  XXV. 

2  Ibid.,  XXVII.  3  Dawson,  231. 


104 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 


July  6 


July  7 


Battle  of 
Hubbardton 


Engagement 
at  Skenes- 
borough 

July  6 


dertook  to  march  to  the  same  point,  following  a  cir 
cuitous  route  of  about  45  miles  through  Hubbardton 
and  Castleton,  there  being  no  road  through  the  rough 
country  adjacent  to  the  lake.  St.  Clair  reached  Castle- 
ton  the  next  evening,  but  the  rear  guard,  consisting  of 
Warner's  and  Francis's  regiments,  with  the  stragglers 
and  infirm — about  1,200  men  in  all — was  then  about  six 
miles  behind,  at  Hubbardton.1  Here  they  were  over 
taken  in  the  morning  by  Fraser's  brigade,  which  had 
marched  nearly  all  night.  He  made  a  most  vigorous 
attack,  and  was  soon  reinforced  by  the  advance  guard  of 
the  Hessians  under  Riedesel.2  Warner  was  defeated, 
Francis  was  killed,  their  retreat  to  Castleton  was  cut  off, 
and  their  men  dispersed  through  the  mountains  to  the 
eastward.3  Their  losses  were  never  accurately  known. 
Burgoyne  claimed  that  200  dead  were  left  on  the  field 
and  600  wounded;4  Gordon  says  the  total  loss  was  324, 
but  does  not  give  his  authority.  He  gives  the  British 
loss  as  20  officers  and  183  killed  and  wounded.5 

Meanwhile,  Burgoyne  in  person  had  pursued  Long  up 
the  lake.  As  soon  as  the  retreat  was  discovered  the  naval 
vessels  had  pushed  forward  and  cut  a  passage  through 
the  bridge,  and  by  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Burgoyne, 
with  two  frigates  and  several  gun-boats,  carrying  three 
regiments  of  infantry,  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Skenesbor- 
ough.6  The  Americans  were  in  a  stockaded  fort;  the 
British  regiments  landed  and  climbed  the  adjacent  hills 
with  the  intention  of  getting  in  rear  of  the  fort  and  cutting 

1  St.  Glair's  Report,  Dawson,  229. 

2  Burgoyne,  Appendix  XXX;  Riedesel,  I,  363. 

3  St.  Clair's  Report,  Dawson,  229. 

4  Burgoyne's  Report,  Dawson,  234;  Riedesel,  I,  363. 

6  Gordon,  II,  484;  Riedesel,  I,  363;  Burgoyne,  Appendix  XXXIII. 
6  Burgoyne,  Appendix  XXX;  Riedesel,  I,  362. 


THE  HUDSON  105 

off  the  retreat.    But  before  this  could  be  accomplished        1777 
the  fort  and  the  boats  near  by  in  the  river  were  set  on  fire, 
and  Long  and  his  men  hastily  retreated  up  the  valley  of 
Wood  Creek  to  Fort  Ann.    Here  he  was  overtaken  the  Engagement 
next  morning  by  the  9th  British  Regiment,  with  the 
two  other  regiments  of  Phillips's  brigade  only  a  short 
distance  back.    Long  attacked  the  9th  Regiment  and  a 
sharp  engagement  took  place,  but  when  the  two  other 
regiments  came  up  he  was  forced  to  retire.    After  setting 
fire  to  Fort  Ann  he  retreated  to  Fort  Edward. 

Hearing  that  Skenesborough  was  occupied,  St.  Clair 
was  forced  to  retreat  from  Castleton  eastward  to  Rutland, 
and  after  a  painful  and  circuitous  march  of  seven  days 
he  joined  Schuyler  at  Fort  Edward.    The  remnants  of  juiyi2 
Warner's  men  remained  in  the  vicinity  of  Rutland.1 

Burgoyne's  campaign  thus  began  with  a  brilliant  vic 
tory.  The  loss  of  Ticonderoga  created  consternation  in 
Congress  and  throughout  the  Colonies.  Washington  was 
then  in  the  vicinity  of  Ramapo,  baffled  by  conflicting 
reports  of  Howe's  movements,  and  heard  the  news  by 
successive  reports  received  from  Schuyler  at  Fort  Ed 
ward.  He  immediately  bent  every  energy  to  reinforce 
Schuyler.  He  sent  Morgan's  Virginia  riflemen  from  his 
own  army,  and  directed  Putnam  to  send  him  two  brigades 
(Nixon's  and  Glover's);  he  also  ordered  Arnold  to  join  Reinforce- 
him;  he  sent  Lincoln  to  organize  and  command  the  New 
England  militia;  and  he  wrote  the  most  urgent  letters 
to  the  governors  of  New  York  and  the  New  England 
States,  telling  them  how  critical  the  situation  was,  and 
calling  upon  them  to  use  every  effort  to  fill  up  their  Con 
tinental  regiments  and  to  call  out  the  militia.2  As  a 

1  St.  Glair's  Report,  Dawson,  230. 

2  Sparks,  IV,  476,  480,  484,  500;  V,  17. 


106  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  result  of  these  measures,  reinforcements  kept  arriving  on 
the  upper  Hudson  during  July,  August  and  September, 
until  at  the  time  of  Burgoyne's  capitulation  Gates's 
morning  return  showed  13  brigades  of  infantry  besides 
artillery  and  cavalry,  with  a  total  strength  of  1,698 
officers  and  18,624  men,  of  whom  14,914  were  present 
for  duty.1 

The  other  part  of  Burgoyne's  plan — the  expedition 
under  St.  Leger  from  Oswego — met  with  complete  dis- 

st.  Leger  aster.  The  route  via  Oswego  and  Oneida  Rivers,  Oneida 
Lake,  Wood  Creek  and  the  Mohawk  Valley  had  also 
been  followed  in  the  earlier  French  and  Indian  wars; 
and  a  stockaded  fort  had  been  built  at  the  portage  be 
tween  Wood  Creek  and  Mohawk  River,  near  the  present 
city  of  Rome,  and  called  Fort  Stanwix.2  It  was  more  or 
less  in  ruins  in  the  spring  of  1777,  and  Schuyler  sent 

April  Colonel  Gansevoort  of  the  3d  New  York  Regiment  to 

take  command.    He  put  the  works  in  as  good  a  condition 

May  28  as  possible,  and  renamed  the  place  Fort  Schuyler.    He 

was  soon  joined  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Willett  and  the 

juiy  15          rest  of  his  regiment.3 

St.  Leger  arrived  at  Oswego  and  began  organizing  his 
expedition.  News  of  this  reached  General  Herkimer, 
who  commanded  the  militia  in  Tryon  County,  and  he 
issued  a  call  for  every  able-bodied  man  in  the  county. 
They  assembled,  to  the  number  of  about  800,  at  Fort 
Dayton,  now  the  village  of  Herkimer.4  Thence  they 

Aug.  4  marched  to  the  relief  of  Fort  Schuyler,  30  miles  to  the 

westward,  before  which  St.  Leger  had  appeared  on  the 

Aug.  3  previous  day.    News  of  their  approach  reached  St.  Leger, 

1  Printed  in  Burgoyne's  narrative,  Appendix  CIV. 

2  Arnold,  141.  3  Ibid.,  149. 
4  Arnold,  149;    Burgoyne,  Appendix  LXXVIII. 


THE   HUDSON  107 

and  he  sent  all  his  Indians,  under  Brant,  and  a  part  of  his        1777 
loyalist  militia  to  ambuscade  Herkimer  near  Oriskany, 
about  5  miles  east  of  Fort  Schuyler.    Here  the  road,  on 
which  Herkimer  was  advancing,  crossed  a  deep  ravine, 
at  the  bottom  of  which  was  a  marsh  and  causeway. 
Just  as  Herkimer's  force  had  passed  over  the  causeway  Aug.  6 
and  was  climbing  the  western  slope  of  the  ravine,1  with 
their  wagons  still  on  the  causeway,  the  Indians  sur 
rounded  them  and  attacked  with  great  fury.     Herkimer  Battle  ot 
was  wounded  almost  at  the  first  fire,  but  he  caused  him 
self  to  be  propped  up  against  a  tree,  lighted  his  pipe  and 
directed  the  battle  for  eight  hours.2    It  was  a  bushwhack-  6  A.  M.  to 
ing  fight  at  close  quarters,  and  the  Tryon  County  militia 
were  as  expert  in  that  kind  of  fighting  as  the  Indians 
themselves;    moreover,  they  personally  knew  the  tory 
militia  opposed  to  them,  and  fiercely  hated  them.3    No 
quarter  was  asked  or  given,  and  the  losses  were  out  of  all 
proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged. 

During  the  morning  three  messengers  from  Herkimer,  HA.M. 
sent  to  advise  the  garrison  of  his  approach,  succeeded 
in  reaching  Fort  Schuyler.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Willett, 
with  250  men,  was  immediately  ordered  to  make  a  sortie, 
which  was  completely  successful,  the  tory  and  Indian 
camps  being  both  captured,  with  a  large  amount  of  sup 
plies  and  all  of  St.  Leger's  and  Johnson's  papers.  The 
Indians  fled  to  the  woods.  When  pews  of  this  reached 
the  ambuscading  party  an  hour  or  so  later,  the  Indians 
there  also  fled,  leaving  Herkimer  and  his  militia  in  pos 
session  of  the  field.4 

1  The  spot  is  marked  by  a  large  monument  just  south  of  the  New  York 
Central  tracks,  225  miles  from  New  York  City. 
3  Arnold,  151;   Lossing,  I,  246. 
8  Dawson,  242. 
•Arnold,  151\ 


108 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 


Siege  of  Fort 
Schuyler 


Aug.  12 


Aug.  21 


Aug.  22 

Defeat  of  St. 
Leger 


Notwithstanding  this  success,  the  siege  was  not  yet 
abandoned.  Herkimer  was  carried  back  to  his  home 
and  died  of  his  wounds.  About  one-third  of  his  militia 
had  been  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  rest  soon  retired  to 
Fort  Dayton  (Herkimer).  St.  Leger  gathered  together 
his  tories  and  Indians  and  his  200  regulars,  and  closely 
invested  Gansevoort  in  Fort  Schuyler.  Willett  was  then 
sent  to  ask  aid  from  Schuyler.  With  one  companion  he 
succeeded  in  making  his  way  through  St.  Leger's  line  and 
reached  Schuyler,  then  at  Stillwater.  Schuyler  called  the 
usual  council  of  war  and  explained  the  importance  of 
relieving  Fort  Schuyler.  To  his  astonishment  there  were 
mutterings  accusing  him  of  cowardice  and  treason,  and 
intimating  that  he  was  planning  this  move  in  order  to 
give  Burgoyne  an  opportunity  to  enter  Albany  unop 
posed.  Schuyler  then  called  for  a  brigadier  to  lead  the 
relieving  party,  and  Arnold,  although  a  major-general 
and  second  in  command,  instantly  volunteered. 

With  800  men,  all  of  whom  had  volunteered  for  the  ser 
vice,  he  began  his  march  the  following  day,  and  soon 
reached  Fort  Dayton.  From  this  point  he  contrived  to 
send  men  into  St.  Leger's  camp  carrying  exaggerated 
statements  of  his  strength,  and  was  preparing  to  follow 
them  and  attack  St.  Leger,  when  the  Indians,  alarmed  at 
these  reports  and  discouraged  by  the  losses  at  Oriskany 
and  the  sortie,  became  mutinous  and  deserted  in  a  body. 
The  next  day  St.  Leger  raised  the  siege,  and  with  his 
regulars  and  the  few  tories  who  still  remained  with  him, 
retreated  hastily  to  Oswego,  and  later  to  Montreal.2 

Thus  ended  St.  Leger's  expedition. 

While  these  events  were  in  progress  others  of  equal 
importance  to  the  success  of  the  Americans  were  trans- 

2  Arnold,  153-162;  Dawson,  247;  Lossing,  I,  243-252. 


THE  HUDSON  109 

piring   near   the  upper   Hudson.    After   the  battle  of        1777 
Hubbardton  and  the  engagements  at  Skenesborough  and  July  7 
Fort  Ann,  Burgoyne  assembled  his  entire  force  at  Skenes-  July  6 
borough  and  prepared  to  advance  to  the  Hudson  at  Fort  July  s 
Edward.1    He  decided  to  use  all  his  boats  to  bring  his 
supplies  via  Lake  George,  but  to  march  his  men  by  the 
direct  route    through  the  wilderness  of  Wood   Creek. 
Although  the  distance  was  only  22  miles,  a  road  had  to 
be  cut  for  nearly  the  entire  distance,  and  the  obstructions 
which  Schuyler's  axemen  had  created  had  to  be  removed. 
Thus  20  days  were  consumed  in  the  operation.    At  the 
end  of  that  time  Burgoyne  arrived  at  Fort  Edward,  and 
on  the  same  day  Phillips  took  possession  of  Fort  George,  juiy  29 
at  the  head  of  Lake  George.    Fort  George  then  became 
Burgoyne's  secondary  base  of  supplies,  but  although  the 
distance  to  Fort  Edward  was  only  15  miles,  the  country 
was  so  broken  and  heavily  wooded,  and  the  transportation 
so  poor,  that  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that  his  army 
could  be  supplied.2 
Schuyler's  reinforcements  had  hardly  yet  begun  to 


arrive,  and  his  force  was  too  small  to  oppose  any  resistance  stiiiwater 
to  Burgoyne.    He  therefore  abandoned  Fort  Edward  and  juiy  2? 
retreated  down  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson  to  Still-  juiysi 
water,  about  25  miles  south  of  Fort  Edward  and  the 
same  distance  north  of  Albany.3 

The  fatal  defect  of  Burgoyne's  plan  was  the  inability  Difficulty  of 
to  supply  his  army.  At  Fort  Edward  he  was  185  miles 
from  his  base  at  Montreal.  There  were  23  miles  of  land 
transport  at  the  northern  end  and  15  miles  at  the  south 
ern  end,  and  the  latter  was  through  most  difficult  country. 
The  intervening  147  miles  was  by  water,  Lakes  Cham- 

1  Burgoyne,  Appendix  XXXIV. 

2  Ibid.,  16-19.  3  Arnold,  140-148. 


110  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  plain  and  George,  but  there  was  a  troublesome  portage 
between  the  two  at  Ticonderoga. 

Burgoyne,  therefore,  began  to  look  for  supplies  in  the 
enemy's  country.  He  had  heard  that  Bennington — in 
the  southern  part  of  the  "  Hampshire  Grants,"  now  the 
State  of  Vermont,  but  then  claimed  both  by  New  York 
and  New  Hampshire — was  a  great  depot  of  corn,  flour 
and  cattle;  that  it  was  defended  by  only  a  few  militia; 
and  that  the  district  "abounds  in  the  most  active  and 
most  rebellious  race  of  the  continent,  and  hangs  like  a 
gathering  storm  on  my  left." l  He  therefore  deter 
mined  to  deliver  a  blow  at  Bennington,  capture  its  stores, 
disperse  its  militia,  and  strike  terror  to  its  inhabitants. 
Incidentally  he  expected  to  obtain  horses  to  mount  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick's  Dragoons,  a  project  which  Riedesel 
had  much  at  heart.  If  the  move  succeeded,  he  thought 
it  would  prevent  the  sending  of  any  American  reinforce 
ments  to  the  relief  of  Fort  Schuyler,  and  would  enable 
St.  Leger  to  join  him  in  a  triumphant  entry  into  Albany.2 

For  this  expedition  Burgoyne  detailed  the  Brunswick 
dragoons  (unmounted),  Captain  Fraser's  selected  marks 
men,  some  tory  militia  and  some  Indians,  and  2  field 
guns,  the  whole  numbering  about  600  men  under  com 
mand  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Baume.3  To  facilitate  the 
Raid  toward  operation  and  to  be  ready  to  take  advantage  of  its  suc 
cess,  Burgoyne  moved  down  the  east  side  of  the  Hudson 
and  built  a  bridge  near  Saratoga  (now  Schuylerville).3 
Schuyler  fell  back  to  the  islands  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Mohawk.4 

Baume  left  the  Hudson  at  Saratoga,  and  moving  up 
the  Battenkill  crossed  the  hills  to  Cambridge  and  thence 

1  Burgoyne,  Appendix  XLVI;  Riedesel,  I,  368-372. 

»  Burgoyne,  XLIV.  3  Ibid.,  XLI.  4  Arnold,  163-165. 


THE  HUDSON  111 

to  the  Hoosick  River  at  the  mouth  of  Walloomsac  1777 
Creek.  There  he  encountered  a  small  party  of  American  Aug.  14 
militia,  and  he  soon  learned  that  Burgoyne  had  based 
his  plans  upon  quite  erroneous  information.1  There  was, 
in  fact,  a  body  of  New  England  militia,  under  General 
John  Stark,  far  exceeding  his  own  force  in  numbers, 
posted  at  the  village  of  Bennington,  about  7  miles  up  the 
Walloomsac,2  and  the  remnants  of  the  regiments  which 
had  fought  under  Warner  at  Hubbardton  seven  weeks 
before  were  now  resting  and  recruiting  at  Manchester, 
about  20  miles  to  the  north.  Baume  sent  a  messenger  Aug.  14 

4  A.  M. 

to  Burgoyne  with  a  report  of  these  facts.3 

Stark  had  served  in  the  French  and  Indian  wars,  had 
taken  a  New  Hampshire  regiment  to  Boston  in  time  for 
Bunker  Hill,  had  been  colonel  of  the  5th  Continental 
Regiment  in  the  following  year,  and  had  served  in  all  the 
engagements  under  Washington,  including  Trenton  and 
Princeton.  Then  several  promotions  were  made  over 
his  head  at  which  he  took  offence,  resigned  and  retired 
to  his  farm.  When  Ticonderoga  fell,  the  New  Hamp 
shire  legislature  made  him  a  brigadier-general  and  asked 
him  to  raise  the  militia  for  their  defence.  They  had  no 
confidence  in  the  officers  who  commanded  under  Schuyler, 
and  when  Lincoln,  sent  by  Washington  to  organize  the 
New  England  militia,  ordered  Stark  to  join  Schuyler  at 
Stillwater,  Stark  refused  point-blank,  and  said  it  was  at  stark  Refuses 
his  own  option  whether  he  acted  in  conjunction  with  the  orders 
Continental  army  or  not.4  When  Congress  heard  of  this 
it  sent  the  correspondence  to  the  New  Hampshire  legis-  congress  cen- 
lature,  with  a  resolution  saying  that  Stark's  action  was 

1  Baume's  Report;  Burgoyne,  Appendix  LXX. 

2  Stark's  Report,  Dawson,  260. 

3  Burgoyne,  LXX.  4  Stark's  Memoirs,  10-50. 


112 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 
Aug.  19 


And  Then 
Gives  Him  a 
Vote  of 
Thanks 

Oct.  4 


Aug.  14 


Burgoyne 
Sends  Re 
inforcements 
to  Baume 


Aug.  15 


" destructive  of  military  subordination/'  and  requesting 
that  he  be  instructed  to  conform  to  the  "same  rules 
which  other  general  officers  of  the  militia  are  subject  to 
whenever  they  are  called  out  at  the  expense  of  the 
United  States."  This  was  three  days  after  Stark  had 
gained  the  victory  at  Bennington.  On  hearing  of  this 
Congress  expressed  its  appreciation  of  what  Stark  had 
done,  and  later  passed  a  resolution  giving  him  a  vote  of 
thanks  and  appointing  him  a  brigadier-general  in  the 
Continental  army.1 

Seldom  has  such  rank  insubordination  produced  such 
excellent  results.  In  this  case  it  resulted  in  placing  Stark, 
with  superior  force,  at  the  very  point  where  Baume  was 
going  to  collect  stores  and  horses;  as  the  latter  approached 
Stark  sent  word  to  Warner  to  march  at  once  to  his  relief, 
and  in  spite  of  a  drenching  rain  Warner  arrived  in  time 
to  be  of  assistance. 

Burgoyne  received  Baume's  report  during  the  night, 
and  immediately  ordered  Lieutenant-Colonel  Breyman, 
with  the  Brunswick  grenadiers  and  other  Hessians,  642 
men  in  all,  with  2  field  guns,  to  reinforce  Baume;  and 
marching  as  rapidly  as  he  could  over  the  bad  roads  in 
the  heavy  rain,  Breyman  arrived  while  the  battle  was  in 
progress.2 

After  spending  a  day  at  Van  Schaick's  mill,  Baume 
moved  forward  the  next  morning,  the  advance  guard  of 
the  militia  retreating  before  him.  But  after  he  had 
moved  up  the  north  bank  of  the  Walloomsac  about  four 
miles,  the  militia  were  reinforced  by  Stark's  main  body, 
coming  down  the  creek  from  Bennington.  Baume  hesi 
tated  to  attack,  and  selecting  a  good  position,  spent  the 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VIII,  656;  IX,  770. 
3  Burgoyne,  XLIII;  Riedesel,  127-133. 


THE  HUDSON  113 

rest  of  the  day  in  intrenching.  His  unmounted  dragoons  1777 
were  loaded  down  with  immense  hats,  boots,  swords  and 
muskets;  and  on  a  hot  August  day  in  a  thinly  settled 
country,  with  bad  roads  and  torrents  of  rain,  were  ill 
equipped  to  match  the  New  Hampshire  farmers  in  their 
shirt-sleeves  and  with  no  impedimenta  except  a  gun 
and  cartridge-box.1 

Early  the  next  morning  Stark  sent  out  these  farmers,  Aug.  ie 
whom  Baume  at  first  did  not  recognize  as  soldiers,  to 
surround  the  Hessians;  200  under  Colonel  Nicholls  by  the 
right,  200  under  Colonel  Herrick  by  the  left;  while  the 
main  body,  under  Stark  himself,  moved  down  the  creek  Battle  of 
to  attack  them  in  front.  Before  Baume  realized  it  he 
was  surrounded  by  double  his  numbers — all  good  marks 
men.  His  Indians  fled  at  the  first  shot,  but  the  Bruns- 
wickers  fought  hard  and  used  their  two  little  field-guns 
to  the  best  advantage.  Two  hours  of  incessant  fighting 
followed,  which  finally  became  a  hand-to-hand  encounter 
after  the  ammunition  was  exhausted.  Baume  was  mor 
tally  wounded,  a  large  part  of  his  force  had  been  destroyed, 
some  surrendered,  and  the  rest  escaped  down  the  creek. 

Stark's  men  divided  their  attention,  some  plundering  12  M. 
the  Hessian  camp  and  some  pursuing  the  retreating 
dragoons.  When  the  pursuit  had  gone  about  half-way 
to  Van  Schaick's  mill,  Breyman  arrived  from  one  direction 
and  Warner  from  the  other;  the  battle  was  fiercely  re 
newed  and  Breyman  lost  almost  as  heavily  as  Baume 
had.  Abandoning  his  artillery 2  and  wagons  at  dusk,  he 
hastily  retreated  to  the  Battenkill  and  Saratoga. 

1  Stark,  50-75;  Lossing,  I,  391,  399. 

2  The  history  of  these  four  guns  is  interesting.    They  were  of  French 
manufacture,  were  taken  by  Wolfe  at  Quebec  in  1759,  captured  by  Stark 
at  Bennington  in  1777,  surrendered  by  Hull  at  Detroit  in  1812,  retaken 
at  Niagara  in  1813.     Fonblanque's  Burgoyne,  273. 


114 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 


Burgoyne's 
Precarious 
Position 


July  29  to 
Aug.  20 


Sept.  13 


Burgoyne 
Advances 


Stark's  force,  including  Warner's  men,  numbered  about 
2,000;  Baume  and  Breyman  had  about  1,300.  The 
American  losses,  according  to  Stark's  report,  were  only 
30  killed  and  40  wounded;  he  also  reported  that  there 
were  207  Hessians  dead,  a  large  number  wounded  and  that 
he  had  taken  700  prisoners.  The  Hessian  accounts  put 
the  number  at  somewhat  less;  but  even  these  admit  the 
loss  of  596  men,  exclusive  of  the  loss  among  the  British.1 

Thus  the  Hessian  detachment  on  the  east  and  St. 
Leger's  expedition  on  the  west  were  practically  de 
stroyed,  almost  at  the  same  time.  Burgoyne's  position 
immediately  became  precarious.  It  was  just  at  this 
time  that  Gates  arrived  and  superseded  Schuyler.  The 
army  was  immensely  elated  by  the  two  victories,  the 
militia  turned  out  in  large  numbers,  Stark  soon  marched 
to  join  Gates,  and  the  reinforcements  of  Continental 
troops  were  now  coming  in  rapidly  from  New  England 
and  from  Peekskill. 

Burgoyne  had  now  been  on  the  Hudson  for  three  weeks, 
slowly  and  with  infinite  toil  dragging  his  provisions  and 
boats  over  from  Lake  George  in  the  hope  of  accumulat 
ing  a  sufficient  supply  to  last  him  during  an  offensive 
campaign  of  thirty  days,  and  enough  boats  to  move  them 
on  the  Hudson,  from  one  rapids  to  the  next,  as  he  ad 
vanced  toward  Albany.  He  continued  this  work  for 
three  weeks  longer,  and  then  believing  that  he  had  suffi 
cient  supplies,  he  crossed  from  the  east  to  the  west  bank 
of  the  Hudson  on  the  bridge  which  he  had  built  just  above 
the  mouth  of  the  Battenkill,  and  moved  forward.  His 
letters  to  Germain  show  that  he  was  far  from  being  con 
fident  of  success.  He  said:  "I  yet  do  not  despond."2 


1  Burgoyne,  XLIII;  Riedesel,  132;  Dawson,  259. 
3  Burgoyne,  XLVIII. 


THE  HUDSON  115 

Nevertheless  he  knew  he  was  already  outnumbered  by  1777 
the  reinforcements  which  had  come  to  the  American 
army;  he  realized  that  he  was  far  from  his  base  of  sup 
plies,  that  he  could  not  obtain  supplies  from  the  enemy's 
country  and  that  his  communications  were  in  danger  of 
being  cut  off.  He  could  probably  have  saved  his  army 
by  a  prompt  retreat  to  Ticonderoga.  To  have  done  so 
would  have  been  to  acknowledge  the  failure  of  the  whole 
plan  which  he  had  induced  the  King  to  adopt.  More 
over,  he  had  a  lingering,  though  faint,  hope  that  Howe 
would  march  up  the  Hudson;  and  finally  the  King's 
orders  of  March  16  required  him  "to  force  his  way  to 
Albany."  As  he  wrote  Germain,  he  felt  that  he  was  not  Aug.  20 
at  liberty  to  disregard  these. 

Gates,  on  his  arrival,  found  the  main  body  of  the  Aug.  19 
American  army  on  the  islands  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mo-  situation  in 
hawk,  with  Poor's  brigade  4  miles  up  the  Mohawk  on  his  Army 
left,  Lincoln  and  Stark  at  Bennington,  30  miles  on  his 
right,  and  Arnold  on  the  upper  Mohawk,  110  miles  on 
his  left.     Arnold,   after  the   relief  of  Fort   Schuyler, 
promptly  returned  and  joined  Gates  just  as  Burgoyne 
was  preparing  to  cross  the  Hudson.    Gates  had  already  sept.  10 
issued  orders  to  have  everything  in  readiness  to  march, 
but  had  made  no  movement.    When  Arnold  arrived  and 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  left  wing,  he  took 
Kosciusko  (apparently  on  his  own  responsibility),  made  sept.  12 
a  reconnoissance  of  the  ground  in  his  front,  selected  a 
position  at  Bemis'  Heights,  about  6  miles  in  advance, 
and  furnished  Kosciusko  the  men  to  fortify  it.1    The 
lines  were  on  a  plateau  about  200  feet  above  the  Hudson, 
with  a  deep  ravine  (Mill  Creek)  in  their  front,  and  ex 
tended  around  three  sides  of  a  rectangle  more  than  2 

1  Arnold,  165-178. 


116  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  miles  in  length.  Gates's  army,  about  9,000  strong,  occu 
pied  these  lines,  Arnold  on  the  left  and  Gates  on  the  right, 
when  Burgoyne,  after  five  days  of  cautious  advance, 

sept.  19  came  in  sight.  The  latter's  plan  was  to  send  Fraser  and 
Breyman  on  his  right  to  move  around  the  head  of  the  ra 
vine  and  attack  the  American  left;  he  himself  with  the 

Battle  of         main  body  of  the  British  was  to  cross  the  ravine,  and, 

Farm™1  deploying  on  the  southern  side  of  it,  to  attack  the  centre; 
while  Phillips  and  Riedesel  were  to  move  along  two 
roads  near  the  Hudson  and  protect  his  left.  His  force 
had  been  reduced  by  losses  to  a  strength  of  about  6,000 
men.  As  his  columns  on  the  march  were  widely  separated 
in  a  broken  country,  their  arrival  in  position  was  to  be 

i  P.  M.  to  announced  by  the  firing  of  signal-guns,  and  these  were 
heard  early  in  the  afternoon. 

These  movements  had  been  observed  for  more  than 
three  hours,  but  Gates  gave  no  orders.  Arnold  at 
length,  after  much  entreaty,  obtained  permission  to  send 
Morgan's  riflemen  against  the  Canadians  and  Indians 
who  formed  Fraser 's  advance.  Morgan  attacked  with 
such  impetuosity  that  his  men  got  out  of  hand,  and  when, 
after  driving  back  the  Indians  and  Canadians,  he  came 
upon  Fraser's  main  body,  he  was  in  turn  driven  back  with 
considerable  loss.  Seeing  this,  Arnold,  without  waiting 

3  P.  M.  for  further  orders,  brought  up  his  entire  force,  and  lead 

ing  them  in  person  he  made  a  furious  assault  upon  Fraser. 
The  fighting  continued  at  close  quarters  and  often  hand 
to  hand  for  about  four  hours.  Arnold  applied  for  rein 
forcements  to  Gates,  but  Gates  refused  to  send  them  for 
fear  that  he  would  expose  his  camp.  Phillips  and  Rie 
desel,  finding  that  Gates  did  not  advance  against  them, 
marched  to  the  sound  of  the  guns  and  Arnold  had  nearly 
the  whole  of  Burgoyne's  force  opposed  to  him.  Not- 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


FREEMAN'S  FARM 
Sept.  19,  1777 


THE  HUDSON  117 

withstanding  the  superiority  of  the  force  opposed  to  him,        1777 
he  held  his  ground  until  sunset,  and  then  returned  within 
his  lines.    The  British  lay  upon  their  arms,  where  they 
were  when  the  fighting  terminated. 

The  losses  on  the  American  side  were  65  killed,  218  Report  of 
wounded  and  33  missing;  on  the  British  side  more  than  Adjutant-ben- 
500.    One  regiment,  the  62d,  which   left  Canada   500 
strong,  came  out  of  this  battle,  according  to  Burgoyne, 
with  only  60  men  and  5  officers.1 

This  was  the  first  of  the  Saratoga  battles,  sometimes 
called  Freeman's  Farm  and  sometimes  Bemis'  Heights. 
Instead  of  attacking,  as  he  had  intended,  Burgoyne  had 
been  thrown  on  the  defensive  from  the  beginning  of  the 
action.  The  next  day  he  began  intrenching  on  the  north 
and  east  sides  of  the  Mill  Creek  ravine,  about  a  mile  or 
more  distant  from  the  American  lines;  and  he  remained 
there  until  the  second  battle,  eighteen  days  later.  The 
Americans,  meanwhile,  continued  to  strengthen  their 
lines. 

On  the  second  day  after  the  battle,  Burgoyne  received  sept.  21 
word  from  Sir  Henry  Clinton  advising  him  of  his  inten 
tion  to  attack  Fort  Montgomery,  opposite  Peekskill; 2 
and  Burgoyne  sent  back  the  same  messenger  that  night, 
and  followed  this  by  two  other  messengers.    They  all 
carried  the  same  message,  viz.,  that  Burgoyne  could  hold 
out  until  October  12,  and  he  urged  Clinton  to  come  to  his 
assistance  before  that  date.    All  three  reached  Clinton  oct.s 
in  safety,  and  the  latter  sent  them  all  back.    The  return  Oct.  9 
trip  was  not  so  successful.    The  bearer  of  one  message, 
Sergeant  Taylor,  was  captured  at  Kingston  and  hung  as 
a  spy;    Captain  Campbell,  who  carried  the  second,  is 

1  Dawson,  285-290;  Riedesel,  144-150;  Arnold,  170-190. 
3  Burgoyne,  24. 


118  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777        said  by  Lossing  to  have  delivered  it  to  Burgoyne  on  the 
Oct.  17  night  before  the  surrender,  although  Riedesel  does  not 

mention  this;   Captain  Scott,  who  bore  the  third,  was 
unable  to  reach  Burgoyne,  and  after  the  capitulation 
escaped  down  the  river  and  joined  the  British  fleet, 
oct.  s  The  message  which  was  intercepted  was  written  at 

Fort  Montgomery,  and  was  in  these  words:  "Nous  y 
voici,  and  nothing  now  between  us  and  Gates.  I  sin 
cerely  hope  this  little  success  of  ours  may  facilitate 
your  operations.  In  answer  to  your  letter  of  28th  of 
September  by  C.  C.  [Captain  Campbell]  I  shall  only  say, 
I  cannot  presume  to  order,  or  even  advise,  for  reasons 
obvious.  I  heartily  wish  you  success."  l 

This  indifferent  reply,  sent  to  a  brother  general  who 
had  just  informed  him  how  desperate  his  situation  was, 
shows  that  Clinton's  point  of  view  in  regard  to  the  Hud 
son  campaign  was  very  different  from  Burgoyne's. 

On  the  American  side,  Gates  now  became  intensely 
jealous  of  Arnold.  He  did  not  mention  his  name  in  the 
sept.  22  report  which  he  made  to  Congress  (not  to  Washington) 
of  the  battle;  and  his  adjutant-general,  Wilkinson,  was 
circulating  reports  that  Arnold  had  not  been  on  the  field. 
The  feud  was  stimulated  by  the  fact  that  Schuyler's  staff 
officers  had  remained  with  the  army  and  were  serving 
with  Arnold.  Finally  Arnold,  whose  mind  was  ill- 
balanced,  although  he  was  a  brave  and  skilful  soldier, 
became  so  incensed  that,  after  a  stormy  interview  with 
Gates,  he  foolishly  applied  for  permission  to  leave  the 
army,  which  Gates  promptly  gave  him.  But  Arnold 
was  very  popular  with  his  troops,  and  they  begged  him 
to  remain.  Arnold  decided  to  do  so,  but  Gates  then  re 
fused  to  allow  him  to  resume  command,  and  announced 

Sparks,  V,  131;  Lossing,  I,  684. 


THE  HUDSON  119 

his  intention  to  assign  Lincoln,  as  soon  as  he  should        1777 
arrive,   to   command   his   division.     When   the  second 
battle  came  on  Arnold  was  in  camp  without  any  defined 
position.1 

Meanwhile,  Lincoln  was  collecting   the  militia   near 
Bennington,  but  before  marching  to  join  Gates  he  sent 
a  detachment  under  Colonel  Brown  on  a  raid  against  sept,  is 
Burgoyne's  communications.     Brown  marched  via  Hub-  American 
bardton  to  Mount  Independence  and  captured  that  hill, 


while  part  of  his  force  went  by  way  of  Skenesborough  to 
Mount  Defiance.  Brown  took  293  prisoners,  released  100 
Americans  and  captured  all  the  outlying  posts,  but  was 
unable  to  take  the  fort  at  Ticonderoga.  He  then  re 
joined  Lincoln,  and  the  latter  brought  his  troops,  about  sept.  27 
2,000  in  number,  to  Gates's  camp.2  Gates  now  outnum 
bered  Burgoyne  more  than  two  to  one,  but  he  made  no 
move  against  him;  and  Burgoyne  remained  on  the  de 
fensive,  hoping  from  day  to  day  to  hear  of  Clinton. 

No  news  came.3  Clinton,  however,  was  moving  up  the 
Hudson.  His  expedition  was  undertaken  under  the  fol 
lowing  circumstances.  Although  Germain  had  failed  to 
give  Howe  any  instructions  to  co-operate  with  Burgoyne,4 
yet  the  latter  had  written  to  Howe  three  letters  —  from 
Plymouth  in  April,  from  Montreal  in  May  and  from 
Crown  Point  in  June5  —  in  each  of  which  he  had  advised 
Howe  of  the  instructions  he  had  received  to  force  his 
way  to  Albany  and  effect  a  junction  with  him.  Howe 
received  all  three  letters  at  New  York;  and  just  before 
sailing  for  the  Delaware,  he  sent  Burgoyne  a  brief  and 
indefinite  reply  saying  that  "  after  your  arrival  at  Albany, 
the  movements  of  the  enemy  will  guide  yours;  ...  Sir 

1  Arnold,  190-195.  3  Lossing,  150.  8  Burgoyne,  25. 

4  See  page  78,  ante.  6  Burgoyne,  9,  11. 


120 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 


so 


Oct.  3 

Clinton  Moves 
up  the 
Hudson 


Oct.  5 


American 
Force  in  the 
Highlands 


Oct.  5 


Henry  Clinton  remains  in  the  command  here,  and  will 
act  as  occurrences  may  direct."  But  after  arriving  in 
the  Delaware  and  before  sailing  to  the  Chesapeake,  Howe 
decided  to  write  to  Clinton,  suggesting  that  he  make  a 
diversion  in  Burgoyne's  favor,  if  he  could  do  so  with 
out  endangering  the  security  of  Kingsbridge.  The  date 
when  Clinton  received  this  letter  is  not  known.  It  was 
prior  to  September  12,  the  day  on  which  he  wrote  Bur- 
goyne  of  his  intention  to  attack  Fort  Montgomery.  But 
Clinton  did  not  move  until  the  long-delayed  reinforce 
ments  arrived  from  England,  nearly  three  weeks  later. 

Then  he  started  up  the  Hudson  with  three  columns, 
one  of  which  marched  from  Kingsbridge  to  Tarrytown 
and  the  other  two  proceeded  to  the  same  point  by  water. 
The  total  force  was  about  3,000  men,  and  it  was  con 
voyed  by  several  ships  of  war.  At  Tarrytown  the  entire 
force  was  put  on  boats  and  landed  again  at  Verplanck's 
Point,  threatening  Putnam  at  Peekskill.1 

Putnam  had  about  1,200  Continentals  and  as  many 
militia.  They  garrisoned  the  forts,  which  had  been  built 
at  great  expense  early  in  the  year,  at  the  southern  en 
trance  to  the  Highlands;  Fort  Independence  on  the  east 
side  and  Forts  Montgomery  and  Clinton  on  the  west. 
The  river  was  obstructed  by  a  boom  and  chain  opposite 
Fort  Montgomery,  and  two  frigates  were  on  the  north 
side  of  the  boom  to  protect  it.  When  Putnam  saw  this 
strong  force  approaching  the  eastern  shore  he  retired  to 
the  hills  behind  Peekskill,  and  brought  over  a  part  of  the 
force  stationed  on  the  west  shore.  A  few  hours  later  the 
British  galleys  had  advanced  far  enough  up  the  river  to 
prevent  any  further  communication  between  the  two 
shores,  so  that  Putnam,  when  he  desired  on  the  following 

1  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  344. 


THE  HUDSON  121 

day  to  send  men  to  the  relief  of  the  forts  on  the  west  shore,        1777 
was  unable  to  do  so.1    In  reality  Clinton's  move  at  Ver- 
planck's  Point  was  only  a  feint;   his  real  objective  was 
the  west  shore.    He  seems  to  have  been  well  posted  in 
regard  to  these  forts,  and  his  dispositions  were  skilfully 
made.    At  daybreak  the  next  morning  his  entire  force  Oct.  e 
landed  above  Stony  Point,  and  was  pushed  forward 
through  the  deep  valley  behind  the  Dunderberg  until  it 
came  within  about  a  mile  of  Fort  Clinton.    Here  the 
advance,  consisting  of  the  52d  and  27th  Regiments  and 
some    tory   militia,   about    900   in    all,   under  Colonel 
Campbell,  marched  around  Bear  Hill  into  the  valley  of  capture  of 
Peploap's  Kill,2  which  empties  into  the  Hudson  between  gom^y  and 
the  two  forts,  to  attack  Fort  Montgomery.    The  main 
body,  about  1,100  men  under  General  Vaughan,  which 
Clinton  accompanied  in  person,  was  to  attack  Fort  Clin 
ton  from  the  south.    The  rest  of  his  force,  under  Gen 
eral  Tryon,  was  in  reserve,  keeping  up  communication 
with  the  fleet,  and  ready  to  support  either  column  if 
necessary.3 

The  two  forts  were  under  command  of  General  James 
Clinton.  His  brother,  General  George  Clinton,4  recently 
elected  Governor  of  New  York,  was  attending  a  session 
of  the  legislature  at  Kingston.  Hearing  that  a  move 
ment  up  the  river  was  projected,  he  adjourned  the  legis 
lature  and  hastened  to  his  brother's  assistance,  bringing 
with  him  such  militia  as  he  could  gather,  which  carried 
the  total  strength  of  the  garrison  to  about  800  men. 
He  arrived  two  days  before  the  British  landed.  On 

1  Putnam's  Report,  Dawson,  341. 

2  So  named  on  the  map  in  Stedman,  vol.  I;  now  called  Popelopen  Creek. 
8  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  345. 

4  Fort  Clinton  was  defended  by  James  Clinton  and  George  Clinton,  and 
captured  by  Sir  Henry  Clinton.  , 


122  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777        Sunday  evening  he  sent  out  a  reconnoissance  to  the 
Oct.  s  south  and  it  returned  the  next  morning  with  the  infor 

mation  that  the  British  had  landed.  Governor  Clinton 
despatched  as  many  men  as  he  could  spare  to  scour  the 
roads  to  the  south.  They  soon  met  the  British  and  were 
driven  back.  The  British  attack  was  then  made  by 
both  columns,  and  though  it  encountered  a  spirited  de 
fence,  the  assailants  entered  both  works  about  sunset. 
Part  of  the  garrisons  surrendered  and  the  rest  escaped 
over  the  hills  and  across  the  river.  The  British  loss  was 
about  40  killed  and  150  wounded;  that  of  the  Americans 
about  250  killed,  wounded  and  missing.  The  two  Ameri 
can  frigates  were  burned  by  their  crews,  who  escaped 
to  the  east  shore.  The  boom  and  chain  across  the  river 
were  destroyed.  The  British  ships  sailed  up  the  river 
and  attacked  Fort  Constitution,  opposite  West  Point, 
and  it  was  hastily  abandoned.  Putnam,  with  the  men 
who  had  been  at  Peekskill,  retreated  up  the  river  to  Fish- 
kill.  The  Americans  lost  67  cannon  in  the  various  forts 
and  30  on  the  frigates,  besides  a  large  amount  of  powder, 
ordnance  stores  and  provisions.1 

It  was  a  signal  success  on  Sir  Henry  Clinton's  part,  and, 
as  he  wrote  to  Burgoyne,  there  was  nothing  between  him 
and  Gates.    If  he  had  pushed  on  quickly  to  Albany  he 
might  have  changed  the  whole  situation.    But  instead 
1777        of  doing  so  he  wrote  to  Burgoyne  a  trifling  letter,2  sent 
Oct.  s  Vaughan  up  the  river  on  a  marauding  expedition  as  far 

Oct.  13  as  Kingston,  which  was  burned,  and  then  returned  with 

cnnton  to        his  entire  force  to  New  York.    He  attempted  to  justify 
his  action  on  the  ground  that  he  could  not  take  any 

1  Reports  of  Governor  Clinton,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  and  Putnam,  Dawson, 
341-346;  Sparks,  V,  88,  91,  471-476. 
3  P.  118,  ante. 


Hospitals,  Magazines 
Burgoyne's  Hdqrs 
vision  Bateaux 


•£*•,        ?»£  \\         --^"f>  V_   k     .  c,^-  // 


English  Statute  Miles 

Roads  at  the  time 
of  the  Revolution 
Present  Roads  ===. 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


BEMIS  HEIGHTS 
Oct.  7,  1777 


:   r  >*  ,  •  ;  ; : 


THE  HUDSON  123 

chances  at  New  York.  The  excuse  was  not  sufficient,  1777 
for  he  had  8,500  men,  and  there  was  no  enemy  nearer 
than  Putnam,  whom  he  had  driven  away  from  Peekskill, 
and  Washington,  who  was  in  front  of  Philadelphia  con 
fronted  by  a  superior  force  under  Howe.  Clinton  ac 
knowledges  that  he  understood  from  Captains  Campbell 
and  Scott  how  desperate  Burgoyne's  situation  was. 
That  under  these  circumstances  he  was  so  concerned 
about  the  safety  of  New  York  can  only  be  explained  on 
the  theory  that  Washington's  wonderful  exploit  at  Tren 
ton  and  Princeton  in  the  preceding  winter  had  made  Clin 
ton  attribute  to  Washington  almost  supernatural  powers. 
Burgoyne's  situation  was  indeed  desperate.  He  had 


written  to  Clinton  that  he  could  hold  out  until  the  12th.  situation? 
On  the  3d  he  put  his  men  on  half  rations,  and  on  the  7th, 
still  hearing  nothing  from  Clinton,  he  determined  to  at 
tack;  but  his  advance  was  made  in  a  half-hearted  fashion, 
for  the  purpose,  as  he  said  in  his  report  to  Germain,  of 
discovering  "  whether  there  were  any  possible  means  of 
forcing  a  passage,  should  it  be  necessary  to  advance,  or 
dislodging  him,  for  the  convenience  of  a  retreat."  *  Hav 
ing  started  the  battle,  he  lost  control  of  it,  and  Arnold 
fell  upon  him  with  fury,  inflicting  a  terrible  defeat. 

Leaving  the  greater  part  of  his  force  in  the  intrench-  Battle  ot 
ments  which  he  had  constructed  on  the  north  and  east  Heights 
sides  of  Mill  Creek,  Burgoyne  in  person  took  1,500  regulars  Oct.  7 
and  six  pieces  of  artillery,  and  attempted  to  go  around  the  11  A.  M. 
head  of  Mill  Creek  ravine  and  attack  the  American  left. 
His  movement  was  detected,  and  before  he  reached  the 
American  lines  Gates  had  sent  Morgan's  riflemen  to  attack 
his  right,  and  a  strong  force  consisting  of  Poor's  brigade, 
two  New  York  regiments  and  the  Connecticut  militia  to 

1  Burgoyne,  LXXXIX. 


124 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 
2  P.  M. 


Burgoyne's 
Retreat 


Oct.  8 


9  P.  M. 


assail  his  left.  Severe  fighting  was  the  immediate  result; 
Fraser  was  mortally  wounded,  and  Burgoyne,  abandon 
ing  his  artillery,  was  driven  back  across  the  ravine  and 
into  his  lines.  Arnold,  although  deprived  of  all  com 
mand,  had  gone  into  the  fight  with  his  troops,  leading 
them  and  inspiring  them.  Finally  he  took  entire  charge, 
brought  up  all  the  troops  he  had  lately  commanded  and, 
himself  in  the  van,  hurled  them  against  the  lines  held  by 
Earl  Balcarras  in  the  centre,  and  later  against  a  strong 
redoubt  held  by  Breyman  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
British  lines.  The  fighting  continued  throughout  the 
autumn  afternoon.  Balcarras  made  a  successful  defence; 
but  Breyman  was  killed,  a  large  part  of  his  men  were 
taken  and  his  works  captured  just  before  sunset.  Arnold 
was  wounded  as  he  entered  the  redoubt. 

Night  put  an  end  to  the  fighting,  which  had  resulted 
in  a  loss  on  the  American  side  of  only  150  men,  whereas 
the  British  had  lost  about  600.  There  was  no  question 
of  Burgoyne's  defeat,  and  during  the  night  he  abandoned 
his  lines  and  part  of  his  tents  and  provisions,  retreated 
about  a  mile  across  a  creek  to  the  north  of  Mill  Creek  and 
took  refuge  in  three  redoubts  overlooking  the  Hudson 
which  he  had  previously  constructed.1  Gates  did  not 
appear  on  the  field,  but  remained  in  his  tent,  spending 
a  good  part  of  the  day  in  discussing  the  merits  of  the 
Revolution  with  Burgoyne's  aide  who  had  been  wounded 
and  captured. 

The  next  day  there  was  skirmishing  in  front  of  these 
redoubts,  while  three  columns  in  succession  were  sent 
past  his  right  flank  to  capture  the  fords  of  the  Hudson  in 
his  rear.  Detecting  these  movements  during  the  after 
noon,  he  abandoned  his  hospital  and  wounded  and  re- 

1  Burgoyne,  XC-XCII;  Arnold,  196-211;  Dawson,  301,  307. 


THE  HUDSON  125 

treated  five  miles  to  Saratoga  (Schuylerville),  where  on        1777 
the  second  morning  he  assembled  his  men  and  began  the  Oct.  10 
construction  of  new  lines  on  the  heights  above    Fish 
Creek.    Gates  followed  him  and  soon  completely  sur-  Oct.  n 
rounded  him,  the  main  body  of  the  Americans  on  the 
south  of  Fish  Creek,  Poor's  and  Learned's  brigades  and 
Morgan's  riflemen  on  the  west  of  the  British  camp, 
Fellow's  brigade  on  the  heights  across  the  Hudson  and 
Stark  in  Burgoyne's  rear  at  Fort  Edward. 

Burgoyne  then  called  a  council  of  war,  himself,  Oct.  12 
Phillips,  Riedesel  and  Hamilton,  and  submitted  five  pos 
sible  movements  to  his  associates;  but  the  only  one  that 
was  seriously  considered  was  a  prompt  retreat  to  Fort 
Edward.  To  accomplish  this  a  start  of  four  miles,  un 
observed,  was  deemed  essential.  Scouts  were  sent  out, 
and  on  their  return  reported  that  the  army  was  so  sur 
rounded  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  it  to  march 
without  being  immediately  discovered. 

Burgoyne  then  called  a  second  council  of  war,  "con-  Oct.  is 
sisting  of  all  the  general  officers  and  field  officers  and  cap 
tains  commanding  corps,"  and  asked  them  whether  an 
army  was  justified  "in  capitulating  in  any  possible  situ-  Negotiations 

.         ,  ,         ,  J .  for  Surrender 

ation,"  and  whether  "the  present  situation  is  of  that 
nature."  Both  questions  were  unanimously  answered 
in  the  affirmative.  An  officer  was  then  sent  to  Gates 
with  a  letter  from  Burgoyne  asking  a  "cessation  of  arms"  Oct.  14 
long  enough  to  enable  Burgoyne  to  state  the  terms  "by 
which  in  any  extremity  he  and  his  army  mean  to  abide." 
Gates  replied,  naming  his  own  terms,  and  granting  a 
cessation  of  arms  until  sunset.  The  sixth  article  re 
quired  Burgoyne's  army  to  be  paraded  in  their  camps, 
ground  their  arms  and  be  marched  to  the  riverside  on 
their  way  to  Bennington.  The  council  was  reassembled 


126  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  and  unanimously  rejected  this  article.  An  officer  was 
sent  back  and  at  sunset  delivered  this  ultimatum  to 
Gates:  "If  General  Gates  does  not  mean  to  recede  from 
the  6th  article,  the  treaty  ends  at  once.  .  .  .  The  cessa 
tion  of  arms  ends  this  evening."  He  also  delivered  the 
terms  which  Burgoyne  was  willing  to  accept.  To  the 

Oct.  15  surprise  of  every  one,  the  next  morning  Gates  sent  an 

officer  to  Burgoyne,  practically  accepting  the  latter's 
terms,  but  stipulating  that  the  conquered  army  should 
leave  its  position  at  2  o'clock  on  that  day.  Gates  had, 
in  fact,  just  learned  of  the  capture  of  Fort  Montgomery 
and  Fort  Clinton  and  the  advance  of  Vaughan  up  the 
Hudson.  He  was  disposed  to  take  the  best  terms  he 
could  get.  But  the  stipulation  about  moving  before  2 
o'clock  made  Burgoyne  suspicious.  He  determined  to 
gain  time,  and  appointed  commissioners  to  arrange 
terms.  Their  negotiations  continued  until  11  p.  M.,  at 
which  hour  the  articles  were  agreed  upon,  the  British 
commissioners  giving  their  word  that  they  would  be 

Oct.  is  signed  by  Burgoyne.  But  when  they  returned  to  their 

camp  at  midnight  Burgoyne  had  just  learned  from  a 
deserter  that  Fort  Montgomery  had  been  captured  and 
that  part  of  Clinton's  army  had  reached  Kingston.  Bur 
goyne  thereupon  called  his  council  together  again  and 
asked  whether  it  was  honorable  to  withdraw  from  a 
treaty  definitely  agreed  upon  by  authorized  commission 
ers;  fourteen  officers  thought  it  was  dishonorable  and  eight 
that  it  was  not.  Burgoyne  refused  to  be  bound  by  their 
decision,  and  agreed  with  the  minority.1  He  then  asked 

1  The  minutes  of  the  council  are  given  in  Burgoyne's  narrative,  Appen 
dix,  pp.  cii  to  cv.  General  Riedesel  also  wrote  out,  on  September  18, 
his  memorandum  of  the  negotiations.  Riedesel's  Memoirs,  pp.  175-184. 
Stedman  (I,  385-392)  gives  verbatim  the  letters  that  were  exchanged 
between  Gates  and  Burgoyne. 


-3  British  three  gun  batteries 
z  "  ^our  mortar  battery 
4  Redoubts  to  cover  batteries 

sf  approach 


FORT  SCHUYLER 

Aug.    3-22,    I777 


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From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 

and  Its  People 


FORTS   MONTGOMERY  AND  CLINTON 
Oct.  6,  1777 


SURRENDER  OF   BURGOYNE 
Oct.  17,  1777 


THE  HUDSON  127 

whether  the  army  would  defend  their  position  to  the  last  ITT? 
extremity.  On  this  the  opinions  were  conflicting,  the 
majority  inclining  to  the  opinion  that  they  would  not. 
In  order  to  gain  more  time,  Burgoyne  sent  word  to  Gates 
early  in  the  morning  that  he  had  heard  that  some  of  the 
American  army  had  been  sent  to  Albany,  and  in  order  to 
assure  himself  that  he  was  surrounded  by  a  force  three  or 
four  times  as  numerous  as  his  own,  he  wished  to  send  one 
of  his  own  officers  to  examine  his  force.  This  was  more 
than  Gates  would  stand,  and  he  replied  declining  his  re 
quest,  saying  that  he  would  show  his  army  after  the  con 
vention  was  signed,  warning  Burgoyne  of  the  consequences 
of  refusing  to  sign  the  articles  agreed  upon  by  authorized 
commissioners,  and  telling  him  if  they  were  not  signed  ••  Articles  oif 
within  an  hour  he  would  resort  to  extreme  measures,  signed 
Another  council  was  then  summoned,  and,  although  opin 
ions  were  still  divided,  Burgoyne  decided  to  yield.  He 
signed  the  articles1  and  sent  them  to  Gates,  who  signed 
them  in  turn. 

The  British  and  Hessians  marched  out  of  their  camp  Oct.  17 
the  following  afternoon,  laid  down  their  arms  and  then 
marched  through  the  American  camp,  where  the  troops 
were  paraded  under  arms  and  then  on  toward  Albany. 
The  return,  drawn  up  that  day,  showed  341  officers,  586  strength  of 
non-commissioned  officers  and  4,836  privates,  a  total  of  dered  Army 
5,763.2    Burgoyne  gives  a  detailed  statement  of  his  total 
losses  during  the  campaign,  amounting  (among  the  regu 
lars,  exclusive  of  Canadians  and  Indians)  to  415  killed, 
911  wounded  and  1,169  prisoners,  a  total  of  2,495.3 

The  garrison  of  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point  escaped 

1  The  original  document  is  in  the  possession  of  the  New  York  Historical 
Society. 

2  Dawson,  300.  3  Burgoyne,  LI. 


128  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777        to  Montreal.    The  Hudson  was  free  down  to  Spuyten 
Duyvil. 

Ten  times  has  the  United  States  army  received  the 
capitulation  of  the  armed  force  opposed  to  it,  viz.:  at 
Saratoga,  Yorktown,  Vera  Cruz,  City  of  Mexico,  Donel- 
son,  Vicksburg,  Appomattox,  Durham's  Station,  Santiago 
and  Manila.  Saratoga  was  the  first,  and  it  gave  rise  to 
an  unfortunate  controversy  which  was  not  the  case  in 
any  of  the  others.  In  his  first  proposals  Gates  stipulated 
that  Burgoyne's  army  "can  only  be  allowed  to  surrender 
[as]  prisoners  of  war."  But  later  he  agreed  to  a  "  Con 
vention"  instead  of  a  "Capitulation,"  and  its  thirteen 
articles  said  nothing  of  prisoners  of  war.  The  essence  of 
the  convention  was  that  all  the  troops,  of  whatever  coun 
try,  under  Burgoyne's  command  were  "to  march  out  of 
their  camp,  with  the  honors  of  war,"  and  lay  down  their 
arms  "by  word  of  command  of  their  own  officers";  were 
then  to  march  to  Boston,  and  as  soon  as  Howe  should 
send  transports  to  receive  them,  were  to  sail  to  England, 
controversy  "on  condition  of  not  serving  again  in  North  America 
*c°oUnVenetion  during  the  present  contest,"  unless  they  or  any  part  of 
them  should  be  exchanged  by  cartel.1  As  a  matter  of 
fact  they  were  never  sent  to  England,  but  were  kept  at 
Boston  for  a  year,  then  sent  to  Charlottesville,  Va.,  and 
after  that  to  Lancaster,  Pa.,  and  other  places.  Mean 
while  each  side  charged  the  other  with  bad  faith  and  a 
breach  of  the  convention. 

The  real  trouble  was  that  under  the  convention  it  was 

possible  to  send  Burgoyne's  army  back  to  England  for 

garrison  duty,  releasing  fresh  troops  for  service  in  Amer- 

oct.  20  ica.    Burgoyne  wrote  a  private  letter  to  Germain,  three 

*The  convention  in  full  is  printed  in  Dawson,  303,  304;  Riedesel,  I, 

184-186. 


THE  HUDSON  129 

days  after  the  surrender,  calling  attention  to  this  possi-        1777 
bility,  and  claiming  great  credit  for  "saving  the  army."  1  NOV.  5 
Gates  seems  not  to  have  seen  this  point,  but  Washington's  NOV.  is 
clear  mind  saw  it  the  moment  he  read  the  document,  and 
he  wrote  to  Heath,2  who  commanded  at  Boston,  pointing 
it  out  to  him,  and  requiring  him  to  insist  on  a  rigid  com 
pliance  by  Burgoyne  with  his  part  of  the  terms.    Howe 
did  not  like  to  send  his  ships  so  far  away  from  New 
York,  and  presently  he  asked  to  have  the  point  of  em 
barkation  changed  to  Newport;  but  Washington  refused 
to  make  any  change.3    If  Howe  could  send  his  ships  to 
Boston,  and  spare  them  for  the  long  voyage  to  England, 
well  and  good;  but  there  should  be  no  change  whatever  Dec.  n 
in  the  terms.    The  matter  presently  came  up  in  Congress, 
and  that  body  resolved  that  the  embarkation  should  not 
take  place  until  the  convention  was  explicitly  ratified  by 
the  court  of  Great  Britain.    It  charged  that  Burgoyne        1773 
had  not  surrendered  all  his  "arms,"  because  he  had  re-  Jan.s 
tained  or  concealed  his  cartridge-boxes  and  colors,  and 
Riedesel  admits  that  he  took  the  colors  off  their  staffs, 
burned  the  latter  and  put  the  colors  in  his  trunks.4 
Howe  complained  that  the  prisoners  were  suffering  for 
food  and  shelter,  and  Congress  insisted  that  the  British 
should  pay  for  the  provisions,  and  in  gold  at  that,  not  in 
Continental  currency.5 

It  was  an  unseemly  controversy  and  many  of  the  posi 
tions  taken  by  Congress  were  not  tenable;  but  it  all  arose 
from  the  trick  by  which  Burgoyne  tried  to  outwit  Gates 
by  a  surrender  which  would  result  in  bringing  an  equal 
number  of  fresh  troops  from  England  as  fast  as  ships 

1  Burgoyne,  XCVII.  '  Sparks,  V,  144. 

8  Ibid.,  V,  234,  535-538.  4  Madame  Riedesel's  Memoirs,  161 

a  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  IX,  1032;  X,  35. 


130  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1777  could  cross  the  ocean  and  back.  The  controversy  dragged 
on  for  nearly  four  years,  Burgoyne  meanwhile  going  to 
England  on  parole,  and  taking  his  seat  in  Parliament 
where  he  defended  before  a  committee  his  conduct  while 
in  America.  More  than  four  years  after  the  surrender,  in 
Dec.  17,  nsi  a  debate  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  American  war, 
he  complained  that  he  was  still  a  prisoner  of  war.1  Dur 
ing  all  these  four  years  the  subject  of  "  convention  troops  " 
was  in  controversy  both  in  and  out  of  Congress.  Finally 
Congress  turned  the  whole  matter  over  to  Washington.2 
In  the  meantime  most  of  the  officers  and  a  large  part  of 
the  men  had  been  gradually  exchanged;  and  others,  par 
ticularly  the  Germans,  were  allowed  to  escape  and  settle 
in  America,  where  they  permanently  remained,  but  some 
of  them  were  still  prisoners  when  peace  came  in  1783.3 
The  surrender  of  Burgoyne  was  of  signal  advantage  to 
the  American  cause.  It  hastened  the  French  alliance ;  it 
left  the  Hudson  permanently  in  American  control;  it  put 
out  of  action  more  than  one-fourth  of  the  King's  forces 
in  America.  It  has  been  sufficiently  pointed  out  that 
Burgoyne's  plan,  which  he  persuaded  the  King  and  the 
ministry  to  adopt,  although  the  latter  failed  to  advise 
Howe  of  his  part  in  it,  was  inherently  wrong  and  inevi 
tably  doomed  to  failure.  With  the  means  of  transporta 
tion  then  existing  an  army  could  not  operate  in  a  hostile 
country  when  separated  from  its  base  of  supplies  by  180 
miles  of  wilderness.  Even  if  Howe  had  carried  out  the 
part  originally  assigned  to  him,  the  British  disaster  might 
have  been  greater  than  it  was;  for,  remembering  what 
Washington  accomplished  at  Trenton  and  at  Yorktown, 

1  Hansard,  Parl.  Hist,  of  England,  XXII,  862. 

2  Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  46,  218. 

'  Sparks,  VI,  257;  Riedesel,  II,  175. 


THE  HUDSON  131 

it  is  quite  possible  that  in  the  event  of  Howe  going  up  ms 
the  Hudson  to  join  Burgoyne,  Washington  might  have 
taken  New  York,  cut  Howe  off  from  his  ocean  base  and 
captured  his  army  as  well  as  Burgoyne's.  The  plan 
which  offered  the  greatest  chance  of  success  in  the  spring 
of  1777  was  the  one  that  King  George  "greatly  disliked"  * 
and  that  Washington,  with  clear  military  insight,  antici 
pated  and  dreaded,  viz. :  to  bring  every  man  in  America 
to  New  York,  and  with  this  overwhelming  force  to  crush 
Washington.  Could  his  army  have  been  destroyed  or 
scattered,  the  conquest  of  the  Hudson  and  the  separa 
tion  of  New  England  from  the  Middle  States  would  have 
been  an  easy  task. 

1  P.  78,  ante. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE1 

1778  THE  site  of  the  encampment  at  Valley  Forge  is  now  an 

unitary          historical   park  owned  by  the  State  of  Pennsylvania. 

Advantages  . 

of  the  Position  The  house  occupied  by  Washington  and  the  other  stone 
houses  in  the  vicinity  are  in  substantially  the  same  con 
dition  as  they  were  during  the  terrible  winter  of  1777- 
78;  the  lines  of  intrenchments  and  the  redoubts  in  or 
adjacent  to  the  works  can  still  be  distinctly  traced.2 
They  follow  the  contour  of  wooded  hills,  which  rise  at 
their  highest  point  to  an  altitude  of  354  feet  above  the 
waters  of  the  Schuylkill  on  the  north  and  Valley  Creek  on 
the  west.  To  the  eastward  the  hills  slope  gently  into  an 
open  country,  to  the  north  the  slope  is  more  abrupt 
and  to  the  west  it  is  precipitous.  The  length  of  the 
" inner  line"  of  intrenchments  was  about  a  mile  and  a 
half,  and  they  enclosed  an  irregular  triangle  of  about  500 
acres  between  Valley  Creek  and  the  Schuylkill.  But  a 
large  part  of  the  troops  were  encamped,  or  hutted,  out 
side  of  these  lines  for  a  distance  of  two  miles  to  the  east 
ward.  From  these  positions,  in  case  of  attack,  the  troops 

lThe  statue  of  Rochambeau  in  Lafayette  Square,  Washington,  was 
unveiled  in  1902;  and  in  connection  therewith  Congress  has  published  an 
elaborate  memoir,  edited  by  George  de  B.  Keim,  under  the  title  of  Rocham 
beau,  which  contains  much  original  data,  not  hitherto  available,  concern 
ing  the  French  troops  and  ships. 

3  See  Annual  Report  Valley  Forge  Park  Commission,  1906. 

132 


VALLEY   FORGE 
Dec.  19,  lyyy-June  17,  1778 


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From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


PHILADELPHIA 
Evacuated  June  18,  1778 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  133 

could  quickly  retire  within  the  main  lines  behind  which        ms 
a  very  strong  defence  could  be  made. 

The  distance,  following  the  windings  of  the  Schuylkill, 
from  the  mouth  of  Valley  Creek  to  the  Middle  Ferry  (now 
Market  Street  bridge  in  Philadelphia)  was  twenty-one 
miles;  and  by  road,  from  Washington's  outposts  at  Port 
Kennedy  (at  the  mouth  of  Trout  Creek)  to  those  of 
Howe  at  Germantown,  it  was  about  sixteen  miles. 

In  this  position,  easily  defensible,  with  a  rich  and  long- 
settled  agricultural  region  at  his  back  from  which  to  ob 
tain  supplies,  and  in  which  were  already  the  crude  begin 
nings  of  what  is  now  the  great  mineral  and  manufacturing 
district  of  Reading,  Washington  was  on  Howe's  flank  as 
he  had  been  the  previous  winter  at  Morristown,  and  was 
prepared  quickly  to  follow  Howe  should  he  make  any 
move. 

The  American  army  remained  at  Valley  Forge  just  six  Dec.  19, 
months — months  of  intense  anxiety  for  the  commander-  r?™.™ 
in-chief  and  of  terrible  suffering  for  his  men.    It  was 
destitute  of  shoes,  clothing  and  provisions;   it  was  not 
properly  organized;  it  was  deficient  in  knowledge  of  drill 
and  manoeuvres;   it  had  no  proper  system  of  account-  principal 
ability;  its  regiments  and  battalions  were  mere  skele 
tons  and  recruits  were  not  forthcoming  to  fill  them  up.1 
While  Washington  was  working  with  all  his  energy  to 
remedy  these  defects  the  wretched  Conway  Cabal  was 
equally  active  in  contemptible  intrigues  with  Congress, 
the  purpose  of  which  was  to  displace  Washington  and 
substitute  Gates  as  commander-in-chief. 

These  were  also  months  of  great  events  in  Europe;  the 

1  The  terrible  winter  at  Valley  Forge  has  been  described  in  every  history 
of  the  Revolution.  Perhaps  the  most  vivid  picture  of  it  is  that  given  in 
Trevelyan,  III,  294-302. 


134 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


Feb.  6 
March 

April 
Feb.  8 
March  8 
March  21 


1778  conclusion  of  the  French  alliance;  the  adoption  by  the 
British  ministry  and  King  of  measures  offering  to  the 
Colonies  everything  they  had  asked  for  except  indepen 
dence  ;  the  despatch  of  commissioners  to  treat  with  Con 
gress  for  peace  on  these  terms;  the  resignation  of  Howe 
and  the  appointment  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  in  his  place; 
and  the  sending  of  instructions1  to  Clinton  that  "the  war 
must  be  conducted  on  a  different  plan/7  the  offensive  to 
be  abandoned,  part  of  his  force  to  be  sent  to  the  West 
Indies  to  attack  the  French  at  St.  Lucia,  part  to  Florida 
to  retain  the  British  possessions  there,  part  to  harry  the 
New  England  coast  towns,  Philadelphia  to  be  evacuated, 
everything  to  be  concentrated  at  New  York,  and  if  in 
danger  there — scuttle  for  Halifax.2 

The  campaign  of  1777  marked  the  end  of  all  active 
operations  by  the  British  in  the  Northern  States.  The 
war  was  to  last  five  years  longer,  but  the  British  strength 
was  to  be  frittered  away  in  disjointed  movements  at 
great  distance  from  each  other;  and  although  the  force 
at  New  York  was  to  be  maintained  at  a  strength  always 
at  least  fifty  per  cent  greater  than  the  Continentals  under 
Washington,  it  was  to  remain  all  those  years  strictly  on 
the  defensive. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  winter  Washington  wrote  to 
Congress3  two  letters  which  conveyed  a  most  graphic 
picture  of  his  starving  and  naked  army.  Congress  ap 
pointed  a  committee4  to  go  to  Valley  Forge;  it  remained 
there  for  several  months,  and  in  concert  with  it  Washing 
ton  formulated  plans  for  overcoming  the  defects  above 
conway  cabai  enumerated.  As  to  the  Conway  Cabal,  it  was  a  contest 
of  pygmies  against  a  giant.  Washington  shattered  and 


Dec.  22 
Dec.  23 


1  Sparks,  V,  395,  548-551. 
3  Ibid.,  V,  192-203. 


2  Germain  to  Clinton,  Sparks  V,  550. 
4  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  IX,  1052. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  135 

destroyed  it  by  the  sheer  force  of  his  lofty  character  and  ma 
great  services.  Gates,  indeed,  had  strength  enough  to 
secure  his  appointment  two  years  later  to  the  command 
of  the  Southern  army,  where,  having  no  Arnold  to  lead 
his  troops  as  at  Saratoga,  he  speedily  proved,  to  the  com 
plete  satisfaction  of  all  concerned,  his  shallowness  and 
incapacity.  But  Mifflin,  Conway  and  the  rest  were  more 
quickly  disposed  of;  Mifflin  being  without  military  em 
ployment  for  nearly  a  year,  then  resigning  and  going  to 
Congress  where  he  had  no  influence;  Conway,  wounded 
in  a  duel,  resigning  his  commission  in  the  army,  writing 
an  abject  apology  to  Washington  and  finally  returning 
to  Europe  and  disappearing  forever  from  public  view.1 
No  one  ever  ventured  again  to  dispute  the  fact  that 
Washington  was  the  one  indispensable  man  for  the  suc 
cess  of  the  Revolution,  or  to  suggest  any  other  name  for 
the  position  of  commander-in-chief . 

As  to  the  more  distinctly  military  problems  at  Valley 
Forge,  Washington  solved  them  one  by  one,  so  that  when 
the  army  moved  in  June  it  was  in  a  condition  of  military 
efficiency  which  it  had  never  before  approached.    The 
most  pressing  questions  were  food  and  clothing.    The 
country  was  not  deficient  in  either,  and  the  responsibil 
ity  for  the  destitute  condition  of  the  army  was  partly  due 
to  the  unwise  action   of  Congress  and  partly  to  the 
hopeless  inefficiency  of  the  quartermaster's  department. 
The  delegates  in  Congress,  seldom  more  than  twenty-five        1777 
present,  were  very  jealous  of  a  standing  army,  but  they 
did  not  hesitate  to  pass  the  most  despotic  resolutions.2  sept.  17 
Among  others  they  ordered  Washington  "to  take,  wher-  Nov- 14 
ever  he  may  be,  all  such  provisions  and  other  articles  Dec- 10 

1  Sparks,  V,  517.  8  Ibid.,  V,  187,  406. 


136 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1777 


Greene  AD- 


March  23 


1778 

Washington 
to  Greene, 
August  15, 
1780 


as  may  be  necessary  for  the  comfortable  subsistence  of 
the  army  under  his  command,  paying  or  giving  certifi 
cates  for  the  same";1  but  it  made  no  adequate  provision 
for  paying  the  certificates.  To  enforce  this  impressment 
with  the  utmost  rigor  was  to  deprive  the  army  of  the  sup 
port  of  the  people.  Washington  exercised  the  despotic 
powers  conferred  upon  him  by  this  and  previous  resolu 
tions  with  great  prudence  and  much  less  vigorously  than 
Congress  demanded.2  Such  supplies  as  he  did  seize  were 
never  at  the  place  wanted,  for  Mifflin,  the  quartermaster- 
general,  had  for  six  months  practically  abandoned  the 
duties  of  his  office,3  and  his  department  was  in  com 
plete  disorder.4  In  concert  with  the  committee,  Wash- 
ington  prevailed  upon  Congress5  to  make  better  provi- 
-  sion  for  payment  of  the  certificates;  and  jointly  they 
persuaded  Greene,  much  against  his  will,  to  perform 
the  duties  of  quartermaster-general  without  vacating  his 
position  in  the  line.6  Having  accepted  the  task,  he  bent 
every  energy  to  its  successful  accomplishment.  Before 
the  army  moved  in  June  he  had  established  a  line  of 
depots  or  magazines  of  supplies  in  rear  of  the  army  from 
the  Head  of  Elk  to  the  North  River,7  and  as  Washington 
expressed  it,  "by  extraordinary  exertions  you  [he]  so 
arranged  it  as  to  enable  the  army  to  take  the  field  the 
moment  it  was  necessary,  and  to  move  with  rapidity 
after  the  enemy."  8 
The  deficiencies  in  drill,  organization,  discipline  and 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VIII,  752;  IX,  905,  1014. 

2  Sparks,  V,  187,  188.  3  G.  W.  Greene,  II,  20,  43,  49. 

4  Report  of  committee  of  Congress,  February  12,  1778.  Original  is  in 
handwriting  of  Joseph  Reed;  a  complete  copy  is  published  in  Life  and 
Correspondence  of  Joseph  Reed,  I,  360. 

6  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  X,  210,  223,  224,  325. 

9  Ibid.,  X,  210.  7  G.  W.  Greene,  II,  57. 

8  Sparks,  VII,  153. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  137 

accountability  were  overcome  by  the  fortunate  arrival  of        ms 
a  thoroughly  competent  man,  Steuben,  who  had  served  Feb.  23 
at  Prague  and  Rossbach  and  the  other  battles  of  the  Seven 
Years'  war,  on  the  personal  staff  of  the  great  Frederick,  steuben 
He  joined  Washington  as  a  volunteer,  and  later,  when  he  inspector- 
had  proved  his  entire  competency  for  the  position,  he 
was  appointed  inspector-general  of  the  army.1    He  in-  May  2? 
troduced  a  definite  plan  (which  Congress  subsequently 
approved)  of  organization  in  the  infantry,  artillery,  cav 
alry  and  engineers;    he  devised  a  system  of  accounta 
bility  for  public  property  which  resulted  in  enormous 
saving;   he  taught  the  troops  how  to  take  care  of  their 
arms;  he  gave  them  their  first  drill-book2  and  regulations 
for  troops  in  active  service;   he  personally  drilled  them 
until  they  could  execute  manoeuvres  with  creditable  ex 
actness.3    It  was  to  do  these  things  that  he  had  been 
selected  and  sent  over  by  the  French  ministers.4    In 
view  of  their  plans  to  aid  the  American  cause  with  men, 
munitions  and  money,  they  wished  to  improve  the  mili 
tary  efficiency  of  the  American  army.    There  was  proba 
bly  not  a  man  in  the  whole  world  more  competent  for 
this  task  than  Steuben. 

In  order  to  increase  the  strength  of  his  army,  Wash 
ington  succeeded,  in  spite  of  much  insubordinate  opposi 
tion  on  the  part  of  Gates  and  Putnam5  in  bringing  to  Washington 
Valley  Forge  the  greater  part  of  the  Continentals  that  NOV.  19, 1777 
had  been  at  Saratoga.    The  militia,  which  had  formed 
more  than  half  of  Gates's  army,  went  home  soon  after 

1  Kapp,  Steuben,  52,  192-273;  Sparks,  V,  526,  529;  Jour.  Cont.  Cong., 
XI,  465,  514,  538,  543,  550. 
3  Kapp,  Steuben,  200-214. 
8  Ibid.,  52,  192-273. 
*IMd.,  68,  69;  Sparks,  V,  527. 
'Sparks,  V,  125,  161,  162;  Sparks,  Letters,  II,  536-544. 


138 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1778  the  surrender.  Moreover,  these  Continentals,  like  those 
already  at  Valley  Forge,  were  depleted  to  a  mere  fraction 
of  their  normal  strength.  In  order  to  fill  up  the  ranks, 
Congress,  which  had  hitherto  " recommended"  to  the 
States  to  furnish  their  quota,  now  undertook  to  "  require 
Recruits  for  forthwith"  the  States  to  do  this  by  means  of  a  draft.1 
Feb.  2^yi7?8  Effectually  to  carry  out  a  draft  required  powers  and  ad 
ministrative  organization  far  beyond  those  possessed  by 
the  Congress  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation;  and 
it  is  probable  that  the  personal  appeals  which  Washing 
ton  made  all  through  this  winter  and  spring  to  the 
governors  of  States,  Jonathan  Trumbull  in  Connecti 
cut,  George  Clinton  in  New  York,  Thomas  Wharton  in 
Pennsylvania,  Patrick  Henry2  in  Virginia,  and  others, 
had  more  effect  than  the  resolutions  of  Congress,  how 
ever  commanding  their  language  might  be.  Between 
them  all,  however,  a  certain  number  of  recruits  were 
obtained.  The  committee  of  Congress  led  Washington 
to  believe  that  the  104  battalions  (16  Continental  and 
88  State  "line")  which  existing  laws  then  authorized 
would  produce  an  army  of  40,000  men  for  the  year's 
campaign.3  In  fact  they  produced  barely  half  that 
number. 

As  for  the  British  Peace  Commission,  headed  by  the 
Earl  of  Carlisle,  which  arrived  at  Philadelphia,  it  was  two 
years  too  late.  The  French  alliance  bound  each  country 
not  to  make  peace  without  the  consent  of  the  other,  nor 
without  acknowledgment  by  Great  Britain  of  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  United  States.4  Congress  refused  to 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  X,  200. 

2  Sparks,  IV,  477;  V,  9,  146,  239,  252. 
8  Ibid.,  V,  314. 

4  Treaty  of  Alliance,  February  7,  1778.  Treaties  and  Conventions  of 
the  United  States,  308. 


British  Peace 
Commission 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  139 

treat  on  any  other  terms,1  and  the  mission  was  a  ridicu- 
lous  failure. 

The    motives    which   induced   France   to   make   the  Feb.  6 
alliance  cannot  be  discussed  here.    The  signing  of  the 
treaty  was  due  to  the  campaign  of  1777,  resulting  in  the 
capture  of  Burgoyne's  army  on  the  Hudson  and  to  the 
fierce,  if  inconclusive,  battles  around  Philadelphia.    It  French 
necessarily  involved  the  prompt  despatch  to  America  of 
a  considerable  land  and  naval  force  by  France. 

At  the  beginning  of  June,  therefore,  Clinton,  who  had  May  11 
relieved  Howe  in  the  command,  began  to  make  prepa 
rations  for  evacuating  Philadelphia.  Washington  was 
watching  him  like  a  hawk.  As  at  Trenton,  his  service 
of  information  seems  to  have  been  remarkably  efficient. 
Everything  of  importance  that  transpired  in  Philadelphia, 
either  in  the  way  of  events  or  of  plans  under  discussion, 
came  to  the  knowledge  of  Washington  within  forty-eight 
hours  or  less.2 

At  this  time  the  British  force  in  the  United  States  strength  of 
numbered  33,756;  made  up  of  18,174  British  regulars,  A?mSng 
11,007  Hessians  and  4,575  Provincials;   and  they  were 
stationed,  19,530  at  Philadelphia,  10,456  at  New  York  March  26 
and  3,770  at  Newport.3    The  American  regular  force,  or 
"Continental  line"  and  the  State  "lines,"  according  to 
the  returns  which  Washington  laid  before  a  council  of 
war,  were  about  15,000,  of  whom  11,800  were  at  Valley 
Forge,  1,400  at  Wilmington  and  1,800  on  the  Hudson. 
Washington  thought  that  he  could  get  enough  additional 
recruits  to  bring  the  entire  force  up  to  20,000.    At  this 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  XI,  701,  702. 

3  Sparks,  V,  377,  393,  409. 

8  The  returns  of  the  British  army,  copied  from  the  State  Paper  Office  in 
London,  at  various  periods  from  1777  to  1782,  are  given  in  Sparks,  Writings 
of  Washington,  V,  542-545. 


140 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1778 

May  8 


May  18 


Skirmish  at 
Barren  Hill 


council,  after  a  long  discussion,  it  was  decided  not  to 
attack  Philadelphia,  but  to  wait  events.1  The  army  at 
Valley  Forge  was  organized  into  four  divisions  under 
Greene,  Stirling,  Lafayette  and  Wayne.  Lee,  who  had 
recently  been  exchanged,  was  again  on  duty  as  second 
in  command.  Steuben  was  inspector-general. 

With  a  view  to  watching  the  first  move  in  the  expected 
evacuation  of  Philadelphia,  Washington  threw  out  an 
advance  guard  between  the  Schuylkill  and  the  Delaware.2 
It  was  composed  of  Lafayette's  division,  numbering  about 
2,100  men  and  5  guns.  They  advanced  to  a  hamlet 
known  as  Barren  Hill,  about  11  miles  from  Valley  Forge 
and  only  2  miles  from  Clinton's  outposts  at  Chestnut 
Hill.  In  selecting  Lafayette,  who  was  not  yet  twenty- 
one  years  old,  for  this  important  duty,  Washington  doubt 
less  intended  a  compliment  to  France.  But  within  forty- 
eight  hours  he  was  in  mortal  dread  lest  the  outcome 
might  be  anything  but  pleasing  to  France.  For,  from 
the  top  of  the  high  hill  at  Valley  Forge,  he  saw,  across  the 
rolling  ground  between  him  and  Barren  Hill,  the  smoke 
of  skirmishes  and  the  dust  of  marching  columns,  which 
showed  that  the  young  marquis  was  in  full  retreat  toward 
a  ford  on  the  Schuylkill  and  in  imminent  danger  of  being 
cut  off. 

Clinton  had,  in  fact,  planned  to  capture  Lafayette  and 
came  very  near  doing  it.  He  had  sent  Grant  with  about 
5,000  men  via  Whitemarsh  to  come  in  rear  of  Lafayette's 
left,  Grey  with  about  2,000  men  to  cross  the  Schuylkill 
and  come  behind  Lafayette's  right,  while  with  a  consider 
able  force  under  his  own  command  he  marched  through 
Germantown  and  Chestnut  Hill  to  attack  Lafayette  in 


1  Sparks,  V,  360. 

2  Washington's  instructions  to  Lafayette,  Sparks,  V,  368. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  141 

front.  These  movements  were  made  during  the  night;  ms 
and  early  the  next  morning  Lafayette  was  nearly  sur-  May  20 
rounded  by  a  force  about  five  times  greater  than  his  own. 
He  extricated  himself  from  this  dangerous  situation  with 
no  little  adroitness;1  and  although  Grant  was  nearer  to 
Matson's  ford  (now  Conshohocken)  than  Lafayette  was, 
the  latter,  by  skilful  feints  of  his  rear  guard  against  both 
Grant  and  Clinton,  marched  by  the  longer  road  (through 
Manatawna),  got  past  the  head  of  Grey's  column  and 
crossed  Matson's  ford  (Conshohocken)  in  safety.  He 
took  a  strong  position  on  the  heights  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  Schuylkill,  while  Washington  assembled  every 
man  at  Valley  Forge  to  march  to  his  assistance.  Thanks 
to  Steuben's  drills,  they  were  all  under  arms  in  fifteen 
minutes.  But  notwithstanding  his  enormous  superiority 
in  force,  Clinton  did  not  cross  the  ford  nor  attack.  He 
retired  almost  immediately  to  Germantown;  and  Lafay 
ette  returned  to  Valley  Forge.  Clinton  lost  2  men  killed 
and  7  or  8  wounded,  and  Lafayette's  losses  were  about 
the  same. 

The  foolish  Mischianza  in  honor  of  Howe  took  place  the  May  is 
same  day  that  Lafayette  moved  to  Barren  Hill;  and  a  May  25 
week  later  Howe  sailed  for  England.    Clinton  began 
loading  his  transports  with  his  heavy  baggage,  and  early 
in  June  several  vessels  had  dropped  down  the  river. 
Washington  was  fully  informed  of  this;    he  was  more 
than  ever  on  the  alert;    frequent  councils  of  war  were 
held;  and  preparations  were  made  to  move  promptly  as 
soon  as  Clinton  made  any  movement.2 

Finally,  the  transports  being  loaded  with  all  they  could  Evacuation  of 

.      ,      ,.  i  xi        A  i  •  Philadelphia 

carry,  including  some  cavalry  and  the  Anspacn  regiment, 


1  Sparks,  V,  377,  546;  Irving's  Washington,  III,  407. 

2  Sparks,  V,  393,  395,  398,  403. 


142 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1778 
June  18, 

3  A.  M. 


10  A.  M. 


June  19, 
Washington 
Marches  from 
Valley  Forge 


June  24 


which  it  was  feared  would  desert  on  the  march,1  Clinton 
assembled  his  troops  just  south  of  Philadelphia,  crossed 
the  Delaware  to  Gloucester  Point  and  marched  out  to 
Haddonfield,  5  miles.2  Washington  had  information  of 
this  within  a  few  hours;  and  early  in  the  afternoon  6 
brigades,  3  under  Lee  and  3  following  under  Wayne,  had 
marched  from  Valley  Forge.  Washington  with  all  the 
rest  of  his  army  marched  at  5  o'clock  the  next  morning. 
This  was  the  first  fruit  of  Greene's  work  as  quartermaster 
and  Steuben's  as  drill-master. 

Washington  believed  that  Clinton  would  move  to  New 
Brunswick,  cross  the  Raritan,  then  march  to  Amboy  and 
cross  the  Kills  to  Staten  Island.2  Such  was  exactly 
Clinton's  plan.  It  was  therefore  a  race  for  New  Bruns 
wick,  and  a  very  pretty  race  it  was.  The  distance  was 
58  miles  from  Philadelphia,  66  miles  from  Valley  Forge. 
The  roads  were,  rather  better  on  Washington's  line  of 
march;  the  weather  was  the  same  for  both — intense 
heat  (the  thermometer  exceeding  100°  F.  in  the  sun) 
alternating  with  violent  showers. 

On  the  sixth  day  Clinton  had  advanced  only  34  miles, 
and  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Allentown,2  about  10  miles 
east  of  Trenton.  Washington  was  squarely  in  front  of 
him,3  having  marched  47  miles,  crossing  the  Delaware  at 
CoryelPs  ferry  (Lambertville),  15  miles  above  Trenton; 
his  main  body  was  north  and  east  of  Princeton,  and  Max 
well's  brigade  and  the  New  Jersey  militia  were  in  contact 
with  Clinton,4  breaking  down  the  bridges,  blockading  the 
roads  and  otherwise  obstructing  his  march. 

Clinton  therefore  had  to  change  his  plan  and  make 
Sandy  Hook  instead  of  New  Brunswick  his  objective. 

1  Lowell,  Hessians,  212.  3  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  415. 

«  Sparks,  V,  409,  411,  416,  422-423.  4  Ibid.,  V,  423. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  143 

He  put  all  his  baggage,  wheeled  vehicles  and  pack-horses        1773 
under  Knyphausen;   and  turning  to  the  right  at  Allen-  The  TWO 
town  he  sent  them  forward  on  the  road  which  leads  contact"1 
through  Freehold  village,  or  Monmouth  Court  House,  to 
Sandy  Hook.    Hitherto  he  had  been  able  to  move  his 
columns  on  parallel  roads,  but  now  he  had  only  a  single 
road,  and  his  impedimenta  stretched  out  for  a  length  of 
12  miles.    The  armed  force  with  Knyphausen  consisted 
of  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  a  battalion  of  light  infantry,  2 
brigades  of  British,  2  brigades  of  Hessians,  and  some 
Provincials.    In  spite  of  the  heat  and  the  deep  sandy 
roads,  Knyphausen  reached  Freehold — 19  miles — on  the 
second  morning.1    Clinton  followed  him2  with  a  regiment 
of  cavalry,  a  battalion  of  light  infantry,  3  battalions  of  June  26 
grenadiers  and  3  British  brigades.    He  arrived  at  Free 
hold  the  same  afternoon. 

The  whole  force  then  rested  a  day  in  a  fairly  strong  de 
fensible  position  on  both  sides  of  Monmouth  Court  House,2  June  27 
their  flanks  protected  by  pine  woods  and  their  front  by 
streams  and  morasses. 

Washington  on  the  previous  day  was  at  Cranberry,  8 
miles  east  and  south  of  Princeton,  with  his  main  body; 
and  his  advance  guard  of  nearly  4,000  men,  under  Lafay 
ette,  was  on  the  Monmouth  road  about  5  miles  in  rear  of 
Clinton,  with  orders  to  attack  their  rear  guard.  But  as 
Lafayette  was  too  far  separated  from  the  main  body, 
Washington  drew  him  off  to  the  north  toward  English- 
town,  6  miles  west  of  Monmouth.  At  Lee's  request 
Washington  sent  him  with  two  more  brigades  to  join 
Lafayette;  and  on  his  arrival  Lee,  as  senior  officer,  was 
in  command.3 

1  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  415. 

2  Sparks,  V,  424.  8  Ibid.,  V,  423. 


144 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1778 
June  27 


June  27 

Battle  of 
Monmouth 


June  28 


5  A.  M. 
8  A.  M. 


10  A.  M. 


11.30  A.  M. 


At  the  close  of  this  day,  therefore,  the  positions  were  as 
follows:  Clinton  and  Knyphausen,  about  15,000  men, 
on  the  Monmouth  plain  and  the  hills  just  south  of  it, 
facing  west;  Lee  with  the  advance,  5,000  men  and  12 
guns,  at  Englishtown;  and  Washington  with  his  main 
body,  6,000  men,  between  Cranberry  and  English- 
town. 

About  10  or  12  miles  north  of  Monmouth  (Freehold) 
the  country  is  broken,  the  Middletown  hills  rising  to  an 
altitude  of  about  400  feet  and  affording  a  number  of  good 
defensible  positions.  Washington  was  very  anxious  to 
attack  Clinton  while  he  was  still  in  the  low  ground  and 
before  he  could  reach  these  hills.  He  therefore  sent  ex 
plicit  orders1  that  evening  to  Lee  to  have  his  men  in 
readiness  for  attack,  intending  to  march  with  the  main 
body  at  daylight  to  his  support. 

The  next  morning  Knyphausen  resumed  his  march, 
and  as  soon  as  his  column  was  stretched  out  Clinton 
followed.2  Washington  heard  of  it  and  put  his  own 
troops  in  motion  at  sunrise,  at  the  same  time  sending  an 
order  to  Lee  to  attack  Clinton.  Lee  moved  forward  rather 
leisurely,  and  began  a  skirmish  with  Clinton's  rear  guard 
about  a  mile  north  of  the  Court  House;  but  instead  of 
making  a  vigorous  attack  he  gave  a  number  of  contra 
dictory  orders  and  then  ordered  a  retreat.3  The  officers 
and  men  were  astonished,  and  fearing  that  something 
was  wrong  the  retreat  soon  became  disorderly.  Wash 
ington,  galloping  ahead  of  his  main  body,  met  the  fugi 
tives  about  three  miles  east  of  Englishtown4  and  the  same 
distance  west  of  the  Court  House  where  Lee  had  had  his 


1  Sparks,  V,  420,  424,  425. 

2  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  416. 

3  Sparks,  V,  420,  424,  425. 


•Ibid.,  V,  419. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  145 

skirmish.  He  soon  encountered  Lee,  and  there  is  little  me 
doubt  that  Washington's  passionate  nature,  which  he  Battle  of 
usually  controlled  by  his  strong  will,  for  once  got  the  June  28 
better  of  him.  All  accounts  agree  that  strong  language 
was  used,  but  the  exact  words  are  in  dispute.  Dawson 
quotes  Lafayette  as  saying — on  his  visit  to  Vice-President 
Daniel  D.  Tompkins  at  his  house  in  New  York  on  August 
15, 1824,  forty-six  years  after  the  event — that  Washington  Meeting  of 
called  Lee  "a  damned  poltroon."  l  If  ever  profanity  is 
justifiable,  it  was  then.  Here  were  the  fruits  of  Washing 
ton's  labors  with  the  committee  of  Congress  to  establish 
the  army  on  an  efficient  basis,  of  Greene's  work  as  quar 
termaster  to  put  it  in  condition  to  march,  of  Steuben's 
instruction  in  drill  and  discipline — all  in  danger  of  being 
lost  by  the  combined  incapacity,  cowardice  and  treason 
of  this  damnable  Charles  Lee.  While  Arnold,  two  years 
later  on  the  Hudson,  planned  an  infamous  stroke  which, 
had  it  succeeded,  might  have  proved  serious,  yet  what 
Arnold  actually  accomplished  in  injury  of  the  American 
cause  was  but  a  slight  fraction  of  the  mischief  caused  by 
Lee  on  this  hot  Sunday  morning  at  Monmouth.  In  spite 
of  Clinton's  numerical  superiority,  had  Lee  attacked  him 
vigorously  and  held  him  at  the  Court  House  until  Wash 
ington  came  up,  Washington  would  have  passed  around 
Clinton's  right  flank  between  Monmouth  and  Middle- 
town,  penetrated  between  Clinton  and  Knyphausen  and 
in  all  probability  have  captured  a  large  part  of  Clinton's 
command. 

But  the  mischief  was  done,  and,  without  wasting  more 
words  on  Lee,  Washington  rode  forward  toward  the  rear 
of  the  retreating  troops  and  personally  halted  and  re 
formed  them,  establishing  a  line,  north  and  west  of  the 

1  Dawson,  408. 


146 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1778 

Battle  of 
Monmouth, 
June  28 


1  to  5.30  P.  M. 


parsonage,  between  the  two  morasses.1  Clinton  mean 
while  had  turned  back  all  his  own  force  and  had  sent  to 
Knyphausen  for  a  regiment  of  cavalry  and  a  brigade  of 
infantry.2  With  this  combined  force  he  deployed  on 
both  sides  of  the  road  from  Monmouth  to  Englishtown 
and  attacked  the  line  which  Washington  had  established 
between  the  two  morasses.3  But  the  main  body  had  now 
arrived;  and  it  went  into  action,  Greene  on  the  right, 
Stirling  on  the  left  and  Washington  himself  in  the  centre, 
on  the  road.  Severe  fighting  continued  throughout  the 
blazing  afternoon — so  intense  was  the  heat  that  many 
men  on  both  sides  dropped  dead  without  being  wounded.4 
Clinton  first  tried  to  turn  the  American  left,  then  their 
right;  each  time  without  success.  Finally,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Monckton  led  his  grenadiers  in  a  fierce  assault 
against  Wayne,  who  was  posted  hi  an  orchard  on  an 
eminence  on  the  north  side  of  the  road,  about  400  yards 
north  of  the  parsonage.  Monckton  was  killed  and  the 
attack  failed.5 

Toward  sunset  the  British  retired  a  short  distance  to 
reform  and  take  up  a  strong  defensive  position  with 
both  flanks  protected  by  small  streams.  Simultaneously 
Washington  withdrew  to  the  west  side  of  the  west  morass 
or  ravine,  intending  to  reform  his  men  and  attack  Clinton 

1  Most  of  the  maps  in  Sparks's  Writings  of  Washington  are  fairly  accurate. 
But  the  one  in  Vol.  V,  p.  430,  is  very  defective  in  topography  and  otherwise. 
It  was  copied  into  Lossing,  Irving  and  other  histories  and  was  probably 
the  cause  of  much  of  the  difficulty  expressed  by  various  writers  as  to  under 
standing    the  battle  of  Monmouth.    The  accompanying  map  gives  the 
topography  as  delineated  on  the  maps  of  the  U.  S.  Geological  Survey;  and 
the  positions  of  the  troops  are  based  upon  Dawson's  and  Carrington's 
analyses  of  the  testimony  at  the  court-martial  of  Lee. 

2  Clinton's   Report,   Dawson,   416;    Carrington,   Battles  of  American 
Revolution,  423-449. 

3  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  416. 

'  Sparks,  V,  426,  427.  6  Lossing,  II,  157. 


BARREN   HJLL 

May  20,  1778 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company,       »*  From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 

Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio  MONMOUTH  and  Its  People 

June  27,  1778 


24 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  147 

on  both  flanks.     But  night  came  on  before  these  disposi-        1773 
tions  could  be  perfected,  and  the  attack  was  postponed 
until  morning. 

When  day  broke  the  British  had  disappeared;1  they  June  29 
had  moved  at  midnight  and  were  well  on  their  way  to  the 
Middletown  heights.  Although  in  close  contact  with  the  canton 
enemy,  the  American  troops  had  slept  so  soundly,  ex 
hausted  with  the  intense  heat  and  the  battle  of  the 
previous  day,  that  they  had  not  heard  the  British  as 
they  moved  away.  In  the  broken  country  of  the  Mid 
dletown  heights  there  was  no  chance  of  successful  as 
sault,  and  Washington  therefore  did  not  pursue.  Clinton 
reached  Sandy  Hook  in  safety,2  and  simultaneously  Lord 
Howe  arrived  with  his  ships  from  the  Delaware.  On  these 
the  troops  were  transported  up  the  bay  to  New  York.3 

Clinton  reported  his  losses  at  124  dead,  170  wounded 
and  64  missing;  and  he  claimed  that  nearly  half  his  dead 
had  perished  from  the  heat.  But  Washington  stated 
that  the  number  of  British  buried — "  according  to  the  re 
turns  of  the  parties  assigned  to  that  duty" — was  249 .4 
He  wrote  to  Arnold — who,  on  account  of  his  wound  re 
ceived  at  Bemis'  Heights,  was  unable  to  move  with  the 
army  and  had  been  sent  into  Philadelphia  to  take  com 
mand  and  perserve  order  there — that  Clinton 's  losses 
during  his  retreat  must  have  been  at  least  2,000,  includ 
ing  600  Hessians  who  had  deserted  during  the  march  and 
gone  back  to  Philadelphia,  thenceforth  to  become  good 
American  citizens.  Washington  reported  his  own  losses 
at  58  killed,  161  wounded  and  131  missing.4 

Washington's  army  remained  a  few  days  at  English- 
town,  and  thence  moved  by  easy  marches  through  Bruns- 

1  Sparks,  V,  427,  428,  429.  2  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  417. 

3  Mahan,  360.  4  Sparks,  V,  428;  Dawson,  415. 


148  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1778        wick  and  Paramus  to  the  Hudson,  crossed  the  river  at 
juiy  21  Haverstraw  and  established  itself  at  White  Plains. 

Charles  Lee  was  promptly  put  in  close  arrest  and 


brought  to  trial  for  disobedience  of  orders,  misbehavior 
before  the  enemy  and  disrespect  to  the  commander-in- 
chief.1  The  court-martial  moved  with  the  army,  hold 
ing  its  sittings  from  day  to  day  for  a  period  of  six  weeks. 
The  court  found  him  guilty  of  all  three  charges,  and  im 
posed  the  ridiculously  inadequate  sentence  of  suspension 
from  rank  for  twelve  months.  The  proceedings  went  to 
Congress  for  ratification,  and  that  body  held  it  under 

Dec.  5  consideration  for  nearly  four  months.    Then,  by  a  vote 

of  16  to  7  (Massachusetts,  under  the  lead  of  Samuel 
Adams,  and  Georgia  voting  No;  New  Jersey,  Maryland 
and  Virginia  being  divided  and  casting  no  vote,  and  six 
States,  Rhode  Island,  Connecticut,  New  York,  Pennsyl 
vania,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina  voting  Ay),  Con 
gress  grudgingly  directed  the  sentence  to  "be  carried 
into  execution/'  2  Just  as  his  sentence  was  expiring, 
Lee  committed  the  heinous  offence  of  writing  a  disrespect 
ful  letter  to  Congress,  whereupon  that  body,  without  a 

Jan.  10,  1780  roll-call,  unanimously  passed  a  resolution  that  they 
"have  no  further  occasion  for  his  services  in  the  army  of 
the  United  States."  3  Lee  retired  to  his  farm  in  Virginia 
and  occupied  the  remaining  six  years  of  his  life  in 
making  scurrilous  attacks  upon  Washington  and  writing 
a  blasphemous  will.4 

While  Clinton  was  retreating  from  Philadelphia  to  New 
York  —  and  for  many  weeks  before  —  a  French  squadron 

1  Court-Martial  of  Charles  Lee,  printed  by  order  of  Congress,  August  21, 
1778.     Reprinted  in  1823  and  1824.     Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  XII,  1287. 

2  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  XII,  1195. 

3  Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  421. 

4  Sparks,  V,  552-558;  VI.  309;  Life  and  Memoirs  of  Charles  Lee,  160 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  149 

of  12  ships  of  the  line  and  5  frigates,  mounting  834  guns        ms 
and  carrying  4,000  soldiers,  was  on  its  way  across  the 
Atlantic.     It  had  sailed  from  Toulon  and  after  a  voyage  APru  15 
of  84  days  had  arrived  at  the  capes  of  the  Delaware.1  juiy  s 
Lord  Howe,  who  commanded  the  British  fleet  and  trans 
ports,  had  been  gone  10  days.1    He  knew  that  the  French 
fleet  was  on  the  way,  and  he  had  thrown  into  the  work  of  Arrival  of  the 
loading  Clinton's  transports  and  moving  them  to  New 
York  that  necessary  energy  of  which  his   brother   Sir 
William  had  shown  so  great  a  lack.    The  commander  of 
the  French  fleet  was  Comte  d'Estaing,  who  had  served  in 
the  army  until  his  thirtieth  year  and  then  been  trans 
ferred  to  the  navy  "with  the  premature  rank  of  rear- 
admiral."    He  lacked  the  sailor's  training,  and  his  cap 
tains  were  jealous  of  him.2 

After  sending  the  French  minister  up  the  Delaware  in  jmy  11 
one  of  his  ships,  d'Estaing  sailed  northward  and  anchored 
in  the  ocean  just  south  of  Sandy  Hook.  Washington 
sent  his  aides,3  first  Laurens  and  then  Hamilton,  to  wel 
come  d'Estaing  and  explain  his  views  as  to  co-operation. 
Lord  Howe,  having  carried  Clinton's  army  to  New  York, 
hastened  back  to  his  ships  and  anchored  inside  the  Hook. 
The  two  fleets  were  in  plain  view  of  each  other,  across  the 
low  narrow  strip  of  sand  just  south  of  the  Hook.  Lord 
Howe  had  only  9  ships  of  the  line  to  d'Estaing's  12,  and 
534  guns  to  his  834;  but  he  was  a  sailor — as  d'Estaing 
was  not4 — and  he  was  determined  to  dispute  the  entrance 
of  the  French  fleet  to  the  last. 

D'Estaing  remained  there  eleven  days.     In  letters  to 
Washington  and  to  Congress,  filled  with  profuse  com- 

1  Mahan,  359,  360;  Sparks,  V,  440. 

2  Chevalier,  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Frar^aise,  quoted  by  Mahan,  371. 

3  Sparks,  VI,  1-5.  *  Mahan,  360,  363,  364. 


150  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1778  pliments,  he  explained  the  difficulty  of  crossing  the  bar, 
and  said  that  he  offered  the  pilots  50,000  crowns1  if  they 
would  promise  success.  But  Mahan  says  that  "d'Es- 
taing's  heart  failed  him  under  the  discouragement  of  the 

juiy  22  pilots;  he  gave  up  the  attack  and  stood  away  to  the 

southward."  Mahan  intimates  that  with  Nelson  or 
Farragut  in  d'Estaing's  place,  the  result  might  have 
been  very  different.  Probable  it  is  that  if  d'Estaing 
had  smashed  the  British  fleet  in  New  York  and  united 
his  4,000  soldiers  to  those  of  Washington  on  the  north 
side  of  Harlem  River,  Clinton's  army — on  Manhattan 
Island  and  without  ships — would  have  been  caught  like 
rats  in  a  trap,  and  not  a  man  would  have  escaped. 

Attack  on  It  had  been  arranged  between  d'Estaing  and  Wash 

ington's  aides2  that  if  it  was  not  feasible  to  cross  the  bar 
at  Sandy  Hook  a  combined  land  and  naval  movement 
should  be  made  against  Newport,  where  General  Pigott 
was  in  command  of  about  3,000  men,  part  of  those  who 
had  captured  Newport  under  Clinton  in  1776.3  D'Estaing 

juiy  29  sailed  thither  and  at  the  end  of  a  week  anchored  off  Point 

Judith.4  Sullivan  had  been  in  command  at  Providence 
since  the  adjournment  of  the  court  which  had  inquired 
into  his  conduct  at  the  Brandywine  and  on  Staten  Island 

juiy  n  and  had  acquitted  him.  He  had  about  1,000  Continentals 

under  his  command,  and  Washington  wrote  to  him  "to 
apply  in  the  most  urgent  manner  in  my  [his]  name"  to 
the  New  England  States  to  raise  5,000  militia — or  more. 
The  militia  turned  out  so  promptly  that  within  thirty 
days  Sullivan  had  7,000  of  them,  with  John  Hancock  at 
their  head.  Washington  then  put  Lafayette  in  com- 

1  Sparks,  VI,  12. 

'Sparks,  VI,  12;  Sparks,  Letters,  II,  155,  159. 

3  Page  62,  ante.  4  Mahan,  361. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  151 

mand  of  two  brigades  and  directed  him  to  march  to        1773 
Providence;    and  a  few  days  later  he  sent  Greene  to  Juiy27 
Rhode  Island  (his  own  State)  and  instructed  Sullivan  that 
his  entire  force,  Continentals  and  militia,  was  to  be 
divided  into  two  divisions,  of  which  Greene  would  com 
mand  one  and  Lafayette  the  other.1 

The  result  of  these  dispositions  was  to  assemble  a  force 
of  about  10,000  men  under  Sullivan's  command.  Un 
fortunately  they  did  not  arrive  until  about  ten  days  after 
d'Estaing;  and  when  d'Estaing  sailed  into  Narragansett 
Bay,  between  Newport  and  Jamestown,  and  was  pre-  Aug.  s 
paring  to  land  his  soldiers  a  few  miles  north  of  Newport, 
and  join  Sullivan  who  had  brought  his  troops  to  the 
same  point,  Lord  Howe  appeared  off  Point  Judith.2 
With  his  customary  energy  he  had  sailed  from  New  York 
for  Newport  as  soon  as  he  heard  that  d'Estaing  had  gone 
there.  When  the  latter  saw  the  masts  of  Howe's  ships 
in  the  distance,  he  promptly  decided  to  fight  the  British 
fleet  before  aiding  Sullivan.  Sullivan  protested,  but  the 
French  captains  were  a  unit  in  insisting  upon  it;  and 
when  the  wind  changed  to  the  north-east  d'Estaing  Aug.  10 
sailed  out  to  meet  Howe.3  He  carried  his  4,000  soldiers 
with  him;  but  why  he  should  have  wished  to  be  encum 
bered  with  them  in  a  naval  action  has  never  been  ex 
plained.  The  two  fleets  manoeuvred  off  Block  Island  Aug.  12 
for  the  weather-gage  for  nearly  two  days,  and  then  a 
furious  gale  arose  and  scattered  both  French  and  English 
ships.  Several  ships  were  dismasted,  and  the  damage 
was  so  serious  that  Howe  had  to  return  to  New  York. 
D'Estaing  came  back  to  Newport,  but  only  to  announce  Aug.  20 

1  Sparks,  VI,  6. 

2  Mahan,  361-364;  Sparks,  29,  40,  41;  Sparks,  Letters,  II,  176-179. 
9  Sparks,  VI,  29. 


152  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1778  his  intention  of  proceeding  to  Boston  for  repairs.1  Greene 
and  Lafayette  urged  him  to  land  his  troops  and  attack 
the  British;  after  that  he  could  refit  his  squadron  either 

Aug.  22  in  Newport  or  in  Boston.  But  d'Estaing  would  not 
yield,  and  sailed  away.2 

Dissension  Bad  blood  was  thus  stirred  up  between  the  allies  at  the 

Anies?en  very  start.  Washington,  with  his  usual  calmness  and 
good  judgment,  tried  to  restore  good  feeling;  and  Greene 
and  Lafayette  ably  seconded  his  efforts.  But  Sullivan 
was  so  angry  that  he  was  most  indiscreet.  He  not  only 
filed  a  written  protest  with  d'Estaing,  but  he  published 

Aug.  24  an  order  to  his  troops  expressing  the  hope  that  America 
would  be  "able  to  procure  with  her  own  arms  that  which 
her  allies  refused  to  assist  her  in  obtaining."  2  When 
the  militia  read  this  they  made  up  their  minds  that  the 
expedition  would  fail  and  that  they  might  as  well  go 
home;  and  more  than  5,000  of  them  went  off  within  a 
few  days. 

Aug.  15  When  d'Estaing  had  gone  out  to  meet  Howe,  Sullivan 

had  decided  hot  to  delay  his  operations;3  and  he  ad 
vanced  his  men  to  within  two  miles  of  the  British  lines 
just  north  of  Newport.  During  the  ensuing  week  he 
prosecuted  siege  operations  against  the  British  redoubts 
and  lines  in  the  vicinity  of  Easton's  Pond,  and  for  several 
days  a  vigorous  artillery  fire  was  exchanged  between  the 
two  lines.  But  when  d'Estaing's  fleet  sailed  away  and 
the  militia  went  home  there  was  nothing  for  Sullivan  to 
do  but  to  extricate  himself  from  his  difficult  position  as 

Aug.  28  best  he  could — and  without  delay.  Accordingly  he  re 
treated  during  the  night  to  the  northern  end  of  the 
island,  and  there  took  position  in  the  lines  which  had 

1  Mahan,  362-364. 

2  Sparks,  V,  41,  45,  47.  s  Sullivan's  Report,  Dawson,  439. 


American  Forces  in  Blue 
British  Forces  in  Red 
First  Position  in  battle      M 
Second  Position  in  battle  Oc: 


Huntington  and 
U n Jackson 


Battle  of  Springfield 
June  23,  1780 


Connecticut  Farms 
urtied  at  first  attem 
inst  Morristou 
-June  7, 17SC 


A.  British  Fort  on  Caetine  Pen. 

B.  Fort  erected  by  British  naval 

commander  to  protect 
communications  after 
driven  to  3rd  position 

C.  Battery  captured  by 
Americans  July  £8   . 

D.  Battery  engaged  July  27 

E.  British  Camp 

F.  Americans  land  and  eetaolisl 
intrenchments,  July  "8 

«.  Naval  action  July  25 
British  fleet  to  I. 
Battery  causes  British  fleet 
to  withdraw  to  J.  July  28 

K.  American  Batteries 

M.  One  field  piece 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company,  Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohk 
From  A  very 's  History  of  the  United  States  and  Its  People 


PENOBSCOT 
July  25,  1779 


trenchmenu  thrown 
up  by  Knyphffusen  afle 
his  retreafof  June  7, 


Advance  of 
British  Army  from  Staten  Island 

SPRINGFIELD 
June  23,  1780 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  153 

originally  been  fortified  by  the  British,  just  south  of        ms 
Butt's  Hill.1    At  daylight  Pigott  moved  after  him  in  Battle  of 
two  columns,  the  British  on  the  east  road  and  the  Hes 
sians  on  the  west  road.    As  soon  as  he  came  up  with  Aug.  29 
Sullivan's    outposts    and    " light    parties,"    skirmishing  7 A.M. 
began.    These  were  driven  back  and  then  Pigott  made 
a  vigorous  attack  by  the  west  road  against  Sullivan's 
right  flank,   which  was  commanded  by  Greene.    The  OA.M. 
firing  continued  here  for  several  hours  and  the  British 
brought  their  entire  force  into  action  and  supported  it  by 
a  flanking  fire  from  some  ships  in  the  bay.2    But  Greene 
had  two  veteran  brigades — Glover's  famous  Marblehead 
fishermen  and  Varnum's  Rhode  Island  regiments  which 
had  marched  to  Cambridge  more  than  three  years  before 
and  been  in  constant  service  ever  since;    in  addition 
to  these  was  Cornell's  militia  and  a  regiment  of  Rhode 
Island    negroes    commanded    by    Christopher    Greene. 
They  all  made  a  good  defence,  and  the  whole  force  of 
British  and  Hessians  could  not  dislodge  them.     During 
the  afternoon  the  firing  ceased.    Both  armies  remained 
within  a  short  distance  of  each  other  during  the  night 
and  following  day.3     Pigott  sent  back  to  Newport  for  Aug.  so 
his  artillery  and  intended  to  attack  again  as  soon  as  it 
arrived.4     But  during  the  morning  Sullivan  received  a 
letter  from  Washington  telling  him  that  Lord  Howe  had 
sailed  from  New  York  with  reinforcements;  and  later  in 
the  day  report  was  received  that  the  British  fleet  had 
been  sighted  off  Block  Island.    He  decided  to  withdraw 
to  the  main-land,  and  during  the  night  succeeded  in  doing 
so  without  loss,  a  portion  of  his  force  crossing  to  Bristol, 

1  Sullivan's  Report,  Dawson,  439.  2  Pigott's  Report,  Dawson,  442. 

3  Sullivan's  Report,  Dawson,  440,  441;   Sparks,  Corr.,  II,  179-204. 

4  Pigott's  Report,  Dawson,  442,  443. 


154  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1778  but  the  greater  part  to  Tiverton.  His  losses  were  30 
killed,  137  wounded  and  44  missing;  and  those  of  Pigott, 
38  killed,  210  wounded  and  12  missing.1 

Aug.  si  Within  a  few  hours  of  Sullivan's  retreat  to  Tiverton, 

Lord  Howe's  fleet,  carrying  Sir  Henry  Clinton  and  5,000 

of  his  men,  dropped  anchor  in  Newport  harbor.    This 

increased  the  strength  of  the  British  garrison  to  about 

11,000  men.    The  rest  of  Sullivan's  militia  now  went 

home,  and  with  his  1,200  Continentals  he  withdrew  to 

Providence.    Clinton  made  no  attempt  to  follow  him, 

but  taking  part  of  his  men  on  the  ships,  he  harried  the 

towns  along  the  shores  of  Long  Island  Sound.2 

NOV.  4  D'Estaing  finally  completed  the  repairs  of  his  ships  at 

Departure        Boston  and  then  sailed  for  Martinique,  still  keeping  his 

oMhc French    ^^  soldiers  with  him.3    And  on  the  same  day  Clinton 

despatched  from  New  York  to  St.  Lucia  the  5,000  men 

which  he  had  been  ordered  to  send  there.    During  the 

winter   Lafayette,  after  vainly  endeavoring    to  secure 

Jan.  11. 1779    Washington's  approval  to  a  project  for  the  reconquest  of 

Canada,  sailed  back  to  France.4 

The  close  of  the  year  thus  saw  the  French  and  English 
renewing  their  ancient  strife,  and  the  seat  of  war  trans 
ferred  to  the  West  Indies. 

The  French  alliance,  which  many  thought  would 
promptly  end  the  war,  brought  at  first  little  but  distrust 
and  recrimination.  Whether  the  French  admiral  had 
instructions  similar  to  those  given  the  minister  of  France 
— to  be  guided  by  French  and  not  entirely  by  American 
interests — is  not  known;  but  Gerard  had  been  his  guest 
on  his  flag-ship  for  twelve  weeks,  and  it  is  probable  that 

1  Sullivan's  Report,  Pigott's  Report,  Dawson,  438,  444. 

3  Sparks,  VI,  63. 

*  Mahan,  365.  4  Sparks,  VI,  190,  545-556. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  155 

d'Estaing  knew  his  instructions.1  To  have  brought  peace 
so  quickly  and  without  an  attempt  to  regain  Canada  for 
the  French  would  perhaps  not  have  accorded  entirely 
with  the  French  plans.  Nor  have  we  the  slightest  ground 
to  complain  of  this.  Every  nation  must  act  for  its  own 
interests  first,  and  even  exclusively.  It  was  our  good 
fortune  that  it  was  the  interest  of  France  to  aid  America 
in  order  to  injure  Great  Britain;  and  its  aid  was  of  im 
mense  value  in  enabling  America  to  gain  what  it  desired.2 

The  military  operations  of  the  next  four  years  at  the 
North  were  of  minor  importance  and  can  only  be  briefly 
summarized. 

The  British  army  occupied  New  York  and  Newport      1778-79 
during  the  first  winter;    and  Washington  disposed  his 


troops  in  cantonments  at  Middlebrook  (now  Bound  Brook) 
Elizabeth,  Ramapo,  West  Point,  Fishkill  and  Danbury.3 
They  were  dispersed  in  this  fashion  for  the  purposes  of 
subsistence,  but  they  were  in  supporting  distance,  and 
could  be  concentrated  quickly  if  Clinton  made  any  move 
into  New  Jersey,  up  the  Hudson  or  into  New  England. 
The  cantonments  formed  a  semicircle  of  forty  miles' 
radius  around  Clinton  at  New  York;  and  they  guarded 

1  Mahan,  359. 

2  Lafayette's  plan  for  the  reconquest  of  Canada  was  submitted  by  him  to 
Congress,  and  received  the  formal  approval  of  that  body  October  22,  1778. 
Precise  instructions  were  sent  four  days  later  to  Franklin  to  govern  his 
conduct  as  minister  in  France;    and  among  these  instructions  were  the 
complete  plans  for  the  invasion  of  Canada.     At  the  same  time  Congress 
asked  Washington  for  his  views  on  the  subject.     In  a  far-sighted  letter, 
dated  November  14,  1778,  he  replied,  opposing  the  project  with  such  un 
answerable  arguments  that  it  was  abandoned.     In  this  letter  Washington 
uses  these  words  —  as  true  and  as  significant  to-day  as  the  day  they  were 
written  —  "It  is  a  maxim,  founded  on  the  universal  experience  of  mankind, 
that  no  nation  is  to  be  trusted  further  than  it  is  bound  by  its  interest." 
Sparks,  VI,  107,  110;  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  1039-1048. 

3  Sparks,  I,  306;  VI,  124,  135,  153,  158,  167. 


156  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1778  the  vital  points  in  the  Highlands  of  the  Hudson  through 
which  communication  was  kept  up  between  New  Eng 
land  and  the  Middle  States.    The  fortifications  in  the 
Highlands   were  meanwhile   strengthened,   West   Point 

Oct.  being  the  centre  of  the  system  instead  of  the  forts  eight 

capture  of       miles  below  which  had  been  captured  by  Sir  Henry 

Clinton.    An  outpost,  however,  was  planned  at  Stony 

Point,   and  this  was  in  process  of  fortification   when 

1779  Clinton  attacked  and  captured  it.    At  the  same  time  he 
May  31  took  possession  of  the  fort  at  Verplanck's  Point  on  the 

opposite  side  of  the  river.1 

For  this  purpose  Clinton  had  brought  about  6,000  men 
up  the  river; 2  and  the  possession  of  Stony  and  Verplanck's 
Points  cut  off  King's  Ferry,  which  connected  the  two  points 
and  which  had  been  the  usual  and  most  convenient  place 
for  crossing  the  Hudson.  An  attack  on  West  Point  was 
likely  to  be  the  next  move  of  Clinton.3 

Washington  therefore  left  Middlebrook,  which  had  been 
June  e  his  head-quarters  for  the  last  six  months,  and  moved  first 

June  25          to  the  Clove  (near  Haverstraw),  then  to  New  Windsor 
juiy  21  (Newburg)  and  finally  to  West  Point,  where  he  remained 

until  the  close  of  the  year.  Nearly  5,000  of  his  Conti 
nental  troops  had  recently  been  sent  under  Sullivan  to 
punish  the  Indians  who  had  committed  the  massacres  in 
the  Wyoming  valley  of  Pennsylvania  during  the  preceding 
summer.4  This  left  him  not  more  than  about  8,000  men. 
This  was  insufficient  for  an  attack  on  New  York,  for  which 
there  was  a  tempting  opportunity  had  he  had  sufficient 
force,  or  had  d'Estaing  with  his  fleet  and  his  soldiers 

1  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  526;  Sparks,  VI,  269. 

2  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  345. 

3  Sparks,  VI,  164,  264,  272,  304. 

4  Sullivan's  Indian  Expedition,  1779,  published  by  the  State  of  New 
York,  1887. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  157 

been  in  that  vicinity  instead  of  in  the  West  Indies.  The  1779 
most  that  Washington  could  attempt,  therefore,  was  the 
recapture  of  Stony  and  Verplanck's  Points.  The  former 
was  intrusted  to  Wayne1  and  the  latter  to  McDougall.2 
Through  some  misunderstanding  or  miscarriage  of  orders 
McDougall  made  no  serious  attempt ;  but  Wayne  carried 
out  his  part  of  the  project  in  the  most  brilliant  manner. 

For  this  attack  Washington  placed  under  Wayne's  Recapture  of 
command  the  light  infantry  of  the  army,  about  1,200  in 
number,  and  after  reconnoitring  the  approaches  in  person 
he  gave  Wayne  instructions  to  make  the  attack  with  un 
loaded  muskets  and  to  rely  solely  on  the  bayonet.  As 
the  usual  hour  for  such  enterprises  was  just  before  dawn, 
and  on  that  account  the  watch  was  more  strict  at  that 
hour,  Washington  enjoined  Wayne  to  make  the  attempt 
about  midnight.  Muhlenberg's  brigade  of  about  300  men 
was  to  follow  Wayne  and  be  in  position  to  reinforce  the 
attack,  if  necessary;  or  to  form  a  rallying-point  in  the 
retreat,  if  the  enterprise  should  prove  unsuccessful. 

Wayne  began  his  march  from  Fort  Montgomery  at  July  is 
noon;  and  crossing  the  mountains  in  rear  of  Stony  Point 
he  arrived  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  enemy's  lines 
at  8  o'clock;3  here  he  formed  his  troops  in  two  columns, 

1  Sparks,  VI,  289.  2  Ibid.,  VI,  288,  298,  299. 

3  Washington  was  generous  enough  to  report  to  Congress  (Sparks,  VI, 
298)  that  Wayne  "  improved  upon  the  plan  recommended  by  me  [him]  and 
executed  it  in  a  manner  that  does  signal  honor  to  his  judgment  and  to  his 
bravery." 

Wayne's  Order  of  Battle,  drawn  up  by  him  on  July  15  and  submitted 
to  Washington  before  it  was  read  to  his  troops  late  that  evening,  is  a  model 
for  a  document  of  that  kind — clear,  definite,  explicit,  brief  but  lacking  in 
no  detail.  It  contained  two  paragraphs  which  showed  the  serious  nature  of 
the  business  on  hand;  and  the  understanding  by  his  men  of  this  serious 
ness  was  possibly  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  brilliant  success  which 
followed. 

"If  any  soldier  presumes  to  take  his  musket  from  his  shoulder  to  fire 
or  begin  the  battle  until  ordered  by  his  proper  officer,  he  shall  be  instantly 


158  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1779  each  preceded  by  an  advance  guard  of  about  150  volun 
teers,  and  in  front  of  these  a  party  of  20  picked  men  and 
an  officer.1  After  carefully  reconnoitring  the  ground 
over  which  the  advance  was  to  be  made,  Wayne  placed 
himself  at  the  head  of  the  right  column,  and  shortly 
juiy  16  after  midnight  both  columns  moved  forward.1  Not  a 

Wayne's  Re-  shot  was  fired  on  the  American  side.  Wayne  "gave  the 
troops  the  most  pointed  orders  not  to  fire  on  any  account, 
but  place  their  whole  dependence  on  the  bayonet,  which 
order  was  literally  and  faithfully  obeyed.  Neither  the 
deep  morass,  the  formidable  and  double  rows  of  abatis 
nor  the  strong  works  in  front  and  flank  could  damp  the 
ardor  of  the  troops,  who,  in  the  face  of  the  most  tremen 
dous  and  incessant  fire  of  musketry,  and  from  cannon 
loaded  with  grape-shot,  forced  their  way  at  the  point  of 
the  bayonet  through  every  obstacle,  both  columns  meet 
ing  in  the  centre  of  the  enemy's  works  nearly  at  the  same 
instant."  Wayne  was  wounded  at  the  abatis,  but  his 
men  pressed  on  into  the  fort,  and  all  of  the  garrison  who 
had  not  been  killed  or  wounded  were  taken  prisoners.1 

Wayne 's  loss  was  15  killed  and  83  wounded.  The 
British  lost  19  killed,  74  wounded,  58  missing  and  472 
prisoners — 623  in  all.2  The  captured  cannon  were  ap- 

put  to  death  by  the  officer  next  to  him;  for  the  misconduct  of  one  man  is 
not  to  put  the  whole  troops  in  danger  or  disorder,  and  be  suffered  to  pass 
with  life.  .  .  ." 

After  promising  rewards  to  the  first  five  men  to  enter  the  works,  he  adds: 
"But  should  there  be  any  soldier  so  lost  to  every  feeling  of  honor  as  to 
attempt  to  retreat  one  single  foot,  or  to  skulk  in  the  face  of  danger,  the 
officer  next  to  him  is  to  immediately  put  him  to  death,  that  he  may  no 
longer  disgrace  the  name  of  a  soldier  or  the  corps  or  State  he  belongs  to. 

"As  General  Wayne  is  determined  to  share  the  danger  of  the  night,  so 
he  wishes  to  participate  in  the  glory  of  the  day  in  common  with  his  fellow- 
soldiers." 
1  Wayne's  Report,  Dawson,  525. 

2 Wayne's  Report,  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  527;  Johnston,  Stony 
Point,  206. 


A.  Right  Column  under  Wayne 

B.  Left  Column  under  Murphy 

and  Butler 

C.  British  guard  at  Causeway 

D.  Reserve  under  Muhlenberg 


HUDSON 


RIVER 


STONY   POINT 
July  1 6,  1779 


Aery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


TRVON'S  RAID 
July  5-8,  1779 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  159 

praised  at  $158,640  and  that  sum  was  distributed  by  1779 
order  of  Congress1  among  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
storming  party,  in  proportion  to  the  pay  of  each;  and 
the  further  sum  of  $1,500  was  divided  among  the  first 
five  men  to  enter  the  works.  Congress  also  ordered 
three  medals  to  be  struck  in  honor  of  Wayne,  and  of 
Fleury  and  Stewart  who  commanded  the  two  columns. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton  immediately  brought  reinforcements  July  i? 
from  New  York  up  the  river  to  Dobb's  Ferry;  and  Wash 
ington  made  a  personal  examination  of  Stony  Point.    He 
was  convinced  that  it  could  not  be  held  by  less  than 
1,500  men;2  it  was  nearly  20  miles,  following  the  winding 
roads  through  the  mountains,  from  his  main  position  at 
West  Point.    He  therefore  determined  to  evacuate  the  Evacuation  of 
post,  and  the  cannon  and  stores  were  removed  and  the 
works  destroyed  during  the  following  night,  the  troops  July  is 
retreating  to  West  Point.    Clinton  brought  up  his  whole 
force  from  Dobb's  Ferry  and  regained  possession  of 
Stony  Point  the  next  morning.3    He  retained  possession  July  19 
of  it  only  a  short  time,  however.    Finding  that  he  could 
not  draw  Washington  into  a  general  engagement  south 
of  the  Highlands,  and  not  feeling  any  confidence  in  his 
ability  to  capture  West  Point,  he  soon  afterward  deter 
mined  to  transfer  the  war  to  the  south  and  to  accompany 
the  expedition  himself.4     In  anticipation  of  this  he  with 
drew  his  troops  from  both  Verplanck's  and  Stony  Points. 
In  the  following  month  Major  Henry  Lee,  who  com-  Oct.  21 
manded    the   "  Light  Horse/7   requested    permission  to  capture  of 
attack  the  British  post  at  Paulus  or  Powle's  Hook  on 
the  Jersey  shore  (just  behind  the  present  site  of  the  Jersey 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  XIV.  890-891.          2  Sparks,  VI,  300,  301,  302. 

8  Clinton's  Report,  Dawson,  526. 

4  Stedman,  II,  152;  Sparks,  I,  328;  Clinton  to  Germain,  Sparks,  VI,  327. 


160  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1779  City  station  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad).  Lee  had  been 
in  the  supporting  party  at  Stony  Point  and  he  was  keen 
to  undertake  a  similar  enterprise  on  his  own  account. 
After  some  hesitation1  Washington  gave  his  consent, 
but  stipulated  that  not  more  than  300  men  should  be 
engaged,  and  that  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  hold 
the  post.  The  purpose  was  to  surprise  the  garrison  and 
bring  off  as  many  prisoners  as  could  be  secured. 

Aug.  is.  Lee  set  out  from  Paramus  (now  Ridgewood),  21  miles 

north-west  of  Paulus  Hook,  with  part  of  his  command 

4p.M.  and  was  joined  by  the  rest  at  Hackensack.  Through 

the  treachery  or  ignorance  of  a  guide  several  hours  were 
lost  during  the  evening  and  part  of  his  men  were  sepa 
rated  from  him.  With  the  remainder,  something  less 
than  300  in  number,  he  reached  the  marsh,  which  sepa 
rated  the  fortified  position  on  the  Hook  from  the  main- 

Aug.  19,  land,  not  long  before  dawn.  The  tide  was  rising,  the  day 
would  soon  break  and  the  ammunition  was  ruined  in 
wading  through  the  marsh.  Not  a  moment  was  to  be 
lost,  and  the  men  rushed  forward — as  at  Stony  Point — 
without  firing  a  shot.  They  cleared  the  abatis,  crossed 
the  ditch  and  entered  the  works.  There  was  a  short 
hand-to-hand  fight,  in  which  it  is  said  that  Lee  lost  only 
2  killed  and  3  wounded,  whereas  the  British  loss  was 
about  50,  and  then  the  greater  part  of  the  garrison  sur 
rendered.  Daylight  was  coming  on  and  Lee  immediately 
began  his  retreat,  bringing  with  him  158  prisoners.  On 
his  way  back  he  was  attacked  in  flank  by  a  portion  of  the 
British  garrison  which  was  on  a  foraging  expedition  near 

Aug.  19,  Weehawken ;  but  Lee  beat  them  off  and  arrived  in  safety 
at  the  Hackensack  Bridge,  after  twenty-seven  hours  of 
continuous  marching  and  not  a  little  fighting.  Here  a 

1  Sparks,  VI,  317,  318. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  161 

supporting  brigade  under  Lord  Stirling  received  him,        1779 
and  the  next  day  the  entire  force  returned  to  Para-  Aug.  20 
mus.1 

Lee's  exploit  was  justly  applauded  and  he  received  the 
thanks  of  Congress2  and  a  gold  medal.  Its  military  im 
portance  was  that  which  results  from  an  "insult"  to  the 
enemy  and  from  the  encouragement  it  gave  to  our  own 
army. 

Stony  Point  and  Paulus  Hook  were  the  only  two  mili 
tary  events  of  the  year  at  the  North.    Clinton  had,  in-  May  9 
deed,  sent  a  marauding  expedition  of  2,500  men,  under  Marauding 

1-1  -H.T      f   n       Expeditions  in 

Matthews,  into  the  Chesapeake,  which  captured  Norfolk,  Virginia  and 

_    _  .  '       „   „  ,  .     .  Connecticut 

destroyed  a  number  of  ships  at  Suffolk  and  carried  away 
a  considerable  quantity  of  stores,  including  3,000  hogs 
heads  of  tobacco.3    Later  a  similar  expedition,  under 
Try  on,  was  sent  along  the  Sound;  it  destroyed  the  ship-  Julys 
ping  and  set  fire  to  the  towns  from  New  Haven  to  Nor-  July  11 
walk.4    These  raids  angered  the  population,  but  had  no 
effect  whatever  on  the  issue  of  the  contest. 

On  the  other  hand,  about  1,000  Massachusetts  militia  Penobscpt 
undertook  an  independent  expedition  against  Castine, 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Penobscot5  River  in  Maine,  where 
about  800  British  troops  had  been  sent  from  Halifax  to 
cover  parties  engaged  in  getting  masts  and  spars  for  the 
British  ships.    The  expedition  was  a  failure,  the  naval  juiy2s 
and  military  commanders  quarrelled,  the  attack  was  re-  Aug.  11 
pulsed,  a  portion  of  the  British  fleet  arrived  from  New 
York,  the  ships  (24  transports  and  20  armed  vessels 
carrying  344  guns)  were  burned  and  the  members  of 
the  expedition  made  their  way  home  through  the  wilder- 

1  Lee's  Report,  Dawson,  549-552. 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  XV,  1100.  3  Sparks,  VI,  261,  262. 

'Tryon's  Report,  Dawson,  514;  Sparks,  VI,  285,  293. 

8  Sparks,  VI,  307,  350;  Stedman,  II,  147,  151. 


162 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


Dec.  7 

Winter  Can 
tonments  for 
1779-80 


1779  ness,  in  small  groups  amidst  terrible  hardships,  during 
the  autumn.1 

This  expedition  was  undertaken  without  consulting 
Washington,2  and  is  an  example  of  that  lack  of  central 
control  which  prevented  the  successful  application  of  our 
military  resources  during  the  Revolution. 

As  winter  came  on  Washington  moved  his  head-quar 
ters  to  Morristown.  Sullivan's  force  had  returned  from 
the  Indian  campaign,  but  it  was  necessary  to  send  a  con 
siderable  reinforcement  to  the  South.  His  little  army 
was  disposed  in  cantonments — much  as  in  the  preceding 
winter — at  Morristown,  in  northern  New  Jersey,  in  the 
Highlands  and  in  Connecticut.3  It  was  a  winter  of  ex 
treme  severity,  North  River  and  a  part  of  New  York  Bay 
being  closed  with  ice  strong  enough  to  bear  artillery.4 
The  sufferings  of  the  men  for  lack  of  food  and  clothing 
were  but  little  inferior  to  those  at  Valley  Forge  two 
years  before;  and  it  soon  became  necessary  to  resort  to 
impressment  in  order  to  obtain  food.  The  ever-present 
difficulty  of  obtaining  recruits  gave  Washington  the  great 
est  anxiety,  and  in  several  of  his  letters  he  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  prospect  of  final  success  was  never 
March  9  so  discouraging  as  at  that  time.  Congress  had  consoli 
dated  5  the  104  battalions  (16  Continental  and  88  State 
"lines")  into  80  battalions.  The  return  of  October 
showed  a  paper  strength  of  27,099,  of  whom  14,998  were 
enlisted  for  the  war  and  the  others  for  various  periods 
which  would  expire  during  the  coming  spring  and  summer. 
Washington  urged  an  annual  draft  to  fill  up  the  battalions, 
the  payment  of  a  Continental  bounty  to  such  of  the 

1  Thacher's  Military  Journal,  170;  Stedman,  II,  152. 

3  Sparks,  VI,  350.  3  Ibid.,  408,  411,  420,  438. 

*  Kapp,  Kalb,  183.  6  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  XIII,  298. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  163 

drafted  men  as  would  enlist  for  the  period  of  the  war,  1779 
and  the  abolition  of  State,  county  and  town  bounties.1 
The  States  and  towns,  however,  continued  to  exercise 
their  own  judgment  about  bounties,  and  there  was  much 
dissatisfaction  among  the  men  who  three  years  before 
had  enlisted  for  the  war.  The  recruiting  was  never  thor 
oughly  organized  and  systematized;  but  a  certain  num 
ber  of  recruits  was  obtained  by  Washington's  incessant 
appeals. 

On  the  British  side,  Newport  was  abandoned,  and  the  Evacuation  of 
only  post  retained  was  New  York.    Cornwallis  arrived  octWP25rt> 
with  reinforcements,   and  these,   added  to  the  troops 
brought  from  Newport,  carried  the  garrison  of  New  York  Dec.  i 
to  28,756.     Of  these  13,848  were  British  regulars,  10,836 
were  Hessians  and  4,072  were  Provincials.    Washington 
had  only  10,400  effective  in  all  his  cantonments;2   but 
Clinton  did  not  feel  strong  enough  to  attack  him.     He 
preferred  the  plan  of  sending  a  large  part  of  his  force  to 
the  South. 

Some  months  after  Clinton  had  gone  to  the  South,  1780 
Knyphausen,  who  was  left  in  command  at  New  York,  offensive 
determined  on  an  offensive  movement  in  New  Jersey.3 
He  had  heard  that  two  regiments  at  Morristown  had 
mutinied  because  they  had  received  neither  food,  cloth 
ing  nor  pay,  and  that  the  population  of  New  Jersey  were 
disaffected  to  the  American  cause.  He  thought  that  if 
the  British  troops  appeared  in  New  Jersey  the  people, 
the  militia  and  possibly  the  mutinous  regiments  would 
rally  to  their  support.  He  therefore  took  two  brigades, 
Matthews'  and  Stirling's,  with  about  5,000  men,  crossed 
the  Kills  from  Staten  Island  to  Elizabeth  and  marched 

1  Sparks,  VI,  402,  403.  2  Ibid.,  V,  543;  VII,  6. 

3  Stedman,  II,  240,  241 ;  Sparks,  VII,  76. 


164 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1780 

June  7 


Skirmish  at 
Springfield 


Battle  of 
Springfield, 
June  23 


toward  Morristown.  But  he  was  quickly  undeceived  as 
to  the  temper  of  the  inhabitants.  They  fired  upon  his 
troops  from  their  houses  and  from  the  woods;  Stirling 
was  fatally  wounded;  the  militia  gathered  quickly  in 
front  of  him,  and  when  after  a  march  of  eight  miles  he 
reached  the  village  of  Springfield,  he  found  one  of  the 
regiments  which  had  mutinied  drawn  up  in  line  to  op 
pose  him.  Only  a  few  shots  were  fired,  and  then  the 
British  column  began  a  retreat,  which  seems  to  have  been 
unnecessarily  precipitate,  to  Elizabeth.  They  would 
have  crossed  to  Staten  Island,  but  the  low  tide  prevented 
their  getting  their  cavalry  to  the  bridge  of  boats  which 
they  had  built  across  the  Kills  where  it  joins  Newark  Bay. 
They  therefore  stopped  on  the  Jersey  shore,  and  threw 
up  intrenchments,  in  the  nature  of  a  bridge  head,  for 
their  protection.1 

A  few  days  later  Clinton  returned  to  New  York  from 
South  Carolina,  and  he  determined  to  do  something  to 
redeem  this  fiasco.  He  therefore  put  some  of  his  troops 
on  transports  and  made  a  feint  of  moving  up  the  Hud 
son.  Washington  promptly  started  toward  Ramapo  and 
the  Clove  with  a  part  of  his  force,  leaving  Greene  in  com 
mand  at  Morristown.  Greene  with  about  1,000  Con 
tinentals  and  the  Jersey  militia  under  Dickinson  took 
position  behind  the  stream  at  Springfield,  about  10  miles 
in  advance  of  Morristown.2 

Knyphausen  left  Elizabeth  early  in  the  morning  with 
about  5,000  infantry,  a  considerable  body  of  cavalry  and 
18  pieces  of  artillery.  Marching  rapidly,  he  soon  reached 
the  Elizabeth  River,  about  3  miles  east  of  Springfield, 
and  there  divided  his  force  into  two  columns;  sending 


'Stedman,  II,  240,  241;  Sparks,  VII,  76. 

2  Ibid.,  II,  243,  244;  ibid.,  VII,  85,  87,  506-508. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  165 

Matthews  forward  on  the  road  to  Springfield,  while  he  ITSO 
himself  took  the  Vauxhall  road  on  the  right,  intending  to 
turn  Greene's  left  flank.  Greene  sent  Henry  Lee  with 
his  cavalry  and  a  regiment  of  infantry  to  defend  the 
Vauxhall  bridge,  and  posted  the  rest  of  his  Continentals 
&t  the  two  bridges  in  front  of  Springfield.  The  militia 
were  placed  on  the  flanks.  While  these  troops  were  far 
inferior  in  strength  to  the  British  force,  they  made  so 
spirited  a  defence  at  the  bridges  that  they  delayed  the 
advance  of  Knyphausen  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  and 
gave  Greene  time  to  withdraw  his  force  to  a  strong  posi 
tion  in  front  of  Short  Hills,  where  the  Vauxhall  and 
Springfield  roads  came  together.  Here  he  awaited  an 
attack;  and  a  brigade,  sent  back  by  Washington  as  soon 
as  he  heard  of  the  fight,  was  momentarily  expected.  But 
instead  of  attacking,  the  British  set  fire  to  the  houses  in 
Springfield  and  late  in  the  afternoon  began  a  hasty 
retreat — so  rapid  that  Stark's  brigade,  which  was  sent 
in  pursuit,  was  unable  to  overtake  them. 

Greene's  loss  was  13  killed,  62  wounded  and  9  missing. 
The  loss  of  the  British  was  supposed  to  be  somewhat 
larger,  but  was  never  accurately  known. 

Knyphausen  remained  at  his  bridge  head  near  Eliza 
beth  until  midnight  and  then  crossed  over  to  Staten 
Island,  taking  up  his  bridge  of  boats  at  daylight.1    The  June  24 
British  troops  never  again  attempted  any  serious  opera 
tions  in  New  Jersey.2 

Washington  did  not  return  to  Morristown.  He  thought 
that  Clinton  would  attack  the  forts  in  the  Highlands, 
.and  he  moved  his  army  to  the  northern  part  of  New 
Jersey;  and  moved  his  own  head-quarters,  in  succession, 

1  Sparks,  VII,  506-508;  Dawson,  596-600. 

2  Stedman,  II,  244. 


166 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1780 


July  26 

Washington  to 
President  of 
Congress,  April 
14,  1779 


March  16,  1779 


Nov.  24,  1779 

Arnold  in 
Command  at 
West  Point 


Aug.  4 

Arnold's 
Treason 


Feb.  3,  1779 
May  1,  1779 


Jan.  20.  1780 


to  Ramapo,  to  Peekskill  and  to  West  Point.  Greene, 
worn  out  with  the  vexatious  relations  with  Congress  in 
his  uncongenial  and  thankless  task  as  quartermaster- 
general,  finally  resigned  that  post1  and  resumed  his 
duties  in  the  line,  being  now  second  in  command  to 
Washington.  Washington,  conscious  of  his  own  strength 
and  rectitude,  waived  all  consideration  of  the  innuendoes 
and  unjust  criticism  of  him  which  Gates  was  constantly 
sending  to  his  friends  in  Congress.  He  had  offered 
Gates  the  command  of  Sullivan's  expedition  against  the 
Indians,  which  Gates  curtly  declined.  As  the  com 
mand  in  the  Highlands  seemed  now  the  most  important 
station  in  the  army,  Washington  offered  this  to  Gates;2 
he  again  declined,  and  obtained  leave  to  retire  to  his 
estate  in  Virginia.  Arnold  then  applied  for  the  com 
mand  at  West  Point  and  his  application  was  supported 
by  some  members  of  Congress.  After  considering  the 
application  for  several  months,  Washington  granted  it, 
and  Arnold  took  command.3 

This  application  was  made  with  treasonable  intent, 
for,  as  was  afterward  learned,  Arnold  had  been  in  corre 
spondence  with  Clinton  under  an  assumed  name  for  nearly 
eighteen  months.  While  in  command  at  Philadelphia, 
he  lived  beyond  his  means  and  got  into  debt;4  he  also 
gave  offence  to  the  Council  of  Pennsylvania  and  they  pre 
ferred  charges  against  him.  Washington  promptly  or 
dered  a  court-martial,  but  the  council  were  slow  in  pro 
ducing  their  witnesses,  and  the  trial  dragged  through  the 
year.  It  was  finally  concluded,  and  the  court  found  him 
censurable  on  two  of  the  charges  and  sentenced  him  to  a 


1  Sparks,  VII,  91,  131,  150,  304,  512,  515. 
3  Ibid.,  VI,  188,  189,  214-223,  409. 
*Ibid.,  VII,  95,  139,  140,  265,  521. 


*  Arnold,  239. 


°dM>*%  *Te 


Hempstead  ^irdnlg^  „    \ 

*— »  -  I  /?  New  City  /  JL&ff 


Andre's  Route 
—   before  capture 
.  -  after  capture 


41 ^- V^—^ 

\S* 1.74°/       THE  M 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  A  very 's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its' People 


ARNOLD'S  TREASON 
ANDRE'S  CAPTURE 
Sept.  20-25, 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  167 

reprimand.1  While  he  was  a  brave  and  skilful  soldier, 
his  mind  was  ill-balanced;  and  brooding  over  his  griev 
ances  and  the  slights  which  he  fancied  had  been  put  upon 
him  ever  since  the  capture  of  Ticonderoga  in  1775,  he 
thought  he  would  duplicate  the  parts  which  had  been 
played  in  the  past  by  Monck  and  by  Marlborough2  —  to 
their  great  profit  —  and  would  deliver  the  American  army 
into  the  hands  of  the  British  and  restore  the  allegiance  of 
the  Colonies  to  the  British  crown. 

When  Clinton  learned  the  identity  of  his  anonymous  Meeting  of 
correspondent  he  turned  him  over  to  Andre,  his  adjutant-  a 


general.  The  correspondence  continued,  and  at  Arnold's 
request  and  under  his  passport  Andre  went  up  the  river, 
and  met  Arnold  late  at  night,  on  the  west  shore  a  few 
miles  below  Stony  Point.  Arnold  delivered  to  him  vari 
ous  documents,  some  of  them  in  his  own  handwriting 
—  a  detailed  statement  of  the  troops,  3,086  in  number, 
stationed  at  various  posts  in  the  Highlands;  a  complete 
description  of  the  forts  in  the  Highlands  and  the  arma 
ment  and  ordnance  stores  at  each;  the  standing  orders 
to  the  garrison  as  to  what  they  should  do  in  case  of 
attack;  and  a  copy  of  the  proceedings  of  the  council  of 
war  held  at  West  Point  a  short  time  before.3  What 

JThe  language  which  Washington  used  in  this  reprimand  is  classic. 
"Our  profession  is  the  chastest  of  all;  even  the  shadow  of  a  fault  tarnishes 
the  lustre  of  our  finest  achievements.  ...  I  reprimand  you  for  having 
forgotten  that  in  proportion  as  you  have  rendered  yourself  formidable  to 
our  enemies,  you  should  have  been  guarded  and  temperate  in  your  de 
portment  toward  your  fellow-citizens.  Exhibit  anew  those  noble  qualities 
which  have  placed  you  on  the  list  of  our  most  valued  commanders.  I  will 
myself  furnish  you,  so  far  as  it  may  be  in  my  power,  with  opportunities  of 
regaining  the  esteem  of  your  country."  (Arnold,  261.) 

2  Monck  delivered  the  Roundhead  army  to  Charles  II  ;   Marlborough 
deserted  during  the  night  from  James  II  to  William  of  Orange,  and  aided 
in  establishing  William  on  the  throne.    See  Wolseley's  Marlborough,  where 
the  question  of  Marlborough's  honor  is  discussed  at  length. 

3  All  the  essential  letters  are  given  in  Sparks,  VII,  520-552. 


168  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1780        plans  were  verbally  discussed  at  this  midnight  meeting  is- 

not  a  matter  of  record;  but  it  was  universally  believed, 

and  doubtless  correctly,  that  they  included  the  details 

of  an  attack  by  Clinton  and  a  surrender  by  Arnold;  and 

that  this  would  take  place  either  during  the  next  two  days 

or  later,  during  an  expected  movement  of  Washington 

against  New  York,  concerning  which  Washington  was  at 

that  moment  in  conference  with  Rochambeau  at  Hartford. 

sept.  22  The  next  morning  Arnold  returned  to  his  head-quarters 

capture  of       at  the  Robinson  house,  opposite  West  Point,  and  Andre 

sept.  23          started  to  return  to  New  York.    He  was  captured  near 

Tarrytown  with  the  above-mentioned  documents  in  his 

boots.    The  officer  to  whom  Andre  was  brought  sent  word 

of  the  capture  to  Arnold,  and  despatched  the  documents 

by  messenger  to  meet  Washington  on  the  road  back  from 

Hartford.  Arnold  received  the  intelligence  while  at  break- 

sept.  25          fast.    He  immediately  left  the  house  and  escaped  in  his 

barge,  which  rowed  him  down  the  river  below  Verplanck's 

Point,  where  he  arrived  safely  within  the  British  lines. 

Washington  arrived  at  the  Robinson  house,  on  his 
return  from  Hartford,  an  hour  after  Arnold  had  left.  He 
crossed  to  West  Point  and  inspected  the  works,  and  re 
turned  to  the  Robinson  house  about  noon.  There  the 
messenger,  who  had  missed  Washington  on  the  road, 
arrived  with  the  documents  and  a  letter  from  Andre. 
Hamilton  was  at  once  sent  off  in  the  hope  of  capturing 
Arnold,  but  the  latter  had  so  many  hours  the  start  that 
pursuit  was  fruitless.  Simultaneously  orders  were  sent 
to  Greene,  who  had  been  left  in  command  of  the  army  at 
Tappan  during  Washington's  absence,  to  march  the  left 
wing  to  King's  Ferry  so  as  to  be  in  position  to  dispute 
any  attempt  of  Clinton  to  come  up  the  river.1 

1  Sparks,  VII,  520-552;  also  VII,  205,  212,  214-221,  235,  241,  256. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  169 

The  unfortunate  Andre"1  was  first  brought  to  West        ITSO 
Point  and  then  to  Tappan.    A  board  of  fourteen  general  Trial  of  Andre, 
officers,  with  Greene  as  president,  and  including  Stirling,  ^ 
Lafayette,  Steuben,  James  Clinton,  Knox,  Glover  and 
Stark,  was  convened  to  try  Andre.    The  board  found  sept.  29 
that  "  under  a  feigned  name  and  in  a  disguised  habit  he 
passed  our  works,"  .  .  .  that  he  was  captured  "in  a  dis 
guised  habit,"  while  on  his  way  to  New  York,  and  "when 
taken  he  had  in  his  possession  several  papers  which 
contained  intelligence  for  the  enemy."    The  board  was 
therefore  of  opinion  that  he  "ought  to  be  considered  a 
spy  from  the  enemy,  and  that  agreeably  to  the  laws  and 
usage  of  nations,  it  is  their  opinion  he  ought  to  suffer 
death."    Washington  approved  the  sentence,  and  Andre  Death  of 

i  i  i     t      A        ij        j   nr        Andr6-  Oct- 2- 

was  hanged.  Appeals  were  made  by  Arnold  and  Clm-  12  M. 
ton,1  and  the  latter  sent  up  the  tory  chief -justice  to 
argue  that  Andre  was  not  a  spy;  it  is  said  that  Arnold 
offered  to  Clinton  to  take  Andre's  place,  but  Clinton  de 
clined  to  allow  it;  and  Andre  himself,  in  a  touching  letter, 
appealed  for  the  privilege  of  being  shot  instead  of  dying 
"on  a  gibbet."  l  But  there  was  too  much  at  stake;  the 
proof  of  his  being  a  spy  was  incontrovertible,  and  Wash 
ington — deeply  affected  as  he  was — was  inflexible  that 
he  should  die  the  death  of  a  spy. 

Forty  years  later  his  body  was  disinterred,  carried  to 
England  and  buried  in  Westminster  Abbey  near  a  monu 
ment  which  had  already  been  erected  to  his  memory,  in 
the  company  of  England's  greatest  men.    The  author  of  subsequent 
his  misfortunes,  the  man  who  tempted  him,  received  for  Arnold 
his  treason  a  commission  as  brigadier-general   in   the 
British  army,  and  fought  against  his  former  comrades 
during  the  campaign  in  Virginia.     He  was  then  brought 

Arnold,  307,  311,  335,  343,  348;  Sparks,  VII,  534,  540,  542,  543. 


170  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

north  and  led  an  expedition  of  tories  and  Hessians  against 
New  London  New  London,  not  many  miles  from  his  birthplace.  It 
septum!  was  the  last  engagement  of  the  war  at  the  North.  He 
captured  Forts  Trumbull  and  Griswold,  burned  the  town 
and  massacred  the  garrison.  Soon  after  he  was  sent  to 
England,  and  received  £6,315  in  money  for  himself,  a 
pension  of  £500  a  year  for  his  wife  and  £100  a  year  for 
each  of  her  children.  Subsequently  the  King  gave  him 
a  grant  of  13,400  acres  of  land  in  upper  Canada.  He  re 
mained  in  the  British  army  until  his  death  twenty  years 
later;  but  the  British  officers  despised  him;  he  fought  a 
duel  in  resentment  of  their  insults,  got  into  debt,  lost 
his  fortune  and  died  in  poverty.1  It  is  said  that  he  died 
in  the  uniform  of  an  American  major-general,  which  he 
had  on  at  the  time  he  escaped  from  the  Robinson  house 
and  which  he  had  always  preserved. 

The  actual  damage  which  he  succeeded  in  doing  to  the 
American  cause  was  slight;  but  it  was  not  for  lack  of 
intention.  His  name  has  been  a  synonym  for  infamy 
during  130  years,  and  it  seems  probable  that  it  will  so 
continue  so  long  as  history  is  written. 

Meanwhile,  what  of  the  French  alliance?  What  were 
the  French  ships  and  soldiers  doing  during  the  two  years 
and  more  which  had  elapsed  since  the  signing  of  the  treaty? 
Feb.  6, 1778  The  answer,  in  brief,  is  that  they  were  fighting  the  com 
mon  enemy,  England,  in  the  West  Indies.  They  thus 
created  a  diversion  by  causing  British  ships  and  soldiers 
to  be  sent  from  New  York  to  St.  Lucia  and  elsewhere; 
and  to  this  extent  they  aided  the  American  cause.  But 
while  the  French  were  primarily  concerned  with  French 
interests,  Washington  was  keenly  alive  to  American  in 
terests.  He  thought  that  as  much  harm  could  be  done 

1  Arnold,  348,  363,  378,  389,  393,  395. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  171 

to  England,  and  more  benefit  conferred  on  America,  if        1730 

the  French  would  concentrate  their  strength  at  New  York. 

If  they  could  command  the  sea  and  land  only  a  few  of 

their  troops,  he  pledged  himself  to  "  bring  25,000  effective 

men  into  the  field";   and  with  these  he  felt  confident 

that  he  could  capture  the  city  and  its  garrison  and  put 

an  end  to  the  war.    All  through  the  year  1779  he  tried  May  i,  1779 

to  bring  this  about.    He  had  conferences  with  Gerard,  sept.  16 

the  French  minister,  and  his  successor,  Luzerne.    He  Oct.  4 

wrote  to  d'Estaing;   he  called  on  the  governors  of  the  Oct.  2 

nearest  States  for  12,000  militia  and  they  began  to  as-  sept,  is 

semble;  he  stationed  Henry  Lee,  and  later  Duportail  Oct.  10 

and  Hamilton,  on  the  Jersey  coast  with  letters  to  be 

handed  to  d'Estaing  as  soon  as  he  reached  the  Delaware 

capes.1 

But  d'Estaing  never  came.    Although  he  had  written  Movements  of 
that  he  would  be  on  the  coast  of  Carolina  in  May,  he  re 
mained  in  the  West  Indies  to  capture  St.  Vincent  and  june  is 
Grenada.    Then  he  went  to  San  Domingo  and  thence  juiy4 
to  Georgia.    But  instead  of  making  short  work  of  the 
British  there  as  he  had  anticipated,  and  then  proceed 
ing  to  the  Delaware  and  New  York,  he  became  involved  Oct.  9 
in  a  siege  at  Savannah,  and  finally  in  an  assault,  in  which 
he  was  repulsed  and  wounded.    Then  he  sailed  away  to  Oct.  20 
France.2    Washington  heard  of  this  at  the  close  of  the 
year;  he  dismissed  the  militia  and  put  his  Continentals  NOV.  20 
into  cantonments  as  previously  stated.    It  was  a  bitter 
disappointment. 

A  few  months  later  Lafayette  rejoined  Washington  at  May  10.  mo 
Morristown,  after  an  absence  of  sixteen  months  in  France. 
While  the  responsible  French  ministers  had  an  eye  single 

Sparks,  VI,  61,  62,  237,  368,  371,  373,  378,  409,  540. 
'Mahan,  367,  376;  Sparks,  VI,  320,  361,  368,  409. 


172  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

to  the  interests  of  France  as  they  understood  them,  and 
used  their  ships  and  their  men  to  protect  their  interests 
in  the  West  Indies  rather  than  in  an  attack  upon  New 
York — this  enthusiastic  young  nobleman  cared  nothing 
about  the  West  Indies,  but  was  wholly  and  disinterestedly 
devoted  to  America,  and  to  Washington  personally.  It 
was  due  chiefly  to  his  persistent  and  persuasive  appeals 
during  his  absence  in  France  that  the  King  was  induced 
to  send  a  new  and  larger  expedition  to  America,  and  to 
give  explicit  instructions  to  its  commander  that  he  was 
to  act  under  Washington's  orders.1 
Arrival  of  The  expedition  consisted  of  7  ships  of  the  line  under 

Second  French      irn  •  •         /»  j»   11  • 

Expedition       de  Temay  convoying  transports  carrying  6  full  regiments 
May  2  (6,000  officers  and  men)  under  Rochambeau.     It  sailed 

juiy  10  from  Brest  and  landed  at  Newport.    It  was  to  be  followed 

by  a  second  expedition  of  4  regiments;  but  this  was  block 
aded  in  Brest  by  a  British  squadron  and  never  arrived.2 
Lafayette  had  brought  to  Washington  full  information 
in  regard  to  the  French  expedition  and  copies  of  the  in 
structions;  which  were  that  the  French  troops  should 
act  as  a  unit,  under  Washington's  orders,  should  "co 
operate  in  the  most  effectual  manner"  and  that  the  plan 
of  campaign  should  be  left  to  Washington.  Before 
Rochambeau  arrived  Washington  had  prepared  his  plan 
— which  was  an  attack  on  New  York — had  completed  his 
own  arrangements  for  supplies  and  for  calling  out  a  large 
juiy  15  body  of  militia.  He  sent  Lafayette  to  confer  with  Ro 

chambeau,  carrying  with  him  detailed  instructions,  both 
written  and  verbal,  in  regard  to  the  movement  against 
New  York.3  This  was  to  begin  immediately,  and  the 

Sparks,  VI,  368,  497,  545-556;  VII,  511. 

2  Ibid.,  VII,  171,  176,  520;  Mahan,  382,  394. 

3  Ibid.,  VII,  142,  171,  496-498,  510. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  173 

allied  troops  were  to  meet  just  north  of  the  Harlem  River 
about  August  5. 

But  this  plan  was  upset  by  the  British  naval  com 
manders.  It  was  a  fundamental  part  of  the  plan  that 
the  French  should  have  a  naval  superiority.1  They  had 
this  when  de  Ternay  arrived.  But  within  ten  days  they 
lost  it.  De  Ternay  had  been  followed  across  the  Atlantic  July  13 
by  six  British  ships  under  Admiral  Graves,  who  arrived 
at  New  York  a  few  days  after  de  Ternay  reached 
Newport.2  This  restored  the  British  superiority  on  the 
sea;  and  the  combined  fleet  under  Admiral  Arbuthnot 
promptly  sailed  for  Newport  and  anchored  off  Point  Juiy2i 
Judith. 

Clinton  followed  this  with  6,000  troops  which  left  New 
York  and  proceeded  down  the  Sound  with  the  intention 
of  attacking  Newport.  But  Washington  instantly  met 
this  move  by  crossing  his  army  from  New  Jersey  at 
Dobb's  Ferry,  and  marching  down  toward  Kingsbridge 
to  attack  New  York.  Clinton  thereupon  returned  to  juiyai 
New  York,  the  British  fleet,  however,  still  remaining  off 
Point  Judith,  blockading  the  French  and  intercepting  or 
turning  back  their  despatch-boats.  News  of  Clinton's 
movement  reached  Rochambeau  and  he  immediately 
called  upon  Heath,  who  commanded  in  New  England, 
for  militia  to  aid  in  his  defence.  Several  thousand  turned 
out  quickly  and  went  to  his  assistance  on  Rhode  Island.3 

Within  a  month  after  its  arrival,  therefore,  the  French  French  Army 
expedition  of  1780,  far  from  aiding  Washington  in  any  Blockaded  in 
offensive  movements,  found  itself  cooped  up  in  New- 

1  "A  naval  superiority  being  essential  to  every  enterprise  in  these  States," 
Washington  to  Guicken.    (Sparks,  VII,  196.)    "A  decisive  naval  superiority 
is  to  be  considered  as  a  fundamental  principle,"  Washington  to  Lafayette. 
(Sparks,  VII,  509.) 

2  Sparks,  VII,  113,  127,  169.  s  Ibid.,  VII,  113,  127,  131,  138. 


174  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

ITBO        port  and  relying  on  the  New  England  militia  for  its 
protection. 

After  Clinton  had  returned  to  New  York  the  militia 
were  gradually  sent  home ;  but  the  British  fleet  remained 

sept.  21  on  the  blockade.  Washington  went  to  Hartford  and 
discussed  the  situation  with  de  Ternay  and  Rochambeau. 
All  were  agreed  that  the  French  army  could  not  leave  its 
fleet  until  sufficient  ships  should  arrive  to  establish  their 
naval  superiority;  and  while  there  was  a  large  French 
fleet  in  the  West  Indies  at  all  times  during  the  years 
1780  and  1781,  yet  for  various  reasons  no  part  of  it  came 
to  America  until  late  in  the  summer  of  the  latter  year.1 
Nothing,  therefore,  could  be  done.  The  French  army 
remained  inactive  at  Newport  for  eleven  months  after 
its  arrival.2 

The  Revciu-         During  this  time  the  Revolution  came  near  to  expir- 

Exha^steT  ing  from  sheer  exhaustion.  Its  credit  was  exhausted; 
paper  money  had  been  issued  by  Congress  to  the  extent 
of  $241,000,000  and  by  the  States  to  $209,000,000;  and 

March  is  no  provision  had  been  made  for  its  redemption.3  Con 
gress  attempted  to  fix  its  value  at  40  to  1  in  specie,  but 
the  market  rate  was  soon  1,000  to  I,4  and  finally  it  had 
no  value  whatever.5  Having  neither  money  nor  credit, 
Congress  then  attempted  to  collect  supplies  from  the 
States  in  kind.  The  response  was  such  as  each  State 
saw  fit  to  make.6  What  was  furnished,  together  with 

1  Sparks,  VII,  195,  203,  207,  509.  2  Rochambeau,  391. 

8  Lossing,  I,  316-321.  4  Jour.  Cong.,  442. 

5  Fiske,  Amer.  Rev.,  II,  197,  198. 

6  Washington  wrote  to  Congress  (April  3,  1780)  that  this  system  "has 
proved  in  its  operation  pernicious  beyond  description";    and  to  Joseph 
Jones  in  Congress  (May  31,  1780):  "One  State  will  comply  with  a  requisi 
tion  of  Congress;  another  neglects  to  do  it;  a  third  executes  it  by  halves; 
and  all  differ  either  in  the  manner,  the  matter  or  so  much  in  point  of  time 
that  we  are  always  working  uphill."     (Sparks,  VII,  13,  67.) 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  175 

what  was  obtained  by  impressment  was  barely  enough  to 

keep  the  troops  from  starving.     In  clothing  there  was  a 

similar  destitution;  and  in  powder  the  supplies  were  so 

low  that  Washington  endeavored  through  Lafayette  to 

negotiate  a  loan1  from  the  French  of  30,000  pounds  of 

this  indispensable  article.    As  to  recruiting,  matters  were 

in  the  same  unsatisfactory  condition  that  they  had  been 

in  for  the  last  five  years.    The  104  battalions  authorized 

in  1776  had  been  consolidated  into  80  battalions  in  1779,  March  9,  1779 

and  were  now  further  consolidated  into  50  regiments  of  Oct.  3,  nso 

infantry,  with  4  regiments  of  cavalry,  4  of  artillery  and  1 

of  artificers.2    Their  organization  was  to  be  substantially 

that  which  had  been  prepared  by  Steuben  and  approved 

by  Congress  in  1778;  enlistments  were  to  be  for  the  war; 

but  if  the  States  could  not  fill  up  their  quota  with  recruits 

for  the  war,  then  they  were  recommended  to  fill  them  up 

with  recruits  enlisted  for  one  year.3 

Resolutions  were  passed  at  intervals  of  a  few  months,  May  20 
sometimes  "requiring"  and  at  others  "requesting"  or  sept. 21 
"recommending"  the  States  to  fill  up  their  quota.4    If  Oct. 3 
this  had  been  done  the  strength  of  the  army  (including  Dec.  22 
officers)  would  have  been  35,850  infantry,  2,720  artillery  ineffective 
and  2,020  cavalry.5    But  it  was  not  done.    The  regi-  Recruiting 
ments  seldom  had  more  than  one-third  of  their  author 
ized  strength.    The  response,  by  States  or  individuals, 
to  the  resolutions  of  Congress  was  feeble.    The  war  had 
been  in  progress  nearly  six  years,  and  ardor  for  enlist 
ment  was  greatly  diminished.    The  French  alliance  was  in 
itself  a  detriment  to  recruiting.    The  average  man  could 

1  Sparks,  VII,  118.  2  Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  223,  432,  532,  538. 

3  On  Washington's  recommendation  this  was  modified,  October  21,  so 
as  to  provide  "that  the  whole  of  the  troops  be  enlisted  for  the  war";   but 
the  States  continued  to  enlist  recruits  for  one  year.    (Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  538.) 

4  Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  458,  521,  532,  557.  6  Ibid.,  Ill,  538. 


176  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  not  comprehend  the  importance  of  the  command  of  the 
sea,  and  he  could  not  understand  why  more  soldiers  were 
required  when  6,000  well-trained  and  well-equipped  French 
infantry  were  doing  nothing  at  Newport.  Finally  the 
sufferings  and  destitution  of  the  half-starved  and  half- 
naked  men  who  had  enlisted  were  not  such  as  to  tempt 
others  to  share  their  fate.  This  winter  the  troops 
were  cantoned,  as  before,  from  Morristown,  through  the 
Highlands,  to  Connecticut.1  It  was  the  fourth  winter, 
counting  from  Valley  Forge,  in  which  each  time  the 
suffering  had  been  almost  beyond  endurance. 

At  last  the  troops  resolved  that  they  would  stand  it  no 

longer,  and  a  mutiny  broke  out.    The  six  Pennsylvania 

Jan.  i,  regiments,  forming  Wayne's  division,  stationed  at  Morris- 

9  p   M 

town,  began  the  new  year  by  parading  under  arms,  and 
under  command  of  their  sergeants  marched  off  toward 
Mutiny  of  the    Philadelphia.    In  attempting  to  control  them  one  officer 
Line*1  was  killed  and  several  were  wounded.    Wayne,  who  not 

only  at  Stony  Point  but  at  Monmouth  and  elsewhere  had 
shown  the  most  intrepid  courage,  rushed  in  among  his 
men  and  drew  his  pistol;  but  they  merely  placed  their 
bayonets  against  his  breast  and  would  have  killed  him 
if  he  had  persisted.  They  marched  off;  and  the  next 
day  he  followed  and  overtook  them  at  Princeton.  They 
stated  their  grievances — no  pay  for  the  last  twelve 
months,  insufficient  food  and  clothing,  expiration  of  ser 
vice  (on  the  ground  that  they  had  enlisted  for  three 
years  or  the  war,  and  were  held  for  the  war  after  the 
three  years  had  expired).  Wayne  was  powerless  to 
give  any  relief  in  these  matters,  and  the  men  continued 
their  march  to  Trenton.  Three  emissaries,  despatched 
by  Clinton  as  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  trouble,  attempted 

1  Sparks,  VII,  313,  318. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  177 

to  induce  them  to  go  over  to  the  enemy.  But  they  in- 
dignantly  turned  these  over  to  Wayne,  and  after  a  sum-  Jan.  10 
mary  trial  assisted  in  hanging  them.  At  Trenton  they 
were  met  by  a  committee  of  Congress,  by  the  President 
of  Pennsylvania  and  by  a  force  of  1,000  men  under  St. 
Clair,  sent  by  Washington  to  oppose  their  crossing  the 
Delaware.  They  stated  their  case,  and  the  committee 
promised  them  prompt  payment  of  portion  of  their  pay, 
immediate  supply  of  certain  specified  articles  of  clothing 
and  discharge  forthwith  of  all  those  who  had  not  enlisted 
for  the  entire  war — the  term  of  enlistment  to  be  estab 
lished  by  each  man's  oath.  They  were  practically  all 
discharged,  and  their  arms  and  ammunition  were  sent 
to  Philadelphia.  They  were  then  asked  to  re-enlist  for 
the  war,  receiving  the  bounties  then  paid  to  recruits;  and 
almost  all  of  them  did  so  within  ninety  days.1  They 
were  soon  sent  to  Virginia  and  rendered  good  service  in 
the  Southern  campaign. 

The  success  of  this  mutiny  led  to  another — the  three 
regiments  of  New  Jersey,  stationed  at  Pompton.    They  Jan.  20 
similarly  marched  off  one  evening,  under  their  sergeants,  Mutiny  of  the 
for  Trenton.     But  Washington,  who  had  by  this  time  Line 
satisfied  himself  that  he  could  rely  upon  the  main  body 
of  his  troops,  determined  to  handle  this  affair  in  a  differ 
ent  manner.    He  placed  a  detachment  of  New  England 
troops  under  command  of  Major-General  Robert  Howe,  of 
North  Carolina,  and  directed  him  "to  compel  the  muti 
neers  to  unconditional  submission,"  and  "to  grant  no 
terms  while  they  are  with  arms  in  their  hands  in  a  state 
of  resistance."    Howe  carried  out  these  instructions  to 
the  letter.    He  surrounded  the  camp  of  the  mutineers  at 
Ringwood,  disarmed  them,  selected  one  ringleader  from 

1  Sparks,  VII,  350,  359,  364,  387,  436. 


178  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i        each  regiment,  tried  them  by  summary  court  and  hanged 
Jan.  28  them  on  the  spot.    The  others  promptly  submitted  and 

returned  to  duty.1 

Washington  had  repressed  these  outbreaks  with  a  stern 
hand,  but  at  the  same  time  he  wrote  to  the  governors 
of  States  calling  upon  them  to  take  steps  to  redress  the 
well-founded  grievances  of  the  men  in  the  matter  of  pay, 
clothing  and  food,2  with  the  result  that  their  conditions 
were  to  some  extent  improved  and  a  few  dollars  in  real 
money  were  paid  to  them. 

He  realized,  however,  that  the  country  was  nearly  at 
the  end  of  its  resources,  or,  as  he  expressed  it  (in  the 
letter  to  Laurens),  "the  people  are  discontented;  but  it  is 
with  the  feeble  and  oppressive  mode  of  conducting  the 
war,  not  with  the  war  itself."  3 

In  order  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close  it  was  essential  to 
raise  some  hard  money.  For  this  purpose  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  John  Laurens,  of  South  Carolina,  one  of  his  aides, 
was  selected;  and  Congress  appointed  him  a  special 
minister  to  France.4  Washington  gave  Laurens  a  letter 
Jan.  15  of  instructions,  written  in  that  clear,  impressive  and 

Mission  to        forcible  style  of  which  he  was  so  complete  a  master.    In 
this  he  set  forth  the  actual  situation  in  America,  the 
cause  of  her  financial  difficulties,  the  great  natural  re 
sources  which  would  enable  her  to  repay  a  loan  and  the 
imperative  need  of  two  things — a  loan  of  money  and  "a 
constant  naval  superiority  on  these  coasts."    With  this 
Feb.  is          letter5  Laurens  sailed  from  Boston;  he  landed  there  on 
Aug.  25          his  return  six  months  later.    Vergennes  was  of  opinion 

1  Sparks,  VII,  380,  386,  560-566.  2  Ibid.,  381. 

J  Sparks,  VII,  373.  4  Ibid.,  368. 

8  The  original,  in  Washington's  handwriting,  is  in  the  Archives  of  the 

Foreign  Office  in  Paris.  A  complete  copy  is  printed  in  Sparks,  VII, 
368-373. 


THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  179 

that  the  manner  in  which  he  pressed  his  case  savored  more  1781 
of  the  camp  than  of  diplomacy.1  However  that  might 
be,  he  induced  the  French  ministers  to  make  a  loan  of 
6,000,000  francs;2  he  converted  some  of  this  promptly 
into  arms,  ammunition  and  clothing,  all  of  which  he 
brought  back  with  him,  together  with  2,500,000  francs 
in  hard  cash.3  His  representations  and  Washington's 
letter  also  led  to  the  sending  of  the  French  fleet  from 
the  West  Indies  to  Yorktown,  thereby  establishing  the 
French  naval  superiority,  and  enabling  Washington  to 
carry  out  his  long-deferred  plans  for  making  the  French 
alliance  really  effective. 

1  Sparks,  VII,  526;  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  Revolution,  IX, 
211. 

3  Vergennes  stated  that  the  amount  which  the  French  King  had  ad 
vanced  to  America,  to  the  close  of  1781,  was  20,000,000  francs,  exclusive 
of  the  cost  of  maintaining  the  French  army  and  navy  in  America. 
(Sparks,  VIII,  526.) 

3  The  financial  assistance  of  France  was  far  more  effective  than  its 
military  co-operation.  In  the  list  of  Combattants  Fran9ais  de  la  Guerre 
Americaine,  furnished  by  the  French  Government,  and  published  by  the 
United  States  Senate  in  1905,  there  are  more  than  47,000  names — the  offi 
cers  and  men  of  62  naval  vessels  and  13  regiments,  who  at  one  time  or  an 
other  landed  on  our  shores  or  cruised  in  our  waters.  But  like  the  American 
militia  they  came  and  went  at  their  own  will;  the  greatest  number  ashore 
at  any  one  time  was  8,400;  they  took  part  in  two  battles  only,  Savannah 
and  Yorktown;  their  battle  losses  were  637  at  Savannah  and  186  at  York- 
town.  In  a  military  sense  they  were  more  than  offset  by  the  German 
troops  who  fought  with  Great  Britain.  These  numbered  29,867,  of  whom 
only  17,313  returned.  Their  effective  strength  from  1777  to  1782  was 
never  less  than  12,000.  They  were  always  subject  to  the  orders  of  the 
British  general,  and,  hirelings  though  they  were,  they  fought  well;  they 
were  in  9  principal  battles  and  11  minor  engagements,  and  their  killed 
and  wounded  numbered  2,200.  (Lowell,  301;  Sparks,  V,  542-545.) 


CHAPTER  VI 
CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH 

1775  AT  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  Boston  was  about  as  far 

removed  from  Savannah  as  it  now  is  from  Manila.  By 
sea  the  distance  was  1,100  miles;  and  the  time,  depend 
ing  on  wind  and  weather,  was  from  8  to  30  days.  The 
British  controlled  the  sea  and  that  avenue  of  communica 
tion  was  not  open  to  the  Americans.  By  land,  the  roads 
were  so  bad  that  troops  could  not  make  the  march  in  less 
than  60  days,  and  a  courier  riding  "express"  consumed 
fully  20  days.  In  fact  the  letters  exchanged  between 
Washington  and  Greene,  after  the  latter  had  assumed 
command  in  the  South,  were  usually  30  days  old  when 
they  reached  their  destination. 

The  Thirteen  Colonies  were  divided,  by  topographical 
conditions  as  well  as  by  political  affiliations,  into  three 
groups,  whose  interests  were  by  no  means  identical. 
The  dividing  lines  were  the  Hudson  River  and  the 
Potomac  River  and  Chesapeake  Bay.  The  four  New 
England  Colonies  had  a  population  of  less  than  750,000, 
and  were  engaged  in  agriculture  and  ocean  commerce, 
with  the  beginnings  of  some  struggling  manufactures; 
the  five  Middle  Colonies  had  a  population  of  not  quite 
1,000,000;  they  were  almost  wholly  agricultural  and 
furnished  the  food  supplies;  the  four  Southern  Colonies, 
with  a  population  of  more  than  1, 000,000, 1  were  also 

1  Census  Report  on  Growth  of  Population,  1909,  p.  9. 
180 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  181 

agricultural,  but  their  chief  product  was  tobacco  (the       1775 
cotton  planting  being  then  only  just  introduced  and  the 
cotton-gin  being  not  yet  invented),  and  the  greater  part 
of  this  was  raised  for  export. 

These  elementary  facts  must  be  considered  in  order 
properly  to  understand  the  military  events  of  the  Revolu 
tion.  The  Northern  and  Southern  Colonies  were  so  far 
separated  that  they  were  not  within  supporting  distance; 
and  by  its  command  of  the  sea1  England  was  able  to  move 
its  troops  in  attack  upon  one  or  the  other  in  one-fourth 
of  the  time  that  the  Americans  could  move  from  one  to 
the  defence. of  the  other.  The  Northern  and  Southern 
campaigns  were  therefore  entirely  distinct  and  separate; 
and  each  section,  for  the  most  part,  relied  upon  itself  for 
its  defence.  Moreover,  the  lack  of  identity  in  interest 
between  the  three  groups  of  Colonies  produced  jealousies 
in  the  small  body  of  Congress,  where  the  vote  was  always 
by  States;  and  these  jealousies  prevented  the  utilization 
of  the  full  military  resources  of  the  country.2  While 
Congress  did  not  possess  any  specific  power  to  enforce 
its  resolutions,  yet  in  those  matters  where  the  States 
were  in  unanimous  accord,  the  State  government  was 
quite  ready  to  exert  its  sovereign  power  to  carry  these 
resolves  into  effect.  But  where  there  was  only  a  narrow 
majority,  each  State  carried  them  out  or  not  as  it  saw 
fit;3  and  each  State  was  keenly  alert,  both  in  Congress 
and  in  its  own  legislature,  to  see  that  the  effect  of  any 
measure  did  not  give  to  one  State  an  advantage  over 
another.  Against  this  sectionalism,  which  applied  to 

Sparks,  VII,  169,  170,  196,  337,  371;  Mahan,  397-400. 

2  Sparks,  VII,  67,  167,  225,  298,  333,  391. 

3  "  One  State  yields  obedience,  and  another  refuses  it,  while  a  third 
mutilates  and  adopts  the  measure  in  part  only,  and  all  vary  in  time  and 
manner."     (Washington  to  Custis,  Sparks,  VII,  442.) 


182  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1775  the  assembling  and  movements  of  troops  as  well  as  to 
other  matters,  Washington's  letters  contain  a  series  of 
protests,  made  year  after  year  in  temperate  and  judicious 
but  none  the  less  strong  and  forcible  language.  But  they 
were  all  in  vain. 

British  pians  As  the  State  of  Virginia  contained  nearly  one-fifth  of 
the  colonies  the  entire  population,  and  the  four  Southern  States  about 
forty  per  cent  of  it,  the  British  constantly  sought  to  de 
tach  these  States  from  their  allegiance  to  the  cause  of 
the  United  Colonies;  hoping  to  accomplish  this,  first  by 
conquest  and  after  conquest  by  conciliation.  The  true 
military  principle  for  suppressing  the  Revolution  was  to 
defeat,  crush  and  disperse  Washington's  army,  wherever 
it  was,  and  to  capture  or  kill  Washington.  Had  the 
British  adhered  to  this  principle,  and  successfully  carried 
it  into  effect,  there  is  slight  reason  to  doubt  that  the 
Revolution  would,  at  that  time,  have  failed.  But  they 
did  not  adopt  this  principle.  Their  plans  were  always 
based  on  acquiring  territory  and  re-establishing  piecemeal 
the  authority  of  the  crown.  Thus  they  took  New  York 
and  held  it  as  their  base  of  operations;  captured  Phila 
delphia  and  then  lost  it;  occupied  Newport  with  a  view  to 
retaking  Boston,  but  never  carried  out  that  part  of  the 
plan;  tried  to  take  Charleston  and  failed;  sent  Burgoyne 
on  an  abortive  expedition  down  the  Hudson  in  the  hope 
of  detaching  New  England  from  the  Central  States;  and 
then  abandoned  all  aggressive  movements  at  the  North 
and  attempted  to  wear  out  the  Revolution  by  petty 
raids  into  Connecticut,  New  Jersey  and  Virginia.  Fi 
nally,  when  the  war  had  been  in  progress  for  four  years 
without  producing  any  substantial  results  except  the 
establishment  of  a  base  at  New  York,  it  was  determined 
to  make  the  South  the  principal  theatre  of  operations,  in 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  183 

the  hope  that  if  the  North  could  not  be  subdued,  at  least        1775 
its  importance  could  be  greatly  diminished  and  its  ex 
pansion  prevented  by  restoring  the  populous  Southern 
Colonies  to  British  allegiance,  and  thus  creating  a  barrier 
on  the  south  similar  to  that  of  Canada  on  the  north.1 

The  war  began  at  the  South  in  much  the  same  fashion 
as  at  the  North.  The  attack  at  Lexington  and  Patrick 
Henry's  eloquence  caused  the  four  Southern  Colonies  to 
break  out  into  such  open  resistance  that  three  of  the 
royal  governors  found  it  necessary  to  seek  refuge  on 
British  ships  of  war,  and  to  write  home  asking  that  regular 
troops  be  sent  to  their  assistance.  Pending  the  arrival 


of  these  there  were  conflicts  with  the  militia.    The  first 
of  these  was  in  Virginia,  at  the  Great  Bridge  over  the  vaea 
Elizabeth  River,  about  nine  miles  from  Norfolk.2    In 
this  encounter  the  British  were  defeated  and  their  com-  Dec.  9 
manding  officer  fell,  pierced  by  fourteen  bullets.    The 
militia  pursued  them  and  took  possession  of  Norfolk.2 
Soon  afterward  the  royal  governor,  from  his  ships,  called        me 
on  the  town  to  surrender;  and  this  being  refused  he  bom-  Jan.  i 
barded  it  for  three  days,  set  fire  to  it  and  reduced  it  to  Jan.  4 
ashes.3 
The  next  clash  was  in  North  Carolina,  at  Moore's  Moore's  Bridge, 

N   C 

Bridge,  over  a  branch  of  the  Cape  Fear  River,  near  the 

site  of  the  present  town  of  Fayetteville.    The  contestants  Feb.  27 

were  about  1,500  tory  militia,  raised  by  the  royal  governor, 

1  There  were  ten  principal  battles  at  the  North,  with  aggregate  losses  of 
a'oout  24,000  men;   and  eleven  at  the  South,  with  losses  of  about  18,000. 
In  numbers,  importance  and  losses  the  battles  in  the  South  were  about 
equal  to  those  at  the  North;  the  duration  of  the  campaigns  in  each  section 
was  about  the  same  —  four  years.    The  crowning  victory  at  Yorktown  was 
due  in  about  equal  measure  to  the  previous  campaigns  on  each  side  of  the 
Potomac,  and  to  the  skill  with  which  Washington  profited  by  the  results 
of  both. 

2  Dawson,  122-126.  3  Dawson,  122-126. 


184 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1776 


Arrival  of 

Regular 

Troops 

Feb.  13 
May  3 
Jan. 


June  4 
June  9 


Preparations 
for  the 
Defence  of 
Charleston 

1775 
June  26 
Nov.  4 
Dec.  28 


May 


and  1,000  Colonial  militia,  called  out  by  the  Provincial 
Council  and  commanded  by  General  Moore.  It  was  dis 
astrous  to  the  tories;  30  of  them  were  killed  or  wounded, 
their  leader  and  850  men  were  captured  and  the  rest 
fled;  the  Colonials  lost  only  two  men  slightly  wounded, 
and  they  captured  a  large  quantity  of  supplies,  including 
1,500  rifles  and  a  military  chest  containing  £15,000  in 
specie.1 

Meanwhile  the  regular  troops  which  had  been  called 
for  were  on  their  way.  Cornwallis,  with  7  regiments, 
convoyed  by  a  squadron  of  2  ships  of  the  line  and  6 
frigates  mounting  in  all  230  guns,  sailed  from  Cork  and 
arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the  Cape  Fear  River.  Clinton 
was  already  there,  having  been  despatched  from  Boston 
with  parts  of  2  regiments.  He  was  senior  to  Corn 
wallis  and  took  command  of  all  the  troops.  He  decided 
to  proceed  to  the  attack  of  Charleston,  where  he  arrived 
outside  the  bar,  and  soon  after  landed  part  of  his  troops 
on  Long  Island.2 

On  the  American  side  preparations  were  not  lacking  to 
defend  the  South.  By  successive  resolutions  Congress 
requested  North  Carolina  to  raise  2  battalions,  South 
Carolina  3,  Georgia  1,  and  Virginia  6 — all  to  be  on  the 
Continental  establishment.3  It  was  some  time  before 
these  troops  were  raised,  but  meanwhile  South  Carolina 
was  taking  energetic  measures  for  its  own  defence. 
Several  months  before  Congress  passed  its  resolutions  the 
State  had  raised  4  regiments  of  its  own;  and  having 
learned,  by  intercepted  despatches4  to  the  royal  governor, 
first  that  it  was  intended  to  send  regular  troops  to  coerce 
the  South,  and  later  that  Cornwallis  with  his  7  regiments 


1  Dawson,  128-134. 

3  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  II,  107,  325,  463. 


2  Ibid.,  135,  140,  142. 
4  Lossing,  II,  543. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  185 

was  about  to  sail  from  Cork,  the  State  began  the  con-  me 
st ruction  of  elaborate  fortifications  to  defend  Charleston 
harbor.1  These  were  not  quite  finished  when  Parker's 
fleet  with  Clinton's  and  Cornwallis's  soldiers  appeared 
off  the  bar.  Simultaneously  2  battalions  arrived  from  June 
Virginia  and  1  from  North  Carolina,  carrying  the  total 
strength  of  the  garrison  (including  militia)  to  more  than 
6,000  men.2  Charles  Lee,  who  had  been  sent  from  Boston 
by  Washington,  arrived  at  the  same  time  and  took  com 
mand.  The  fortifications  were  constructed  on  Sullivan's 
Island,  on  the  north  side  of  the  entrance  to  the  harbor; 
on  James  Island,  on  its  south  side;  at  HaddrelPs  Point, 
nearer  to  the  city;  and  on  the  wharves  of  the  city  itself.3 
In  all  they  mounted  nearly  100  cannon;  and  there  was  a 
good  supply  of  powder  on  hand,  part  of  which  had  been 
purchased  in  the  West  Indies  a  year  before  and  part  of 
it  captured  from  a  British  supply  ship  at  St.  Augustine, 
by  a  cruiser  which  the  gentlemen  of  Charleston  had  fitted 
out  for  that  purpose.  The  principal  fort  was  on  the 
southern  side  of  Sullivan's  Island;  and  under  the  name 
of  Fort  Moultrie  that  point  has  ever  since  been  strongly 
fortified.  In  1776  its  fort  had  4  bastions  and  was  made 
of  soft  palmetto  logs  and  earth,  with  a  deep  ditch,  and 
parapets  16  feet  thick  mounting  30  guns.  It  was  large 
enough  for  a  garrison  of  1,000  men,  but  its  defenders 
numbered  only  344,  the  2d  South  Carolina  Regiment, 
under  command  of  Colonel  William  Moultrie.4  The  1st 
Regiment,  Colonel  Gadsden,  was  at  Fort  Johnson  on 
James  Island,  and  the  3d  Regiment,  Colonel  Thomson, 
was  on  the  eastern  end  of  Sullivan's  Island;  he  was  to 

1  Moultrie's  Memoirs  of  the  American  Revolution,  I,  140. 

2  Marshall's  Washington,  I,  72.  s  Moultrie,  I,  142,  146. 
4  Gordon,  II,  283;  Lossing,  II,  544-546. 


186  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1775  oppose  any  attempt  of  Clinton's  men  to  cross  the  inlet 
known  as  the  "  Breach,"  which  separated  Long  Island 
from  Sullivan's.  The  rest  of  the  defending  force  was 
distributed  at  HaddrelPs  Point,  where  Lee  had  his  head 
quarters,  and  in  the  city.1 

Defence  of  The  soul  of  the  defence  was  Moultrie.2    Lee  arrived 

three  weeks  before  the  attack  began  and  gave  a  great 
many  orders,  most  of  them  foolish;  but  his  reputation 
was  so  great  on  account  of  his  alleged  services  in  various 
European  armies  that  he  was  looked  up  to  as  a  great 
soldier  and  cheerfully  obeyed.  He  gave  it  as  his  opinion 
that  Fort  Moultrie  would  be  a  "mere  slaughter  pen"  and 
would  have  to  be  abandoned;  and  in  the  orders  which  he 
kept  sending  to  Moultrie,3  he  impressed  daily  upon  him 
the  importance  of  securing  his  retreat  and  his  impa 
tience  that  a  bridge  of  boats,  which  he  had  ordered  to  be 
built,  was  not  finished.  Moultrie  built  the  bridge  as  or 
dered,  but  he  remained  in  the  fort;  and  he  afterward 
wrote  that  he  "never  was  uneasy  on  not  having  a  retreat " 
because  he  did  not  imagine  that  the  enemy  could  force 
him  "to  that  necessity." 4 

June  4  Three  weeks  were  spent  by  Parker  and  Clinton  in 

June  23          getting  the  ships  over  the  bar,  landing  the  troops  on 
Long  Island  and  making  other  preparations.5    Finally 
June  28          the  attack  was  made.    Two  ships  of  the  line  and  two 
Attack  on        f  rigates  were  to  sail  in  under  topsails  and  anchor  off  Fort 
Sullivan;   three  frigates  were  to  pass  them  on  the  west 
and  anchor  between  Fort  Sullivan  and  the  city  where 

1  Gordon,  II,  283. 

2Fiske,  Amer.  Rev.,  I,  198,  199;  Amer.  Archives,  4,  VI,  1191. 

3  More  than  twenty  of  these  have  been  preserved.  (Amer.  Archives,  4,  VI, 
1186.)  *  Lossing,  II,  547. 

5  Stedman,  I,  186;  Lee's  Report,  Sparks,  Letters,  I,  243-247;  Lossing, 
II,  548-550. 


SULLIVAN'S   ISLAND  (CHARLESTON) 
June  29,  1776 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 

Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 
From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States  and  Its  People 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  187 

they  could  enfilade  the  fort  and  bombard  its  western  side  me 
which  was  not  quite  finished.  A  bomb-ship,  or  mortar- 
boat,  escorted  by  the  remaining  frigate  was  to  anchor 
south-east  of  the  fort  and  bombard  it  from  that  side. 
Clinton's  troops  were  to  cross  the  "Breach"  inlet  from 
Long  Island,  in  boats  or  by  fording,  drive  back  Thom 
son's  regiment  and  take  the  fort  in  the  rear. 

The  ships  went  in  as  ordered;  but  Clinton's  men  never 
got  across  the  inlet.  It  proved  to  be  full  of  sand-bars,  on 
which  the  water  was  only  a  few  inches  deep,  and  the  boats 
ran  aground;  and  between  these  were  deep  holes  where 
the  men  sank  in  up  to  their  necks.  Thomson's  regiment 
also  opened  fire  on  them.  They  returned  to  Long  Island 
and  took  no  part  in  the  battle. 

The  action  thus  devolved  entirely  on  the  navy.  For  June28, 
ten  hours  they  bombarded  the  fort,  and  the  fort  replied  9  PAMM' 
with  equal  spirit.  In  the  middle  of  the  action  the  flag 
ship  (Bristol)  swung  around  so  as  to  be  exposed  to  en 
filade,  and  Moul trie's  men  swept  her  decks  so  effectively 
that  every  man  on  them  was  killed  or  wounded.1  The 
ships  were  at  such  close  range  that  musketry  fire  was 
used  with  deadly  effect.  The  mortar-boat  was  disabled 
early  in  the  action;  and  the  three  frigates,  which  were  to 
pass  the  rest  of  the  squadron  and  take  position  between 
the  fort  and  the  city,  grounded  on  the  "Middle  Shoal" 
(where  Fort  Sumter  was  afterward  built).  Two  of  them 
got  off  after  a  few  hours,  but  the  third  stuck  fast,  and  was 
abandoned  and  blown  up  the  following  morning. 

After  darkness  had  set  in  and  the  tide  was  running  ebb, 
having  made  no  impression  on  the  fort  Parker  withdrew 
out  of  range  to  his  former  anchorage  in  the  "Five  Fathom 
Hole."  He  had  lost  64  killed  and  161  wounded;  one  of 

1  Parker's  Report,  Dawson,  141. 


188  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1776  his  ships  had  been  struck  70  times,  one  was  abandoned 
and  the  others  were  so  seriously  injured  that  it  was 
several  months  before  the  repairs  were  completed.    The 
loss  in  the  fort  had  been  only  17  killed  and  20  wounded.1 
Parker  and  Clinton  remained  for  three  weeks,  repairing 

juiy  19  damages.  Then  Clinton  sailed  north  convoyed  by  the 

one  frigate  that  was  in  condition  to  go  to  sea.  He  ar- 

Aug.  i  rived  on  Staten  Island  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  attack 

on  New  York.2 

Results  of  the       The  defence  of  Charleston  was  a  brilliant  victory. 

atrcharie9etoen  Seven  newly  organized  regiments,  which  had  never  before 
been  under  fire,  had  beaten  off  7  regiments  of  regulars 
and  8  ships  of  war  whose  guns  outnumbered  6  to  1  those 
of  Fort  Sullivan.  It  inspirited  the  South,  cheered  the 
whole  country  and  disheartened  the  British.  They  made 
no  further  movements  in  the  South  for  two  and  a  half 
years.  The  Continental  battalions  of  the  four  Southern 
States,  which  in  1777  were  increased  to  31  in  number,3 
were  duly  organized;  and  in  the  absence  of  military 
operations  near  their  homes  they  were  available  for  ser- 

1777  vice  under  Washington.    The  entire  quota  of  Virginia 
Feb.  19  and  North  Carolina  (24  battalions)  were  ordered  to  join 
Feb.  5  Washington;   they  were  engaged  in  the  battles  around 

Philadelphia,  and  they  remained  with  him  until  the 
British  began  anew  their  attack  on  the  South. 

1778  This  renewal  began  in  the  winter  of  1778-79.    Wash 
ington  was  then  at  Middlebrook,4  with  his  troops  in  can 
tonments  through  the  Highlands  to  Connecticut.    Clinton 
had  27,803  men5  (exclusive  of  officers)  at  New  York  and 
5,789  at  Newport.    Before  leaving  Philadelphia  he  had 

1  Lee's  Report,  Dawson,  139.  *  Sparks,  IV,  27. 

3  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VII,  90,  133.  4  Ante,  p,  155. 

6  Sparks,  V,  542. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  189 

received   instructions,  due   to  the  French  alliance,  to        m& 
send  5,000  men  to  St.  Lucia  and  3,000  to  Georgia  or 
Florida;   to  abandon  offensive  operations  at  the  North; 
and  in  the  following  winter  to  make  an  attack  on  the 
Southern  Colonies.    "  Georgia  should  be  first  taken,  and 
the  passage  into  South  Carolina  will  then  be  compara-  March  s 
tively  easy."  1  March  21 

The  retreat  to  New  York  and  the  operations  at  New 
port  delayed  for  several  months  the  execution  of  these 
orders;  but  toward  the  close  of  the  year  these  expeditions 
left  New  York  for  their  destinations,  the  first  for  St.  NOV.  4 
Lucia  and  the  second  for  Georgia.    The  latter  consisted  NOV.  27 
of  2  British  battalions,  2  Hessian  battalions,  4  battalions  British  Troops 
of  New  York  tories  under  Cruger  and  De  Lancey  and  a  Georgia 
detachment  of  royal  artillery — numbering  in  all  about 
3,500  men,  and  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Archi 
bald  Campbell  of  the  71st  Highlanders.     Convoyed  by 
a  British  squadron  under  Commodore  Hyde  Parker,  it 
arrived  safely  at  Tybee  Island,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Dec.  23 
Savannah  River.2 

These  movements  were  not  made  without  the  knowl-  partisan 
edge  of  Washington  and  of  Congress;  and  it  was  also  inPGeorgS? 
known  that  the  predatory  warfare  which  had  been  car 
ried  on  during  the  last  two  years  between  the  Georgia 
loyalists  who  had  taken  refuge  in  Florida,  on  the  one 
side,  and  the  Colonial  militia  of  Georgia  and  South  Caro 
lina  under  Major-General  Robert  Howe,  on  the  other 
side,  had  resulted  adversely  to  the  latter;  and  that  the 
former  were  now  preparing  to  invade  both  Georgia  and 
South  Carolina.  Congress  thereupon  passed  resolutions 
requesting  the  Governor  of  Virginia  to  forward  1,000  men  Oct.  17 

1  Germain  to  Clinton,  Sparks,  V,  549. 

2  Campbell's  Report,  Dawson,  477. 


190  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1778        and  the  Governor  of  North  Carolina  to  send  3,000  men, 
sept.  25          for  the  defence  of  the  other  two  Southern  States;  and  at 
the  same  time  directed  Howe  to  repair  to  Washington's 
head-quarters  and  Lincoln  to  take  his  place  as  commander 
of  the  Southern  Department.1    These  resolutions  were 
passed  without  consulting  Washington,  but  he  fully  con 
curred  in  the  selection  of  Lincoln  in  whom  he  had  the 
Dec.  19          highest  confidence.    When  Lincoln  arrived  at  Charleston 
situation  at      the  situation  was  as  follows:  Campbell  with  3,500  men 
wLn  Lincoln   on  transports  was  approaching  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah 
mand  River;  Prevost  with  2,000  men  was  moving  north  from 

Florida,  part  of  his  force  marching  by  land  and  part  of 
them  being  transported  by  water;  these  two  forces  were 
to  effect  a  junction  and  under  Prevost's  orders  were  to 
conquer  Georgia  first  and  then  South  Carolina;2  Robert 
Howe,  with  about  1,000  (1st  and  2d  Georgia,  3d  and 
4th  South  Carolina  and  some  Georgia  militia)  was  at 
Fort  Sunbury  (the  site  of  Fort  McAllister  in  the  Civil 
War),  about  20  miles  south  of  Savannah;  Lincoln  was 
at  Charleston,  with  perhaps  1,500  men  (1st  and  2d  South 
Carolina  and  some  militia);  the  North  Carolina  and 
Virginia  troops  were  assembling,  and  part  of  them  were 
on  the  march  but  none  of  them  had  yet  arrived.3 
About  Dec.  25  Howe  heard  of  the  arrival  of  Campbell  off  the  Savannah 
River  and  of  the  approach  of  Prevost  from  Florida  at 
the  same  time.  Leaving  part  of  his  force  at  Sunbury,  he 
quickly  marched  back  to  the  defence  of  Savannah.  On 
arriving  there  he  posted  his  little  force  as  follows:  the 
Georgia  regiments  on  the  east  of  the  town  with  their 
left  flank  on  the  river;  the  South  Carolina  regiments 
across  the  road  leading  into  town  from  the  south-east, 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  XIT,  950,  951,  1021;  Sparks,  VI,  74,  83. 

2  Germain  to  Clinton,  Sparks,  V,  549.  8  Lossing,  II,  525. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  191 

their  right  flank  protected  by  a  swamp,  and  one  com-        ms 
pany  in  advance  on  a  hill  about  two  miles  down  the  river; 
the  Georgia  militia  in  observation  on  the  main  road  lead 
ing  into  town  from  the  south.1 

While  Howe  was  making  these  dispositions,  Campbell  capture  of 
had  reconnoitred  the  river  and  captured  some  citizens 
who  gave  him  quite  accurate  information  in  regard  to 
the  situation  at  Savannah  and  the  small  force  opposed 
to  him.  He  decided  to  attack  without  waiting  for  a 
junction  with  Prevost.  Accordingly  the  ships  came 
over  the  bar,  sailed  up  the  river  with  a  flood  tide  and 
anchored  about  two  miles  below  the  city.  At  daybreak  Dec.  28 
the  debarkation  began,  and  the  first  troops  who  landed  Dec.  29 
climbed  the  bluff  (where  Fort  Jackson  was  afterward 
built)  and  were  received  by  a  smart  fire  from  the  com 
pany  of  the  Carolina  regiment,  in  which  3  Highlanders 
were  killed  and  5  wounded.  But  this  company  was 
completely  outnumbered  and  driven  back  and  the  de 
barkation  then  proceeded.  When  this  was  completed,  2 P.M. 
Campbell  moved  forward  to  within  1,000  yards  of  Howe's 
position;  he  then  made  a  feint  against  Howe's  left,  near 
the  river,  and  at  the  same  time  sent  his  light  infantry 
supported  by  one  of  the  New  York  tory  battalions  accom 
panied  by  a  negro  guide,  who  led  them  along  a  blind  path  3  p.  M. 
through  the  swamp  on  Howe's  right.  These  came  out 
of  the  swamp  on  the  main  Ogeechee  Road,  and  brush 
ing  aside  the  Georgia  militia  they  were  directly  in  rear 
of  Howe.  Simultaneously  Campbell  attacked  Howe  in 
front.  Completely  overpowered  by  such  superior  num 
bers,  Howe  and  the  two  Carolina  regiments  made  their 
escape  through  the  town  and  across  the  swamps  to  the 
west  of  it.  But  the  Georgia  troops,  who  were  on 

1  Dawson,  474;  Campbell's  Report,  Dawson,  478. 


192  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1778  Howe's  left,  were  less  fortunate  and  were  nearly  all 
captured. 

Campbell's  losses  were  only  7  killed  and  19  wounded; 
he  captured  38  officers  and  415  men,  besides  45  cannon, 
23  mortars  and  a  large  amount  of  ammunition  and  stores. 
He  states  that  83  Americans  were  found  dead  in  Savannah 
and  11  wounded;  a  considerable  number  were  drowned 
in  attempting  to  escape  through  the  swamps.1 

The  British  victory  was  complete.  Howe  was  tried 
by  court-martial,2  but  was  acquitted  and  served  under 
Washington  until  the  close  of  the  war.3 

Meanwhile  Prevost  was  marching  north  through  Geor 
gia.4  He  met  with  slight  resistance  at  Fort  Sunbury, 

1779  and  captured  the  place  and  its  garrison  of  200  men  with- 
jan.  6  out  difficulty.    Then  he  pressed  on  to  Savannah,  effected 
Jan.  19           his  junction  with  Campbell,  took  command  of  the  united 
conquest  of      forces  and  promptly  sent  Campbell  up  the  river  120  miles 

to  Augusta.    This  place  was  also  taken  without  serious 
Jan.  29  opposition,  the  Provincial  militia  retreating  as  Campbell 

approached.  Leaving  a  garrison  at  Augusta,  Campbell 
proceeded  to  establish  posts  at  various  places  in  western 
Georgia.5 

Within  six  weeks  from  the  time  Campbell  landed  at 
Savannah  the  conquest  of  Georgia  was  complete,  and  the 
royal  governor  was  requested  to  return  from  England 
and  resume  his  government.6 

1  Dawson,  Campbell's  Report,  477-479. 
3  Sparks,  V,  451. 

3  Ibid.,  VI,  299;  VII,  74-88,  94,  363,  382,  563;  VIII,  457. 

4  If  contemporary  accounts  are  to  be  relied  upon,  the  damage  to  private 
property  on  this  march,  and  the  one  which  soon  followed  it  from  Savannah 
to  Charleston,  was  even  greater  than  that  on  the  more  famous  march 
through  Georgia  eighty-six  years  later.     (See  Gordon,  III,  259,  261.) 

6  Stedman,  II,  106-108. 
8  Lossing,  II,  528. 


t        MS         Longitude     so:!0'     West  fruui 
20 


tinttle  of 
V* '-if'  Creek 
*}Mathew'a 
I  Bluff 

I 


Movements  of  American 
forces  are  shown  in  blue 
and  of  French  auxiliarie 
in  black  lines;  British  are 
shown  in  red. 

Operations  in  1778  and  1779  are 
designated  by  broken  lines. 

Operations  in  1780  in 
continuous  lines. 

Gen.  Gates 

Sir  Henry  Clinton  and 
Earl-Cornwallis 


Movements  of  partisans  and      — — 
of  small  bodies  of  troops  ._$  mg 

are  shown  in  fine  lines  AmtAema  'and  f 

Arrows  indicate  direction        **'"•  1G  *  Oct- 


£  Battles  and  skirmishes 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland.  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


SOUTH   CAROLINA 
1779-1780 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  193 

Lincoln,  however,  was  not  disposed  to  give  up  South        1779 
Carolina  without  a  struggle,  and  he  even  contemplated 
an  attempt  to  reconquer  Georgia.1    Additional  militia 
had  come  in  and  the  North  Carolina  regiments  were  be 
ginning  to  arrive.    With  these  and  the  troops  which  he 
had  found  at  Charleston  on  his  arrival,  he  made  up  a 
force  of  about  3,500  men,  of  whom  1,000  were  counted 
as   "regulars"  because  they  were  on  the  Continental 
establishment,  1,400  were  armed  militia  and  1,000  were 
unarmed,    undisciplined   and   untractable   men.     With  Defence  of 
this  force  he  marched  toward  Savannah,  but  it  fell  before  Carolina 
he  arrived,  and  picking  up  the  remnants  of  the  garrison 
which  had  escaped  with  Howe,  he  took  post  on  the  east  Jan.  3 
bank  of  the  river,  at  the  hamlet  of  Purysburg,  about  15 
miles  above  Savannah. 

Nearly  opposite  to  him,  at  the  hamlet  of  Ebenezer, 
was  Prevost,  whose  force  of  more  than  5,000  men,  the 
greater  part  of  them  British  regulars,  was  stationed  at 
various  points  along  the  river  from  Savannah  to  Augusta, 
with  some  outlying  posts  in  the  western  part  of  the 
State.2 

Notwithstanding   the   odds   against  him,  the  stout 
hearted  Lincoln  proceeded  with  his  plans,  not  only  to 
defend  South  Carolina  but  to  recapture  Georgia.    Some 
preliminary  skirmishes,  resulting  favorably  to  the  Ameri 
cans,  confirmed  his  intentions  in  this  respect.    At  Beau-  Action  at 
fort,  on  Port  Royal  Island,  a  force  of  four  companies  of 
regulars,  sent  by  sea  to  capture  that  island,  was  met  and  Feb.  3 
defeated  by  the  militia  which  Moultrie  brought  out  from 
Charleston  to  oppose  them.    Ten  days  later,  in  the  upper 

1  Lincoln  to  Washington,  Sparks,  Letters,  II,  245. 
2Lossing,  II,  552;  Gordon,  III,  229;  Marshall,  II,  296;  Dawson,  480; 
Life  of  Lincoln. 


194 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1779 

Engagement 
at  Kettle 
Creek 

Feb.  14 


Lincoln  Takes 
the  Offensive 


Feb.  27 


part  of  Georgia,  160  miles  from  the  sea-coast,  the  tory 
militia  under  Colonel  Boyd  had  a  collision  with  the  Pro 
vincial  militia  under  Colonel  Andrew  Pickens.  The 
locality  was  on  Kettle  Creek,  Wilkes  County,  beyond 
Augusta.  Boyd  was  severely  wounded,  more  than  40  of 
his  men  were  killed,  a  large  number  wounded,  75  were 
captured  and  the  rest  dispersed.  The  captives  were 
all  tried  for  treason  and  5  of  them  were  hanged.  Pickens 
lost  only  9  killed  and  23  wounded.1  The  tory  militia  of 
the  Carolinas  never  afterward  assembled  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  give  any  trouble. 

Encouraged  by  these  successes,  Lincoln,  whose  force 
had  increased  to  between  6,000  and  7,000  men  by  the 
arrival  of  North  Carolina  and  Virginia  troops  and  the 
gathering  of  militia,  now  felt  strong  enough  to  take  the 
offensive.  For  this  purpose  he  sent  Ashe  with  1,500 
men  up  the  east  bank  of  the  river  to  attack  Augusta.2 
Prevost  then  realized  that  his  force  was  too  much  scat 
tered;  he  drew  in  the  outlying  garrisons  in  the  upper 
part  of  the  State,  and  uniting  them  with  that  of  Augusta 
under  Campbell  marched  them  all  down  the  west  bank 
of  the  river,  intending  to  concentrate  his  entire  force  at 
Ebenezer.3  When  Lincoln  heard  of  this  he  ordered 
Ashe  to  follow  Campbell  down  the  west  bank;  and  Ashe 
did  so,  going  into  camp  in  the  angle  between  Briar  Creek 
and  the  river,  about  53  miles  above  Savannah. 

Then  Prevost  planned  and  carried  out  an  admirable 
counter-stroke.  He  sent  his  younger  brother,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Prevost,  with  portions  of  the  60th  and  71st 
Regiments,  some  light  infantry,  a  troop  of  cavalry  and 
some  Provincials — in  all  about  900  men — to  make  a 


1  Dawson,  481.  s  Ibid.,  487. 

3  Ibid.,  Lincoln's  Report,  492;  Prevost's  Report,  493. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  195 

detour  of  about  50  miles,  crossing  Briar  Creek  far  above        1779 
Ashe's  camp  and  coming  down  on  his  rear.    In  order  to 
divert  Ashe's  attention  from  the  real  movement  a  demon 
stration  was  made  against  his  front  by  one  battalion  of 
the  71st  Regiment. 

The  movement  was  carried  out  as  smoothly  as  at  an  Battle  of 
annual  manoeuvre.    Ashe  was  completely  surprised  and  March  3 
ignominiously  defeated.    Only  450  of  his  men  rejoined 
Lincoln's  army.    The  rest — more  than  two-thirds  of  the 
whole    force — were    lost.    About    150    were    killed    or 
wounded;   as  many  more  were  drowned  in  attempting 
to  cross  the  river;  27  officers  and  nearly  200  men  were 
taken  prisoners;   nearly  600  succeeded  in  escaping  and 
went  home.    Young  Prevost  lost  5  killed  and  11  wounded.1 

Ashe  was  tried  by  court-martial  and  severely  cen 
sured;  he  was  soon  after  taken  prisoner,  contracted 
small-pox  and  died.  He  was  a  patriot  of  the  highest 
character,  but  without  military  experience  or  instinct.2 

This  brilliant  action  of  the  British  destroyed  the  pos-  Lincoln  Ad- 
sibility  of  recovering  Georgia  at  that  time.    But  Lincoln,  Augusta0 
whose  courage  and  determination  were  perhaps  greater 
than  his  military  skill,  did  not  think  so.    He  determined 
to  cross  the  Savannah  River,  cut  off  the  enemy's  com 
munications  with  the  back  country  and  protect  the  leg 
islature  which  had  been  summoned  to  meet  at  Augusta.3 
Leaving  about  1,000  men  under  Moultrie  on  the  lower 
river,  at  Purysburg  and  the  Black  Swamp,  with  the  other 
4,000  men  of  his  command  he  marched  up  the  river,  APra23 
crossed  it  and  moved  on  toward  Augusta.3    In  so  doing 
he  uncovered  the  road  to  Charleston,  unless  Moultrie 
could  hold  Purysburg. 

1  Dawson,  489-491;  Lincoln's  Report,  493;  Prevost's  Report,  494. 

2  Dawson,  494.  3  Ibid.,  495,  496. 


196  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1779  As  soon  as  Prevost  detected  the  movement  he  advanced 

April  29  against  Purysburg,  intending  at  first  only  to  make  a 
demonstration  which  would  bring  Lincoln  back.  But 
as  Moultrie's  force  was  too  small  to  oppose  him,  and  as 
Prevost  met  less  resistance  than  he  had  anticipated,  he 
Ad-  pushed  on  to  Charleston,  driving  Moultrie  before  him. 
Expresses  had  been  sent  to  Lincoln  begging  him  to  re 
turn;  but  he  believed  that  Prevost 's  movement  was  only 
a  feint  and  he  was  not  to  be  deterred  from  his  intention 
of  going  to  Augusta. 

May  10  Finally,  Prevost  crossed  the  Ashley  River  and  appeared 

before  Charleston.  The  situation  there  was  desperate, 
but  the  people  were  energetic;  the  fortifications  had  all 
been  on  the  side  toward  the  sea,  but  during  Prevost 's 
advance  lines  were  laid  out  on  the  land  side,  between  the 
Ashley  and  Cooper  Rivers,  and  their  construction  vigor 
ously  pushed;  the  slaves  were  armed;  the  entire  able- 
bodied  population  turned  out  as  militia.  Fortunately, 
Feb.  2  Pulaski's  Legion,1  which  had  been  ordered  by  Congress 

from  New  Jersey  to  the  South,  had  just  completed  its  sixty 
May  11  days7  march,  and  arrived  at  the  same  time  as  Prevost.2 

May  12  The  next  day  Prevost  summoned  the  town  to  surren 

der,  and  some  rather  discreditable  proposals  were  put  f or- 

1  Pulaski  was  a  Polish  revolutionist  who  had  been  obliged  to  flee  from 
his  own  country  in  1771,  and  after  serving  in  the  Turkish  army  had  come 
to  America  in  1777.  Congress  made  him  a  brigadier-general,  and  he 
served  at  the  Brandywine  and  Germantown.  By  resolution  of  March  28, 
1778,  Congress  authorized  him  to  raise  and  command  "an  independent 
corps  of  68  horse  and  200  foot,  the  horse  to  be  armed  with  lances  and  the 
foot  to  be  equipped  as  light  infantry."  It  was  called  "Pulaski's  Legion," 
and  was  independent  of  and  additional  to  the  regular  military  establish 
ment  planned  by  Steuben  and  adopted  by  Congress,  May  27,  1778.  Con 
gress  considered  this  legion  as  under  its  special  orders,  and  by  frequent 
resolutions  ordered  it  from  one  point  to  another.  (Jour.  Cont  Cong.,  X, 
291;  XII,  983;  XIII,  132.) 

3  Dawson,  496-498. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  197 

ward  by  the  defenders  that  South  Carolina  should  remain        1779 
neutral  during  the  rest  of  the  war  and  its  status  be  de-  Charleston 
termined  by  the  treaty  of  peace  when  made;  Prevost  sender0 
rejected  this  and  demanded  an  unconditional  surrender. 
This  was  refused,  and  the  town  prepared  to  receive  an 
assault.1 

Prevost,  however,  did  not  assault.  Lincoln  was  al 
ready  marching  to  the  relief  of  Charleston;  he  had  per 
sisted  in  his  intention  of  going  to  Augusta,  but  the  news 
he  received  there  from  Charleston  convinced  him  that 
Prevost  intended  something  more  serious  than  a  feint, 
and  he  was  now  hurrying  back  with  all  possible  speed. 
Prevost  intercepted  a  letter  from  Lincoln  to  Moultrie 
telling  of  his  approach,  and  he  also  knew  of  Pulaski's 
arrival ;  his  force  was  less  than  3,000  men,  far  inferior  to 
that  of  Lincoln;  the  defenders'  trenches  were  strong,  and 
could  not  be  carried  without  heavy  loss. 

Prevost    therefore    determined    to    withdraw    from  Prevost  with- 
Charleston.2    As  Lincoln  was  advancing  by  the  road  cS 
from  Savannah,  Prevost  was  forced  to  retire  by  the 
islands  which,  with  numerous  marshes  and  inlets,  form 
the  sea-coast  from  Charleston  to  Savannah.     He  had 
abundant  shipping  to  facilitate  such  a  movement.    He 
therefore  crossed  the  Ashley  River  during  the  night,  May  is 
marched  over  to  Stono  Inlet,  crossed  that  and  estab 
lished  himself  on  John's  Island.    To  protect  his  position 
and  permit  him  to  withdraw  gradually  and  without 
molestation  to  Savannah,  a  bridge-head  was  constructed 
on  the  main-land  at  Stono  Ferry.    It  consisted  of  three 
strong  redoubts,  with  heavy  abatis  in  front;  and  in  its 
rear  was  a  bridge  of  boats  to  John's  Island. 

Cordon,  III,  257;  Lossing,  11,554;  Marshall,  1, 299;  Stedman,!!,  112. 
'Dawson,  498,  499;  Stedman,  II,  112-115. 


198 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1779  The  troops  were  gradually  sent  back  through  the  Sea 

Islands  to  Savannah,  until  finally  only  the  rear  guard  re 
mained  at  Stono  Ferry.  It  consisted  of  one  battalion  of 
the  71st  Highlanders,  the  Hessian  regiment  Von  Trum- 
bach,  a  detachment  of  artillery  and  some  Carolina 
loyalists — in  all  about  900  men.  All  the  boats  but  one 
had  been  taken  away  in  connection  with  the  withdrawal 
of  the  other  troops  through  the  Sea  Islands,  and  this 
rear  guard  was  thus  in  a  somewhat  perilous  position. 

Lincoln  determined  to  attack  and  if  possible  capture  it. 
He  now  had  between  6,000  and  7,000  men  in  Charleston, 
but  he  only  brought  1,200  men  into  action.  His  plan 
was  to  send  Moultrie,  "with  all  the  troops  that  can  be 
spared  from  Charleston,"  to  make  a  demonstration  on 
James  Island  so  as  to  prevent  reinforcements  from  com 
ing  to  the  assistance  of  the  rear  guard,  and  if  circum 
stances  were  favorable  to  land  his  men  on  John's  Island 
and  cut  off  their  retreat.  The  real  movement  was  under 
Lincoln's  own  direction,  and  was  an  attack  on  the  main 
land  against  the  bridge-head.1 

Lincoln  crossed  the  Ashley  River  soon  after  midnight 
and  began  his  march  across  to  Stono  Ferry,  a  distance  of 
about  8  miles.  His  left  wing  consisted  of  the  South 
Carolina  Continentals  under  Huger;  his  right,  of  the 
Carolina  militia;  in  the  reserve  were  the  Virginia  militia; 
and  he  had  6  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  small  body  of 
cavalry.  He  had  to  advance  through  a  dense  growth 
of  pine  saplings  on  one  flank  and  "an  open  forest  of 
stately  pines"  on  the  other  flank;  and  it  was  difficult  to 
maintain  connection  between  them.  But  a  little  after 
7  A.  M.  sunrise  he  approached  the  redoubts.  The  Hessians  re 

treated;  but  2  companies  of  the  Highlanders  made 

1  Dawson,  499,  500;  Lowell,  241;   Lee's  Memoirs,  130,  131. 


June  20 


Battle  of 
Stono  Ferry 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  199 

such  a  stout  defence  that,  according  to    Stedman,  only        1773 
11  men  succeeded  in  making  their  retreat,  all  the  rest 
being  either  killed  or  wounded.1 

The  entire  British  force  was  then  brought  into  action, 
and  there  was  stiff  fighting  at  close  quarters,  and  some 
times  hand  to  hand  with  the  bayonet,  for  about  an  hour. 
Then  reinforcements  from  the  western  end  of  John's 
Island  came  in  sight.  It  was  to  prevent  this  that  Moul- 
trie  had  been  sent  by  way  of  James  Island;  but  through 
some  misunderstanding  there  was  delay  in  Moultrie's 
movements  and  he  did  not  arrive  in  time.2 

Lincoln  therefore  ordered  a  retreat,  and  he  moved 
back  to  Charleston  in  good  order.  The  British  followed 
him  a  short  distance  and  then  abandoned  the  pursuit. 
The  Americans  lost  146  killed  and  wounded  and  165 
missing.  The  British  loss  was  26  killed,  103  wounded 
and  1  missing.3 

Lincoln  did  not  again  molest  Prevost,  and  the  latter 
retired  slowly  from  island  to  island,  and  finally  reached 
Savannah.  An  outpost  was  left  at  Beaufort,  on  Port 
Royal  Island. 

The  sickly  season  and  intense  heat  put  a  stop  to  all 
military  operations  for  the  next  two  months.  During 
this  interval,  Governor  Rutledge,  Lincoln,  the  French 
consul  and  the  citizens  of  Charleston — all  wrote  letters 
to  d'Estaing,  begging  him  to  come  to  their  assistance. 
D'Estaing  had  promised  to  be  on  the  American  coast  in 
May,  but  he  stayed  in  the  West  Indies  to  capture  St. 
Vincent  and  Grenada.4  Then  he  sailed  for  Haiti,  and 
there  the  letters  from  Charleston  safely  reached  him.5 

Stedman,  II,  117.  2  Dawson,  500;  Prevost's  Report,  503. 

'Dawson,  500;  Prevost's  Report,  503. 

4  Ante,  p.  171.  5  Sparks,  VI,  359. 


200  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1779  He  decided  to  sail  for  Savannah.  His  arrival  was  so 
sept.  4  unexpected  that  off  the  mouth  of  the  river  he  captured 

a  British  ship  of  the  line,  a  frigate  and  two  supply 
ships.1  Prevost  promptly  called  in  his  outlying  detach 
ments,  at  Sunbury  and  Beaufort,  and  prepared  for  de 
fence;  and  Lincoln  with  equal  alacrity  marched  toward 
Savannah. 

D'Estaing  brought  with  him  6,000  soldiers  and  a 
squadron  of  37  ships  with  over  2,000  guns.2  Compared 
with  this  the  British  ships  on  the  Southern  coast  were  in 
significant.  Prevost  had  less  than  3,000  men.2  Lincoln 
had  about  1,000  Continentals,2  and  a  few  months  before 
he  had  gathered  together  nearly  5,000  militia.  Adding 
these  to  the  6,000  of  d'Estaing,  Prevost  was  outnumbered 
4  to  1.  With  good  leadership  and  prompt  action  there 
was  now  an  opportunity  to  capture  Prevost  's  entire  force; 
then  proceed  to  the  North,  fight  the  British  fleet,  which 
was  inferior  to  d'Estaing's,  unite  with  Washington  in  an 
attack  on  New  York  and  end  the  war.  But  these  proved 
to  be  idle  dreams;  for  the  leadership  was  poor  and  the 
action  was  slow. 

D'Estaing  had  sent  some  of  his  ships  in  advance  to 

Charleston  to  concert  plans  with  Lincoln;    when  his 

sept.  9  main  body  anchored  off  Tybee  Island;  small  vessels  were 

arriving  from  Charleston  to  aid  in  landing  his  troops,  and 

Lincoln  was  on  the  march  from  Charleston. 

It  was  decided  to  make  the  landing  through  Ossabaw 


Sound,  about  12  miles  south  of  Tybee  Island;  the  troops 
came  ashore  at  a  plantation  called  Beaulieu,  about  8 

sept.  12  miles  due  south  of  Savannah.  D'Estaing  landed  only 
3,500  men,  but  with  these  he  marched  to  Savannah  the 

sept,  is          next  day  and  demanded  a  "  surrender  to  the  arms  of 

1  Dawson,  563;  Stedman,  II,  122-123.  2  Keim,  255. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  201 

the  King  of  France."  *    Prevost  asked  for  twenty-four        1773 
hours  to  consider  it,  his  object  being  to  gain  time  till 
the  arrival  of  the  Beaufort  garrison;  he  then  declined 
to  surrender.    Some  skirmishing  took  place  during  the  sept.  ie 
next  three  days,  and  then  Lincoln  arrived,  having  crossed  Lincoln  joins 
the  river  several  miles  above  Savannah.    He  brought  savannah at 
with  him,  however,  only  600  Continentals  and  750  mili 
tia.2    His  militia  came  and  went  at  their  own  will,  and 
rendered  obedience — and  not  much  of  that — only  to  the 
State  officials.    On  four  days'  notice  it  was  probably  not 
possible  for  Lincoln  to  despatch  a  larger  force. 

Twelve  days  had  now  elapsed  since  d'Estaing's  fleet  Defence  of 
had  first  been  sighted,  and  during  that  time  Prevost  and 
his  engineers  and  other  officers  had  been  working  with 
tremendous  energy.2  The  4  men-of-war  had  retired  up 
the  river;  their  guns  and  sailors  were  being  landed  to 
take  positions  in  the  trenches;  2  of  the  ships  and  4 
transports  had  been  sunk  in  the  river,  blocking  the 
channel  below  the  town;  smaller  vessels  had  been  scuttled 
and  a  boom  stretched  across  the  river  above  the  town  to 
prevent  fire  rafts  from  coming  down;  gangs  of  4,000 
negroes  had  been  working  in  reliefs,  night  and  day,  under 
the  direction  of  the  soldiers,  in  throwing  up  redoubts  and 
trenches,  cutting  timber  and  building  abatis.3  The  line 
extended  from  the  swamp  on  the  west  of  the  town 
around  to  the  river  on  the  east.  It  was  about  1,100 
yards  long,  and  there  were  five  strong  redoubts  made  of 
soft  wood  and  earth  and  connected  by  trenches,  with 
traverses  at  suitable  intervals.  In  these  were  posted  the 
regulars  and  Provincials  which  Campbell  had  brought 

1  Dawson,  563;  Stedman,  II,  123-124. 
3  Ibid.,  564;  ibid.,  II,  125-133;  Lossing,  II,  530. 
8  Ibid.,  565;  ibid.,  II,  125-133;  Moultrie,  II,  33;  Gordon,  III,  328-332; 
Lee's  Memoirs,  55-60;  Lossing,  II,  528-531. 


202  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1779  from  New  York  and  Prevost  from  Florida.  Prevost 
states  their  numbers  at  only  2,360  effective,  but  it  is 
hard  to  reconcile  this  with  the  official  reports  of  six 
months  before  when  they  numbered  over  5,000,  and  in 
the  meantime  they  had  had  no  severe  losses.  Including 
the  sailors,  the  volunteers  from  the  transports  and  the 
negroes  whom  he  armed,  he  probably  had  in  the  trenches 
fully  4,000  men. 

siege  of  Moultrie  recorded  his  opinion  that  if  the  works  had 

been  assaulted  the  day  after  the  Americans  joined  the 
French  they  would  have  been  carried.  D'Estaing  and 
Lincoln  thought  differently,  and  decided  on  a  siege.1 
Artillery  had  to  be  landed  from  the  ships  and  brought  up 
from  Beaulieu  with  insufficient  transportation.  A  week 

sept.  23          went  by  before  ground  was  broken  for  the  approaches 
and  ten  days  more  before  the  artillery  opened  fire. 

In  the  meantime  Prevost  had  made  two  small  sorties 
which  were  repulsed.  This  was  of  small  consequence.  The 
important  thing  was  that  he  had  gained  in  all  eighteen 
more  days  for  his  negroes  to  work  on  the  trenches  and  his 
sailors  to  mount  their  guns.  When  the  allies  made  their 
junction  he  had  only  12  guns  in  place;  when  their  artil 
lery  was  ready  he  had  mounted  76  guns — pieces  of  6,  9 
and  18  pounds. 

oct.  4  Finally  the  cannonade  opened  and  continued  almost 

Oct.  9  without  interruption  for  five  days.    Some  houses  were 

damaged  and  a  few  persons  injured  in  the  town;  but  no 
harm  was  done  to  the  trenches  or  their  defenders. 

D'Estaing  then  became  anxious.  He  was  impatient 
to  send  some  of  his  ships  back  to  the  West  Indies  and 
the  rest  to  France.  He  had  already  been  five  weeks  on 
the  American  coast.  His  engineers  told  him  that  it 

1  Prevost's  Report,  Dawson,  566. 


r*> 

•  Main  Guard  Houses     \  *-. 

naonn 
aaaaa 

nDDQD 

annan 


//     American 
//       Br|tl8h 

I  French 


Ameri* 
British 

A.  Wilkin's  Battery,  10  Guns 

B.  Gibb's  Battery,  9  Guns 

.  Ferguson's  Battery,  5  Gune 
Old  Magazine,  6  Guns 

E.  Citadel,  66  Guns 

F.  Where  garrison  laid  down 


G.  Gadsden's  Wharf,  7  Guns 
H.  Old  Indian  Wharf,  5  Guns 

.  Governor's  Bridge,  3  Gu 

.  4  Guns 
K.  Dan-ell's,  7  Guns 

e  doubts 
Vessels  behind  Boom 
L' A  venture,  24  Guns 
Boston,  32  Guns 
LePolaque,  16  Guns 
Range  r,  20  Guns 
Providence,  32  Guns 
Five  Galleys 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  A  very 's  History  of  the  United  States  and  Its  People 


SAVANNAH,  Oct.  9,  1779 
CHARLESTON,  April  lo-May  12,  1780 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  203 

would  take  ten  days  more  to  complete  the  sap  which  was        1779 
about  300  yards  from  British  trenches  just  south  of  the 
town.    He  would  not  wait.    It  was  either  raise  the  siege 
or  make  an  assault.1    He  decided  on  the  latter. 

The  allied  camp  was  about  1,200  yards  south  of  the  The  Allies 
British  lines;  the  French  on  the  right,  the  Americans  on  British Lines 
the  left.  The  plan  of  assault  was  to  send  Huger  with  the 
South  Carolina  militia  to  make  a  demonstration  against 
the  works  on  the  east  or  left  of  the  British  line;  while 
the  main  attack  was  to  be  made  on  the  opposite  flank, 
in  two  columns.  One  of  these,  under  Count  Dillon,  was 
to  make  its  way  along  the  base  of  the  bluff  and  on  the 
edge  of  the  swamp,  where  it  would  be  protected  from 
British  fire,  and  when  near  the  river  it  was  to  climb  the 
bluff  and  attack  the  Sailor's  Battery,  which  formed  the 
extreme  right  of  the  British  lines.1  The  other  column 
was  to  be  led  by  d'Estaing  and  Lincoln  and  was  to  at 
tack  the  Spring  Hill  redoubt,  at  the  south-west  angle  of 
the  lines,  where  the  road  from  Augusta  rose  to  the  bluff 
from  the  causeway  across  the  swamp.  There  were  3,500 
French  and  850  Americans  in  the  two  columns.  The 
troops  were  to  move  at  4  o'clock  in  the  morning  so  as  to 
make  the  assault  at  dawn. 

There  was  delay,  however,  in  getting  started,  and  it  Oct.  9 
was  broad  daylight  when  Dillon,  who  had  lost  his  way  in 
the  swamp,  was  discovered.  He  was  not  near  enough 
to  the  bluff  to  be  sheltered  from  fire,  and  after  losing 
heavily  he  retreated  to  camp  without  having  reached  the 
enemy's  lines  at  all. 

The  other  column  made  a  fierce  attack  and  was  warmly 
received.    That  portion  of  the  lines  was  commanded  by 

1  Dawson,  565;  Stedman,  II,  125-133;  Moultrie,  II,  33;   Gordon,  III, 
328-332;  Lee's  Memoirs,  55-60;  Lossing,  II,  528-531. 


204  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1779  Lieutenant-Colonel  Maitland,  the  competent  officer  who 
had  so  successfully  defended  the  bridge-head  at  Stono 
Ferry  four  months  before.  A  Charleston  sergeant  who 
had  deserted  the  day  before  had  told  him  of  the  prepara 
tions  for  the  assault,  and  while  Maitland's  force  (one 
battalion  of  71st  Regiment,  one  battalion  of  60th  and  a 
company  of  marines)  was  far  inferior  in  numbers  to  the 
assailants,  he  was  ready  to  make  a  vigorous  defence. 

The  attack  was  made  with  the  greatest  gallantry.  Al 
though  the  column  was  exposed  to  the  direct  fire  of  the 
Spring  Hill  redoubt  and  to  the  cross-fire  of  the  works  on 
either  side  of  it,  yet  the  men  pressed  on  until  the  colors 
of  France  and  Carolina  were  planted  on  the  parapet.  A 
desperate  hand-to-hand  encounter  continued  for  fifty- 
five  minutes.  D'Estaing  was  twice  wounded,  although 
not  severely.  Pulaski  was  horribly  mangled,  receiving 
wounds  from  which  he  died  in  a  few  days.  The  troops 
that  did  not  reach  the  parapet  were  crowded  in  the  ditch 
and  on  the  glacis;  and  the  Highlanders  came  out  of 
their  trenches  on  the  left  of  the  redoubt  and  mowed 
down  the  assailants  with  a  terrible  enfilade  fire.  Three 
standard-bearers  of  the  Carolina  colors,  two  lieutenants 
and  a  sergeant  were  killed  in  succession  on  top  of  the 
parapet. 
Repulse  of  BU£  the  British  did  not  yield  an  inch.  They  had 

the  Allies  J  f  » 

driven  back  Huger  when  he  made  his  demonstration  on 
the  opposite  flank,  and  they  now  began  to  bring  reinforce 
ments  from  that  flank  to  support  Maitland.  The  losses 
of  the  French  and  Americans  were  so  heavy  that  they 
were  finally  forced  to  yield,  and  they  retreated  to  their 
camps. 

The  British  loss  was  40  killed,  63  wounded  and  52 
missing.    The  allies  lost  16  officers  and  228  men  killed 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  205 

and  63  officers  and  521  men  wounded,  a  total  of  837  —  1779 
nearly  six  times  as  many  as  the  defenders.1  It  was  the 
severest  fighting  since  Bunker  Hill  —  a  fierce  assault  and 
a  splendid  defence.  The  loss  of  officers,  particularly  the 
Americans,  shows  how  gallantly  they  led  their  men,  and 
seems  to  justify  Moultrie's  opinion  that  if  the  assault  had 
been  made  when  the  allies  made  their  junction  three  weeks 
before,  and  when  the  British  works  were  only  partially 
completed,  it  would  have  succeeded. 

The  assault  having  been  tried,  and  having  failed,  Lin 
coln  was  for  continuing  the  siege;  but  d'Estaing  would 


not  hear  of  it.    He  raised  the  siege  at  once  and  returned  The 

to  his  ships.    Sending  some  of  these  to  the  West  Indies,  siege6 

with  the  others  he  sailed  for  France2  —  on  the  same  day  Oct.  20 
that  Washington  wrote  to  Lafayette:  "We  have  been  in 


hourly  expectation,  for  the  last  fifteen  days,  of  seeing  Frlnce°r 
Count  d'Estaing  off  Sandy  Hook."3  Henry  Lee  and  Du 
Portail  and  Hamilton  were  on  the  Jersey  coast  watching 
for  d'Estaing's  arrival  in  order  that  they  might  deliver 
the  letters  which  Washington  had  addressed  to  him  in 
regard  to  joint  operations  after  his  arrival.4  But  he  did 
not  come  their  way. 

When  d'Estaing  left  Savannah  Lincoln  was,  of  course, 
forced  to  march  back  to  Charleston. 

D'Estaing  mismanaged  affairs  at  Savannah  as  badly 
as  he  had  at  Newport  in  the  previous  year.  The  feeling 
against  him  was  very  bitter.  The  South  was  terribly 
disheartened;  and  the  militia,  which  had  been  gathering 
in  large  numbers  at  Charleston,  went  home.  The  British 
were  correspondingly  elated. 

1  Dawson,  565;  Stedman,  II,  125-133;  Moultrie,  II,  33;  Gordon,  III, 
32&-S32;  Lee's  Memoirs,  55-60;  Lossing,  II,  528-531. 
'  Dawson,  569.  '  Sparks,  VI,  383.  4  Ante,  p.  171. 


206  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1779  When  Clinton    heard   of  d'Estaing's  arrival  on  the 
Oct.  25  Southern  coast  he  recalled  to  New  York  the  6,000  men 
Clinton's  EX-  who  had  so  long  been  doing  nothing  at  Newport;  and  as 
the  so°uth0  soon  as  news  arrived  of  d'Estaing's  defeat  and  departure 

for  France,  he  determined  to  leave  Knyphausen  in  com 
mand  at  New  York,  while  he  himself  went  to  the  South, 
taking  Cornwallis  with  him  as  second  in  command,  to 
try  a  second  time  to  capture  Charleston,  believing  that  if 
successful  he  could  complete  the  conquest  of  the  South 
and  restore  the  entire  section  to  the  British  crown.  He 
also  planned  to  operate  on  an  entirely  different  line  from 
that  which  he  adopted  in  1776.  Having  now  a  base  at 
Savannah,  that  was  his  destination;  and  from  there  he 
intended  to  move  along  the  islands,  following  in  an  op 
posite  direction  the  route  of  Campbell  in  the  summer  of 
1779,  and  attack  Charleston  from  the  rear  with  his  army, 
while  the  fleet  assailed  it  in  front.1 

His  expedition  was  of  no  small  proportions — 90  trans 
ports  and  supply  ships,  carrying  8  British  and  5  Hessian 
regiments,  besides  Provincials  and  artillery  and  cavalry, 
in  all  about  8,500  men.  They  were  convoyed  by  a  fleet 
under  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  consisting  of  5  ships  of  the 
line  and  9  frigates,  with  650  guns  and  crews  numbering 
probably  5,000  men.2 
Dec.  26  The .  ships  sailed  at  a  bad  season,  and  off  Hatteras 

1780  encountered  the  winter  gales;  so  that  it  was  more  than 
Jan.  so  thirty  days  before  the  ships  began  arriving  at  Tybee 

Island.  They  had  been  scattered  and  dispersed  on  the 
voyage;  an  ordnance  ship  had  foundered;  a  ship  con 
taining  Hessians  was  driven  across  the  ocean  to  be 
beached  on  the  Cornwall  coast  of  England';  most  of  the 

1  Sparks,  VI,  486;  Lee's  Memoirs,  62-75;  Dawson,  570;  Tarleton,  4,  35. 
3  Dawson,  570,  571. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  207 

artillery  and  cavalry  horses  perished;  the  stores,  of  which        ITSO 
there  was  a  plentiful  supply,  were  damaged.1 

After  making  a  few  of  the  most  urgent  repairs  the  fleet  ciinton  Lands 
sailed  up  to  North  Edisto  Inlet  and  the  troops  were  tonar< 
landed  on  John's  Island  about  30  miles  south  of  Charles-  Feb.  n 
ton.    Within  a  few  days  advance  guards  had  crossed 
John's  Island,  and  seized  Stono  Ferry,  James  Island, 
Wappoo  Cut  and  the  west  bank  of  the  Ashley  River  op 
posite  Charleston.    Lincoln  at  that  time  had  only  1,400 
Continentals  and  1,000  militia.    Clinton  had  more  than 
8,000  regulars.    Had  he  acted  with  the  same  celerity 
which  Campbell  displayed  at  Savannah  the  year  before, 
he  could  have  captured  Charleston  and  its  small  garrison, 
conquered  the  whole  of  South  Carolina  and  then  marched 
northward  to  the  Chesapeake.    But  whereas  Campbell 
captured  Savannah  in  six  days  from  the  time  his  ships 
arrived  off  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah  River,  Clinton 
did  not  cross  the  Ashley  River  and  begin  serious  opera-  March  29 
tions  against  Charleston  until  seven  weeks  after  he  was 
ashore. 

In  the  meantime  he  had  brought  1,200  men  from 
Savannah  and  had  sent  about  half  of  his  transports 
back  to  New  York  for  reinforcements;  and  the  lighter 
ships  of  Arbuthnot's  squadron  had  crossed  the  bar  and 
anchored  in  Five  Fathom  Hole,  to  the  south  of  Fort 
Moultrie.1 

Lincoln  had  been  doing  whatever  was  possible  with  preparation 
his  slender  resources.    The  lines  across  the  peninsula, 
from  the  Cooper  to  the  Ashley  Rivers,  were  completed 
and  strengthened.    Washington  had  already  sent  all  the 

1  Dawson,  570-578;  Lee,  62-75;  Tarleton,  1-84;  Stedman,  II,  176-195; 
Lowell,  244-247,  301;  Eelking,  176-184.  The  reports  of  Clinton  and 
Arbuthnot,  the  articles  of  capitulation  and  other  official  documents  are 
given  in  full  in  Tarleton. 


208  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1779  North  Carolina  and  Virginia  Continentals  which  he  had 
NOV.  23  in  his  army;1  and  these  arrived  while  Clinton  was  mak- 
oec.  10  ing  his  preparations  to  cross  the  Ashley  River,  or  during 

1780  the  siege.     The  American  squadron  under  Commodore 
Feb.  20  Whipple — 9  vessels  and  248  guns — were  at  first  disposed 

to  contest  the  entrance  of  Arbuthnot's  ships  into  the 
harbor  f  but  it  was  not  deemed  strong  enough  for  that 

Apra?  purpose,  and  it  was  therefore  withdrawn  to  the  city; 

some  of  the  guns  were  carried  ashore  and  placed  in  the 
trenches,  and  4  of  the  frigates  and  several  merchant- 
ships  were  sunk  in  the  two  channels  on  either  side  of 
Shute's  Folly  (where  Castle  Pinckney  was  afterward 
built)  at  the  mouth  of  the  Cooper  River.  Their  masts 
were  connected  by  boom  and  chains,  and  chevaux-de-f rise 
were  placed  on  their  decks.  The  passage  into  the  Cooper 
River  was  thus  effectually  blocked;  and  behind  the  bar 
rier  was  the  rest  of  the  squadron^-5  vessels  and  124  guns.2 
Lincoln  was  thus  enabled  to  preserve  his  communications 
with  the  main-land  and  keep  open  a  route  for  the  rein 
forcements  which  were  expected,  or  for  a  retreat,  if  that 
should  be  decided  upon. 

Finally,  Clinton  had  completed  his  preparations,  crossed 
the  Ashley  River  in  force  and  opened  his  first  parallel 

March  29        at  1,800  yards  from  Lincoln's  works.    A  few  days  later 

APHIS  Arbuthnot,  with  7  frigates  and  216  guns,  ran  by  Fort 

Moultrie,  with  a  loss  of  27  men,  and  anchored  between 
James  Island  and  the  city.1 

April  10  Clinton  and  Arbuthnot  united  in  a  demand  for  sur 

render,  and  Lincoln  sent  back  a  brief  but  spirited  refusal. 
The  siege  then  began  in  earnest.3    Clinton  had  lost  60 

1  Sparks,  VI,  415.  2  See  foot-note,  p.  207. 

8  The  most  complete  account  of  the  siege  of  Charleston  is  that  given  in 
Moultrie's  Memoirs  of  the  American  Revolution,  II,  65-106,  and  Tarleton, 
1-84. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  209 

days  in  getting  ready,  and  Lincoln  had  not  been  idle. 
Charleston  was  now  surrounded  by  a  series  of  redoubts  siege  of 
and  trenches,  forming  an  irregular  triangle  whose  three 
sides  had  a  total  length  of  nearly  five  miles.  On  the 
water  sides  were  9  batteries  with  60  guns.1  On  the  land 
side  there  was  a  large  hornwork  astride  the  main  road, 
"the  Citadel,"  with  66  guns;  in  front  of  this  a  strong 
line  of  trenches,  extending  from  river  to  river,  and  with  a 
redoubt  at  each  flank  like  a  bastion,  giving  a  flanking  fire 
in  front  of  the  trenches;  in  front  of  this  again,  a  wet  ditch 
or  canal,  with  a  dam  to  retain  the  water  at  low  tide;  and 
in  front  of  the  canal  a  line  of  abatis  and  trous-de-loup. 

The  siege  was  carried  on  according  to  the  scientific 
rules  of  the  day,  under  the  able  direction  of  the  chief 
engineer,  Colonel  Moncrieff,  who  had  gained  great  repu 
tation  at  the  defence  of  Savannah.  There  were  first, 
second  and  third  parallels;  saps,  double  saps  and  flying 
saps;  and  a  sortie,  in  which  15  of  the  enemy  were  killed 
and  12  taken  prisoners.  Finally,  on  the  twenty-eighth  Mays 
day,  the  counterscarp  had  been  gained,  the  canal  had 
been  drained  and  the  besiegers  were  ready  to  crown  the 
scarp.  Then  Clinton  sent  a  second  summons  to  sur 
render.  Lincoln  replied,  proposing  impossible  terms  in 
order  to  gain  time. 

He  was  now  nearly  surrounded,  and  his  communica-  Charleston 
tions  with  the  North  were  practically  severed.  These 
communications  had  been  maintained  through  a  post  at 
Monck's  Corners,  30  miles  north  of  Charleston,  which 
was  occupied  by  a  detachment  of  Continental  cavalry 
and  some  militia  under  Huger.  Against  this  Clinton 
sent  about  1,400  men;  and  a  portion  of  this  force  under 
Tarleton  surprised  Huger  and  dispersed  his  command, 

1  See  foot-note,  p.  207. 


210 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


14 


May  6 


April  18 


April  24 


Surrender  of 
Fort  Moultrie 


May  7 

Surrender  of 
Charleston 


May  12 


of  which  they  captured  about  100  officers  and  men  and 
400  horses  —  the  latter  being  very  useful  in  replacing  the 
horses  of  "Tarleton's  Legion"  which  had  been  injured 
and  thrown  overboard  on  the  rough  voyage  from  New 
York.  Tarleton  then  pressed  north,  and  at  the  crossing 
of  the  Santee  River  he  defeated  the  mounted  militia 
which  was  gathering  at  that  point,  inflicting  on  them  a 
loss  of  41  killed  and  wounded  and  67  taken  prisoners.1 

Lord  Rawdon,2  meanwhile,  had  arrived  from  New  York 
with  a  reinforcement  of  2,500  men,  and  had  been  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  all  the  force  operating  on  the 
east  of  the  Cooper  River;  he  soon  captured  the  works  at 
HaddrelPs  Point,  and  Arbuthnot  then  landed  sailors  and 
marines  to  assault  Fort  Moultrie  from  the  land  side 
while  he  bombarded  it  with  his  ships  from  the  water  side. 
When  these  preparations  were  completed  the  fort  was  sur 
rounded,  and  it  surrendered  with  its  garrison  of  291  men. 

Lincoln  was  thus  completely  surrounded  by  a  force 
which  (including  the  reinforcements  from  New  York  and 
Savannah  and  the  sailors  who  had  been  landed  to  man 
the  siege-guns)  numbered  about  14,000  men.  Further 
resistance  was  hopeless,  and  he  signed  the  articles  of 
capitulation  which  Clinton  offered.  The  return  of  pris 
oners,  signed  by  John  Andre,  deputy  adjutant-general, 
numbers  7  generals,  290  other  officers,  5,169  rank  and 
file,  including  Continentals,  militia  and  armed  citizens  — 
5,466  in  all.  The  return  of  captured  ordnance  shows 
391  guns  of  different  calibres,  5,316  muskets,  15  regimental 
colors,  33,346  rounds  of  small-arms  ammunition,  8,394 
round  shot,  376  barrels  of  powder  —  besides  grape  and 
case  shot,  cartridges,  etc.,  by  the  thousand. 

1  See  foot-note,  p.  207. 

8  Afterward  Earl  of  Moira  and  Governor-General  of  India. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  211 

Lincoln's  losses  during  the  siege  were  92  killed  and  146        ITSO 
wounded;    those    of  Clinton    were  76   killed    and  179 
wounded.1 

It  was  the  greatest  disaster  sustained  by  the  American 
army  during  the  war — or,  in  fact,  at  any  time;  for  on  no 
other  occasion  (except  at  Harper's  Ferry)  have  5,000  men 
of  the  United  States  laid  down  their  arms  to  an  enemy.2 

Lincoln  was  sent  North  on  parole  and  immediately 
asked  for  a  court  of  inquiry.1  But  it  was  never  held. 
Washington  was  at  first  disposed  to  think  that  Lincoln 
should  have  retreated  North  as  soon  as  the  Arbuthnot 
ships  crossed  the  bar;  but  when  he  learned  all  the  cir 
cumstances  he  held  Lincoln  blameless.1  The  latter  was  NOV.  7 
soon  exchanged,  resumed  his  military  duties  under 
Washington's  direction,  rendered  excellent  service  for  a 
year  and  was  then  appointed  to  the  newly  created  office 
of  secretary  of  war,3  filling  that  office  until  after  the  Oct.  so 
treaty  of  peace  had  been  signed.  In  fact,  serious  as  was 
the  disaster,  there  is  but  little  ground  for  criticism  of 
Lincoln  and  much  for  commendation.  The  idea  of  re- 
treating  was  fully  discussed  in  two  councils;  at  the  second  APru  21 
of  these,  a  large  number  of  citizens  broke  in  and  declared  April  20 
that  "if  he  attempted  to  withdraw  the  troops  and  leave 
the  citizens,  they  would  cut  up  his  boats  and  open  the 
gates  to  the  enemy."  The  greater  part  of  his  force  was 
militia  and  armed  citizens;  his  Continentals  were  from  the 
Southern  States,  and  disposed  to  render  allegiance  to 
State  rather  than  Continental  authority.4  The  command- 

1  See  foot-note,  p.  207. 

2  The  surrender  of  11,000  men  under  General  White,  near  Harper's  Ferry, 
on  Sept.  15, 1862  was,  in  view  of  the  magnitude  of  the  struggle  then  in  progress, 
comparatively  unimportant. 

3  Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  471,  683;  Sparks,  VII,  102. 

4  Moultrie's  Memoirs,  II,  97. 


212 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1780 


ing  general  was  the  only  Northern  man  in  the  army. 
If  he  had  ordered  a  retreat  his  orders  would  not  have 
been  obeyed,  and  there  would  have  been  dissension  on 
the  part  of  the  civil  authorities  which  would  have  prob 
ably  carried  the  State  back  to  its  British  allegiance.  The 
prudent  course  of  Lincoln  preserved  its  adhesion  to  the 
United  States. 

On  strictly  military  grounds  a  retreat  was  out  of  the 
question.  Clinton  had  12,500  soldiers  well  equipped 
in  every  particular.  Had  Lincoln  crossed  the  Cooper 
River  with  his  2,000  ill-equipped  Continentals  and  at 
tempted  the  long  march — without  adequate  transporta 
tion — to  join  Washington  in  New  Jersey,  he  would  prob 
ably  have  been  overwhelmed  and  destroyed  before  he 
reached  the  Santee.  In  place  of  that  he  made  a  sturdy 
defence — remarkably  so,  in  view  of  the  slender  resources 
at  his  disposal — and  in  so  doing  he  delayed  the  conquest 
of  South  Carolina  for  at  least  two  months. 


Action  at  the 
May  29  ' 


Junes 


Having  taken  Charleston,  Clinton  sent  out  detachments 
to  occupy  various  points  in  the  interior  of  the  State.  One 
of  them  under  Tarleton,  a  most  energetic  cavalry  leader, 
overtook,  near  the  North  Carolina  boundary,  the  3d 
Virginia  Regiment,  about  300  men  under  Colonel  Buford. 
which  was  marching  from  Virginia  to  Charleston.  The 
engagement  was  short  but  destructive,  the  Americans 
losing  113  killed,  150  wounded  and  53  prisoners;  while 
Tarleton's  losses  were  only  9  killed  and  12  wounded.1 

Believing  that  the  State  was  now  fully  conquered, 
Clinton  returned  to  New  York,  taking  with  him  about 
one-third  of  his  troops,2  and  leaving  with  Cornwallis, 


1  Dawson,  582-585;  Tarleton,  30;  Stedman,  II,  193. 
3  Ante,  p.  164;  Sparks,  V,  544. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  213 

who  hereafter  commanded  in  the  South,  6  British,  1        ITSO 
Hessian,  and  6  Provincial  regiments  —  in  all  8,345  men.  Return  of, 
The  main  body  was  at  Charleston,  but  there  were  strong 
detachments  at  Savannah  and  Augusta  in  Georgia;  and 
there  was  a  chain  of  posts  in  South  Carolina,  from  Ninety-  Disposition  of 
Six  on  the  West,  through  Rocky  Mount,  Camden  and  After3  tner°c 
Cheraw,  to  Georgetown  on  the  coast.1    The  intense  heat 
precluded  active  operations,  and  it  was  Cornwallis's  in 
tention  to  rest  his  troops  during  the  summer,  and  as  soon 
as  the  crops  were  gathered,  and  he  could  have  the  aid  of 
the  tory  militia,  to  march  northward  and  conquer  North 
Carolina  and  Virginia.2 

Active  operations  had  now  been  in  progress  in  the 
South  continuously  (except  as  interrupted  by  the  summer 
heat)  for  about  eighteen  months.  Savannah  and  Charles 
ton,  the  two  principal  cities,  had  been  captured;  Georgia 
and  South  Carolina  had  been  conquered  and  were  every 
where  under  British  control;  the  authority  of  the  United 
States  was  not  recognized  nor  were  there  any  Continental 
soldiers  —  except  prisoners  of  war  —  in  any  part  of  either 
State.  Large  numbers  of  the  citizens  had  returned  to  the 
British  allegiance;  a  greater  number,  however,  adhered 
to  the  United  States.  Each  side  furnished  its  militia 
and  they  fought  each  other  furiously;  in  one  rough-and- 


tumble  encounter  with  clubbed  muskets,  about  400  men  Hanging  Rock, 
on  a  side,  more  than  one-third  of  the  combatants  were 
killed  and  wounded;  in  another  of  a  similar  character, 
with  about  800  men  on  each  side,  the  tory  losses  were 
fully  fifty  per  cent,  those  of  the  Americans  not  being  re 
corded.3  In  a  smart  skirmish  between  75  men  under 


Colonel  Bratton,  one  of  Sumter's  partisan  chiefs,  and  a  s.ac..ajuiy'i2 

1Dawson,  592;  Tarleton,  87;  Stedman,  195;  Lee,  78. 

'Tarleton,  86.  s  Dawson,  592-596,  601-603,  608-611. 


214 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1780 


Rocky  Mount, 
S.  C.,  July  30 


Green  Spring, 
S.  C.,  Aug.  1 


Hanging  Rock, 
Aug.  12 


April  3 


De  Kalb 
Marches  to 
the  South 

April  16 
May3 
June  6 
June  20 


scouting  party  from  "Tarleton's  Legion"  with  some  of 
the  tory  militia — 115  men  in  all — the  latter  was  surprised 
and  destroyed,  only  12  men  escaping.  Soon  after,  Sum- 
ter  himself,  with  600  men,  assaulted  a  British  fortified 
post  but  was  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  13  men,  the  de 
fenders  (New  York  volunteers)  losing  12.  Two  days 
later,  at  a  point  about  60  miles  distant,  in  the  north-west 
corner  of  South  Carolina,  Colonel  Clarke,  of  Georgia,  with 
196  men,  met  and  defeated  Captain  Dunlap,  who  was 
scouting  with  a  detachment  of  210  men — dragoons  and 
mounted  riflemen.  The  losses  on  each  side  were  about 
15  per  cent.  A  week  after  that,  Sumter,  with  800  men, 
again  attacked  a  British  stockaded  post  just  north  of 
Camden.  He  was  again  unsuccessful  and  was  forced  to 
retreat,  but  only  after  a  severe  fight  lasting  nearly  four 
hours,  in  which  he  had  inflicted  on  the  enemy  a  loss  of 
about  130  men.1 

These  partisan  encounters  were  soon  succeeded  by 
events  of  a  more  serious  character.  Four  months  pre 
viously  Washington  had  ordered  the  Continental  line  of 
Maryland  and  Delaware  with  a  regiment  of  artillery  and 
12  guns  to  proceed  to  Charleston.  Baron  de  Kalb,  who 
had  come  from  France  with  Lafayette,  was  assigned  to 
the  command.2  The  force  numbered  2,000  men,  and  the 
transfer  of  such  a  body  for  a  distance  of  nearly  800  miles 
was  a  serious  matter.  The  troops  started  from  Morris- 
town  and  marched  to  Head  of  Elk,  where  the  infantry 
embarked  on  boats  and  proceeded  through  Chesapeake 
Bay  and  James  River  to  Petersburg,  where  it  was  joined 
by  the  artillery  which  had  gone  overland.  Here  De  Kalb 
learned  of  the  surrender  of  Charleston.  He  continued  his 
march,  however,  and  crossing  the  border  of  North  Carolina 


Dawson,  604-605. 


3  Sparks,  VII,  7,  15. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  215 

finally  came  into  the  theatre  of  operations  and  encamped        ITSO 
on  Deep  River,  about  50  miles  north  of  the  British  post  July  6 
of  Cheraw.    He  had  called  on  the  governors  of  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina  for  reinforcements  of  militia  and  for 
supplies  of  all  kinds  and  transportation.    But  he  received 
almost  nothing;  and,  in  fact,  the  States  had  little  or 
nothing  to  give.    More  than  once  on  their  march  the 
troops  were  in  danger  of  starvation.1 

The  news  of  the  fall  of  Charleston  had  reached  Wash-  June  i 
ington,  through  his  secret  service  in  New  York,2  earlier  Gates  AP- 
than  it  did  De  Kalb,  and  he  had  at  once  informed  Con-  command  the 
gress.    That  body,  without  consulting  Washington,  ap-  Army?" 
pointed  Gates  to  command  the  Southern  army.3     Six 
weeks  later  Gates  arrived  at  De  Kalb's  camp  and  took  juiy25 
command. 

De  Kalb  was  an  experienced  soldier,  and  he  had  care 
fully  studied  the  situation  and  formed  a  definite,  careful 
plan  of  operations.  It  was  submitted  to  Gates,  with  the 
approval  of  all  the  senior  officers.4  But  Gates  declined 
to  consider  it  and  forthwith  issued  an  order  for  the  Juiy26 
army  to  march  immediately  against  Camden,  the  prin 
cipal  British  post.  This  march  of  about  120  miles  was 
accomplished  in  about  two  weeks,  and  in  the  course  of  it 
Gates  was  joined  by  1,200  North  Carolina  militia  under 
Caswell  and  by  a  few  small  detachments  from  the  North.5 

His  movements  were  not  unknown  to  Rawdon,  who 
commanded  at  Camden.  He  called  in  his  outlying  de 
tachments,  reported  the  facts  to  Cornwallis  and  urged 

1  Kapp's  Kalb,  195-199.  » Sparks,  VII,  69. 

8  Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  465. 

4  Kapp's  Kalb,  206-209;  narrative  of  Williams,  Johnson,  I,  486. 

8Dawson,  612-619;  Tarleton,  102-153;  Stedman,  204-218;  Lee,  94- 
103;  Kapp's  Kalb,  220-238.  The  official  reports  are  given  at  length  in 
Tarleton. 


216  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

him  to  come  in  person  with  reinforcements  from  Charles- 
Aug.  is  ton.  Cornwallis  did  so,  and  arrived  at  Camden  three 
days  before  the  battle.1 

The  situation  was  then  as  follows :  Gates  was  at  Ruge- 
ly's  Mills,  13  miles  north  of  Camden,  with  a  force  which 
he  imagined  numbered  7,000  men,  but  in  reality,  as  his 
adjutant-general  informed  him  on  the  following  morning, 
numbered  3,052  present  fit  for  duty.  They  consisted  of 
the  Continentals  of  Maryland  and  Delaware,  the  militia 
of  North  Carolina  and  Virginia,  8  pieces  of  artillery,  Ar- 
mand's  Legion  and  Porter-field's  Light  Infantry.  The 
militia  had  been  recently  assembled  and  had  never  been 
in  action  or  received  any  military  training.  There  were 
no  less  than  13  general  officers  present,  the  greater  part 
of  them  belonging  to  the  militia.  With  this  force  Gates 
intended  to  attack  the  British  post  at  Camden,  of  which 
he  had  no  adequate  knowledge,  either  by  reconnoissance 
or  otherwise.  He  seems  to  have  thought  that  he  could 
repeat  the  brilliant  capture  of  Stony  Point,  and  his  order 
for  a  night  march  was  in  some  degree  copied  from  Wayne's 
famous  order.  In  the  afternoon  before  the  march  he 
issued  to  his  men  a  full  ration  of  corn-meal  and  fresh 
meat,  and,  having  no  rum,  he  distributed  (from  the  hos 
pital  stores  just  arrived  from  Virginia)  a  gill  of  molasses 
per  man.2  The  food  was  hastily  and  badly  cooked,  and, 
washed  down  with  molasses,  it  was  more  powerful  than 
a  compound  cathartic.  The  men  were  in  great  distress 
during  the  night  march  and  when  the  battle  began  were 
in  an  enfeebled,  weak  condition.3 

Opposed  to  Gates,  the  force  under  Cornwallis  should 
have  numbered  about  4,000;  but  the  intense  heat  of 

1  See  foot-note  5,  p.  215.  2  See  foot-note  5,  p.  215. 

3  Narrative  of  Colonel  Otho  Williams,  Johnson,  I,  494. 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  217 

summer  had  produced  a  good  deal  of  sickness;  more  than  ITSO 
800  were  in  the  hospital,  and,  including  the  reinforcements 
which  Cornwallis  brought  from  Charleston,  the  morning 
report  showed  only  122  officers  and  2,117  men  fit  for 
duty.  About  half  the  force  was  well-seasoned  regulars, 
23d,  33d  and  71st  Regiments;  there  were  two  tory  regi 
ments  raised  in  New  York,  the  Volunteers  of  Ireland 
and  the  British  Legion,  who  were  almost  as  good  as 
regulars,  and  two  regiments  of  Carolina  militia.  Corn 
wallis  (like  Gates)  believed  that  the  American  army 
numbered  7,000  men.  Nevertheless,  he  determined  to 
attack  them,  relying  upon  the  superior  discipline  and 
greater  experience  of  his  troops.1 

Both  armies,  therefore,  moved  out  at  10  o'clock  at  night,  Aug.  15 
each  intending  to  surprise  the  other.  About  2  o'clock  in  Aug.  ie 
the  morning  the  advance  guards  came  in  contact  at  a 
point  9  miles  north  of  Camden,  where  the  road  after 
crossing  Saunder's  Creek  passes  through  an  open  forest  of 
pines  about  a  mile  wide,  flanked  on  each  side  by  an  im 
passable  marsh.  Armand's  Legion,  at  the  first  fire,  was 
thrown  back  on  the  main  body  in  some  confusion.  But 
Cornwallis  did  not  pursue,  as  he  did  not  wish  to  risk  the 
uncertainties  and  accidents  of  a  night  engagement.  He 
leisurely  deployed  his  force,  the  light  infantry,  23d  and 
63d  Regiments  on  the  right,  Irish  Volunteers,  Legion 
and  North  Carolina  Regiment  on  the  left,  71st  in  re 
serve  and  Tarleton's  cavalry  in  the  rear;  and  when  the 
deployment  was  completed  he  waited  for  daylight. 
Gates  also  deployed  in  similar  manner,  2d  Maryland 
and  Delaware  on  the  right,  North  Carolina  and  Virginia 
militia  on  the  left  and  1st  Maryland  in  reserve.  The 
distance  between  the  lines  was  about  200  yards.1 

JSee  foot-note  5,  p.  215. 


218  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

ITSO  At  daylight  Cornwallis  began  the  action  by  a  vigorous 

Aug.  i6  attack  from  his  right.1  The  British  regulars  struck  the 
Battle  of  Carolina  and  Virginia  militia;  the  latter,  in  their  weak 
ened  condition,  due  to  the  improper  diet  which  Gates 
had  prescribed,  without  any  experience  of  battle  and 
commanded  by  untrained  officers,  threw  away  their  arms 
and  fled.1  Armand's  foreign  legion  went  with  them,  and 
they  broke  through  the  left  flank  of  the  1st  Mary 
land,  throwing  that  brigade  into  confusion,  and,  sweeping 
Gates  with  them,  carried  him  off  the  field  so  that  he  was 
not  again  heard  from  for  several  days.  But  the  Mary- 
landers  restored  order  in  their  ranks,  made  a  partial 
change  of  front  to  the  left,  arrested  the  British  advance 
and,  on  the  right,  under  the  gallant  leadership  of  De  Kalb, 
took  the  offensive.  Rawdon's  Irishmen  made  a  stout 
defence,  and  there  was  fierce  fighting  in  the  woods  for 
nearly  an  hour.  Then  De  Kajb  fell,  mortally  wounded; 
the  23d  and  33d  Regiments  turned  the  left  flank  of 
the  Maryland  brigades;  and  Cornwallis,  perceiving  that 
there  was  no  cavalry  opposed  to  him  (Armand  hav 
ing  fled),  sent  Tarleton  with  the  cavalry  of  his  legion 
still  farther  around  their  flank  and  in  their  rear.  The 
whole  line  then  gave  way,  and  the  retreat  was  soon 
a  rout.1 

The  American  force  was  destroyed.  It  lost  all  its 
artillery,  all  its  baggage,  all  its  supplies  and  nearly  all 
its  muskets  and  ammunition.1  The  militia  scattered  in 
every  direction  and  in  small  groups  worked  their  way 
home;  the  Delaware  regiment  was  almost  annihilated; 
the  remnants  of  the  6  Maryland  regiments,  about  700 
men  in  all,  came  together  at  Hillsborough  about  ten  days 
after  the  battle.1  Gates  covered  the  60  miles  to  Char- 

1  See  foot-note  5,  p.  215. 


Cainden  and 
Vicinity. 

0183  MILES 
SCALE 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 

Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 

From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 

and  Its  People 


Sin  all  \ 
1st  Maryland/ 


Gist 
2  Md.  Del. 


JfN* 


->".(',  v<>] 
BvyHiiogMf 


Corn 


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^ff        23rd       LUnfy. 
Webster 


I 


FIRST 
POSITION 


cnti 


Line 


—  <T  <  i 


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»t  SECOND 

POSITION":: 


CAMDEN 
Aug.  16,  1780 


CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH  219 

lotte  on  the  day  of  the  battle,  and  in  the  next  48  hours        ITS? 
another  100  miles  to  Hillsborough.  night  of 

Cornwallis  lost  68  killed,  245  wounded  and  11  missing.1 
Gates's  army  was  thus  destroyed;  but  Sumter  and  his  AUS.  is 
partisans  were  still  intact  a  few  miles  away.    On  the  day  Aug.  is 
before  the  battle  Gates  had  sent  him  a  reinforcement  of 
400  men,  and  on  the  day  of  the  battle  Sumter  had  inter 
cepted  and  captured  a  considerable  amount  of  supplies  Aug.  15 
and  their  escort  which  were  coming  up  from  Charleston 
and  had  nearly  reached  Camden.1    Hearing  of  Gates 's 
defeat,  Sumter  began  his  retreat  northward  to  his  home 
country  in  the  Catawba  settlements.    Tarleton   went  Action  at 
after  him  in  hot  pursuit,  surprised  him  in  his  camp  and  Aug!nilCr< 
destroyed  him.    Sumter  himself  escaped  without  hat, 
coat  or  boots;  of  his  men,  150  were  killed  or  wounded, 
300  taken  prisoners  and  the  rest  dispersed.    The  prison 
ers  and  supplies  which  Sumter  had  taken  two  days  before 
were  recaptured.    Tarleton's  loss  was  only  6  killed  and 
9  wounded.1 

1  Dawson,  623. 


CHAPTER  VII 
BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH 

1780  THE  conquest  of  the  South  seemed  now  to  be  complete. 

Greene  AP-      The  only  armed  force  of  the  Americans  south  of  New 

pointed  to 

command  the  Jersey  was  the  remnants  of  Gates's  army,  about  700  in 
Army  number,  which  were  assembling  at  Hillsborough,  in  the 

northern  part  of  North  Carolina.  Nevertheless,  Con 
gress  did  not  despair.  As  usual  when  disasters  came 
thickly  it  turned  to  Washington.  Having  itself  chosen 
the  three  commanders,  Howe,  Lincoln  and  Gates,  under 
whom  Savannah  and  Charleston,  Georgia  and  the  two 
Carolinas  had  been  lost,  it  now  called  upon  Washington 
to  select  a  commander  for  the  Southern  army.1  Wash 
ington  selected  Greene,2  who,  in  the  language  of  John 
Fiske,  "in  every  campaign  since  the  beginning  of  the  war 
had  been  Washington's  right  arm;  and  for  indefatigable 
industry,  for  strength  and  breadth  of  intelligence,  and 
for  unselfish  devotion  to  the  public  service,  he  was  scarcely 
inferior  to  the  commander-in-chief ." 3 

Oct.  22  Greene  received  his  orders4  and  letters  from  Washing 

ton  while  in  command  at  West  Point  after  Arnold's 
treason,  and  in  accordance  with  his  instructions  pro 
ceeded  immediately  to  Philadelphia  for  conference  with 
Congress.  Steuben  was  sent  with  him,5  to  be  second  in 

1  Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  534.  3  Sparks,  VII,  257. 

3  Fiske,  American  Revolution,  II,  250.  *  Sparks,  VII,  271,  272. 

6  Fiske,  II,  251. 

220 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  221 

command,  and  to  be  president  of  the  court  which  Greene 
was  ordered  to  convene  to  inquire  into  Gates's  conduct. 

Congress  approved  and  ratified  Washington's  selection  Oct.  so 
and  adopted  resolutions  conferring  upon  Greene  extraor 
dinary  powers.  His  army  was  to  consist  of  all  the  Con-  Oct.  3 
tinental  regiments  raised  or  to  be  raised  from  Delaware  Oct.  21 
to  Georgia,  inclusive  (the  number  of  such  regiments 
having  been  fixed  by  previous  resolutions  at  24,  with  an 
authorized  strength  of  36  officers  and  681  men  each);  he 
was  to  organize  and  employ  his  army  as  he  should  judge 
most  proper,  subject  to  the  control  of  the  commander- 
in-chief,  whose  control  at  a  distance  of  800  miles,  with 
no  railroads  or  telegraph,  was  merely  nominal;  he  was  to 
have  all  the  powers  heretofore  conferred  upon  Gates  in 
regard  to  appointments  and  promotions,  and  in  addition 
was  to  have  the  power1  of  making  exchanges  of  prisoners, 
which  hitherto  had  been  conferred  only  upon  Washington; 
the  legislatures  and  governors  of  the  six  States  above 
named  were  "earnestly  recommended"  to  "afford  every 
assistance  and  support,  in  men,  clothing,  money,  arms, 
intrenching  tools,  provisions  and  other  aids  and  supplies"; 
and  the  heads  of  the  several  staff  departments  were 
"directed  to  furnish"  on  his  order  "such  articles  as,  upon 
inquiry,  he  shall  find  cannot  be  obtained  in  the  Southern 
Department." 2  In  short,  every  power  that  Congress 
could  put  on  paper  was  given  to  him.  He  was  to  carry 
on  the  Revolution  in  the  distant  South  and  regain  the 
conquered  States. 

Had  Congress  been  in  position  to  make  good  its  reso 
lutions,  Greene's  task  would  have  been  an  easy  one. 
But  the  24  regiments  of  the  Southern  States,  from  Dela 
ware  to  Georgia,  with  an  authorized  strength  of  17,000 

1  Jour.  Cong.,  Ill,  538,  540,  541.  '  Ibid.,  Ill,  541. 


222  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

ITSO  men,  had  no  existence,  except  in  the  remnants  of  Gates's 
army  at  Hillsborough.  That  of  Georgia  had  never  been 
raised;  those  of  the  two  Carolinas  and  most  of  those  of 
Virginia  had  been  captured  at  Charleston. 

Greene  undertook  the  task  in  a  hopeful  if  not  confident 
spirit.1  He  left  an  agent  at  Philadelphia  to  see  that  sup 
plies  were  sent  to  him  in  case  Congress  had  any;  and  on 
his  way  south  he  left  Steuben  in  Virginia  to  organize  all 
the  troops  that  Governor  Jefferson  would  call  out,  both 
Continental  and  militia,  and  forward  them  to  the  South. 
Several  of  the  best  officers  in  the  army  made  applica 
tions  to  go  with  him — Steuben,2  Lafayette,3  Henry  Lee3 
(father  of  Robert  E.  Lee)  and  John  Laurens.3  Wash 
ington  had  different  plans  for  Lafayette,  but  the  others 
were  sent.4  On  his  arrival  at  the  South,  Greene  soon 
gained  the  loyal  and  hearty  support  of  the  famous 
partisan  leaders — Morgan,  Marion,  Sumter,  Pickens  and 
William  Washington. 

Dec.  4  When  Greene  took  command  at  Charlotte,  the  paper 

strength  of  his  "army"  was  2,307,  of  whom  1,482  were 

Greene  present,  and  not  quite  800  were  equipped  and  fit  for  duty.5 

command        He  succeeded,  with  Steuben 's  efficient  help,  in  increasing 

this,  within  three  months,  to  4,441  present  for  duty,  of 

whom  1,651  were  Continentals,  although  most  of  them 

were  new  levies  who  had  never  been  in  battle.6    It  never 

again  reached  that  number.    This  was  the  force,  aided 

by  the  partisans  of  Sumter  and  others,  which  varied  in 

1 G.  W.  Greene,  III,  35;  letter  to  Congress. 
3  Kapp,  Steuben;  Sparks,  VII,  316,  361,  404. 

3  Sparks,  VII,  316;  Sparks,  Letters,  III,  140. 

4  Laurens  on  arriving  at  Philadelphia  was  selected  for  the  special  mission 
to  France  (ante,  p.  178),  but  he  joined  Greene  as  soon  as  he  returned. 

6  Greene  to  Lafayette,  G.  W.  Greene,  III,  70;    Gordon,  IV,  27. 
6  G.  W.  Greene,  III,  190;  Gordon,  IV,  54. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  223 

numbers  at  various  times,  from  nothing  to  perhaps  a 
maximum  of  2,000,  with  which  Greene  reconquered  the 
South.  The  returns  in  the  British  Record  Office  show 
that  in  1781  and  1782  the  British  force  in  the  Caro- 
linas  and  Georgia  varied  from  a  minimum  of  8,141  to  a 
maximum  of  10,859  * — effective,  fit  for  duty,  exclusive 
of  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers.  About  three- 
fourths  of  them  were  regulars,  British  and  Hessians,  and 
the  rest  were  tory  regiments  from  New  York  and  New 
Jersey,  which  had  seen  four  years'  service,  and  were  fully 
as  well  organized  as  and  infinitely  better  equipped  and 
supplied  than  the  few  Continentals  in  the  Southern 
army. 

In  the  interval  between  the  battle  of  Camden  and  the  Aug.  ic 
date  when  Greene  assumed  command,  Cornwallis  had  Dec- 4 
not  been  idle.    He  had  marched,  unopposed,  into  North  Sept- 8 
Carolina  as  far  as  Charlotte;  and  Clinton  had  sent  3,000  ^^ 22 
men  under  Leslie  from  New  York  to  the  Chesapeake,2  Oct- 16 
there  to  act  under  Cornwallis's  orders  and  either  effect  a 
junction  with  him  as  he  marched  north,  or  to  create  a 
diversion  in  his  favor  and  prevent  the  sending  of  reinforce 
ments  to  the  South.    These  plans  miscarried;  for,  soon  cimton sends 
after  Cornwallis  reached  Charlotte  and  before  Leslie  had  to  the  south 
sailed  from  New  York,  a  force  of  backwoodsmen,  between 
900  and  1,500  strong,  who  lived  in  the  mountains  from 
Virginia  to  Georgia,  suddenly  appeared  almost  as  if  they 
had  sprung  out  of  the  ground,  and  surrounded  a  party 
of  regulars  and  tory  militia,  about  1,100  in  number,  on 
King's  Mountain.    This  force  was  commanded  by  Major 
Ferguson,  of  the  71st  Regiment,  a  gallant  and  skilful 
officer.    He  had  been  posted  in  the  foot-hills  of  the  Alle-  Battle  of 
ghanies,  on  Cornwallis's  left  flank,  about  thirty  miles  from  Mountain 

1  Sparks,  V,  542.  2Tarleton,  170,  199;    Sparks,  VII,  269. 


224  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

ITSO  Charlotte.  He  was  to  keep  down  the  patriot  militia  in 
that  neighborhood.  Hearing  of  the  approach  of  Colonel 
Williams  and  the  others,  he  took  a  defensive  position  on 
the  top  of  King's  Mountain,  a  wooded  hill  just  north  of 
the  boundary  between  North  and  South  Carolina.  Here 
he  was  surrounded  by  the  mountaineers  about  4  o'clock 

Oct.  ?  on  an  autumn  afternoon.  The  battle  was  not  very 

scientific,  but  it  was  effective.  Dismounting  from  their 
horses,  these  frontiersmen  climbed  the  hill  on  all  sides, 
using  their  hunting  rifles  with  great  effect.  Ferguson 
made  a  gallant  defence.  Three  times  he  beat  them  back, 
using  the  bayonet.  After  an  hour  of  hard  fighting  Fer 
guson  was  killed  and  his  men  surrendered.  He  had  lost 
224  killed  and  163  wounded;  716  were  taken  prisoners. 
On  the  American  side  28  were  killed  (including  Williams) 
and  60  wounded.1  The  Americans  dispersed  almost  as 
quickly  as  they  had  gathered. 

Oct.  14  The  news  of  this  extraordinary  action  spread  fast  in 

all  directions;  it  brought  out  the  militia  of  North  Carolina 
and  the  new  levies  in  Virginia;  it  carried  discouragement 

Results  of  the   to  the  tones  in  both  Carolinas.    It  took  place  on  the  edge 

King's  of  Mechlenberg  County,  where  the  hostility  to  Great 

Britain  was  fierce,  and  whence  a  declaration  of  indepen 
dence  had  been  launched  a  full  year  before  that  of  Phila 
delphia.  Surrounded  by  such  a  hostile  population,  dis 
appointed  in  the  hopes  he  had  formed  that  North  Carolina 
would  rally  to  his  support  as  he  advanced  and  stunned 
by  the  blow  at  King's  Mountain,  where  121  of  his  regu 
lars  and  nearly  1,000  of  his  militia  had  been  destroyed, 
Cornwallis  not  only  halted  his  invasion  but  retreated, 
in  some  haste,  to  South  Carolina.  He  marched  back  90 
miles,  and  took  station  at  Winnsboro,  between  Camden 

,  628-632;  Tarleton,  164,  192-196. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  225 

and  Ninety-Six.    Here  he  fell  ill  of  a  fever  which  incapac- 
itated  him  for  several  weeks.    During  this  time  Rawdon  Oct.  24 
was  in  command,  and  he  received  a  letter  from  Clinton 
advising  him  that  Leslie  had  sailed  for  the  Chesapeake 
and  was  to  act  under  Cornwallis's  orders.    Rawdon  at  Leslie  sent  to 
once  wrote  to  Leslie1  requesting  him  to  come  by  water  to  comwaiiis 
the  Cape  Fear  River  in  North  Carolina.    Leslie  was  de 
layed  by  gales  and  did  not  reach  the  Cape  Fear  River  in 
less  than  six  weeks.     On  arriving  there  he  found  instruc-  Dec.  14 
tions  from  Cornwallis  to  come  to  Charleston,  where  he        ITSI 
arrived  safely,  and  thence  marched  to  Camden.2    He  Jan.  4 
brought  with  him  2,500  men — a. brigade  of  the  Guards, 
the  regiment  of  Bose,  the  Hessian  Yagers  and  some 
Provincials.    This  carried  Cornwallis's  strength,  accord 
ing  to  Clinton,  to  11,306  effective,3  exclusive  of  officers. 
The  number  of  posts  which  he  felt  obliged  to  occupy 
made  it  impossible  to  take  more  than  4,000  men  when  he 
resumed  his  march  into  North  Carolina. 
Until  Leslie  arrived  at  Camden,  nearly  three  months  Action  at 

_._.  __  _.  ,..  .  Fish  Dam 

after  King's  Mountain,  Cornwallis  remained  idle  at  Ford, 
Winnsboro.  The  partisan  troops,  however,  were  inces 
santly  on  the  move — Sumter  in  the  Catawba  district 
and  Marion,  "the  Swamp  Fox,"  on  the  lower  Pedee.  The 
latter  penetrated  to  within  a  few  miles  of  Georgetown 
but  was  driven  back  into  the  swamps.  Sumter  was  at 
tacked,4  at  a  point  on  the  Broad  River  about  25  miles 
north-west  of  Winnsboro,  but  held  his  own.  Then  the 
ever  restless  Tarleton  was  recalled  from  his  pursuit  of 
Marion  in  the  low  country  and  sent  to  destroy  Sumter.  Action  at 

.  Blackstocks 

Tarleton  was  worsted,  losing  more  than  100  men;  the  NOV.  20 

1  Sparks,  VII,  347.  2  Tarleton,  184,  243. 

3  Clin ton-Corn wallis,  I,  282. 

4Dawson,  633;  Lee,  112;  Tarleton,  173,  200. 


226  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

success,  however,  was  counterbalanced  by  the  fact  that 
Sumter  was  wounded  1  and  was  not  able  to  take  the 
field  again  for  several  weeks. 

While  Cornwallis  was  at  Winnsboro  waiting  for  Leslie, 
Greene  had  taken  the  offensive.  He  was  so  inferior  in 
numbers  to  Cornwallis  that  battle  was  out  of  the  question 
until  he  could  raise  and  equip  a  larger  force;  his  only 
plan  now  was  to  carry  on  a  partisan  warfare,  threatening 
CornwalhVs  flanks,  breaking  up  his  communications  and 
Dec.  16  intercepting  his  supplies.2  In  pursuance  of  this  plan  he 
divided  his  force,  small  as  it  was,  and  sent  Morgan  with 
about  600  men — Maryland  line,  Virginia  militia  and  the 
remnants  of  the  1st  and  3d  Dragoons  under  William 
Washington — to  cross  the  Catawba,  join  Sumter  and  other 
partisans  and  move  South,  threatening  Ninety-Six  and 
Augusta.3  The  rest  of  his  force,  about  1,100  in  number 
under  Huger,  was  sent  to  the  Pedee  and  took  position  at 
Cheraw,  where  Rawdon  had  maintained  a  post  prior  to 
the  battle  of  Camden.  In  this  position  they  supported 
Marion,  threatened  Camden  and  were  nearer  to  Charles 
ton  than  Cornwallis  was  at  Winnsboro.  Greene  accom 
panied  Huger 's  column. 

It  was  a  risky  movement,  for  the  two  detachments 
were  140  miles  apart,  with  Cornwallis  between  them, 
and  a  good  chance  for  him  to  beat  them  in  detail.  If 
Cornwallis  attempted  this  Greene  expected  by  a  rapid 
retreat  to  unite  the  two  detachments  in  North  Caro 
lina,4  and  he  sent  his  chief  engineer,  Kosciusko,  and  his 
quartermaster,  Carrington,  back  to  reconnoitre  the  fords 

1  Dawson,  63^-637;  Lee,  114;  Tarleton,  173-180. 

2  G.  W.  Greene,  III,  130;  Greene  to  Washington,  Sparks,  Letters,  III, 
189,  214,  217,  225. 

3  Johnson,  I,  346. 

4  Greene  to  Varnum,  Johnson,  I,  350. 


81°         Longitude     8Q030'W«»t  from   80°     (jreenwioh 


Scale  of  Statute  Miles        > .  '  >.    _  


Movements  of  Americans  are  shown 


in  Blue,  and  of  British  in  Red  lines,' 
arrows  indicating  direction. 

Greene  before  Cornwullis:  > 

Greene's  return  to  South  Carolina:  --- 

Earl  Cornwall  is: 

Lord  Rawdon:    ~ 

Movements  of  Partisans  and  of 
smaller  bodies  of  troops  are 
sel—  shown  in  fine  lines. 

X  Battles  or  Skirmishes. 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


CAMPAIGN  OF   1781 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  227 

on  the  various  rivers,1  collect  boats  and  obtain  wagons        mo 
for  transporting  them  from  one  river  to  the  next.    While 
at  Cheraw,  Lee's  Legion  arrived  from  the  North  and 
was  sent  to  join  Marion  and  make  another  demonstration 
against  Georgetown. 

Meanwhile,  Clinton,  at   New   York,  was  supporting       i?8i 
Cornwallis  by  every  means  in  his  power,  in  the  hope  of  Jan.  12 
making  a  complete  job  at  the  South.    As  soon  as  he 
heard  that  Leslie  had  been  ordered  from  the  Chesapeake 
to  Charleston,  he  sent  another  expedition  to  the  Chesa 
peake2 — 1,600  men  under  Benedict  Arnold,  now  a  briga 
dier  in  the  British  service.    Arnold  arrived  at  Hampton       ITSO 
Roads,  went  up  the  river  to  Jamestown,  marched  800  Arnold  sent 

men  to  Richmond  and  burned  the  town.    His  inst rue- 
Dec.  30 
tions  were  to  cut  Greene's  communications  and  destroy 

his  supplies  at  Petersburg;  but  Steuben  rallied  the  Vir-  7 

Ju,n.  o 

ginia  militia  and  Arnold  retreated  down  the  James  River  Jan  7 
to  Portsmouth  and  waited  for  reinforcements  from  New  Jan  19 
York.    This  movement  into  Virginia  led  Washington  to 
send  Lafayette  thither  with  1,200  men.3    The  entire  en-  Feb.  20 
ergies  of  both  sides  were  thus  concentrated  on  the  South. 
The  successive  reinforcements  of  the  British  were  all 
placed  under  Cornwallis's  orders,  and  those  of  the  Amer 
icans  under  Greene;  but  the  distance  was  so  great  and 
the  means  of  communication  so  slow  that  the  Virginia 
campaign  was  carried  on  by  the  local  commanders  inde 
pendent  of  their  nominal  chiefs. 

To  return  to  Cornwallis :  the  audacity  of  Greene's  move 
ments — dividing  his  inferior  force — had  the  desired  effect. 
It  led  Cornwallis  to  scatter  his  forces.  Had  Cornwallis 

1  The  military  importance  of  these  rivers,  which  played  so  important  a 
part  in  Sherman's  campaign  in  1865  as  well  as  in  Greene's  campaign  of 
1781,  is  evident  from  a  glance  at  the  map. 

2  Sparks,  VII,  348.  3  Ibid.,  VII,  417-423. 


228  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

quickly  concentrated  and  attacked  first  one  and  then 
the  other  of  Greene's  detachments,  he  might  have  de 
stroyed  both.  Instead  of  this  he  sent  Tarleton  to  attack 
Morgan;  directed  Leslie  to  march  to  Camden  to  protect 
that  post  against  a  possible  attack  by  Huger;  and  kept 
his  main  body  at  Winnsboro,  which  was  70  miles  from 
Tarleton  on  the  one  side  and  separated  by  a  deep  river 
(Wateree)  from  Leslie  on  the  other  side.  Instead  of  his 
beating  Greene  in  detail,  Greene's  right  wing  under  Mor 
gan  destroyed  Cornwallis's  detachment  under  Tarleton. 
i78i  Tarleton  crossed  the  Broad  River,  and  moving  rapidly 

Jan.  2  up  its  western  branches  he  came  in  contact  with  Morgan 

Jan.  lo  at  the  Cowpens — an  enclosure  for  cattle  just  south  of  the 

line  between  North  and  South  Carolina  and  about  20 
miles  west  of  King's  Mountain.  Morgan  had  about  1,000 
men,  the  force  with  which  he  left  Charlotte  having  been 
increased  by  about  400  militia.  Tarleton's  command 
numbered  about  1,000  men — British  Legion  and  parts  of 
the  7th,  16th  and  71st  Infantry  and  17th  Dragoons.1  He 
reconnoitred  Morgan's  position  and  found  that  he  was 
posted  in  an  open  wood,  his  flanks  unprotected  and  the 
Broad  River  at  his  back.  Tarleton  was  of  opinion  that 
the  position  was  very  advantageous  for  him  and  disad 
vantageous  for  Morgan.  He  anticipated  an  easy  victory. 
Morgan,  however,  thoroughly  understood  the  troops 
under  his  orders,  and  as  a  commander  of  light  troops 
he  was  unexcelled — perhaps  unrivalled.  He  posted  his 
force  in  three  lines:  in  front,  150  expert  riflemen;  then 
about  315  militia,  many  of  whom  had  served  in  the  Con 
tinental  line;  in  rear  of  these,  on  a  slight  eminence,  the 
Maryland  regulars  who  had  survived  Camden,  and  more 
militia,  about  430  in  all;  behind  this  eminence  the  cav- 

1  Tarleton,  250;    Johnson,  307. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  229 

airy,  125  strong,  under  William  Washington.  The  men 
had  slept  well,  had  eaten  a  good  breakfast  and  were  in 
fine  spirits.  Morgan  had  harangued  them  in  satisfactory 
fashion,  and  had  instructed  them  to  reserve  their  fire 
until  the  enemy  was  within  50  yards,  then  to  take  careful 
aim  at  those  who  wore  epaulets,  and  while  continuing 
their  fire  to  retire  to  the  second  line  of  militia,  which  was 
under  command  of  Pickens.  After  firing  two  rounds, 
carefully  aimed,  Pickens's  line  was  to  retire  to  the  left 
of  the  regulars.  All  these  orders  were  carried  out  with 
remarkable  exactness. 

Tarleton  began  his  march  during  the  night  and  made  Jan.  17, 
such  slow  progress  that  five  hours  elapsed  before  he  came 
in  sight  of  the  first  line  of  the  militia.  He  then  deployed;  8  A' M' 
light  infantry  and  legion  infantry  to  the  right,  7th  In 
fantry  to  the  left  with  the  71st  in  reserve  behind  its  left 
flank,  legion  cavalry  in  the  second  line  and  a  troop  of 
dragoons  on  each  flank.  In  this  order  they  advanced,  Battle  of  the 
without  firing.  At  50  yards  the  militia  delivered  their 
fire  with  murderous  accuracy  and  fell  back  as  ordered; 
the  British  returned  the  fire  and  continued  their  advance, 
the  71st  being  brought  into  line  on  the  left  of  the  7th. 
An  attempt  was  made  by  the  dragoons  on  the  right  to 
turn  Morgan's  left  flank,  but  William  Washington  with  his 
cavalry  came  out  from  behind  the  eminence  where  he 
had  been  under  cover  and  drove  them  back.  The  British 
continued  to  advance,  and  soon  came  on  the  main  line — 
the  Marylanders.  These  received  them  with  very  delib 
erate  fire,  delivered  kneeling,  and  aimed  low.  The  71st 
outflanked  the  American  right,  and  to  meet  this  an  order 
was  given  to  the  companies  on  the  right  to  change  front. 
This  was  not  well  executed,  and  the  whole  line  began  to 
retreat.  Tarleton  thought  the  day  was  won  and  sent 


230  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  orders  to  the  legion  cavalry  to  come  up  on  the  left  and 
charge.  Before  this  could  be  done  Morgan  gave  an  order, 
"Face  about  and  fire  once  more."  This  was  performed 
with  great  coolness,  and  simultaneously  the  militia  which 
had  retreated  as  ordered  at  the  beginning  was  just  fin 
ishing  a  complete  circle  of  the  whole  battle-ground  and 
coming  up  on  the  American  right.  The  British  were 
staggered  at  first  and  then  ran.  They  were  experienced 
troops,  most  of  whom  had  served  throughout  the  war  and 
been  in  many  battles.  A  panic  set  in  quite  similar  to 
that  which  seized  the  Americans  at  Germantown,  and 
their  officers  could  not  stop  them.  More  than  half  the  com 
mand  surrendered  and  the  rest  fled.  William  Washington 
charged  in  pursuit,  but  Tarleton  managed  to  collect  14 
officers  and  40  horsemen  and  checked  the  pursuit  suffi 
ciently  to  enable  him  to  escape  and  rejoin  Cornwallis. 

The  battle  lasted  less  than  an  hour.  Tarleton  lost  100 
killed,  229  wounded  and  600  prisoners  not  wounded, 
about  85  per  cent  of  his  entire  command.  The  firing  at 
the  epaulets  was  very  effective,  for  39  of  his  officers  were 
killed  or  wounded.  Morgan's  loss  was  only  12  killed  and 
60  wounded.1 

This  was  one  of  the  most  interesting  battles  of  the 
whole  war.  It  shows  what  can  be  done  with  militia 
provided  they  are  good  marksmen  and  are  commanded 
by  competent  officers  who  understand  them.  Morgan, 
Pickens,  William  Washington  and  Clarke,  of  Georgia, 
were  all  experts  in  their  respective  lines. 

Jan.  4  It  had  been  suggested  by  Tarleton  two  weeks  before 

the  battle  that  while  he  advanced  against  Morgan's  front 
the  main  body  under  Cornwallis  should  simultaneously 
advance  to  King's  Mountain  to  cut  off  his  retreat. 

'Dawson,  646-653;    Tarleton,  214,  250;    Johnson,  370-384. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  231 

Cornwallis  replied:  "You  have  .  .  .  understood  my 
intentions  perfectly."  *  But  Cornwallis  did  not  do  his  Jan.  5 
part.  He  seems  to  have  been  nervous  about  his  right 
flank,  which  was  threatened  by  Huger  and  the  main 
body  of  Greene's  little  army  on  the  Pedee.  Cornwallis 
moved  a  few  miles  from  Camden  and  then  waited  a  week 
until  Leslie  had  crossed  the  Wateree.  He  then  slowly  Jan.  H 
moved  northward,  but  on  the  day  of  the  battle  instead 
of  being  at  King's  Mountain  in  Morgan's  rear  he  was  25 
miles  to  the  south.  Had  he  been  in  rear  of  Morgan,  he 
might  have  destroyed  him  or  driven  him  westward  into 
the  mountains,  notwithstanding  Morgan's  victory  over 
Tarleton,  for  Cornwallis  outnumbered  Morgan  nearly 
four  to  one.1 

Morgan  had  no  illusions  as  to  his  position  after  the  Morgan  Re- 
battle.    He  buried  the  dead,  left  the  wounded  of  both  cSawi» 
sides  under  a  flag  of  truce  and,  picking  up  his  captured 
cannon,  ammunition,  800  muskets  and  prisoners,  before 
noon  he  began  his  retreat  and  crossed  the  Broad  River. 
He  was  so  encumbered  with  prisoners  and  captured  stores 
that  his  progress  was  slow,  but  it  was  fast  enough  to 
keep  ahead  of  Cornwallis;  and  at  the  end  of  a  week  he 
had  marched  nearly  90  miles  and  had  passed  the  Catawba. 
The  next  day  Cornwallis  arrived  at  Ramsour's  Mill  (now  Jan.  24 
Lincolnton)  on  the  Little  Catawba,  20  miles  to  the  rear.  Jan.  25 

It  was  a  week  before  the  news  of  Morgan's  victory  jan.  24 
reached  Greene,  on  the  Pedee.    He  also  learned   that 
Morgan  was  retreating  and  Cornwallis  advancing,  and  he 
saw  that  the  thing  to  do  was  to  unite  Huger  and  Morgan 
as  quickly  as  possible.    He  therefore  called  in  Lee,  who  Jan.  25 
was  scouting  on  the  sea-coast  near  Georgetown,  and  or 
dered  Huger  to  march  to  Salisbury;  and  personally  he 

Tarleton,  246. 


232  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  rode  across  the  country,  125  miles,  with  only  an  aide 
and  three  orderlies,  and  joined  Morgan  on  the  Catawba.1 

Greene  joins        Coniwallis  was  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  delayed 

Jan.  so'  in  crossing  by  a  sudden  rise  of  the  river.  When  he  had 
arrived  at  Ramsour's  Mill  and  realized  that  Morgan  was 
20  miles  ahead  of  him,  he  made  up  his  mind  to  divest 
himself  of  everything  that  could  impede  rapid  move- 

jan.  26  ments.    He  spent  two  days  in  burning  up  all  his  tents, 

Jan.  27  baggage  and  extra  clothing  and  supplies,  keeping  only 

his  ammunition,  hospital  stores  and  such  rations  as  could 
be  carried  on  the  person.  The  destruction  of  the  rum, 
then  the  choicest  article  on  the  ration  list,  seemed  to  the 
officers  to  be  an  extraordinary  act  of  self-abnegation. 
He  also  destroyed  all  his  wagons  except  a  few  which 
were  to  be  used  for  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  he 
mounted  some  of  his  infantry  on  the  horses  thus  made 
available. 

Dameat  to  the  Then  began  a  retreat2  (on  the  American  side),  one  of 
the  most  memorable  in  the  annals  of  war3 ;  the  numbers 
were  small  but  the  stake  was  great,  and  there  was  abun 
dant  military  skill  on  both  sides. 

Jan.  29  Leaving  Ramsour's  Mill  (Lincolnton),  Cornwallis  ar 

rived  at  the  Catawba  on  the  afternoon  of  the  second  day. 
It  was  too  late  for  a  crossing,  and  during  the  night  came 
the  rise  in  the  river  due  to  a  winter 's  rain.  Cornwallis 
had  no  boats  and  it  was  necessary  to  wait  for  two  days 

jan.  29  for  the  river  to  subside  sufficiently  to  be  fordable.  Dur 

ing  this  interval  Greene  arrived  and  immediately  made 

1  Johnson,  394-403. 

2  Gordon,  IV,  36-45;    G.  W.  Greene,  III,  151-175;    Johnson,  403- 
432;    Greene  to  Washington,  Sparks,  Letters,  III,  225,  233;   Tarleton, 
218-229,  249-264;  Stedman,  325,  333. 

3  "  Every  measure  of  the  Americans,    during  their  march  from  the 
Catawba  to  Virginia,  was  judiciously  designed  and  vigorously  executed." 
(Tarleton,  229.) 


Greene  before 
Comwallis  _ 


Greene's  return  to 

South  Carolina 
Earl  Comwallis 
Lord  Rawdon 


!.<.. 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


RETREAT  TO  THE  DAN 
Jan. -Feb.,  1781 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  233 

the  following  dispositions:  Pickens  with  the  militia  was  i78i 
to  take  the  Cowpens  prisoners  through  the  mountains  to 
Charlottesville,  where  the  Saratoga  prisoners  were  now 
kept;  Morgan  was  to  retreat  at  once  to  the  Yadkin;  the 
fords  on  the  Catawba  were  to  be  watched  by  300  North 
Carolina  militia  under  Davidson,  who  had  just  joined  the 
army;  Huger  was  to  hasten  his  march  to  Salisbury. 

The  next  day  the  river  had  fallen  sufficiently  to  be  ford-  Feb.  i 
able,  and  Cornwallis  forced  a  passage  at  two  fords,  dis-  Passage  of 
persing  the  militia,  but  only  after  they  had  inflicted  on 
him  a  loss  of  4  killed  and  36  wounded  and  their  own 
leader,  Davidson,  had  been  killed.    He  pushed  forward 
during  the  afternoon,   and  one  of  Tarleton's  scouting 
parties  came  near  capturing  Greene,  who  had  remained 
with  the  militia  until  they  dispersed  and  had  then  ridden 
rapidly  toward  Salisbury.    He  stopped  to  pass  the  night  Feb.  i 
at  Carr's  house,  and  from  there  wrote  to  Huger  counter 
manding  his  orders  of  the  previous  day  in  so  far  as  to 
require  him  to  keep  on  the  east  side  of  the  Yadkin  and 
not  to  attempt  to  reach  Salisbury.    It  was  evident  that 
a  junction  with  Morgan  there  was  impossible. 

Morgan,  having  a  day's  start,  easily  reached  the  Yad-  Feb.  2 
kin  before  Cornwallis  could  come  up  with  him.  The  Feb.  3 
river  was  swollen  with  rains,  but  Carrington  was  there 
with  the  boats,  on  which  the  foot  troops  and  supplies 
were  ferried  across,  while  the  mounted  men  swam  their 
horses.  Greene  joined  him  during  the  crossing,  and  just 
as  it  was  completed  toward  sundown  the  advance  of 
Cornwallis's  army  came  up.  They  had  no  boats  and 
could  not  cross.  All  they  could  do  was  to  bring  up  their 
artillery  and  bombard  the  American  bivouac;  the  troops 
were  easily  put  under  shelter,  and  the  only  harm  done 
was  to  shatter  the  hut  in  which  Greene  was  writing  his 


234  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i        despatches — one  of  which  directed  Huger  to  leave  the 

Yadkin  and  march  for  Guilford. 

passage  of  Cornwallis  was  thus  forced  to  move  twenty-five  miles  up 

Feb.  8  the  Yadkin  where  the  fords  were  more  shallow,  and  this  he 

did  during  the  next  few  days.  His  intention  was  to  put 
himself  between  Greene  and  the  fords  on  the  upper  Dan, 
believing  that  Greene  could  not  cross  the  lower  Dan  and 
that  he  could  thus  force  him  to  fight  at  a  disadvantage. 
As  this  movement  developed  Greene,  with  Morgan,  re 
tired  slowly  to  Guilford  (near  Greensborough)  and  there 
was  joined  by  the  rest  of  his  army  under  Huger  and  Lee. 
Feb.  s  His  army  being  reunited,  Greene  was  disposed  to 

Feb.  9  accept  battle.    He  carefully  selected  a  good  position  at 

Guilford.  Unless  he  could  rally  the  militia  he  was  still 
too  weak  in  numbers  to  expect  success.  His  efforts  to 
bring  out  the  militia  were  fruitless;  moreover,  every 
day's  retreat  brought  him  nearer  to  Steuben  and  rein 
forcements  in  Virginia,  and  carried  Cornwallis  farther 
from  his  base.  A  council  of  war  decided  unanimously 
against  a  battle.1 

Greene  therefore  determined  to  continue  the  retreat 
and  put  himself  behind  the  Dan.    Carrington  had  already 
collected  the  boats  on  that  river  in  the  vicinity  of  Boyd's 
Feb.  11  Ferry;   Kosciusko  was  sent  there  to  throw  up  trenches 

to  defend  the  crossing;  a  body  of  700  picked  men  under 
Feb.  14  Williams  was  sent  to  get  in  front  of  Cornwallis  and  retard 

his  advance  as  much  as  possible.  With  the  main  body 
and  the  supplies  Greene  left  Guilford,  and  three  days 
later  crossed  the  Dan  at  Boyd's  Ferry,  about  10  miles 
above  the  junction  of  the  Dan  with  the  Roanoke,  and 
about  30  miles  below  the  present  city  of  Danville.  The 
following  day  Williams,  who  had  carried  on  a  continuous 

1  Johnson,  II,  425. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  235 

series  of  skirmishes  with  Tarleton  for  the  last  four  days,        i78i 
also  safely  crossed  the  river,  his  men  in  the  boats  and  the 
horses  swimming  as  at  the  Yadkin.    Cornwallis's  own  Feb.  is 
letter  accurately  describes  the  movement:    "I  tried  by  Greene 
a  most  rapid  march  to  strike  a  blow  either  at  Greene  Dan  into  e 
(Huger)  or  at  Morgan  before  they  got  over  the  Dan,  but  X 
could  not  effect  it." 

What  was  now  to  be  done?  Cornwallis  was  230  miles  comwaiiis 
from  his  base;  he  had  no  boats  to  cross  the  Dan  or  the 
Roanoke  on  Greene's  left  flank.  If  he  attempted  to 
cross  higher  up  Greene  would  meet  him  at  whatever 
point  he  selected,  and  the  crossing  would  be  difficult  if 
not  impossible.  Should  it  succeed  Greene  would  retreat 
into  Virginia  and  soon  effect  a  junction  with  Steuben, 
and  then  Cornwallis  would  be  outnumbered.  Cornwallis 
therefore  decided  to  march  back  into  North  Carolina, 
occupy  Hillsborough,  where  the  Provincial  legislature  had 
lately  been  in  session,  "raise  the  royal  standard"  and  try 
to  gather  the  tory  militia.  His  army  soon  reached  Hills- 
borough.  It  was  exhausted  with  its  long  march,  during 
which  it  had  lost  about  250  men;  and  the  lack  of  sup 
plies  which  had  been  burned  up  at  Ramsour's  Mill  four 
weeks  ago  was  now  keenly  felt. 

Greene's  army  was  also  exhausted  with  the  long  march 
in  the  dead  of  winter,  over  roads  alternately  frozen  and 
deep  in  mud,  with  a  succession  of  snow-storms  and  rains, 
which  inflicted  a  greater  hardship  on  his  men  than  on  the 
British,  because  they  were  insufficiently  clad,  had  neither 
tents  nor  blankets  and  many  of  them  were  barefooted. 
His  army  was  intact  and  by  no  means  despondent.  Re 
inforcements  from  Steuben  speedily  began  to  arrive. 

In  the  face  of  extraordinary  difficulties,  Steuben  had 
raised  and  equipped  400  Continentals,  and  the  militia  of 


236  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i         the  southern  counties  of  Virginia  at  last  realized  their 
Greene  danger  and  began  to  assemble.    Pickens  had  returned 

Receives  Rein-    „  .    ,  .          ,  -,  .  TT.      .    .  ,  .        , 

from  taking  the  prisoners  to  Virginia  and  was  now  back 


on  the  Catawba  rallying  the  militia  which  had  dispersed 
at  the  crossing  of  that  river.  The  Governor  of  North 
Carolina  was  using  every  effort  to  bring  out  the  militia 
in  other  parts  of  the  State.  From  all  of  these  sources 
Greene's  army,  which  numbered  only  1,430  when  it 
crossed  the  Dan,  was  increased  within  the  next  three 
weeks  to  1,715  Continentals  and  a  force  of  militia  which 
has  been  variously  estimated  at  from  2,800  to  3,900 
men.  His  total  force  at  the  battle  of  Guilford  was  be 
tween  4,500  and  5,700  men.1  His  own  returns,  two  days 
before  the  battle,  give  the  number  as  4,444.2 
Feb.  is  He  moved  in  pursuit  of  Cornwallis  before  the  reinforce- 

Feb.  23  ments  began  to  arrive.  The  day  after  Cornwallis  left 
the  Dan  to  march  to  Hillsborough  Greene  sent  Williams 
across  the  river,  and  he  followed  with  the  main  body 
a  few  days  later.  In  scouting  around  Hillsborough  Lee 
(whose  legion  was  part  of  Williams  's  command)  fell  in  with 
the  first  body  of  tory  militia  which  responded  to  Corn- 
Destruction  of  wallis's  proclamation.  It  numbered  300  men,  was  com- 
ToS;1  F  manded  by  Colonel  Pyle,  was  marching  from  Guilford  to 
Hillsborough  and  was  about  midway  between  the  two 
hamlets.  By  a  stratagem  Lee  got  in  immediate  contact 
with  it  before  his  identity  was  discovered;  when  the  firing 
began  Lee's  men  cut  the  tories  to  pieces,  90  of  them  being 
killed,  nearly  all  the  rest  wounded  and  only  a  few  escap 
ing.3  Lee  did  not  lose  a  man.  The  news  of  this  encoun 
ter  travelled  fast  and  it  put  a  decided  damper  on  rallying 
Feb.  26  to  "the  royal  standard."  The  next  day  Cornwallis  left 

1  Schenck,  310-312.  2  Gordon,  IV,  54. 

3  Dawson,  658-660;    Lee,  154-157;   Tarleton,  231-233. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  237 

Hillsborough   and   marched  westward  to  meet  Greene. 
The  two  armies  came  in  touch  on  the  Haw  River.    Both  March  2 
were  anxious  for  battle,  but  Greene  wanted  to  postpone  it 
until  his  reinforcements  arrived.    Constant  manoeuvring 
followed  for  ten  days,  and 'there  was  a  smart  skirmish1  in  Action  at 
which  about  50  men  were  lost  on  each  side.    Finally  the  March  QS 
reinforcements  arrived,  and  as  soon  as  he  could  organize 
them  Greene  marched  to  Guilford,  intending  to  accept  March  10 
battle  on  the  ground  which  he  had  carefully  selected 
during  his  retreat.    His  force  numbered,  as  already  stated, 
between  4,500  and  5,700  men;  but  of  these  less  than  500 
had  ever  been  in  battle.    Cornwallis's  return  gave  2,253  March  14 
fit  for  duty,  exclusive  of  officers.    Every  man  (except  the 
North  Carolina  regiment  which  was  left  with  the  baggage 
on  the  day  of  the  battle)  was  a  veteran  regular  who  had 
been  in  most  of  the  battles  at  the  North  as  well  as  at 
Savannah,   Charleston   and   Camden.     Relying  on  the 
superior  quality  of  his  troops,  as  at  Camden,  Cornwallis 
did  not  hesitate  to  attack. 

The  dispositions  of  the  troops  on  both  sides  were  quite 
similar  to  those  at  the  Cowpens.  Greene  had,  in  fact, 
recently  received  a  letter  from  Morgan2  giving  his  advice 
in  regard  to  the  handling  of  the  militia.3  Greene  had  the 
highest  regard  for  Morgan  and  adopted  his  suggestions. 
He  posted4  the  North  Carolina  militia  in  a  line  across 
the  Salisbury  road  about  a  mile  from  Guilford,  with  ex 
pert  riflemen  on  each  flank,  the  Delaware  battalion  and 
Lynch's  Virginians  on  the  right  and  the  legion  infantry 
and  Campbell's  Virginians  on  the  left.  About  300  yards 

1  Dawson,  661-663. 

2  Morgan  was  obliged  by  ill  health  to  leave  Greene's  army  in  Febru 
ary.     He  joined  Washington  just  before  the  surrender  at  Yorktown. 

3Schenck,  321. 

4  Greene's  Report,  Tarleton,  312-317. 


238  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1781  behind  them  was  a  line  of  Virginia  militia,  with  William 
Washington's  cavalry  on  their  right  and  Lee's  on  their 
left.  The  third  line  was  about  550  yards  in  rear  of  the 
second  and  was  composed  of  the  Continentals,  2  Virginia 
regiments  on  the  right  and  2  Maryland  regiments  on  the 
left,  posted  on  a  slight  eminence  some  distance  in  front 
of  the  Court-House.  The  only  fault  in  these  dispositions 
seems  to  have  been  in  having  the  lines  too  far  apart, 
about  twice  the  distance  they  were  at  the  Cowpens. 
Doubtless  this  was  made  necessary  by  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  which  was  heavily  wooded,  with  occasional  clear 
ings  of  a  few  acres  for  cultivation.  There  was  one  such 
clearing  in  front  of  the  main  line  and  another  in  front  of 
the  advanced  line,  and  it  was  thought  that  the  North 
Carolina  militia,  posted  in  the  woods  behind  this  latter 
clearing  and  their  flanks  held  by  expert  riflemen,  would 
make  a  good  resistance  although  they  had  never  before 
been  under  fire. 

Battle  of  Cornwallis  had  been  encamped  for  two  days  on  the 

March  is  Salisbury  road,  about  twelve  miles  south-west  of  Guilford. 
Hearing  of  Greene's  movement  to  that  point,  he  left  the 
North  Carolina  regiment  with  the  baggage  and  with  his 
2,000  regulars  broke  camp  at  daylight  and  marched 
toward  Guilford.  After  marching  eight  miles  his  ad 
vance  under  Tarleton  came  in  contact  with  Lee  and  a 
skirmish  ensued,  Lee  falling  back  to  the  main  body  and 
taking  post  on  the  left  flank  as  above  stated.  About  noon 
Cornwallis  came  in  sight  of  the  Ajnerican  lines  and  at  once 
deployed:  Leslie's  brigade  (71st  and  Bose)  to  the  right, 
Webster's  brigade  (23d  and  33d)  and  Yager's  to  the  left, 
O'Hara's  brigade  (Guards)  in  reserve,  two  pieces  of  artillery 
on  the  road  in  centre  and  Tarleton 's  cavalry  in  the  rear.1 

1  Cornwallis's  Report,  Tarleton,  303-310. 


ut  P^_^-:^Tr;c=^''o "  "    ^         xetoi 


W    2  M"M^«  .«  ^.^^  ,:-  5 


U 


s« 

1! 

H  s 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  239 

The  battle1  opened  with  a  cannonade  from  the  two 
3-pounders  which  lasted  twenty  minutes.  Then  the  I.SOP.M. 
whole  line  advanced  with  admirable  steadiness  across  the 
first  clearing.  The  air  was  sharp  and  frosty  and  the 
British  bayonets  glistened  in  the  sun  of  a  cloudless  day.  Battle  of 
The  North  Carolina  militia  had  no  bayonets.  They  were  c 
armed  with  hunting-rifles  and  powder-horns.  It  took 
three  minutes  to  load.  They  delivered  their  first  fire  at 
150  yards.  When  they  had  reloaded  the  Highlanders 
were  within  40  yards;  the  militia  fired  their  second 
round,  leaning  their  rifles  on  the  rail-fence  at  the  edge 
of  the  clearing.  Both  rounds  were  carefully  aimed  and 
were  effective.  But  still  the  British  line  came  on.  It  is 
claimed — and  also  disputed — that  Greene  had  given  the 
North  Carolina  militia  the  same  order  that  Morgan  gave 
at  Cowpens,  to  fire  two  rounds  and  then  retire  to  the  next 
line.  Whether  they  had  this  order  or  not  they  retired, 
not  to  the  second  line,  but  far  beyond  the  battle-ground. 
They  ran  through  the  intervals  of  the  Virginia  militia  and 
past  its  left  flank,  and  most  of  them  were  not  again 
heard  of. 

The  flanking  parties  did  not  take  part  in  the  flight, 
and  Leslie's  brigade  wheeled  to  the  right  against  Lee  and 
Campbell  and  Webster's  to  the  left  against  Kirkwood 
and  Lynch;  O'Hara's  brigade  moved  forward  into  the 
gap  thus  created.  Kirkwood  and  Lynch  fell  back  slowly, 
contesting  their  ground,  and  took  post  on  the  right  of 
the  Continentals;  William  Washington's  cavalry  with 
drew  to  the  rear  of  the  Continentals;  Lee  and  Campbell 
did  not  yield  at  first,  and  it  was  only  after  the  1st  Bat 
talion  of  the  Guards  had  been  brought  up  on  the  right 

'Tarleton,  269-279;  Stedman,  II,  337-347;  Johnson,  II,  1-22;  Lee, 
170-180;  Dawson,  663-670;  Schenck,  292-387. 


240  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  of  the  Bose  regiment  that  they  were  forced  back  up  the 
slope  of  a  hill  just  behind  their  first  position.  The  action 
continued  here,  quite  separate  and  apart  from  the  main 
battle,  for  nearly  two  hours,  and  in  the  course  of  it  Corn- 
wallis  personally  led  the  Guards  battalion  and  had  his 
horse  shot  under  him. 

March  isth,         The  North  Carolinians  having  broken  and  run,  O'Hara's 
brigade  advanced  through  the  woods,  with  Webster  on 


its  left  and  the  71st  on  its  right,  and  fell  upon  the  Vir 
ginia  militia  —  the  second  line.  But  they  made  a  good 
defence,  until  their  right  flank  was  enveloped  by  the 
British  left,  when  it  gave  way;  and  soon  after  Stevens, 
who  commanded  the  left  brigade,  was  badly  wounded. 
Then  the  whole  line  gave  way  and  retreated  past  the  left 
of  the  Continentals. 

Within  half  an  hour  after  the  battle  opened  the  militia, 
whether  their  numbers  were  2,800  or  3,800,  were  all  gone 
except  the  gallant  riflemen  from  Virginia  under  Lynch 
and  Campbell,  many  of  whom  were  old  soldiers,  but  whose 
numbers  did  not  exceed  200  men.  The  North  Carolinians 
had  lost  11  and  the  Virginians  46,  killed  and  wounded, 
and  had  inflicted  probably  an  equal  loss  on  their  oppo 
nents.  The  hard  fighting  of  the  day  was  yet  to  come, 
and  the  numbers  were  about  equal  —  2,000  on  each  side. 
3  P.  M.  The  British  troops  continued  their  advance  through 

the  woods  and  came  to  the  second  clearing.  Three  sepa 
rate  and  somewhat  disjointed  attacks  were  made  across 
this  and  against  the  four  Continental  regiments  posted 
on  the  rising  ground  in  the  woods  on  the  opposite  side. 
Two  of  them  were  repulsed  —  the  first  by  Webster's  bri 
gade,  against  the  centre  of  the  line  between  the  Virginia 
and  Maryland  brigades.  He  was  driven  back  with  heavy 
loss,  Webster  himself  being  mortally  wounded  and  his 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  241 

brigade  forced  back  across  the  clearing  and  separated 
from  O'Hara.  The  second  was  by  two  battalions  of  the 
Guards  under  O'Hara.  They  struck  the  left  flank — the 
2d  Maryland,  a  new  regiment — and  it  fled  almost  with-  Battle  of 
out  firing  a  shot.  Then  the  1st  Maryland  wheeled  to  the 
left  and  took  them  in  flank,  and  they  were  driven  back 
in  great  confusion,  one  battalion  losing  nearly  half  its 
strength  and  O'Hara  being  wounded.  They  were  pur 
sued  by  the  1st  Maryland  and  by  William  Washington's 
cavalry.  Colonel  Stewart  of  the  Guards  was  killed,  and 
their  retreat  was  only  checked  by  Cornwallis  in  person, 
who  brought  the  two  3-pounders  along  the  road  to  the 
edge  of  the  clearing  and  ordered  them  to  fire  grape  over 
the  heads  of  his  own  men,  many  of  whom  were  wounded 
by  it. 

If  at  this  moment  Greene  had  followed  up  his  sue-  March  is, 
cess  by  a  vigorous  attack  with  the  three  regiments  which 
now  remained  to  him,  he  might  have  defeated  Cornwallis. 
The  attack  might  have  failed,  and  if  so  he  would  have 
lost  his  whole  army  and  the  war  in  the  South  would  have 
ended — for  there  were  no  more  reinforcements  to  come 
from  the  North.  He  had  previously  made  up  his  mind 
never  to  risk  the  total  destruction  of  his  army,  and  he 
abided  by  this  determination.  He  therefore  reformed 
his  men  in  their  first  position  on  the  wooded  hill;  and 
Cornwallis  brought  up  the  71st  and  the  battalion  of  the 
Guards  which  had  been  fighting  against  Lee  and  Camp 
bell  on  the  extreme  right,  reformed  his  lines  and  prepared 
for  a  final  assault  with  the  seven  battalions  which  he  now 
had.  As  he  began  to  move  forward  Greene  decided  to  save 
his  army  while  it  was  still  in  his  power  to  do  so.  He  placed 
the  1st  Virginia,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  in  position 
to  cover  his  retreat,  and  retired  in  good  order.  Corn- 


242 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1781 


March  16 


March  17 


Cornwall  is 
Retreats  to 
Wilmington 


March  18 
March  28 


wallis  followed  him  only  a  short  distance,  and  before 
morning  Greene  had  taken  a  good  defensive  position  be 
hind  the  Haw  River,  about  ten  miles  from  the  battle 
field.  He  had  lost  78  killed  and  183  wounded;  when  the 
returns  were  made  up,  1,046  of  the  militia  were  missing; 
the  others  had  straggled  into  camp.  He  had  inflicted 
upon  Corn  wallis  a  loss  of  93  killed,  413  wounded  and  26 
missing,  nearly  30  per  cent  of  his  strength.1 

The  retreat  to  the  Dan  and  the  battle  of  Guilford  were 
to  the  South  what  the  retreat  through  New  Jersey  and 
the  battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton  were  to  the  North. 
They  turned  the  tide;  and  each  attracted  equal  atten 
tion  in  Europe.  Greene  lost  the  battle  but  won  the  cam 
paign,  and  the  first  step  toward  Yorktown  was  taken. 
Cornwallis's  losses  were  so  great  and  his  situation  so  pre 
carious  at  such  a  distance  from  his  base  that  a  retreat 
was  imperative.  The  only  question  was  in  what  direc 
tion  he  should  go.  The  distance  to  Camden  was  about 
160  miles.  To  return  there  was  to  acknowledge  the  total 
failure  of  his  campaign.  The  distance  to  Wilmington 
was  about  200  miles.  There  he  would  have  the  support 
of  the  British  ships;  and  possibly  he  might  draw  Greene 
after  him,  and  after  he  had  refitted  his  army  engage  him 
in  battle  again  and  meanwhile  the  posts  in  South  Caro 
lina  would  be  safe.2 

He  determined  to  retreat  as  far  as  Cross  Creek  (Fay- 
etteville)  where  he  had  ordered  supplies  to  be  sent  from 
Wilmington.  Giving  his  men  two  days'  rest  and  aban 
doning  his  wounded,  he  began  his  march.  Greene  in 
stantly  started  in  pursuit.  He  came  up  with  Corn  wallis 's 
rear  at  Ramsay's  Mill,  on  Deep  River,  but  did  not  feel 

1  Dawson,  669,  670. 

2Tarleton,  278,  322-327;    Stedman,  II,  350-353. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  243 

strong  enough  to  attack  him.    Cornwallis  then  went  on 
unmolested  to  Cross  Creek,  and  finding  no  supplies  there  April  ? 
continued  his  retreat  to  Wilmington.1 

Greene  did  not  follow  him  beyond  Deep  River.  Corn 
wallis  being  out  of  the  way,  he  decided  to  march  to  South 
Carolina  and  endeavor  to  regain  that  State.2 

He  remained  at  Ramsay's  Mills  a  week,  reorganizing  March  29 
his  army  and  perfecting  his  plans.  The  Virginia  and  April  5 
North  Carolina  militia  had  been  called  out  for  six  weeks  and 
their  time  was  up;  they  had  been  with  him  just  twenty- 
three  days,  and  tfeey  had  been  of  real  service  for  they  had 
enabled  him  to  fight  the  battle  of  Guilford  even  though 
they  had  failed  at  the  critical  moment.  He  released 
them  all  with  thanks  and  sent  them  home.  His  army 
was  then  reduced  to  the  four  Continental  regiments — 1st 
and  2d  Virginia,  1st  and  2d  Maryland,  Lee's  Legion  and 
William  Washington's  dragoons — in  all  about  1,450  men. 
Under  a  curious  order  of  the  " Council  Extraordinary" 
which  then  administered  so  much  of  the  Provincial  gov 
ernment  as  existed  in  North  Carolina,  all  of  the  six  weeks' 
militia  who  had  fled  from  Guilford  were  "sentenced  to 
twelve  months'  duty  as  Continentals." 3  An  effort  was 
made  to  round  them  up,  and  later  a  few  hundred  of  them 
joined  Greene  and  did  good  service,  as  did  other  skeleton 
regiments  which  were  raised  as  speedily  as  possible  in 
North  Carolina.  The  force  with  which  Greene  began  his 
march  into  South  Carolina  was  less  than  1,500  men. 

He  designed  to  aid  these  to  the  utmost  by  utilizing  fully 
the  partisan  corps  under  Sumter,  Marion  and  Pickens. 
While  Greene  was  not  as  successful  as  Morgan  in  getting 
the  most  out  of  the  militia  on  the  battle-field,  he  was 

^arleton,  278,  322-327;    Stedman,  II,  350-353. 

2  Greene,  Letters,  Johnson,  II,  37-40.  3  Schenck,  394. 


244  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  far  more  successful  than  any  other  commander  at  the 
South  in  securing  the  co-operation  of  these  irregular 
leaders,  who  abhorred  discipline,  considered  obedience 
as  synonymous  with  servility  and  made  it  a  practice 
to  submit  their  plans  to  their  followers  for  approval 
before  putting  them  into  execution.  Notwithstanding 
these  eccentricities  they  rendered  valuable  service. 

Sumter  was  now  on  the  Broad  River,  recovered  from 
his  wound  and  recruiting  his  men;  Marion  was  hiding  in 
the  Pedee  swamps,  but  ready  to  emerge  when  conditions 
were  favorable;  Pickens  was  on  his  familiar  ground  in 
western  South  Carolina.  Greene  communicated  with  all 
of  them,  requesting  their  assistance,  and  they  cheerfully 
gave  it — sometimes  according  to  Greene's  plans  and 
sometimes  according  to  their  own. 

On  the  British  side,  Rawdon  had  been  left  in  command 
when  Cornwallis  marched  North.  He  was  at  Camden, 
whose  garrison  was  1,400  men,  of  whom  500  were  at  the 
moment  detached  in  the  hope  of  catching  Marion.  In  ad 
dition  to  the  two  main  posts  of  Charleston  and  Savannah, 
there  were  others  at  Augusta,  Ninety-Six,  Fort  Granby, 
Orangeburg,  Fort  Motte,  Fort  Watson  and  Georgetown, 
whose  garrisons  varied  from  120  to  630  men.  Exclud 
ing  Charleston  and  Savannah,  Rawdon  had  about  3,500 
effective  men  in  the  various  other  posts,  and  in  the  two 
States  8,141.* 
Greene  With  his  1,500  Continentals  and  such  assistance  as  he 

Marches  to  . 

south  could  get  from  the  partisan  leaders  and  any  militia  that 

Carolina  J 

might  join  mm,  Greene  set  out  to  capture  these  posts 
and  reconquer  South  Carolina.  With  the  main  body 
he  marched  to  Camden;  he  kept  Lee  on  his  left  flank, 
to  give  warning  if  Cornwallis  should  come  toward  South 

Sparks,  V,  545. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  245 

Carolina,  and  if  not  then  to  effect  a  junction  with  Marion 
and  attack  Fort  Watson,  below  Camden;  Sumter  was 
requested  to  join  the  main  body  at  Camden,  and  Pick- 
ens  to  advance  against  Ninety-Six  on  his  right. 

Greene  marched  to  Camden,  140  miles  in  14  days,  of  APru  6-20 
which  3  were  spent  in  collecting  boats  to  cross  the  Pedee. 
During  this  time  Lee  had  joined  Marion  at  a  ferry  lower  APni  14 
down  on  the  Pedee,  and  the  two  had  proceeded  to  besiege 
Fort  Watson,  a  stockaded  post  on  the  Santee  about  half 
way  between  Camden  and  Charleston.    After  a  siege  of  8  capture  of 
days  the  place  was  captured1  by  the  expedient  of  cutting 
trees  and  erecting  (during  the  night)  a  tower,  from  the 
top  of  which  a  plunging  fire  was  delivered  inside  the 
stockade  which  rendered  it  untenable.    Its  garrison  of  Apru  15-23 
120  men  was  captured,  with  the  loss  to  Marion  and  Lee 
of  2  killed  and  4  wounded.    They  then  moved  to  the  High 
Hills  of  Santee  in  the  hope  of  intercepting  Colonel  Watson, 
who  with  500  men  of  the  Camden  garrison  had  been  sent 
to  catch  Marion  in  the  Pedee  swamps  and  after  a  fruit 
less  chase  was  now  returning  to  his  post.    He  managed 
to  evade  Marion  and  Lee  and  joined  Rawdon  at  Camden, 
but  not  until  after  the  battle  had  been  fought. 

Greene  had  approached  Camden  from  the  north  and  May? 
had  hoped  to  surprise  it,  but  the  tories  gave  warning  of  Apru  20 
his  approach.    Not  having  men  enough  either  to  assault 
or  to  surround  and  besiege  it,  he  retired  to  a  rising  ground 
about  two  miles  north  of  the  village  and  took  up  a  de 
fensive  position.    The  ground  was  wooded — like  nearly 
all  of  the  battle-grounds  in  the  Southern  campaign.    Its 
right  was  protected  by  the  Wateree,  its  left  by  a  rivulet 
and  swamp;  the  high-road  from  Camden  to  the  Waxhaws 
passed  through  the  centre.    The  troops  were  disposed  as 

'Dawson,  672;    Lossing,  II,  501. 


246  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  follows:  the  2  Virginia  regiments  on  the  right,  the  2 
Maryland  on  the  left  and  2  guns  on  the  road  between 
them;  a  body  of  North  Carolina  militia  which  had  just 
joined  were  placed  in  the  second  line,  thus  reversing  the 
dispositions  made  at  the  Cowpens  and  at  Guilford. 
William  Washington's  cavalry  was  in  rear  of  the  left  and 
the  Delaware  battalion  was  stationed  as  an  outpost  at  the 
foot  of  the  hill  about  500  yards  in  advance  of  the  main 
line.  The  men  bivouacked  in  this  order  night  and  day, 
expecting  an  attack.  Greene's  strength,  Lee's  Legion 
being  detached,  was  1,174  Continentals  and  248  North 
Carolina  militia.1 

Battle  of  Hob-      Rawdon  decided  to  attack  without  waiting  for  Watson, 
25  '       as  he  feared  that  Marion  and  Lee  might  join  Greene  if  he 


delayed.  Marching  out  of  his  fortified  village  early  in 
the  morning,  he  circled  to  the  right  through  the  woods  in 
order  to  approach  the  hill  from  the  south-east  where  the 
slope  was  least  steep.  He  had  1  regular  regiment  — 
63d  —  and  3  regiments  of  New  York  tories  (Volunteers  of 
Ireland,  King's  American  and  New  York  Volunteers), 
with  a  detachment  of  South  Carolina  tories  and  a  few 
IOA.M.  dragoons.  As  he  came  in  contact  with  the  Delaware 
battalion  he  deployed  with  3  regiments  in  the  first  line 
and  moved  forward  to  attack  the  hill. 

Greene  seems  to  have  been  overconfident,  and  instead 
of  waiting  to  receive  the  attack  in  his  chosen  position  on 
the  crest  of  the  wooded  slope  he  took  the  offensive. 
Rawdon's  front  being  narrow,  he  endeavored  to  envelop 
him  on  both  flanks  while  he  made  a  vigorous  attack  on 
his  centre.  Campbell  with  the  1st  Virginia  was  to  turn 
his  right  flank,  Ford  with  the  2d  Maryland  his  left; 

1  Johnson,  II,  72-95;  Stedman,  356-362;  Dawson,  680-684;  G.  W. 
Greene,  III,  239-255. 


'  Brie'  «en'l  llu^^ 


Lt.  Col.  Campbell     Lt.  Col.  H  \t 


"'*SrM^Ji»« 

"  *       *-,-*3Mi  »>t£>      I-:? 


Ui-ltish  H  Americans 
CZ1  Original  Column  of  attack 
•§  Formation  for  assault 
d  Final  Position 
MM  American  1st  Position 
i — |  Anit-rican  2nd  Position 


Sffi,>VV!llor'Ei.\^*i  «**  vi!x> 

r  •!'••'  ?fexrvr,         f| 

,ww  '•i""«v 

VC^—  N^     ^  j  ^ 

^Wasliingtoi/^^^  \  ^  v         \ 

f  .  i 


<2 


Thickets  with 
few  trees 


i  t 


^     / 


HOBKIRK'S   HILL  (CAMDEN) 
April  25,  1781 


A.  Spring 

K.  Stockade  Fort 

C.  Jail,  fortified 

D.  Court  House 
K.  Star  Redoubt 
F.  Mine 


G.  American  Camps 

H.  stockade 

1.  Covered  way  from 

Stockade  to  Fort 
K.  Abatis 


NlNETY-SlX 

May  2Z-June  5,   1781 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Companj-,  Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 
From  Avery's  History  of  the  United  States  and  Its  People 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  247 

Gunby  with  the  1st  Maryland  and  Hawes  with  the  2d 
Virginia  were  to  charge  with  the  bayonet  against  his 
centre;  the  artillery  were  to  use  grape;  and  William 
Washington  with  his  cavalry  was  to  sweep  around  his 
left  flank  and  attack  him  in  rear. 

It  was  too  ambitious  a  programme.  Rawdon  quickly 
extended  his  front  by  bringing  up  the  Irish  regiment, 
and  in  the  sharp  fighting  which  ensued  Captain  Beatty 
of  the  1st  Maryland  was  killed,  his  company  began  to  re 
tire  and  Gunby  ordered  the  regiment  to  fall  back  to 
reform.  In  doing  so  this  regiment — which  had  fought 
so  gallantly  at  Camden,  the  Cowpens  and  Guilford,  and 
in  nearly  every  battle  since  Long  Island — became  de 
moralized  and  could  not  be  rallied.  Rawdon's  men 
charged  up  the  hill,  and  the  2d  Maryland,  seeing  the 
retreat  of  the  1st,  and  their  colonel,  Ford,  being  mortally 
wounded,  also  began  to  retreat;  and  this  brought  Raw 
don  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Virginia  regiments.  Greene 
saw  that  the  day  was  lost  and  immediately  withdrew  the 
Virginia  regiments  and  the  artillery.  His  little  force  re 
treated  five  miles  and  took  up  another  position,  but  Raw 
don  did  not  pursue.  He  returned  within  his  lines  at 
Camden  that  same  afternoon. 

Greene's  losses  were  19  killed,  115  wounded  and  136 
missing,  and  Rawdon's  about  the  same,  258  killed, 
wounded  and  missing.1 

Thus  Greene  lost  his  second  battle,  and  he  was 
somewhat  disheartened,  writing  to  Luzerne,  the  French 
minister  (in  a  vain  appeal  for  help  from  the  French 
soldiers  cooped  up  in  Newport):  "We  fight,  get  beat, 
rise  and  fight  again."2  As  at  Guilford,  the  ultimate 
advantages  were  all  on  his  side;  for  Rawdon,  unwill- 

1  Dawson,  684.  s  See  also  Sparks,  Letters,  III,  299, 


248  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  ing  to  risk  a  second  engagement,  soon  retreated  to 
Charleston.1 

May  7  At  the  time  of  the  battle,  Pickens  on  the  extreme  right 

was  approaching  Ninety-Six;  Marion  and  Lee  on  the  left 
were  at  the  Santee  Hills,  trying  to  intercept  Watson  on 
his  return  from  Georgetown  to  Camden;  and  Sumter,  in 
stead  of  joining  Greene  as  requested  had  started  on  an 
independent  expedition  against  Fort  Granby  (Columbia). 
Watson  managed  to  elude  Marion  and  join  Rawdon  in 
Camden.  Greene  then  sent  Lee  against  Fort  Granby, 
Marion  against  Fort  Motte,  30  miles  south  of  Camden, 
and  with  his  main  body  retired  6  miles  to  Rugely's  Mill. 
Rawdon  was  thus  surrounded  and  every  one  of  his 
posts  threatened.  Notwithstanding  the  reinforcement 

May  10  brought  by  Watson,  he  did  not  feel  strong  enough  to  at 

tack  Greene,  and  he  decided  that  his  only  safety  was  in  a 
retreat  to  Charleston.  He  therefore  burned  the  stock- 


cavmdenes  ades  at  Camden  and  such  stores  as  he  could  not  carry, 
and  retreated  to  Monck's  Corner,  about  30  miles  from 
Charleston. 

capture  of  While  he  was  on  his  retreat  Marion  surrounded  Fort 

Motte.2  This  was  a  post,  garrisoned  by  150  men,  at  the 
point  where  the  Congaree  and  Wateree  Rivers  unite  to 
form  the  Santee.  With  Fort  Watson,  lower  down  on  the 
Santee,  it  maintained  the  communications  between  Cam 
den  and  Charleston.  The  post  consisted  of  an  old  colo 
nial  mansion,  in  a  commanding  situation,  which  had  been 
fortified.  It  was  captured  by  the  novel  expedient  of 
shooting  arrows  carrying  firebrands  against  the  dry  shin 
gles  on  the  roof,  by  which  the  house  was  set  on  fire.  The 

May  12  garrisoned  soon  surrendered.3 

1  Stedman,  II,  361. 

3  Dawson,  689-692;    G.  W.  Greene,  III,  278.  3  Lossing,  II,  480. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  249 

Lee  then  went  on  to  Fort  Granby,  where  Sumter  had        nsi 
abandoned  his  attack  in  favor  of  a  more  promising  expedi-  capture  of 
tion  against  Orangeburg,  about  thirty  miles  to  the  south.  May  11 
Rawdon  had  already  given  orders  for  the  evacuation  of 
Orangeburg,  but  Sumter  arrived  before  the  order  was 
executed,  and  with  slight  difficulty  captured  the  garrison 
of  350  men.    He  then  retraced  his  steps  to  Fort  Granby  capture  of 
and  on  his  arrival  was  annoyed  to  find  that  Lee  had  ar-  May  15 
rived  the  day  before  and  had  compelled  its  surrender,  with 
its  garrison  of  240  men.    Sumter  felt  that  Lee  had  stolen 
his  glory  and  complained  to  Greene  of  Lee's  conduct, 
stating  that  he  considered  it  "for  the  good  of  the  public 
to  do  it  without  regulars." l    Greene  replied  that  Lee  had 
acted  in  accordance  with  his  orders;   whereupon  Sumter 
sent  in  his  resignation.     Greene  diplomatically  persuaded 
him  to  withdraw  it,  and  he  afterward  rendered  excel 
lent  service,  in  co-operation  with  Lee,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Charleston.2 

All  the  interior  posts  in  South  Carolina  were  now  capt-  May  9 
ured  except  Ninety-Six.  As  soon  as  Rawdon  evacuated 
Camden,  Greene  marched  rapidly  toward  Ninety-Six, 
sending  Lee  some  North  Carolina  militia,  who  had  just 
arrived,  to  join  Pickens  who  had  collected  a  considerable 
body  of  militia  in  the  vicinity  of  Augusta.  On  his  way  May  21 
Lee  captured  a  large  amount  of  supplies  collected  for  dis 
tribution  to  the  Indians  at  a  point  on  the  Savannah 
River,  about  twelve  miles  below  Augusta.  He  then 
crossed  the  river  and  late  on  the  same  day  joined  Pickens 
on  the  west  side  of  Augusta. 

This  village  was  defended  by  two  stockaded  forts,  one  siege  of 
in  the  village  and  the  other  about  half  a  mile  up  the  river.  M 
Its  garrison  numbered  630  men,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 

1  Johnson,  II,  122.  *  G.  W.  Greene,  III,  290,  295,  298. 


250 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1781 


June  5 


Siege  of 
Ninety-Six, 
May  22  to 
June  19 


May  23 


Browne.  The  garrison  of  the  upper  fort  was  composed  of 
Georgia  loyalists.  They  attempted  to  escape  to  the  main 
fort  and  nearly  half  of  them  were  killed  by  the  Georgia 
militia  of  Colonel  Clarke.  The  siege  of  the  principal 
fort  lasted  fourteen  days.  Browne  made  a  stiff  defence. 
To  the  first  summons  to  surrender  he  returned  a  spirited 
refusal.  He  made  two  vigorous  sorties.  The  besiegers 
finally  won  by  the  same  device  as  at  Fort  Watson — a 
wooden  tower  from  which  to  deliver  a  plunging  fire  within 
the  stockade.  Browne  was  finally  forced  to  yield,  and 
signed  articles  of  capitulation  in  which  his  garrison  was 
definitely  surrendered  as  "field  prisoners  of  war." 1 

Pickens  and  Lee  hastened  to  join  Greene,  who  had 
begun  the  siege  of  Ninety-Six.  This  place  had  been  elab 
orately  and  somewhat  curiously  fortified  with  stockades 
and  deep  ditches.  Its  garrison  numbered  550  men,  a 
tory  regiment  from  New  York,  another  from  New  Jersey 
and  some  South  Carolina  loyalists — all  commanded  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Cruger,  of  New  York.  He  also  made 
a  spirited  defence.  Greene  had  only  984  men — prior  to 
the  arrival  of  Pickens  and  Lee — and  it  was  impossible  to 
surround  the  place.  His  engineer,  Kosciusko,  opened 
his  first  parallel  at  70  yards.  Cruger  punished  this  "in 
sult"  the  next  morning  by  a  vigorous  sortie  supported  by 
the  fire  of  three  3-pounders.  The  intrenching  party  was 
routed  and  lost  most  of  their  tools.  Kosciusko  then  began 
a  new  first  parallel  at  "a  more  respectful  distance,"  400 
yards,  and  from  this  the  besiegers  gradually  worked  their 
way  up  to  the  ditch  of  the  Star  Fort.  There  were  con 
stant  sorties;  there  were  the  same  devices  of  a  wooden 
tower  for  plunging  fire  and  arrows  carrying  firebrands 
to  set  fire  to  the  beleaguered  buildings;  the  source  of 

,  673,  679;    G.  W.  Greene,  300-302;    Stedman,  II,  363. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  251 

water  supply  was  captured,  and  the  besieged  suffered 
terribly  from  thirst.1 

While  the  siege  was  in  progress  reinforcements  from  Junes 
Ireland  arrived  at  Charleston,  three  full  regiments,  3d, 
19th  and  30th,  and  a  number  of  recruits  for  the  Guards. 
Rawdon  determined  to  march  to  the  relief  of  Ninety-Six. 
Marion  was  operating  near  the  coast,  and  hearing  this 
news  sent  a  courier  to  notify  Greene,  who  in  turn  sent 
explicit  instructions  to  Sumter  and  Marion  to  place  them 
selves  in  front  of  Rawdon  and  retard  his  advance,  as 
Williams  and  Lee  had  so  skilfully  done  on  the  Dan. 
Rawdon  managed  to  evade  them,  and  was  approaching 
with  1,800  infantry,  200  cavalry  and  a  body  of  South  Caro 
lina  loyalists.  To  conclude  the  siege  before  his  arrival  Assault  at 
was  impossible,  and  Greene  determined  on  an  assault.  June  fs  u 
Campbell  with  picked  detachments  from  the  Virginia 
and  Maryland  regiments  was  to  attack  the  Star  Fort, 
and  Lee  with  the  legion  infantry  the  redoubt;  the  rest 
of  the  command  was  to  man  the  wooden  tower  and  the 
trenches  from  which  they  were  to  concentrate  their  fire 
on  the  Star  Fort.  Axes  were  provided  to  cut  down  the 
abatis,  fascines  to  fill  up  the  ditch  and  long  poles  with 
hooks  to  pull  down  the  sand-bags  of  the  besiegers'  trenches. 
At  noon  the  assault  began,  preceded  by  an  hour's  can 
nonade  from  Greene's  four  guns.  The  storming  parties 
rushed  forward  and  gained  the  ditch.  Then  the  besiegers 
poured  into  the  ditch  from  the  sally-port  of  the  main 
stockade.  A  desperate  hand-to-hand  struggle  resulted 
and  the  assailants  were  driven  out.  Lee  was  more  suc 
cessful  and  carried  the  redoubt,  and  was  preparing  to 
attack  the  village  stockade  from  the  rear.  Greene,  how-  jmy  20 


,   692-697;    Stedman,  364-373;    G.  W.  Greene,   303-317; 
Johnson,  II,  138-154. 


252  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  ever,  adhering  to  his  resolution  never  to  submit  his  little 
force  to  the  risk  of  total  destruction,  decided  not  to  renew 
the  assault,  but  to  raise  the  siege,  and  preceded  by  his 
wounded  he  moved  across  the  Broad  River  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Charlotte. 

He  had  again  lost  the  battle,  but  won  the  campaign,  for 
Ninety-Six  was  speedily  evacuated  and  never  again  occu 
pied  by  the  British. 

His  losses  during  the  siege  were  57  killed,  70  wounded 
and  20  missing.  Cruger  lost  27  killed  and  58  wounded.1 

June  21  Rawdon  arrived  the  following  day  after  an  exhausting 

march  of  180  miles.  As  quickly  as  possible  he  started 
in  pursuit  of  Greene,  but  finding  that  the  latter  had 
crossed  the  Broad  he  returned  to  Ninety-Six  and  made 

Evacuation  of  preparations  for  its  evacuation.    Leaving  Cruger  there 

juTyet3y~Slx'       to  arrange  for  the  departure, of  the  numerous  loyalists 
residing  in  the  vicinity,  Rawdon  marched  first  to  Fort 

juiy  14  Granby  and  then  to  Orangeburg,  where  he  was  joined 

by  the  3d  Regiment,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Stewart,  from 
Charleston,  and  soon  after  by  Cruger,  from  Ninety-Six. 
This  carried  his  strength  to  nearly  twice  that  of  Greene; 
and  the  latter  decided  on  account  of  the  intense  heat  to 
march  his  men  to  the  high  hills  of  Santee,  about  30 
miles  below  Camden,  for  a  short  but  much-needed  rest. 
Leaving  Stewart  in  command  in  Orangeburg,  Rawdon 
took  500  men  and  returned  to  Charleston,  pursued  by 
Sumter  and  Marion  and  Lee  to  within  5  miles  of  the  city. 
Rawdon  then  left  for  England  on  leave  of  absence,  but 
his  ship  was  captured  by  de  Grasse  and  he  was  carried 
a  prisoner  to  Yorktown.  Stewart  followed  Greene  and 
went  into  camp  facing  him,  with  the  Congaree  between 
them.  Greene's  main  body  was  on  the  Santee  Hills; 

1  Stedman,  II,  373. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  253 

Sumter  took  station  on  his  right  near  the  site  of  Fort 
Granby  (Columbia),  Marion  (who  had  captured  George-  capture  of 
town  while  Greene  was  at  Ninety-Six)  on  his  left  at  Nel-  Juneg2o°w 
son's  Ferry  on  the  lower  Santee,  and  Pickens  returned  to 
his  old  recruiting-ground  near  Ninety-Six.1 

It  was  not  quite  eight  months  since  Greene  had  taken 
command  at  the  South.  At  that  time  everything  south 
of  North  Carolina  was  in  the  enemy's  possession.  Now 
they  had  lost  all  of  Georgia  except  Savannah  and  all 
but  a  small  portion  of  South  Carolina.  In  the  interval 
Greene's  little  army  had  marched  950  miles,  fought  3 
battles  and  a  score  of  minor  engagements,  conducted  5 
sieges,  captured  9  posts  and  taken  nearly  3,000  prisoners. 
His  army  had  no  organized  commissariat  or  transport 
system,  no  tents  or  camp  equipage,  and  only  insuffi 
cient  clothing.  He  had  no  base  of  supplies,  but  lived 
off  the  country  which,  although  in  the  main  friendly 
to  him,  was  filled  with  a  very  substantial  minority  of 
intensely  bitter  loyalists.  The  enemy  outnumbered  him 
three  to  one,  and  was  composed  of  the  best  British 
regulars  and  Hessians,  the  well-organized  and  veteran 
tory  regiments  of  New  York  and  New  Jersey  and  a  nu 
merous  body  of  local  partisans,  all  well  equipped  and  sup 
plied,  and  supported  by  an  ample  military  chest  of  ready 
money. 

Battles  were  lost  because  the  troops  lacked  training 
and  that  steadiness  which  only  experience  under  fire  will 
bring;  but  the  campaigns  were  won  by  tireless  marches 
skilfully  planned  and  directed.  These  were  carried  on, 
with  extraordinary  fortitude  on  the  part  of  the  men, 
through  the  snows  and  cold  rains  of  the  winter  and  the 
fierce  heat  of  a  Southern  summer. 

'Stedman,  II,  372-383;    Johnson,  II,  162-178. 


254  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  Greene  gave  his  little  army  six  weeks'  rest  in  the  com- 

Aug.  23          paratively  salubrious  region  of  the  Santee  Hills.    Dur 
ing  that  time  he  received  some  fresh  levies  from  North 
Greene  Carolina  (the  Guilford  runaways,  "condemned"  to  twelve 

offensive  '  months,  service  as  Continentals),  carrying  his  strength 
to  something  over  2,000  men.  He  then  resumed  the 
offensive,  and  marched  to  attack  Stewart. 

Aug.  28  It  would  have  been  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  have 

forced  a  passage  of  the  Santee;  and  Greene  therefore 
made  a  circuit  of  about  ninety  miles,  crossing  the  Wateree 
near  Camden  and  the  Congaree  below  Fort  Granby 
(Columbia),  and  picking  up  the  militia  of  Pickens  and 
Henderson  (formerly  Sumter)  on  his  march.  Having 
thus  crossed  the  rivers,  he  approached  Stewart  from  the 
north-west,  and  the  latter  retired  about  forty  miles  to 
his  depot  of  supplies  at  Eutaw  Springs. 

sept.?  Greene  slowly  followed  him,  and  a  week  later  was 

joined  by  Marion  on  his  return  from  a  very  successful 
raid  on  the  Edisto  near  Charleston.  The  next  day 
Greene  moved  forward  in  two  columns,  ready  for  deploy 
ment  as  soon  as  the  enemy  was  encountered.  He  had 
2,300  men  of  whom  1,254  were  Continentals  and  the  rest 
militia. 

Stewart  had  an  equal  number,  but  all  veterans;  6  regi 
ments — 3d,  63d,  64th,  Grenadiers,  New  York  Volunteers 
and  New  Jersey  Volunteers.  They  were  encamped  in  a 
clearing,  on  both  sides  of  the  main  road,  a  few  hundred 
yards  from  the  Santee;  and  in  rear  of  the  camp  was  a 
sept,  s  substantial  brick  house  and  palisaded  garden  which 

s  A.  M.  played  a  very  important  part  in  the  battle. 

About  four  miles  from  the  camp  Lee's  cavalry  came 
in  contact  with  a  " rooting"  party  (sent  out  to  dig  sweet- 
potatoes)  and  its  escort.  There  was  a  skirmish  in  which 


Americans 

ast  Positional  2nd  Poaltiou  CD 

British 
Position  Mi 2ii'l  I'osi  ttou 


Col.  .Henderson  £ 

^  8.  C.  MilitiiM  (jen'I  ElcJje'us 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers.  Cleveland,  Ohio 


From  A  very 's  History  of  the  United  States 
and  Its  People 


EUTAW  SPRINGS 
Sept.  8,  1781 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  255 

about  40  prisoners  were  taken  and  the  rest  rushed  back 
to  camp  to  give  the  alarm.  Stewart  promptly  formed 
his  men  in  a  single  line,  3  regiments  on  each  side  of  the 
road  and  2  pieces  of  artillery  on  the  road. 

Greene  moved  forward  and,  as  he  approached  the  Brit-  Battle  of 
ish  position,  deployed  in  two  lines;  the  militia  in  front,  springs, 
Marion  on  the  right  and  Pickens  on  the  left  and  the  North 
Carolina  militia  in  the  centre;    the  Continentals  in  the 
second  line,  the  two  new  North  Carolina  regiments  on  the 
right,  the  1st  and  2d  Virginia  in  the  centre,  1st  and  2d 
Maryland  on  the  left;  two  pieces  of  artillery  in  the  centre 
of  each  line;  Lee's  Legion  on  the  right  flank  and  Hender 
son's  (Sumter's)  partisans  on  the  left;  William  Washing 
ton's  cavalry  and  the  Delaware  battalion  in  the  rear. 

The  firing  began  at  150  yards  and  was  soon  very  heavy.  10  A.  M. 
The  militia,  under  the  guidance  of  Marion  and  Pickens, 
fought  well  and  held  their  ground  for  some  time;  and 
when  they  were  forced  back  Sumter's  two  North  Caro 
lina  regiments  came  into  line  with  them  and  the  ground 
was  regained.  Soon  afterward  they  were  again  forced 
back,  and  Greene  then  ordered  Campbell  and  Williams 
with  the  Virginia  and  Maryland  regiments  to  move  for 
ward  without  firing,  relying  on  the  bayonet;  and  at  the 
same  time  sent  Lee  and  William  Washington  to  charge 
with  their  cavalry  on  both  flanks.  There  was  soon  des 
perate  fighting  along  the  whole  line.  William  Washing 
ton  came  to  grief.  In  the  wooded  ground  his  dragoons 
were  defeated  with  a  loss  of  nearly  half  their  strength, 
their  leader  himself  being  wounded  and  taken  prisoner. 
The  infantry  and  Lee's  cavalry  on  the  right  were  en 
tirely  successful.  They  drove  the  British  regiments  (after 
a  desperate  struggle,  in  which  Campbell  was  killed  and 
Henderson  and  Howard  were  wounded)  to  and  through 


256  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i         their  camp.    Stewart  succeeded  in  rallying  his  men  at 

sept,  s  the  cross-roads  in  rear  of  his  camp,  and  a  portion  of  them 

Battle  of         took  refuge  in  the  brick  house  and  the  adjoining  garden; 

sprigs  and  from  the  windows  of  the  house  and  from  the  shelter 

of  the  stout  garden  fence  they  poured  a  very  destructive 

fire  upon  the  infantry  of  Lee's  Legion  and  Kirkwood's 

Delaware  battalion,  who  had  followed  to  the  door. 

The  Virginia  and  Maryland  regiments  stopped  in  the 
camp.  It  was  filled  with  abundant  supplies,  including 
rum.  It  was  so  long  since  the  Continentals  had  seen  such 
delicacies  that  the  temptation  to  partake  of  them  was 
irresistible — especially  as  they  thought  the  victory  was 
already  theirs. 

12  M.  The  battle  however,  was  not  won.    The  little  party  in 

the  brick  house  was  keeping  up  a  vigorous  fight  against 
the  Delaware  battalion  and  Hampton's  regiment  of 
Sumter's  men;  the  four  pieces  of  artillery  were  brought 
into  action  at  close  range,  but  they  were  unable  to  make 
any  impression  on  the  walls.  Finally  Major  Marjoribanks 
came  out  of  the  garden  and  made  a  bold  and  successful 
attack  (in  which  he  was  mortally  wounded),  turning 
Hampton's  left  flank  and  capturing  three  of  the  four 
pieces  of  artillery.  Meanwhile  the  Continentals  were 
enjoying  the  good  things  in  camp,  but  Stewart  was  re 
forming  his  men  at  the  cross-roads.  He  soon  renewed 
his  attack  and  the  Continentals  were  in  no  condition  to 
receive  it.  They  began  to  fall  back  and  Greene  ordered 
a  retreat,  bringing  off  his  own  wounded  as  well  as  his 
prisoners. 

It  was  a  bloody  battle;1  the  Americans  lost  120  killed, 
375  wounded  and  8  missing;  the  British,  85  killed,  351 

'Stedman,  II,  377-381;  Gordon,  IV,  168-171;  G.  W.  Greene,  III,  391- 
405;  Johnson,  II,  220-237;  Dawson,  711-720. 


BRITISH  DEFEAT  AT  THE  SOUTH  257 

wounded  and  430  missing — a  total  of  nearly  40  per  cent 
of  their  strength. 

Both  sides  retreated,  Greene  on  the  night  of  the  battle,  Results  of 
about   7  miles,    and  Stewart  the   next  day  14  miles, 
leaving  behind  him  a  portion  of  his  wounded  and  1,000 
muskets    and  destroying  such  stores  as  he  could  not 
carry  away.    As  soon  as  Greene  learned  that  Stewart  sept.  10 
had  retreated  he  started  in  pursuit,  but  the  latter  was 
soon  joined  by  a  reinforcement  from  Charleston,  and 
Greene  returned  to  the  Santee  Hills. 

Thus  for  the  fourth  time  Greene  failed  to  gain  a  vic 
tory  in  battle;  the  British  rum  unfortunately  deprived 
him  of  it  at  the  very  moment  of  success.  Again,  as  on 
the  previous  occasions,  the  advantages  of  victory  were 
on  his  side,  for  the  British  retired  to  the  vicinity  of 
Charleston.  Greene  gave  his  men  another  short  rest  at 
the  Santee  Hills  and  then  moved  down  to  the  Ashley  in  Action  at 
pursuit.  After  a  sharp  skirmish  at  the  beginning  of  Dec.  i 
winter  he  drove  them  within  their  lines  at  Charleston; 
and,  although  the  garrison  was  many  times  superior  to 
him  in  numbers,  he  maintained  a  strict  blockade  until 
the  city  was  evacuated. 

There  was  no  serious  righting  at  the  South  after  Eutaw  Re-establish- 
Springs.    The  Carolinas  and  Georgia  were  recovered  and  American 

i  T  mi  Government 

the  American  governments  were  re-established.    The  two  m  the  south 
British  garrisons  remained  quietly  within  the  limits  of        1782 
Savannah  and  Charleston  until  they  were  evacuated  and  July  n 
the  troops  carried  by  sea  to  New  York.  Dec- 14 

This  eleven  months'  campaign — January  to  December, 
1781,  from  the  Catawba  to  the  Dan  and  from  the  Dan 
back  to  Charleston  and  Augusta — received  at  the  time 
the  enthusiastic  commendation  of  Washington  and  his 
comrades  on  the  one  side  and  of  Tarleton  and  Stedman 


258 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1781 

Comments 
on  Greene's 
Southern 
Campaign 


on  the  other.  It  has  always  been  considered  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  in  American  annals,  and  it  has  been  quite 
as  much  praised  by  English  as  by  American  writers. 
Though  the  numbers  on  each  side  were  small,  yet  from 
the  military  stand-point  it  is  full  of  interest  and  instruc 
tion  and  well  repays  examination  in  all  its  details. 
The  marches,  the  manoeuvres,  the  sieges,  the  raids  and 
the  scouting  by  both  Lee  and  Tarleton,  the  improvised 
pontoon  trains,  the  proper  use  of  the  topography  of  the 
country  for  defence  and  offence — were  all  admirable. 
There  was  but  little  artillery  on  either  side,  but  it  was 
well  handled.  The  four  battles  were  fiercely  contested 
and  the  percentage  of  loss  on  both  sides  was  large.  The 
British  had  the  advantage  of  well-trained  and  well-armed 
troops,  but  this  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the 
superiority  of  the  American  generalship.  In  only  one 
respect  can  Greene  be  criticised,  and  whether  the  criticism 
is  just  or  unjust  it  is  hard  to  say.  He  lost  every  battle. 
Morgan,  under  similar  circumstances,  gained  a  great  vic 
tory.  If  Greene  had  possessed  the  same  temperament  as 
Morgan  or  Wayne  he  would  probably,  both  at  Guilford 
and  at  Eutaw,  have  made  one  more  effort  and  risked 
everything  on  the  result  of  it.  If  unsuccessful,  he  would 
have  been  destroyed;  if  successful,  he  would  have  hast 
ened  by  a  few  months  what  he  finally  accomplished. 
The  general  opinion  is,  and  it  is  probably  well  founded, 
that  the  circumstances  did  not  justify  the  risk,  and  that 
his  prudence — in  saving  his  little  army  while  there  was 
yet  time  and  after  he  had,  in  each  case,  inflicted  such  a 
loss  on  his  adversary  as  to  compel  the  adversary's  re 
treat — was  not  the  least  of  the  many  exhibitions  of  good 
judgment  which  characterized  the  whole  campaign. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
YORKTOWN 

WHEN  Cornwallis,  retreating  from  Guilford,  reached 
Wilmington,  he  was  in  great  perplexity.    His  letters  were 
somewhat  pathetic.    To  Phillips:  "My  situation  here  is 
very  distressing;  Greene  has  taken  the  advantage  of  my 
being  obliged  to  come  to  this  place,  and  has  marched 
to  South  Carolina."1   To  Clinton:  "My  present  under-  APni23 
taking  sits  heavy  on  my  mind."2    To  Germain:   "If 
we  are  so  unlucky  as  to  suffer  a  severe  blow  in  South 
Carolina  .  .  .  this  might  enable  General  Greene  to  hem  Perplexity  of 
me   in   among   the   great    rivers    and    by   cutting   off  C 
our  subsistence  render  our  arms  useless.     And  to  re 
main  here  for  transports  to  carry  us  off  ...  would 
be  as  ruinous  and  disgraceful  to  Britain  as  most  events 
could  be."3 

His  view  was  that  if  the  war  was  to  be  offensive  it 
should  be  in  Virginia;  if  defensive,  at  New  York.  In 
either  event  he  had  no  hope  of  saving  the  Carolinas. 
He  was  by  no  means  sure  that  Clinton  would  approve 
his  views.  He  very  much  desired  Clinton's  instruc 
tions,  but  it  would  take  six  weeks  or  more  to  obtain 
them,  and  he  could  not  wait  that  long.  He  had  al 
ready  wasted  two  weeks  in  thinking  about  it,  and  when 
he  received  definite  information  that  Phillips  had  been 

1  Clinton-Cornwallis,  I,  428.  2  Ibid.,  I,  424. 

9  Ibid.,  I,  421,422. 

259 


260 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1781 


Decides  to 
March  to 
Virginia 

April  24 


May  20 

Situation  in 
Virginia 


1780 

Oct.  15 
Nov.  25 
Dec.  20 

1781 
Feb.  24 
Feb.  15 

March  10 
March  16 


ordered  to  Virginia  he  decided  to  march  thither  and 
join  him.1 

Having  made  his  decision,  Cornwallis  marched  from 
Wilmington;  and  following  what  is  now  the  line  of  the 
Wilmington  and  Weldon  Railroad,  through  Goldsborough 
and  Weldon,  he  reached  Petersburg — 223  miles — at  the 
end  of  four  weeks.2  Here  he  found  that  Clinton  had  bent 
every  effort  to  send  a  sufficient  force  into  Virginia,  via 
the  Chesapeake,  to  cut  Greene's  communications,  and 
that  Washington  had  stripped  his  little  army  of  every 
man  that  could  be  spared,  in  order  to  keep  these  com 
munications  open. 

Clinton  first  had  sent  Leslie  with  2,500  men  to  Hamp 
ton  Roads;  and  when  Cornwallis  had  taken  these  to 
Charleston,  Clinton  had  sent  Arnold  with  1,600  men  to 
take  their  place.  Then  Washington  sent  Lafayette  with 
1,200  men  to  join  Steuben,  and  at  the  same  time  ordered 
Wayne  with  1,000  men  to  follow  Lafayette,  although 
Wayne  was  unable  to  march  until  three  months  later. 
Clinton  met  this  by  sending  Phillips  with  2,600  men  to 
reinforce  Arnold,  and  Washington  persuaded  Rocham- 
beau  to  send  1,200  of  the  French  troops  at  Newport  to 
reinforce  Lafayette.  They  never  reached  him  because 

1  This  decision  was  approved  by  Germain,  but  Clinton  maintained  that 
it  was  the  cause  of  the  loss  of  his  army  and  the  disastrous  termination  of 
the  war.    His  view  was  that  Cornwallis  should  have  gone  back  to  South 
Carolina,  collected  his  forces,  which  largely  outnumbered  Greene's,  and 
beaten  him  in  battle;    to  which  the  troops  in  Virginia  would  have  con 
tributed  by  cutting  off  Greene's  communications  with  the  North.     Corn 
wallis  maintained  that  Greene  had  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  march 
back  to  South  Carolina,  and  that  Virginia  was  the  place  for  the  final  struggle. 
The  controversy  was  maintained,  so  long  as  Clinton  lived,  in  almost  endless 
Narratives  and  Replies,  which  by  the  industry  of  Mr.  B.  F.  Stevens  were 
collected,  arranged  and  printed  so  that  every  one  can  now  read  both  sides. 
Clinton-Cornwallis,  I  and  II. 

2  Tarleton,  291. 


If 

li 


SI 

f-s 

-S.2 


YORKTOWN  261 

the  squadron  convoying  them  was  met  and  defeated  by 
a  British  squadron,  and  thereupon  they  returned  to  New 
port.    Finally  Clinton  sent  three  more  regiments  (1,500  May  23 
men)  to  reinforce  Phillips/  and  these  arrived  at  Peters 
burg  a  few  days  after  Cornwallis  reached  that  point.2 

Clinton  had  thus  sent  5,700  men  to  Virginia3 ;  Washing 
ton  could  only  send  1,200.  Cornwallis  brought  1,500 
with  him,  carrying  his  total  strength  to  7,200.  Lafayette 
had  gathered  a  few  hundred  militia;  Steuben  was  in  the 
vicinity  of  Charlottesville,  trying  to  raise  eighteen  months' 
men  to  fill  up  Greene's  new  Continental  regiments;  and 
Wayne,  although  supposed  to  be  marching  through 
Maryland,  had  not  in  fact  left  York,  Pa.,  at  the  time  that  May  24 
Cornwallis  marched  to  cross  the  James. 

Cornwallis  argued,  then  and  afterward,  in  favor  of  "  solid 
operations  in  Virginia. "  Here  was  his  chance.  Lafayette 
was  at  Richmond,  only  twenty  miles  off,  with  a  force  one- 
sixth  as  large  as  his  own.  Destroy  him,  and  break  up  Cornwall's 
Steuben 's  recruiting  depot  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rivanna,  Movements 
and  his  march  to  Virginia  would  have  been  justified  not 
only  to  Clinton  but  to  all  the  world.  Cornwallis  lost 
the  chance;  and  his  movements  for  the  next  three  months 
can  only  be  characterized  as  feeble — far  different  from 
the  energy  which  he  had  displayed  in  the  Jerseys  four 
years  before. 

Lee  and  Jackson  have  shown  what  a  general  of  the 
first  rank  would  have  done  in  Cornwallis's  situation.  Un 
doubtedly  either  of  them  would  have  crossed  the  James 
above  Richmond,  between  Lafayette  and  Steuben,  and 
marched  rapidly  across  the  headwaters  of  the  Virginia 

1  Phillips  died  a  few  days  before  Cornwallis  arrived  and  Arnold  was  sent 
back  to  New  York  soon  after. 

3  Sparks,  VIII,  10,  13,  19,  22,  510-516;    Tarleton,  285-292. 
3  Clinton-Cornwallis,  I,  476-499. 


262  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

streams  to  get  between  Lafayette  and  Wayne.  With 
sufficient  celerity  of  action,  all  three  detachments  could 
have  been  either  destroyed  or  dispersed. 

Cornwallis's  base  was  the  sea,  and  he  could  not  forget 
it.  His  communications  with  New  York  were  via  the 
lower  James,  and  he  was  not  willing  to  cut  loose  and  take 
the  risk  of  Lafayette's  small  force  getting  in  his  rear. 

May  26  He  therefore  crossed  the  James  30  miles  below  Richmond, 

at  Westover;  and  his  plans  extended  no  further  than  "to 
dislodge  Lafayette  from  Richmond  and  with  my  [his] 
light  troops  to  destroy  any  magazines  or  stores  in  the 
neighborhood"  and  then  "to  move  to  the  neck  (penin 
sula)  at  Williamsburg."  1 

Lafayette's          It  was  Lafayette  who  acted  with  the  proper  celerity. 

Action  °         He  promptly  retreated  to  Ely's  Ford  on  the  Rapidan, 

May  27  covering  the  70  miles  in  7  days.    Cornwallis  pursued  no 

farther  than  the  North  Anna  (30  miles).    He  then  sent 

June  4  his  cavalry  (which  outnumbered  that  of  Lafayette  10  to 

1)  on  two  raids,  one  under  Tarleton  to  Charlottesville 
to  disperse  the  legislature,  and  the  other  under  Simcoe 

June  i  to  break  up  Steuben's  depot  at  Point  of  Fork,  where  the 

Rivanna  empties  into  the  James,  50  miles  above  Rich 
mond.  With  the  main  body  he  followed  leisurely  to  the 

June  ?  latter  point  (40  miles  in  6  days),  and  was  joined  there 

June  9  by  Tarleton  and  Simcoe,  who  had  accomplished  the  ob 

ject  of  their  raids,  destroying  a  great  deal  of  tobacco  and 
some  arms  and  supplies.  Steuben  was  forced  to  march 

June  10  rapidly  southward  with  his  450  Continental  recruits ;  but 
he  was  not  pursued.  He  halted  at  Cole's  Ferry,  on  the 
Staunton  River,  and  waited  for  further  advices  or  in 
structions  from  either  Greene  or  Lafayette.2 

1  Clinton-Cornwallis,  I,  488. 

2 Tarleton,  295-299;    Kapp,  Steuben,  448-450. 


YORKTOWN  263 

Meanwhile,   Wayne   was  marching  south  with  good       1731 
speed.    He  made  the  160  miles  from  York,  Pa.,  to  the  Arrival  of 
Rapidan  in  14  days,  and  he  joined  Lafayette  without  May  20 
any  serious  effort  on  Cornwallis's  part  to  prevent  it,  June  10 
although  the  latter  knew  that  Wayne  was  on  his  way  to 
reinforce  Lafayette.    As  soon  as  the  junction  was  made, 
Cornwallis  retreated  through  Richmond  to  Williamsburg,  June  14-25 
Lafayette  following  him,  and  Steuben  joining  Lafayette 
on  the  march.    On  the  outskirts  of  this  little  village  the 
first  shot  was  fired  after  a  month  of  marching.    It  was  June  9 
an  inconclusive  skirmish  between  advance  guard  and 
rear  guard,  with  a  loss  of  about  30  men  on  each  side.1 

At  Williamsburg  Cornwallis  received  a  letter  from 
Clinton  asking  him  to  send  about  3,000  men  to  New  York. 
Cornwallis  thereupon  changed  his  plan  of  remaining  at 
Williamsburg  and  prepared  to  cross  the  James  and  march 
to  Portsmouth,  where  the  men  would  embark.    As  he 
approached  the  river  at  Jamestown  Lafayette  pressed  Battle  of 
close  to  him  and  a  smart  engagement2  resulted  in  which  July  e 
the  Americans  lost  26  killed,  99  wounded  and  12  missing, 
chiefly  in  Wayne's  Pennsylvania  regiments;   and  Corn 
wallis  lost  5  killed  and  70  wounded. 

Lafayette  was  defeated,  but  Cornwallis  made  no  at 
tempt  to  follow  him  and  he  retired  slowly  to  Malvern 
Hill,  below  Richmond.    The  next  day  Cornwallis  crossed  July  7 
the  James,  and  sending  on  to  Portsmouth  the  troops 
designated  for  embarkation,  with  the  rest  he  marched  as 
far  as  Suffolk.    Tarleton  was  sent  on  a  long  raid3  across  juiy9-24 
the  State  to  the  mountains  and  back — 400  miles  in  15 
days — to  destroy  the  stores  which  Steuben  had  been 
accumulating  for  the  Southern  army.    These  had  beer 

1  Dawson,  698-700.  a  Tarleton,  354;    Dawson,  701-704. 

3  Tarleton,  358. 


264  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i        safely  removed  and  all  that  Tarleton  accomplished  was 
to  burn  up  a  good  many  hogsheads  of  tobacco. 

A  situation  then  existed  on  the  British  side  which  had 
a  most  important  bearing  on  the  issue  of  the  campaign. 
It  was  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  four  years  before 
which  resulted  so  disastrously  at  Saratoga.1 

Lack  of  In  London,  Lord  George  Germain — probably  the  most 

ordination  on    incompetent  official  that  ever  held  an  important  post  at 

the  Part  of  the  .   .      ,  ~   ,       .    ,   ~  ,  ,       .  , 

British  a  critical  moment — was  Colonial  Secretary,  charged  with 

the  conduct  of  the  war  under  the  personal  direction  of 
the  King,  with  whom  he  was  a  great  favorite.  His  letters 
were  sometimes  six  weeks  and  sometimes  three  months 
in  crossing  the  ocean,  and  when  they  reached  their  desti 
nation  the  state  of  facts  on  which  they  were  based  had 
usually  changed.  Yet  he  undertook  to  direct  the  opera 
tions  at  this  distance  and  corresponded  directly  with 
Clinton  and  with  Cornwallis — frequently  giving  contra 
dictory  instructions. 

At  New  York,  Clinton,  who  was  commander-in-chief 
of  the  land  forces  and  peace  commissioner  as  well,  was 
responsible  for  the  operations;  but  he  had  no  control 
over  the  navy,  whose  co-operation  was  absolutely  essen 
tial  as  all  plans  were  based  on  the  control  of  the  sea. 
Sometimes  the  naval  commander  was  in  accord  with 
Clinton  and  sometimes  he  was  not;  and  in  the  latter 
cases  he  acted  on  his  own  judgment,  regardless  of  Clin 
ton's  plans. 

At  the  south,  from  Virginia  to  Georgia,  Cornwallis 
was  in  chief  command.  His  letters  reached  New  York 
in  from  eight  days  to  two  months.  Clinton's  letters  to 
him  were  very  numerous,  and  they  were  such  as  not  to 
leave  Cornwallis  a  free  hand;  neither  did  they  give  him 

1  P.  79,  ante. 


YORKTOWN  265 

positive  orders.  Clinton  and  Cornwallis  had  different 
views  as  to  the  proper  plan  of  campaign,  and  Germain 
favored  those  of  Cornwallis.  Clinton  sent  instructions  to 
Cornwallis,  always  with  a  saving  clause  that  if  the  latter 
had  other  plans  in  view  the  instructions  were  not  to  be 
followed.  Cornwallis  tried  to  follow  these  directions, 
but  every  move  he  made  was  disapproved.  Clinton  cen 
sured  him  for  marching  north  from  Wilmington,  for  not 
remaining  at  Williamsburg,  for  going  to  Portsmouth 
and  finally  for  selecting  Yorktown  as  the  naval  sta 
tion.  Clinton  did  not  give  him  any  positive  instructions 
nor  do  his  letters  contain  any  clear,  definite,  matured 
plan.1 

With  such  lack  of  co-operation  and  co-ordination 
among  those  in  the  highest  authority,  success  would 
under  any  circumstances  have  been  difficult. 

On  the  American  side  military  conditions  were  far  Favorable 
more  favorable.  When  Greene  was  sent  to  the  South  the  American 
Congress  gave  him  full  authority  and  placed  at  his  dis 
posal  all  its  resources — they  were  meagre  enough,  but  it 
was  absolutely  everything  they  had.  Washington  gave 
Greene  the  benefit  of  his  advice  before  he  left  and  after 
that  never  sent  him  an  "order,  although  he  continued  to 
accord  him  the  most  hearty  and  unstinted  support.  In 
short,  the  government  and  the  commander-in-chief  gave 
the  local  commander  every  assistance  they  could  com 
mand  and  they  both  left  to  him  the  conduct  of  the 
campaign. 

On  the  American  side  there  was  precisely  that  co 
operation  and  co-ordination  which  was  so  completely 
lacking  on  the  British  side,  and  it  was  one  of  the  prime 
factors  of  success.  There  were  lessons  in  these  opera- 

1  Clinton-Cornwallis,  I,  493;    II,  15,  53,  73,  98,  109,  143. 


266  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1781         tions  of  1781  which  if  they  had  been  learned  and  applied 

in  the  Civil  War  would  have  saved  many  lives. 
Clinton's  in-         The  instructions  which  Cornwallis  received  from  Clin- 
°     ton  —  always  with  a  reservation  as  above  stated  —  re- 


11-15-19  peated  in  three  successive  letters,  were  to  send  about 
3,000  men  to  New  York.  The  reason  given  was  that 
Washington  and  the  French  allies  were  approaching  New 
York,  and  Clinton  feared  he  had  not  enough  men  for  its 
defence—  a  reason  which  would  override  the  reservations. 
Cornwallis  received  the  first  two  of  these  letters  at  Will- 
iamsburg,  and  crossed  the  James  to  march  to  Ports 
mouth  and  obey  them.  While  on  the  march  he  received 

June  28  another  letter,  of  later  date,  ordering  the  detachment  to 
Philadelphia  instead  of  New  York.  Four  days  later 

juiyi  came  another  letter,  of  subsequent  date,  ignoring  the 

orders  for  Philadelphia,  but  urging  immediate  despatch 
of  troops  to  New  York.  Before  the  troops  could  be  put 

juiy  11  on  the  transports  came  a  sixth  and  a  seventh  letter, 

July  15  dated  later  than  the  others,  directing  him  to  keep  all  his 

troops  in  Virginia  and  to  occupy  Old  Point  Comfort  as 
a  support  for  the  fleet  which  was  to  be  sent  to  Hamp- 

juiy26  ton  Roads.  Cornwallis  at  once  went  in  person  to  ex 

amine  Old  Point  Comfort,  taking  with  him  his  army 
engineers  and  the  naval  commanders  then  present.  They 
were  all  of  opinion,  and  so  reported  in  writing,  that  Old 
Point  Comfort  was  not  suitable  for  defence.  Inasmuch 
as  Clinton  and  Graves  (the  naval  commander-in-chief) 
had  both  urged  the  supreme  importance  of  establishing 
a  naval  station  in  the  Chesapeake,  supported  by  defen 
sive  works  on  shore,  Cornwallis  selected  the  harbor  be 
tween  Yorktown  and  Gloucester  as  the  one  best  adapted 
for  that  purpose.  He  informed  Clinton  and  Graves  of 
his  decision,  as  being  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  his 


YORKTOWN  267 

orders,  and  also  in  accordance  with  the  opinion  which 
Phillips  had  given  Clinton1 — that  Yorktown  was  the 
proper  station — which  opinion  Clinton  had  previously 
sent  to  Cornwallis  for  his  guidance.  The  transports  be- 
ing  now  at  Portsmouth,  the  troops  were  sent  to  Gloucester  Yorktown 
and  Yorktown  as  quickly  as  possible,  the  lines  of  field 
fortifications  were  laid  out  and  the  work  of  constructing 
them  was  begun. 

Some  excuse  for  the  vacillating  and  contradictory  Aug.  2 
orders  that  Clinton  gave  may  be  found  in  the  masterly 
plans  that  Washington  had  recently  been  formulating 
and  was  now  putting  into  effect.  For  three  years,  with 
infinite  patience  and  tact,  Washington  had  been  trying 
to  obtain  some  positive,  tangible,  military  benefit  from 
the  French  alliance.  There  was  no  doubt  of  its  moral,  Washington's 
political  and  financial  advantage;  but  as  yet  the  French 
troops  had  taken  little  or  no  part  in  the  military  opera 
tions.  In  1778  the  French  fleet  had  been  blown  away 
from  Newport  carrying  the  soldiers  with  it.  In  1779  it 
had  to  come  to  Savannah  for  a  short  period,  only  to  en 
gage  in  a  disastrous  repulse.  In  1780  it  had  got  into 
Newport,  but  had  been  bottled  up  there  ever  since. 
Now,  at  last,  the  diplomatic  but  incessant  arguments  of 
Washington  with  Rochambeau  at  Newport,  and  the  less 
diplomatic  but  effective  efforts  of  Laurens  supported  by 
Franklin  in  Paris,  began  to  have  their  effect.  A  new 
fleet  was  to  be  sent  under  de  Grasse  to  the  West  Indies 
and  thence  to  the  American  coast — to  co-operate  with 
Rochambeau  under  Washington's  direction. 

As  soon  as  Washington  heard  of  this  at  his  head-  May  22 
quarters  at  New  Windsor  (Newburg)  he  set  out  for 
Wethersfield  (near  Hartford)  and  there  met  Rocham- 

1  Clinton-Cornwallis,  II,  19,  24,  26,  29,  41,  49,  61,  73. 


268 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 


1781 


The  Allies 
Move  Toward 
New  York 

June  10 


July  6 


July  2-3 


July  20-23 


beau.1  They  perfected  the  details  of  an  attack  on  New 
York — the  obvious  plan,  for  the  accomplishment  of 
which  Washington  had  so  often  asked  the  co-operation 
of  the  French.  Washington  again  sent  to  the  New 
England  governors2  the  most  urgent  request  that  they 
fill  up  their  quota  in  the  Continental  regiments,  for  one 
season  if  the  men  could  not  be  obtained  for  longer.  A 
small  portion  of  de  Grasse's  fleet  soon  arrived  in  Boston, 
bringing  700  recruits  for  the  regiments  at  Newport  and 
announcing  what  de  Grasse's  movements  would  be. 
He  intended  to  arrive  on  the  American  coast  in  July  or 
August.  Letters  were  sent  k  him  by  Luzerne  and 
Rochambeau,  at  Washington's  suggestion,  urgently  re 
questing  him  to  bring  troops  as  well  as  ships  from  the 
West  Indies,  and  to  come  to  New  York,  stopping  on  his 
way  at  the  Chesapeake,  where  perhaps  he  might  find  an 
opportunity  for  an  important  stroke. 3 

The  operations  against  New  York  then  proceeded. 
The  French  army  finally  left  Newport  for  Providence 
and  then  marched  westward.  Washington  marched  south 
ward  from  the  Highlands,  and  the  two  armies  came 
together,  taking  a  position  extending  from  Dobb's  Ferry 
to  White  Plains.  An  attempt  was  made  by  the  advance 
guard  under  Lincoln  to  surprise  and  capture  the  posts  on 
the  north  end  of  Manhattan  Island,  and  by  Lauzun's 
Legion  to  capture  an  outpost  of  Provincials  in  Mor- 
risania;  but  both  failed.4 

Washington  then  carefully  reconnoitred  from  Fort  Lee 
in  New  Jersey  and  from  Chatterton's  Hill  across  the 
Harlem,  the  fortifications  of  the  British  on  Manhattan 
Island  where  he  had  himself  first  laid  out  the  fortified 


Sparks,  VIII,  54. 
3  Ibid.,  VIII,  64-78. 


2  Ibid.,  VIII,  51-53. 
4  Ibid..  VIII.  86-98. 


YORKTOWN  269 

lines  five  years  before.  They  were  too  strong  to  be  at- 
tacked.  The  French  had  4  regiments,  Bourbonnais, 
Soissonnais,  Saintonge  and  Royal-Deux-Ponts.  They 
were  10  company  regiments  and  their  full  complement 
was  about  65  officers  and  1,250  men  each.  There  had 
been  some  sickness,  and  detachments  had  been  left  at 
Providence  and  elsewhere  to  guard  their  stores.  Their 
effective  strength  was  now  about  930  each.  In  addition 
there  was  Lauzun's  Legion,  the  artillery  and  the  engineers. 
The  entire  French  force  was  4,756.1  Washington  had 
little  if  any  more,  for  his  appeal  to  the  New  England 
governors  had  brought  only  a  feeble  response.  Clinton 
had  in  New  York  about  14,000  effectives,2  in  fortified 
lines,  to  reach  which  it  was  necessary  to  pass  one  or  the 
other  of  the  rivers,  which  were  controlled  by  the  smaller 
British  vessels,  while  a  large  squadron  was  in  the  lower 
bay.  Until  de  Grasse  should  arrive  an  attack  was  out 
of  the  question. 

Washington's  fertile  mind  was  intently  thinking  of  Washington' 
alternative  plans;   to  be  decided  as  soon  as  definite  in- 


telligence  of  de  Grasse  's  movements  should  be  received. 
He  had  written  to  Lafayette  directing  him  to  establish  July  13 
a  line  of  "expresses"  to  keep  him  quickly  informed  of 
any  movements  of  the  enemy  and  similarly  to  inform 
Greene;  he  now  wrote  to  both  Greene  and  Lafayette,  July  so 
directing  both  of  them  to  send  him  the  most  complete 
information  they  could  obtain  as  to  the  strength  and 
position  of  the  British  troops  in  Virginia  and  at  Charles 
ton,  and  intimating  as  clearly  as  he  dared,  in  view  of  the 
possibility  of  his  letters  being  intercepted  as  several  had 
been  recently,  that  a  campaign  to  Virginia  or  a  siege  of 

1  Return  of  June  1  ;    Keim,  389. 

2  Sparks,  V,  544,  545. 


270  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  Charleston  might  be  the  outcome  of  de  Grasse's  arrival. 
His  later  letters  showed  that  he  was  considering  three 
projects:  if  Clinton  reinforced  Cornwallis,  to  attack  New 
York;  if  Cornwallis  reinforced  Clinton  (as  he  thought  the 
most  probable),  to  march  to  Virginia;  and  if  on  arriving 
in  the  Chesapeake  the  conditions  were  favorable,  to  move 
by  sea  to  Charleston  and  besiege  it  in  conjunction  with 
Greene.1 
News  from  While  he  was  thinking  of  these  different  plans,  definite 

de  Grasse 

news  came  from  de  Grasse.  The  letter  was  addressed 
Aug.  14  to  Rochambeau  and  was  dated  at  Cape  St.  Francis,  San 
July  s  Domingo.  It  was  clear  and  concise,  very  different  from 

the  letters  that  d'Estaing  wrote.  It  stated  that  he  would 
sail  north  on  August  13;  would  bring  with  him  29  vessels 
of  war  and  a  portion  of  the  garrison  of  San  Domingo,  to 
wit:  3  regiments,  Gatinais,  Agenois  and  Touraine,  each 
1,000  strong,  together  with  100  dragoons,  100  artillery 
men,  10  field  pieces  and  several  siege  cannon  and  mortars; 
he  would  proceed  directly  to  the  Chesapeake  and  would 
sail  back  to  the  West  Indies  on  October  15,  taking  the 
troops  with  him.2 

The  Allies  Washington  made  an  instant  decision;  he  would  march 

Virginia0         to  the  Chesapeake  to  meet  him.    Orders  were  immedi- 

Aug.  is          ately   despatched  to   Lafayette   to  prevent  Cornwallis 

escaping  to  South  Carolina;  to  Heath  to  take  command 

of  the  little  force,  twelve  small  battalions,  which  was 

Aug.  17          left  in  the  north.    A  letter  was  sent  by  Duportail,  the 

chief  engineer,  to  de  Grasse,  explaining  his  plans,  and 

asking  him  to  send  light  vessels  to  Head  of  Elk  in  order 

to  transport  the  troops  down  the  Chesapeake.3    And 

Aug.  21          then  the  allied  armies  were  put  in  motion,  crossing  the 

Hudson  at  King's  Ferry  to  Stony  Point,  then  marching 

1  Sparks,  VIII,  116-122.  a  Ibid.,  VIII,  522.  » Ibid.,  127-139 


YORKTOWN  271 

behind  the  Palisades  to  Newark  and  New  Brunswick,        nsi 
making  a  feint  against  Staten  Island,  and  then  on  through  sept,  i 
Philadelphia  to  Head  of  Elk.    So  skilfully  had  Washing 
ton  conducted  this  movement  and  concealed  it  from  the 
enemy  that  the  troops  had  been  14  days  on  the  march, 
and  most  of  them  had  passed  Philadelphia  when  Clinton 
wrote  to  Cornwallis:1    "By  intelligence  which  I  have 
this  day  received,  it  would  seem  that  Mr.  Washington  is  sept.  2 
moving  an  army  to  the  southward,  with  an  appearance 
of  haste,  and  gives  out  that  he  expects  the  co-operation 
of  a  considerable  French  armament." 

In  making  this  move  Washington  put  everything  to  Boldness  of 
the  hazard.  A  vigorous  antagonist  would  have  marched 
up  the  Hudson,  scattered  Heath's  little  force,  seized  the  Aug.  n 
Highlands  and  held  them.  Clinton  had  just  been  rein 
forced  by  2,500  Hessians,  and  his  own  return  showed  an 
effective  strength  at  New  York  of  16,701  men.2  Heath 
had,  at  the  most,  2,500.  Can  there  be  any  doubt  of  what 
a  man  like  Grant  or  Lee  would  have  done  in  Clinton's 
place?  Further,  if  Washington  failed  in  Virginia,  New 
England  was  hopelessly  separated  from  the  South,  and 
notwithstanding  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia  had  been  re 
gained,  the  Revolution  would  have  collapsed. 

Daring  as  was  the  plan,  it  was  eminently  wise;  for 
without  a  great  victory  the  Revolution  would  die  of  ex 
haustion.  It  was  a  time — as  it  had  been  at  Trenton— 
when  nothing  but  audacity  would  avail ;  and  it  indicates 
the  extraordinary  balance  and  poise  of  Washington's 
mind  that  he  could  wait  three  long  years  for  the  psycho 
logical  moment  to  arrive,  and  when  it  did  arrive  that  he 
instantly  took  advantage  of  it. 

1  Clinton-Cornwallis,  II,  149,  150.  « Sparks,  V,  545. 


272  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  In  boldness  of  conception  and  celerity  of  execution 

this  march  to  Virginia  was  comparable  with  Napoleon 's 
famous  campaign  of  1805,  when  he  suddenly  abandoned 
the  camp  which  he  had  formed  at  Boulogne  for  the  in 
vasion  of  England  and  marched  to  the  Danube.  The  dis 
tance  was  about  the  same,  400  miles.  Washington  cov 
ered  it  in  28  days,  Napoleon  in  35  days.  Napoleon  left 
the  Channel  on  August  27,  and  the  capitulation  of  Ulm 
took  place  on  October  15 — 49  days  later.  Washington 
crossed  the  Hudson  August  21,  and  the  surrender  of 
Yorktown  was  on  October  19 — 59  days.  Washington's 
resources  in  men,  money,  equipment,  supplies  and  trans 
portation  were  but  a  small  fraction  of  those  at  Napoleon's 
disposal;  but  the  effect  on  the  world's  history  of  Ulm 
and  Austerlitz  was  a  still  smaller  fraction  of  the  results 
which  flowed  from  Yorktown. 

Movements  of       It  was  an  integral  part  of  Washington's  plan  that  the 
and  English      French  should  for  the  time  being  at  least  control  the  sea. 

Fleets 

and  fortunately  the  naval  commander  was  of  a  different 
type  from  d'Estaing.  De  Grasse  came  up  through  the 
Bahama  Channel  instead  of  the  direct  route,  and  Hood, 
who  left  the  Windward  Islands  in  pursuit,  thus  passed 
him  without  knowing  it.  After  looking  in  at  the  Chesa 
peake,  Hood  went  on  to  New  York,  and  the  united  fleet, 

Aug.  si  under  Graves,  immediately  sailed  for  the  Chesapeake, 
hoping  to  intercept  de  Barras's  smaller  fleet  (which  was  on 
its  way  from  Newport)  before  it  could  join  de  Grasse.  In 

Aug.  so  the  interval  de  Grasse  had  passed  inside  of  Cape  Henry.1 
He  at  once  sent  the  land  troops — the  brigade  of  St.  Simon 

sept.  5  —up  to  the  James  River  and  landed  them  near  Williams- 

burg,  where  they  were  joined  two  days  later  by  Lafayette 
who  had  marched  down  from  Malvern  Hill  to  meet  them. 

'Mahan,  389. 


YORKTOWN  273 

On  the  day  the  French  troops  landed  the  British  fleet 
came  in  sight  of  Cape  Henry.  De  Grasse  went  out  to  Navai  Battle 
fight  them,  but,  unlike  d'Estaing  at  Newport,  he  did  not  Chesapeake 
carry  his  soldiers  with  him.  These  were  left  with  Lafay 
ette.  The  naval  engagement  was  inconclusive,  both  sides 
losing  heavily  in  men  and  guns,  and  then  manoeuvring 
for  four  days  without  renewing  the  action.  The  net 
result  was  very  advantageous  to  de  Grasse,  for  the  Brit 
ish  admiral  found  it  necessary  to  take  his  fleet  back  to 
New  York  for  repairs.  De  Grasse  was  left  in  control  of 
the  Chesapeake,  and  during  the  manoeuvring  de  Barras 
slipped  in  between  the  capes,  bringing  with  him  some 
recruits  for  the  French  regiments  and  a  large  train  of 
siege  artillery.1 

Clinton  at  New  York  learned  from  Cornwallis  prior  to  canton  Goes 
Graves  's  return  that  de  Grasse  was  in  the  Chesapeake, 


and  saw  at  once  that  the  only  chance  to  save  Cornwallis 
was  to  join  him  with  troops  from  New  York.    He  there-  sept.  6 
fore  embarked  4,000  men  on  transports  and  wrote  to 
Cornwallis  that  he  would  sail  with  them  as  soon  as  the 
admiral  could  furnish  a  convoy.    It  was  six  weeks  before 
the  British  ships  were  sufficiently  repaired  to  furnish  a 
convoy.    Clinton  then  sailed  with  7,000  men,  but  when  he  Oct.  19 
reached  the  capes  he  learned  that  Cornwallis  had  already  Oct.  24 
surrendered,  and  he  retraced  his  steps  to  New  York.2 

Meanwhile,  Washington  had  joined  Lafayette  at  Will- 
iamsburg  and  his  troops  continued  to  arrive  during  the  sept.  14 
next  ten  days;   some  marching  by  land,  but  the  greater  Allied  A°mye 
number  coming  down  the  Chesapeake  from  Annapolis,  Washington 
Baltimore  and  Head  of  Elk  in  small  vessels  furnished  by 
the  French.    The  entire  force3  —  the  French  from  New- 

^lahan,  389.  2  Clinton-Cornwallis,  II,  152,  172,  186,  188. 

3  Johnston,  Yorktown,  112-119. 


274  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  port,  the  Americans  from  the  Hudson,  Lafayette's  troops 
from  Virginia  and  the  French  from  Haiti — numbered 
about  16,600  men.  The  Americans  were  organized  into 
3  divisions  under  Lincoln,  Lafayette  and  Steuben ;  there 
were  the  remnants  of  17  infantry  regiments  from  each 
of  the  States  from  Massachusetts  to  Virginia,  4  artillery 
regiments  and  1  of  cavalry — in  all  5,645  Continentals; 
and  there  were  3  brigades  of  new  militia — 3,200  men — 
from  Virginia  under  command  of  the  governor,  Nelson. 
The  French  were  organized  in  2  brigades,  and  there  were 
7  regiments  of  infantry,  1  of  artillery  and  1  of  cavalry — 
about  7,800  rank  and  file,  effective,  in  all. 

Cornwallis's  return  gave  5,316  effective.  He  had  1 
Provincial,  4  Hessian  and  11  British  regiments,  besides 
artillery  and  the  cavalry  of  Simcoe's  Rangers  and 
Tarleton's  Legion. 

siege  of  As  soon  as  his  army  was  assembled  and  organized 

Washington  moved  forward  from  Williamsburg  and  sur 
rounded  Yorktown,  the  Americans  on  the  right  and  the 

sept.  28  French  on  the  left.  The  siege  was  begun  and  prosecuted 
in  thoroughly  military  fashion.  Cornwallis  did  not  feel 
strong  enough  to  occupy  his  outlying  works  south-east  of 

sept,  so  the  village,  and  he  therefore  abandoned  them.  They  were 
immediately  occupied  by  the  allies,  and  from  them  the 

Oct.  c  first  parallel  was  opened  at  600  yards;  the  siege-guns  had 

been  landed  from  de  Barras's  fleet  and  brought  to  the 
trenches,  and  were  vigorously  used.  The  approaches 
were  carried  forward  and  the  second  parallel  was  opened, 

Oct.  11  at  300  yards.    Then  a  most  gallant  night  assault  was 

Oct.  14  made,  Alexander  Hamilton  in  the  lead,  and  two  redoubts 

were  carried  near  the  river  on  the  British  left.    The  second 

Oct.  15  parallel  was  promptly  extended  to  include  these.    On  the 

following  night  just  before  daybreak  Cornwallis  made  a 


Siege  of  Yorktown 


A  redoubts  stormed 
on  Oct.  .T 

ierican  Batters 


~~     Field  where  British 
laid  down  their  arms 


^^A'      rxr — u»-  iNeison's 

^Hospital   Am>ij^___Quarters  Quarters 


•vi  *^^  /^   ri^,nwspiiai    ^vm.  ^<5^_    xtu 

«         ^^jr_a  Steuben'sV  Hospital^^g^ 

H.  .^aj^      ^--r^Quarters  'C*ril.     «MP>  T5.J- 


/llochain  beau's  -C1^ 


V~A-    Arlincers    i-T    U 

*f  '    ^.aboratory  ^  QVM-  Gen 
/        Blagazine  \\ 


Courtesy  of  The  Burrows  Brothers  Company, 
Publishers,  Cleveland,  Ohio 


40 
YORKTOWN 

Sept.  30-Oct.  19,  1781 


From  Avery's  History  of  The  United  States 
and  Its  People 


'  *  • '   J '  *  1     i    ;  j 


YORKTOWN  275 

vigorous  sortie  with  the  Guards  and  light  infantry,  carried        1731 
two  batteries,  hastily  and  imperfectly  spiked  the  guns 
and  inflicted  a  loss  of  about  100  men  on  the  French. 
They  could  not  hold  the  position  and  were  driven  back  to 
their  own  lines.1 

Cornwallis  then  attempted  to  ferry  his  men  across  to  Oct.  16 
Gloucester  in  a  desperate  plan  of  trying  to  save  his  army 
by  marching  toward  Philadelphia;    but  this  plan  was 
completely  frustrated  at  the  start  by  a  violent  storm 
which  arose  during  the  night  and  scattered  and  swamped 
his  boats.    With  great  difficulty  his  men  were  reassem 
bled  on  the  Yorktown  side.    Then  Cornwallis  opened  Oct.  17 
negotiations  for  surrender  and  two  days  later  the  capit-  Oct.  19 
ulation  was  signed.    Washington  took  care  that  there  capitulation 
should  be  no  such  mistakes  as  had  been  made  at  Sara 
toga.    The  garrison,  including  the  naval  force,  was  to  be 
surrendered  as  prisoners  of  war;  all  public  property  was  to 
belong  to  the  United  States;  no  engagement  was  made  as 
to  future  exchange  of  prisoners,  "the  soldiers  to  be  kept  in 
Virginia,  Maryland  or  Pennsylvania  .  .  .  and  supplied 
with  .  .  .  rations";  the  officers  to  be  allowed  to  go  to  Eng 
land  or  New  York  or  elsewhere  on  parole;  no  stipulation  as 
to  the  civil  rights  of  the  inhabitants;  a  ship  to  be  furnished 
to  carry  Cornwallis's  sealed  despatches  to  New  York.2 

It  was  a  long  time  before  the  prisoners  were  ex 
changed,  and  there  never  was  a  word  of  controversy  con 
cerning  the  capitulation. 

The  number  surrendered3  was  7,157  soldiers,  840  sea- 

1  Johnston,  Yorktown,  120-149;  Dawson,  733-744;  Tarleton,  368-393, 
414^33. 

2  The  Articles  of  Capitulation  are  given  in  full  in  Tarleton,  438-442; 
Johnston,  Yorktown,    186-189;    Clinton-Cornwallis,   199-203;    Sparks, 
VIII,  533-536. 

3  Johnston,  Yorktown,  164,  169,  194;    Tarleton,  390,  448-451. 


276  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  men  and  80  camp  followers — 8,077  in  all.  In  addition 
there  were  144  cannon,  6,658  muskets,  large  quantities 
of  ammunition,  supplies  and  clothing  belonging  to  the 
army  and  4  frigates,  30  transports,  15  galleys  and  several 
smaller  vessels  belonging  to  the  navy.  The  losses  during 
the  siege  had  been:  British,  156  killed  and  326  wounded; 
allies,  75  killed  and  199  wounded.  Two-thirds  of  the 
losses  of  the  allies  were  sustained  by  the  French. 
comment  on  Could  CornwalHs  have  saved  his  army?  The  attempt 
surrender &  he  made  the  day  before  he  opened  negotiations  for  sur 
render  would  almost  certainly  have  resulted  in  over 
whelming  disaster.  The  celerity  with  which  Washington 
marched  to  Virginia  indicates  the  vigor  with  which  he 
would  have  pursued  any  such  attempt.  CornwalHs,  fol 
lowed  and  harassed  by  an  enemy  outnumbering  him 
three  to  one,  the  greater  part  of  its  troops  well  equipped 
and  all  of  them  supported  by  the  French  fleet  moving 
up  the  Chesapeake,  would  have  had  small  chance  of 
ever  reaching  Philadelphia.  There  was  an  opportunity 
four  weeks  earlier  when  success  was  possible.  When 
de  Grasse  returned  within  the  capes  after  his  engagement 
with  the  British  fleet,  the  allied  army  was  only  beginning 
sept.  16  to  arrive.  The  force  then  opposed  to  CornwalHs  was 
about  2,000  Continentals  under  Lafayette  and  the  3 
French  regiments  from  the  West  Indies.  The  roll  of 
these  latter  shows  187  officers  and  3,337  men  ;*  but  many 
of  them  were  sick  with  scurvy,  and  it  is  not  probable  that 
more  than  2,200  were  effective.  Lafayette's  total  force 
was  thus  not  more  than  4,200  effective.  CornwalHs  had 
5,100  effective.  If  he  could  have  defeated  Lafayette,  or 
driven  him  back  to  Richmond,  he  might  have  crossed  the 
James  and  marched  to  Charleston.  Tarleton  argues2  that 

507.  3  Tarleton,  369. 


YORKTOWN  277 

this  should  have  been  attempted  and  would  have  sue- 
ceeded.  The  distance  was  420  miles,  through  a  hostile 
country  all  the  way,  with  many  rivers  to  cross,  with 
Washington  and  the  allies  following  from  the  North, 
and  Greene  facing  him  from  the  South  as  soon  as  he 
reached  South  Carolina.  It  does  not  seem  probable  that 
it  could  have  succeeded.  Cornwallis  did  not  attempt  it, 
because  he  had  already  received  Clinton's  letter  of  Sep- 
temper  6  telling  him  that  he  was  coming  to  his  relief; 
and  he  could  not  doubt  that  the  British  would  beat  the 
French  on  the  sea. 

Did  Cornwallis  surrender  too  soon?  When  he  opened  Oct.  10 
negotiations  he  had  2,089  on  the  sick  report  and  about 
4,700  effective.  He  had  upward  of  350,000*  pounds  of 
provisions;  with  proper  care  this  would  have  lasted  from 
20  to  25  days.  Clinton,  with  7,000  men,  arrived  off  the 
capes  within  7  days.  The  fleet  which  convoyed  him 
contained  27  ships  of  the  line;  de  Grasse  had  36.  If 
Cornwallis  had  held  out  10  days  longer,  in  the  naval  en 
gagement  that  would  have  taken  place  there  was  a  chance 
that  the  British  would  have  won,  and  the  addition  of 
7,000  regulars  to  Cornwallis's  force  would  have  changed 
the  whole  situation.  Cornwallis  had  received  a  week 
before  a  letter  from  Clinton  saying  that  he  would  sail  on 
the  12th.  There  is  ground  for  argument  that  neither  the 
number  of  his  sick  nor  the  state  of  his  food  supplies  justi 
fied  him  in  surrendering  at  the  time  he  did,  and  that  he 
should  have  awaited  Clinton's  arrival  and  the  result  of 
the  naval  battle  which  that  would  bring  on.  Cornwallis 
gave  his  reasons  as  follows:2  that  his  works  "were  going 
to  ruin,"  that  it  would  be  " desperate  to  attempt  to  main 
tain  them,"  that  he  " could  not  fire  a  single  gun,"  that 

'Tarleton,  457.  2  Clinton-Cornwallis,  II,  212,  213. 


278  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

i78i  his  "  numbers  had  been  diminished  by  the  enemy's  fire, 
but  particularly  by  sickness"  and  that  "it  would  have 
been  wanton  and  inhuman  to  the  last  degree  to  sacrifice 
the  lives"  of  his  soldiers  "by  exposing  them  to  an  assault, 
which  from  the  numbers  and  precautions  of  the  enemy 
could  not  fail  to  succeed." 

On  his  return  to  England  Cornwallis  was  never  brought 
to  trial  nor  even  censured — except  in  Clinton's  pamphlets. 
He  lived  twenty-five  years  longer,  the  greater  part  of 
which  was  spent  as  governor-general  and  commander- 
in-chief  in  India;  where  in  the  siege  of  Seringapatam 
and  in  his  campaigns  against  Tippoo  Sahib  he  conquered 
for  his  country  a  large  part  of  what  is  now  the  Indian 
Empire.  His  contemporaries  did  not  blame  him  for  the 
loss  of  Yorktown,  and  the  general  opinion  has  since  been 
that  the  surrender  was  due  to  the  masterly  combination 
of  Washington  from  which  no  escape  was  possible. 
End  of  the  The  war  practically  ended  with  Yorktown.  Wash- 

VFar 

ington  tried  to  persuade  de  Grasse  to  join  him  in  an  ex 
pedition  against  Charleston  or  in  one  against  New  York. 
The  latter,  however,  insisted  on  returning  to  the  West 
Indies.  The  troops  were  then  scattered:  Wayne  and 
the  Pennsylvania  Continentals  were  sent  to  reinforce 
Greene  at  the  South;  Rochambeau  remained  at  Williams- 
burg;  St.  Simon's  brigade  was  sent  back  to  Haiti;  Wash 
ington  and  the  New  York  and  New  England  Continentals 
returned  to  the  Hudson ;  Lafayette  went  back  to  France. 
In  the  following  spring  Clinton  was  superseded  by 
Carleton. 

Treaty  of  There  were  no  more  military  movements.    A  year 

was  spent  in  negotiating  the  treaty  of  peace,  and  during 
this  year  Savannah  and  Charleston  were  evacuated,  as 
previously  stated.  When  the  treaty  had  been  signed 


YORKTOWN  279 

New  York  was  evacuated.    The  war  was  over  and  the        1733 
independence  of  the  United  States  was  established  and  NOV.  25 
acknowledged. 

The  war  had  called  forth  the  entire  military  strength 
of  Great  Britain — most  of  her  navy,  nearly  all  of  her  army 
and  all  the  mercenaries  that  her  money  could  hire.  She 
sent  to  America  57  British  and  30  Hessian  regiments,  and 
raised  in  or  near  New  York  12  Provincial  regiments 
which  were  thoroughly  organized  and  equipped  and 
served  from  three  to  six  years.  The  number  of  sea 
men  exceeded  40,000,  in  more  than  100  ships,  and  with 
these  Great  Britain  kept  control  of  the  sea  for  the  entire 
eight  years,  with  the  exception  of  forty-one  days  in  1779 
and  sixty-four  days  in  1781. 

Considered  in  the  light  of  its  influence  upon  the  prog-  Washington's 
ress  of  mankind,  the  Revolution  was  one  of  the  most  soidieras 
important  wars  in  the  whole  history  of  the  world.  The 
result  was  due — more  than  to  all  other  causes  combined 
— to  the  ability  of  Washington  as  a  soldier.  His  political 
services  were  of  such  surpassing  importance  and  value 
that  it  has  long  been  the  fashion  to  speak  disparagingly 
or  at  least  apologetically  of  his  military  achievements. 
If  his  campaigns  are  carefully  studied,  no  other  conclu 
sion  can  be  reached  than  that  they  were  most  skilfully 
conducted;  and  if  Washington  had  died  at  any  time 
between  1783  and  1789  he  would  have  been  known  in 
history  as  one  of  the  great  soldiers  of  all  time. 

In  his  principal  battles,  Long  Island,  Brandywine 
and  Germantown,  he  was  either  defeated  or  the  result 
was  inconclusive.  This  was  not  because  they  were  badly 
planned,  but  because  the  soldiers  by  whom  they  were 
fought,  while  brave  and  patriotic,  were  deficient  in  train- 


280  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR 

1783  ing,  experience  and  discipline — were  not  as  efficient  in 
struments  for  accomplishing  a  specific  purpose,  plans  for 
which  had  been  properly  made,  as  were  their  opponents. 
At  Monmouth  the  combined  treason  and  incapacity  of 
Charles  Lee  robbed  Washington  of  a  well-deserved  vic 
tory.  At  Fort  Washington,  his  own  indecision  caused  a 
grave  disaster.  This  is  about  the  only  criticism  that  can 
be  made  of  his  military  acts  during  eight  long  years  of 
warfare. 

Against  this  are  the  achievements  on  which  his  military 
reputation  securely  rests:  the  marvellous  retreat  from 
Long  Island,  the  audacious  attack  at  Trenton  and  Prince 
ton,  the  well-planned  movement  from  Valley  Forge,  when 
Howe  evacuated  Philadelphia,  and  the  brilliant  march 
to  Yorktown.  These  four  events  occurred  at  intervals 
during  five  years,  and  between  them  were  periods  of 
enforced  inaction  compelled  by  the  poverty  of  military 
resources.  Those  were  the  Fabian  periods  during  which 
any  other  policy  would  have  resulted  in  ruin.  The  four 
offensive  events  were  Napoleonic.  Each  of  them  was 
characterized  by  an  extraordinary  exhibition  of  daring, 
celerity  and  skill,  the  three  qualities  to  which  both  Caesar 
and  Napoleon  owed  their  classic  triumphs.  It  was  in 
the  domain  of  strategy  rather  than  of  tactics  that  Wash 
ington's  genius  was  exhibited,  and  his  successes  were  due 
to  well-matured  plans  and  rapid  marches;  the  accidents 
of  battle  were  nearly  always  unfavorable  to  him.  He 
possessed  the  gaudium  certaminis  in  a  marked  degree, 
and  in  the  melees  at  Kip's  Bay,  Princeton  and  German- 
town  his  reckless  exposure  was  phenomenal.  The  placid 
benignity  which  Stuart  placed  in  the  portraits  which  he 
painted  a  few  years  before  Washington's  death,  and  the 
austere  character  which  Sparks  has  embodied  in  his 


YORKTOWN  281 


twelve  volumes,  must  not  make  us  forget  that  during        1783 
the  Revolution,  at  the  age  of  forty-four  to  fifty-one, 
Washington  had  very  warm  blood  in  his  veins.    He  was 
a  man  of  passionate  vigor,  intense  energy  and  affection 
ate  sympathy.    He  was  a  pre-eminent  soldier. 


PART  II 

THE  MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES 

"Regular  troops  are  alone  equal  to  the  exigencies  of  modern 
war,  as  well  for  defence  as  offence,  and  whenever  a  substitute  is 
attempted  it  must  prove  illusory  and  ruinous." 

— GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED 
MILITIA 

THE  usual  statement  of  our  military  policy  is  that  we 
maintain  a  small  regular  army  in  time  of  peace,  raise 
large  volunteer  forces  in  time  of  war  and  maintain  at  all 
times  a  "well-regulated  militia"  in  the  various  States. 
This  policy  rests  upon  certain  fundamental  principles, 
viz.,  distrust  of  a  standing  army,  reliance  upon  untrained 
troops  and  dependence  upon  voluntary  service.  It  is 
a  singular  fact  that  while  we  have  been  successful,  not 
only  in  the  general  result,  but  in  the  specific  military 
events,  in  all  our  wars  except  the  second  war  with  Great 
Britain,  yet  the  principles  upon  which  our  armies  have 
been  raised  and  organized  have  been  denounced  by  pro 
fessional  soldiers  in  every  generation,  beginning  with 
Washington,  as  wasteful,  extravagant,  inefficient  and 
wrong. 

The  policy  which  we  have  adopted  was  not,  as  Glad-  origin  of 
stone  said  of  the  Constitution,  "struck  off  at  one  time  by  Policy 
the  brain  and  purpose  of  man,"  but,  on  the  contrary,  is 
due  in  part  to  our  geographical  situation,  but  chiefly  to 
racial  prejudices  which  have  their  roots  far  back  in  Eng 
lish  history;  as  far  back,  indeed,  as  the  very  beginning 
of  English — as  distinguished  from  British — history,  in 
the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries.    The  Teutonic  tribes  which 
then  conquered  Britain  and  founded  England  brought 

285 


286    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

with  them  two  ideas  of  profound  significance/  viz.,  the 
ideas  of  representative  government  and  of  voluntary  mil 
itary  service;  and  these  ideas  or  principles  have  never 
been  abandoned,  but  have  been  maintained,  developed 
and  enlarged  during  nearly  fifteen  hundred  years.  They 
are  the  foundation  of  English  civilization,  English  gov 
ernment  and  English  habit  of  thought.  Our  ancestors 
brought  them  to  America  in  the  seventeenth  century,  at 
the  very  time  when  the  Stuart  kings  were  endeavoring 
to  rule  without  Parliament,  to  levy  taxes  without  legis 
lative  sanction,  to  create  a  standing  army  for  the 
destruction  of  the  liberties  and  the  religion  of  the  Eng 
lish  people.  These  twin  principles — representative  gov 
ernment  and  voluntary  military  service — were  the  foun 
dation  of  the  state,  no  less  in  Virginia  than  in  New 
England2;  for,  while  the  Puritan  looked  upon  the  army 
as  the  instrument  of  oppression,  to  the  Cavalier  the 
words  "standing  army"  meant  Cromwell's  disciplined 
troops,  who  had  arrested  members  of  Parliament,  stabled 
their  horses  in  cathedrals,  insulted  and  robbed  the  nobility 
Ancient  and  gentry  and  murdered  the  king.  To  both  Cavaliers 
"tan'dfnf  *  and  Puritans,  therefore,  as  they  founded  their  settlements 
in  America,  the  name  of  standing  army  was  hateful,  with 
a  bitterness  and  intensity  of  hatred  which  we  can  at 
this  distance  hardly  appreciate.  A  hundred  years  or 
more  later  this  hatred  was,  if  possible,  still  further  in 
tensified  by  the  acts  of  an  English  king  and  Parliament, 

1  "The  base  of  the  new  English  society  was  the  freeman.  .  .  .  War 
was  no  sooner  over  than  the  warrior  settled  down  into  the  farmer.  .  .  . 
Each  little  village  commonwealth  lived  the  same  life  in  Britain  as  its 
farmers  had  lived  at  home.     Each  .  .  .  made  laws  in  the  assembly  of 
its  wise  men,  and  chose  its  own  leaders  among  the  'earls'  for  peace  or  war." 
(J.  R.  Green,  Short  History  of  the  English  People,  12.    See  also  John 
Fiske,  The  Beginnings  of  New  England,  25-30.) 

2  John  Fiske,  Civil  Government  in  the  United  States,  64-65. 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    287 

who  again  used  a  standing  army  to  enforce  their  law  for 
levying  taxes  against  the  will  of  those  taxed.  Thus,  the 
outbreak  of  the  Revolution  found  our  ancestors,  North 
and  South,  not  only  inheriting  the  hatred  of  a  standing 
army,  through  generations  of  their  own  forebears,  but  at 
the  instant  confronted  with  a  standing  army  as  the  in 
strument  of  the  oppression  which  they  were  determined 
no  longer  to  tolerate.  Detestation  of  the  word  army 
was  not  alone  an  inherited  prejudice,  but  a  vital  funda 
mental  principle  in  the  political  faith  of  the  day. 

Such  a  prejudice,  founded  originally  on  justice,  is  slow 
to  die.  It  survived  long  after  the  conditions  which  gave 
rise  to  it  had  ceased  to  exist.  It  has  been  slowly  expir 
ing  in  this  country  during  the  last  hundred  years,  but 
it  can  hardly  yet  be  called  extinct.  The  debates  in 
Congress  at  the  last  reorganization  of  the  army  in 
1901  contain  much  of  the  same  oratorical  declamation 
about  standing  armies  and  the  destruction  of  the  liberties 
of  Greece  and  Rome  that  Macaulay1  so  graphically  nar 
rates  in  his  account  of  the  debate  in  Parliament  in  1697. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  militia  in  England  antedated  popularity  of 
the  regular  army  by  at  least  one  thousand  years;  it  was  England ia 
part  of  the  local  government,  and  although  derided  in 
Dryden's  witty  verse2  it  was  always  popular  with  the 
great  body  of  the  English  people.    It  was  essentially  the 
same  in  the  sixth  century  as  in  the  seventeenth,  and  again 
in  the  nineteenth;  its  members  were  by  turns  fishermen, 
husbandmen,  judges  and  warriors;    they  followed  the 

1  History  of  England,  V,  54.    Debate  on  the  mutiny  act. 
a "  Mouths  without  hands,  maintained  at  vast  expense, 
In  peace  a  charge,  in  war  a  weak  defence. 
Stout  once  a  month  they  march,  a  blustering  band, 
And  ever  but  in  time  of  need  at  hand." 

— DRYDEN,  "  Cymon  and  Iphigenia." 


288    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


Colonies 


1775  trade  of  soldier,  not  as  their  chief  occupation,  but  as  in 
cidental  and  subordinate  to  some  other  occupation  by 
which  they  gained  food,  shelter  and  clothing.  Their 
service  was  voluntary,  although — for  the  able-bodied — 
the  liability  to  service  was  universal;  they  elected  their 
own  officers;  they  were  part  of  the  people,  and  not  a 
Popularity  of  class  apart.  These  ideas  were  also  brought  to  America 
be  American  in  the  seventeenth  century.  Belief  in  the  militia  and 
reliance  upon  its  sufficiency  were  as  important  a  part 
of  the  creed  of  the  early  settlers  as  was  their  hatred 
of  an  army.  The  militia  was  organized  in  every  Colony 
as  soon  as  the  government  was  established,  and  was  as 
essential  a  part  of  the  governing  machinery  as  the  town 
meeting  in  New  England  or  the  county  court  in  Virginia.1 
It  performed  its  part,  on  the  whole,  perhaps,  satisfac 
torily,  in  the  numerous  Indian  wars  and  in  the  French 
wars.  It  was  the  only  military  system  indigenous  to 
the  Colonies;  an  army  was  the  system  employed  by  the 
"tyrant,"  George  III. 

Naturally,  when  the  Revolution  broke  out  the  first  re 
liance  was  upon  the  militia;  but  when  the  battles  of  Lex 
ington  and  Concord  brought  a  realization  of  how  serious 
the  struggle  was  going  to  be,  the  word  "army"  came  to 
be  used.  Massachusetts  and  other  New  England  Colonies 
began  to  raise  their  several  armies  and  concentrate  them 
at  Boston;  and  in  June,  1775,  the  Continental  Congress 
took  them  over  as  a  Continental  army,  appointed  Wash 
ington  its  commander-in-chief  and  adopted  rules  and 
regulations  for  its  government.2  A  form  of  enlistment 
was  agreed  upon  which  prescribed  that  the  term  of  ser 
vice  was  to  be  "for  one  year,  unless  sooner  discharged."  3 

1  John  Fiske,  Civil  Government  in  the  United  States,  16-67. 

2  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  II,  90-111.  3  Ibid.,  II,  91. 


Origin  of  the 

Continental 

Army 


June  15 


June  30 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    289 

This  legislation  was  framed  upon  the  Mutiny  Act  of  1697,        1775 
which  limited  the  existence  of  the  British  army  to  one  June  H 
year,  and  which  had  annually  been  re-enacted.    Congress 
evidently  thought  that  the  liberty  of  the  people  might  be 
subverted  quite  as  well  by  a  standing  army  as  by  George 
III,  and  determined  to  retain  the  right  to  disband  it  at 
any  moment.   But  it  soon  became  evident  that  the  danger 
was  not  that  of  having  a  permanent  army,  but  of  having 
no  army  at  all.    Congress  fixed  the  strength  of  the  new  NOV.  4 
army  at  20,372  officers  and  men;1  but  by  December  31, 
only  9,650  had  enlisted  2  and  of  these  large  numbers  were 
absent.    On  the  same  date  the  term  of  service  of  the  old 
army  expired.    It  became  necessary  to  call  on  the  militia 
for  temporary  service  in  the  attack  on  Dorchester  Heights 
in  March,  1776.    Congress  attempted  to  remedy  the  lack        me 
of  enlistments  by  calling  on  the  various  Colonies  to  ineffective 
furnish  a  certain  number  of  battalions  for  the  Continental  of  congress 
army,  for  service  until  the  end  of  the  year,  and  various 
resolutions  to  this  effect  were  passed  between  January 
and  September  of  1776.3    The  response  was  not  alto-  sept,  is 
gether  encouraging,  and  then  Congress  adopted  a  resolu 
tion4  "that  eighty-eight  battalions  be  enlisted  as  soon  as 
possible,  to  serve  during  the  war,  unless  sooner  dis 
charged" — that  each  State  furnish  a  certain  quota;  that 
a  bounty  of  twenty  dollars  be  given  to  each  non-com 
missioned  officer  and  private;  that  a  grant  of  land  be 
made  to  each  officer  and  soldier  who  shall  engage  for  the 
war;  and  that  the  appointment  of  all  officers  below  the 
grade  of  general  be  left  to  the  States.    Still  the  enlist 
ments  were  not  satisfactory,  and  in  November  two  reso- 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  Ill,  321.  3  Sparks,  III,  220. 

3  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  IV,  29,  47,  99,  237,  357,  412;  V,  486,  521,  598. 

4  Ibid.,  V,  762. 


290    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1776  lutions1  were  adopted,  the  first  requiring  the  enlisting 
officers  to  offer  to  recruits  their  choice  of  two  forms  of 
enlistment,  one  for  the  war  and  the  other  for  three  years; 
the  second,  a  few  days  later,  providing  for  only  one  form 
of  enlistment  which  read  "for  three  years  or  during  the 

Dec.  27  war."    The  army  meanwhile  was  dwindling  down  to 

less  than   5,000  men;2  thereupon   Congress   appointed 

Washington      Washington3  virtually  dictator,  authorized  him  to  raise 

Dictate^  16  battalions,  in  addition  to  those  already  resolved  upon, 
and  3,000  light  horse,  3  regiments  of  artillery  and  a  corps 
of  engineers;  to  appoint  and  discharge  officers  and  fill 
all  vacancies,  to  call  on  the  States  for  militia,  to  impress 
supplies  and  to  arrest  and  confine  persons  who  refused 
to  accept. Continental  currency  or  were  disaffected  to  the 
American  cause. 
1778  The  system  of  short-term  voluntary  enlistments  thus 

Feb.  26  came  to  grief  before  the  Revolution  had  been  much  more 
than  a  year  in  progress.  By  Washington's  personal 
efforts  more  than  from  any  other  cause,  acting  under  any 
one  of  the  many  resolutions  of  Congress,  the  Continental 
army  was  maintained  with  varying  strength  from  6,000 
to  10,000  men,  and  the  militia  of  the  various  States  came 
from  time  to  time  to  help  out  for  a  few  weeks  in  an  emer 
gency.  Congress  continued  to  pass  resolutions  through 
out  the  year  1777,4  calling  on  the  States  to  furnish  their 
quota,  but  without  much  effect;  and  after  a  conference 
of  a  committee  with  Washington  at  Valley  Forge  it  re 
sorted  to  the  draft.  The  states  were5  "required  forth 
with  to  fill  up  by  drafts,  from  their  militia  or  in  any 
other  way  that  shall  be  effectual  their  respective  battalions 

1  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VI,  945,  971.  2  Sparks,  III,  225. 

3  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  VI,  1045;  Upton,  30. 

4  Upton,  25-32.  5  Jour.  Cont.  Cong.,  X,  200. 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    291 

of  Continental  troops."    Having  no  power  to  enforce  its        ms 
decree,  this  resolution  of  Congress  had  no  more  effect 
than  its  predecessors,  but  Washington's  personal  appeals, 
combined  with  the  news  of  the  French  alliance,  succeeded 
in  bringing  out  enough  men  to  carry  on  the  war. 

It  continued  in  this  way  to  the  end,  Congress  passing        i?83 
futile  resolutions  and  Washington  raising  men  and  carry-  sept.  3 
ing  on  the  war  by  the  mere  strength  of  his  personal  char 
acter.    The  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  in  1783  and  in  the        1734 
following  year  the  army  was  disbanded,1  except  eighty  june2 
soldiers  retained  to  guard  the  public  stores  at  Fort  Pitt 
and  West  Point. 

The  total  number  of  enlistments  had  been  395,858,2 
and  the  maximum  force  in  the  field  at  any  one  time 
about  35,000,  or  one  in  eleven  of  the  enlistments. 

We  had  succeeded  in  our  main  purpose  of  achieving  waste  and 
independence,  and  we  had  accomplished  this  without  a  dhST*1 

,.  •,  ,  f    •.  i  Revolution 

standing  army,  and  by  means  of  short  and  numerous  en 
listments,  large  bounties  and  grants  of  lands.  The  waste 
and  extravagance  were  repaired  a  few  years  later  by  the 
financial  genius  of  Hamilton.  The  enormous  pension  roll3 
was  easily  provided  for  from  the  resources  of  a  land  of 
rapidly  developing  wealth.  Public  sentiment  was  con-  confirmed 
firmed  in  its  opposition  to  a  standing  army  and  confidence  ^standing to 
in  the  efficacy  of  untrained  volunteers  and  militia  was 
still  further  strengthened.  The  one  man  to  whom  suc 
cess  was  due,  and  who  achieved  it,  not  because  but  in 
spite  of  our  defective  military  policy,  thought  differently. 
Washington's  opinions  on  the  subject  are  worthy  of 
careful  study  even  at  this  late  day,  for  his  judgments 

1  Jour.  Cong.,  IV,  433;  Upton,  69.  2  Upton,  58. 

'Total    Revolutionary    pensions    during    126    years    (1783    to    1908), 
$70,000,000.     Report  Com.  Pensions,  1908,  12,  21. 


292    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1784  were  the  result  of  long  deliberation  and  were  of  almost 
miraculous  accuracy.  He  had  seen  service  in  the  Indian 
and  French  wars  before  he  came  to  take  command  at 
Cambridge  in  1775.  His  knowledge  of  what  took  place 
between  that  date  and  1783  was  unrivalled.  He  was 
pre-eminently  qualified  as  a  witness. 

His  writings  on  the  subject  during  those  eight  years, 
to  Congress,  to  the  State  authorities  and  to  personal 
friends,  form  no  inconsiderable  part  of  the  twelve  vol 
umes  edited  by  Sparks.  A  few  of  the  most  pertinent  of 
those  addressed  to  the  President  of  Congress  are  here 
quoted. 

Washington's  February  9,  1776:1  "To  expect  the  same  service  from 
raw  and  undisciplined  recruits  as  from  veteran  soldiers 
is  to  expect  what  never  did  and  perhaps  never  will 
happen." 

September  24,  1776:2  "To  place  any  dependence  upon 
militia  is  assuredly  resting  upon  a  broken  staff.  .  .  .  The 
jealousy  of  a  standing  army,  and  the  evils  to  be  appre 
hended  from  one,  are  remote  and,  in  my  judgment, 
situated  and  circumstanced  as  we  are,  not  at  all  to  be 
dreaded;  but  the  consequence  of  wanting  one,  according 
to  my  ideas  formed  from  the  present  view  of  things,  is 
certain  and  inevitable  ruin." 

December  20,  1776 :3  "Short  enlistments,  and  a  mis 
taken  dependence  upon  militia,  have  been  the  origin  of 
all  our  misfortunes  and  the  great  accumulation  of  our 
debt." 

August  20,  1780:4  "Had  we  formed  a  permanent  army 
in  the  beginning,  ...  we  never  should  have  had  to  re 
treat  with  a  handful  of  men  across  the  Delaware  in  1776, 

Sparks,  III,  279;  Upton,  11.  2  Sparks,  IV,  113-115;  Upton,  16. 

3  Ibid.,  IV,  234.  « Ibid.,  VII,  162;  ibid.,  53. 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    293 

trembling  for  the  fate  of  America;  ...  we  should  not        i?84 
have  been  the  greatest  part  of  the  war  inferior  to  the  Washington's 
enemy,  indebted  for  our  safety  to  their  inactivity,  en 
during  frequently  the  mortification  of  seeing  inviting 
opportunities  to  ruin  them  pass  unimproved  for  want  of 
a  force  which  the  country  was  completely  able  to  afford, 
and  of  seeing  the  country  ravaged,  our  towns  burnt,  the 
inhabitants  plundered,  abused,  murdered,  with  impunity, 
from  the  same  cause. " 

September  15,  1780 :l  " Regular  troops  are  alone  equal 
to  the  exigencies  of  modern  war,  as  well  for  defence  as 
offence,  and  whenever  a  substitute  is  attempted  it  must 
prove  illusory  and  ruinous." 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  these  letters  Washington 
addressed  himself  solely  to  the  question  of  the  moment: 
the  proper  method  of  organizing  an  army  for  carrying  on 
the  war.  He  said  nothing  about  the  propriety  of  main 
taining  an  army  in  time  of  peace.  In  a  letter2  to  John 
Banister,  of  Virginia,  delegate  in  Congress,  written  from 
Valley  Forge  on  April  21,  1778,  Washington  admits  the 
justice  of  the  jealousy  of  a  standing  army  in  time  of 
peace.  His  words  are:  "The  other  point  is,  the  jealousy,3 
which  Congress  unhappily  entertain  of  the  army,  and 
which,  if  reports  are  right,  some  members  labor  to  estab 
lish.  You  may  be  assured,  there  is  nothing  more  in 
jurious  or  more  unfounded.  This  jealousy  stands  upon 
the  commonly  received  opinion,  which  under  proper 
limitations  is  certainly  true,  that  standing  armies  are 
dangerous  to  a  state.  The  prejudices  in  other  countries 
have  only  gone  to  them  in  time  of  peace,  and  these  from 
their  not  having  any  of  the  ties,  the  concerns  or  inter- 

1  Sparks,  VII,  206;  Upton,  54. 

2  Ibid.,  V,  328;  ibid.,  38.  8  Italics  as  in  Sparks. 


294    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1784        ests  of  citizens,  or  any  other  dependence,  than  what 
Washington's    flowed  from  their  military  employ;   in  short,  from  their 

Opinions  .     .  .,.,.  T.    .  •,.  , 

being  mercenaries,  hirelings.  It  is  our  policy  to  be  prej 
udiced  against  them  in  war,  though  they  are  citizens, 
having  all  the  ties  and  interests  of  citizens,  and  in  most 
cases  property  totally  unconnected  with  the  military  line." 
1783  The  final  word  of  Washington,  as  general-in-chief,  on 

June  8  military  policy  was  given  in  the  address1  which  he  sent  to 

the  governors  of  the  States  from  Newburg  about  six 
months  prior  to  resigning  his  commission.  He  evidently 
thought  it  either  useless  or  unwise  to  advocate  a  stand 
ing  army  in  time  of  peace,  and  therefore  argued  in  favor 
of  making  the  militia  as  effective  as  possible.  He  stated 
that  there  were  four  things  "  essential  to  the  well-being, 
I  may  even  venture  to  say  to  the  existence,  of  the  United 
States  as  an  independent  power,"  and  one  of  them  was 
"the  adoption  of  a  proper  peace  establishment."  His 
opinion  on  this  was  as  follows:2  "The  militia  of  this  coun 
try  must  be  considered  as  the  palladium  of  our  security, 
and  the  first  effectual  resort  in  case  of  hostility.  It  is 
essential,  therefore,  that  the  same  system  should  pervade 
the  whole;  that  the  formation  and  discipline  of  the 
militia  of  the  continent  should  be  absolutely  uniform, 
and  that  the  same  species  of  arms,  accoutrements  and 
military  apparatus  should  be  introduced  in  every  part 
of  the  United  States.  No  one,  who  has  not  learned  it 
from  experience,  can  conceive  the  difficulty,  expense  and 
confusion  which  result  from  a  contrary  system,  or  the 
vague  arrangements  which  have  hitherto  prevailed." 

While  these  recommendations  were  never  carried  into 
effect  until  120  years  after  they  were  written,  to  wit, 
after  the  passage  of  the  Militia  Act  of  1903,  and  while 

1  Sparks,  VIII,  443;  Upton,  68.  2  Sparks,  VIII,  450. 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    295 

each  succeeding  war  has  found  us  at  the  outset  with  ITS? 
different  systems  of  formation  and  discipline,  and  dif-  Military 
ferent  kinds  of  arms,  accoutrements  and  military  ap- 
paratus  in  the  militia  of  the  various  States,  yet  these 
views  of  Washington  were  adopted  in  the  Constitution 
in  1787,  and  have  ever  since  been  and  now  are  the  funda 
mental  law  of  the  land.  As  to  the  navy,  the  Constitu 
tion  gives  Congress  power  "to  provide  and  maintain  a 
navy/'  which  evidently  implies  a  permanent  and  con 
tinuing  force;  but  as  to  the  army  the  power  of  Con 
gress  is  "to  raise  and  support  armies,  but  no  appropria 
tion  of  money  to  that  use  shall  be  for  a  longer  term  than 
two  years/7  which  equally  implies  a  temporary  force 
raised  for  war  or  other  emergency. 

Congress  is  further  given  power/  "to  make  rules  for 
the  government  of  the  land  and  naval  forces,  to  provide 
for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  suppress  insurrections  and  repel  invasions;  and 
to  provide  for  organizing,  arming  and  disciplining  the 
militia,  and  for  governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be 
employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  reserving 
to  the  States,  respectively,  the  appointment  of  the  offi 
cers  and  the  authority  of  training  the  militia  according 
to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress."  In  order  to 
emphasize  still  further  the  basis  of  the  military  policy, 
Congress  at  its  first  session  passed  an  amendment2  to  the 
Constitution,  which  was  promptly  ratified  by  the  States, 
reciting  that  "a  well-regulated  militia"  is  "necessary  to 
the  security  of  a  free  State." 

The  English  tradition,  originating  in  the  tyranny  of 
the  Stuarts  more  than  200  years  before,  was  thus  em- 

1  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  I,  VIII,  12,  13,  14. 

2  Ibid.,  Second  Amendment. 


296    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

ITS?  bodied  in  our  fundamental  law.  The  army  was  to  exist 
on  sufferance  for  no  longer  a  period  than  two  years. 
Our  main  reliance  was  to  be  on  the  militia  and  on  such 
armies  as  could  be  impro vised  when  war  breaks  out. 

Militia  Act  It  will  be  observed,  however,  that  it  was  to  be  a  "  well- 

regulated  militia";  and  during  the  eight  years  of  his  presi 
dency  Washington  made  recommendations  in  each  of 
his  annual  messages  in  favor  of  measures  to  make  the 
militia  a  really  effective  force.  The  only  result  was  the 
passage  of  the  Militia  Act  of  1792,1  which  remained  in 
force  for  111  years,  although  it  was  obsolete  a  few  years 
after  it  was  enacted.  In  his  message  of  1793 2  Washing 
ton  called  attention  to  its  many  defects,  and  again 
pressed  upon  Congress  "the  necessity  of  placing  ourselves 
in  a  condition  of  complete  defence.  .  .  .  The  United 
States  ought  not  to  indulge  a  persuasion  that,  contrary 
to  the  order  of  human  events,  they  will  forever  keep  at 
a  distance  those  painful  appeals  to  arms  with  which  the 
history  of  every  other  nation  abounds.  ...  If  we  de 
sire  to  secure  peace,  it  must  be  known  that  we  are  at  all 
times  ready  for  war."  In  his  message  of  1794  he  called 
attention  to  the  " striking  defects"  in  the  militia  law 
and  resulting  "extraordinary  expense  and  waste."  He 
referred  to  the  subject  again  in  1795,  and  in  his  last 
message  in  1796 3  he  particularly  advocated  the  establish 
ment  of  a  military  academy  to  preserve  and  transmit  a 
knowledge  of  the  military  art,  which  he  considered  "of 
great  moment  to  the  security  of  a  nation." 

continued  These  appeals,  however,  were  all  unsuccessful.  The 

memory  of  the  Stuarts  and  of  George  III  was  still  com- 
paratively  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  people,  and  the 

1  Mil.  Laws,  95;  Upton,  84.  2-Mess.  Presidents,  I,  140. 

3  Mess.  Presidents,  I,  166,  184,  202. 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    297 

prejudice  against  a  standing  army  was  not  to  be  over-        ITS? 
come  even  by  the  arguments  of  the  man  who  had  gained, 
almost  single-handed,  their  independence. 

With  the  close  of  the  Revolution,  as  already  stated,        i?89 
the  army  was  disbanded.    Thirty  years  passed  before 
we  again  had  a  serious  war.    In  the  meantime  there  were 
insurrections,  such  as  Shay's  Rebellion  in  Massachusetts 
in   1786,  and  the  Whiskey  Rebellion  in  Pennsylvania 
in  1794;  Indian  wars,  such  as  Harmar's  Miami  expedi 
tion  in  1790,  St.  Glair's  campaign  of  1791  and  Wayne's 
campaign  of  1794;  the  probability  of  war  with  France 
in  1798.1    These  emergencies  were  met,  partly  by  the 
militia  and  partly  by  volunteer  armies  raised  for  three 
years,  and  by  a  small  but  slowly  increasing  permanent 
force  of  regulars.    This  latter  originated  in  a  force  of  origin  of  the 
700  men  raised  for  service  against  the  Indians  in  1784,  u' s' Army 
continued  for  three  years  in  1785,  again  extended  for  june  2,  i?84 
three  years  in  17872  and  finally  recognized  by  the  First  Apru  i,  i?85 
Congress3  as  "the  establishment  for  the  troops  in  the  Oct.  3,  m? 
service  of  the  United  States."    The  army  has  existed  sept.  29,  ivs 
continuously  from  that  day  to  the  present,  with  increas 
ing  numbers,  and  with  reorganizations  in  1790,  1792, 
1795, 1798, 1802, 1808, 1812, 1815, 1821, 1838, 1842, 1846, 
1855,   1861,   1866,  1870,  1874,  1898,  1901— or,  on  an 
average,  once  in  six  years. 

In  January,  1812,  when  war  with  Great  Britain  seemed  war  of  1812 
inevitable,  the  army  consisted,  under  the  laws  of  1802  and 
1808,  of  11  regiments.    By  successive  acts,4  Congress  in 
creased  this  as  follows: 

January  11,  1812,  to  24  regiments. 

1  Upton,  71-77,  79,  83,  86,  87. 

2  Jour.  Cong.,  IV,  434,  493,  785;  Upton,  69,  71, 

3  Mil.  Laws,  87;  Upton,  75. 

4  Mil.  Laws,  212,  230,  238,  250;  Upton,  95,  123. 


298    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


1812 


Second  War 
with  Great 
Britain 


Feb.  6 


April  10 


1814 

Refusal  to 

Furnish 

Militia 


June  26, 1812,  to  32  regiments. 

January  29,  1813,  to  51  regiments. 

January  27,  1814,  to  54  regiments. 

The  authorized  strength  of  the  latter  was  about  63,000 
men. 

But  recruiting  was  always  slow.  The  actual  force 
varied  from  one-quarter  to  one-half  of  that  which  the 
law  authorized.  Volunteers  were  not  called  for,  but  the 
President  was  "authorized  to  accept"  *  not  exceeding 
30,000  volunteers.  They  did  not  come  forward,  the  total 
number  during  the  entire  war  being  only  about  10,000.2 
The  militia  was  called  out,3  but  not  exceeding  100,000 
men  and  for  a  period  not  longer  than  six  months.  Con 
gress  now  possessed  the  power,  which  the  Continental 
Congress  lacked,  to  enforce  its  laws,  but  it  did  not  exer 
cise  that  power.  All  the  evils  of  the  Revolution  were 
repeated  in  perhaps  aggravated  form:  short  enlistments, 
successive  levies  of  raw  troops,  enormous  bounties,  ex 
travagant  grants  of  lands  and  liberal  promises  of  pen 
sions.  The  rolls  of  the  Pension  Office  show  that  527,654  4 
men  were  in  service,  most  of  them  for  periods  of  less 
than  six  months  and  more  than  half  of  them  for  less 
than  three  months.  Not  more  than  25,000,  or  one  in 
twenty,  were  in  the  field  at  any  time.  The  Pension  Office 
is  still  paying  pensions  to  the  widows  of  soldiers  of  the 
War  of  1812  (338  in  number),  and  the  total  pensions  of 
that  war  have  amounted  to  nearly  $46,000,000.5 

The  military  operations,  as  might  be  expected,  were 
far  from  creditable;  some  of  the  militia  refused,  at 
critical  periods,  to  cross  the  frontier.  The  governors  of 
Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  refused  to  call  forth  the 


1  Mil.  Laws,  215;  Upton,  95. 
3  Ibid.,  222.  <  Ibid.t  137. 


2  Upton,  137. 

5  Com.  Pensions,  1910,  11,  27. 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    299 

militia  of  those  States,  reserving  to  themselves  the  right  isu 
to  determine  when  the  exigency  provided  for  in  the  Con 
stitution  and  in  the  Act  of  Congress  of  1795  had  arisen. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts  sustained  them  in 
this  contention,  and  the  question  remained  in  doubt  until 
1827,  when  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  de 
cided  that  it  belonged  exclusively  to  the  President  to 
judge  when  such  exigency  arises.1 

As  soon  as  the  war  was  over  the  army  was  reduced  to  Mar.  3 
10,000  men,2  and  six  years  later  to  6,000  men.3  John  C.  Mar.  2  1821 
Calhoun  was  then  Secretary  of  War.  He  held  the  posi 
tion  during  the  eight  years  of  Monroe's  administration, 
from  1817  to  1825,  and  next  to  Elihu  Root  was  the  ablest 
administrator  among  the  fifty  or  more  individuals  who 
have  filled  that  important  office.  Congress  called  upon 
him  for  two  reports  on  the  army,  which  he  made  in  Decem 
ber,  1818,4  and  December,  1820.  In  these  he  discussed  in 


the  most  comprehensive  manner  the  purposes  for  which 
we  maintain  an  army,  its  relation  to  our  political  princi 
ples,  its  strength,  organization,  equipment,  emoluments, 
rations  and  clothing.  He  pointed  out  the  terrible  price 
which  we  had  paid  in  1812  in  consequence  of  the  lack 
of  a  proper  military  establishment  and  of  suitable  prep 
aration  in  the  preceding  years;  showed  that  "however 
remote  our  situation  from  the  great  powers  of  the  world, 
and  however  pacific  our  policy,  we  are,  notwithstanding, 
liable  to  be  involved  in  war;  and  to  resist,  with  success, 
its  calamities  and  dangers,  a  standing  army  in  peace  is 
an  indispensable  preparation."  He  further  stated  that 
"to  suppose  our  militia  capable  of  meeting  in  the  open 
field  the  regular  troops  of  Europe  would  be  to  resist  the 

1  Martin  vs.  Mott,  12;  Wharton,  19;  Upton,  96-97. 

3  Mil.  Laws,  266.          3  Ibid.,  306.  4  Burnside,  139,  144;  Upton,  145. 


300    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

most  obvious  truth  and  the  whole  of  our  experience  as 
1820  a  nation";  and  argued  that  "if  our  liberty  should  ever 
be  endangered  by  the  military  power  gaining  the  ascen 
dancy,  it  will  be  from  the  necessity  to  retrieve  our  affairs, 
after  a  series  of  disasters,  caused  by  the  want  of  adequate 
military  knowledge."  1  He  laid  down  the  fundamental 
proposition  that  "at  the  commencement  of  hostilities 
there  should  be  nothing  either  to  new-model  or  to  create : 
the  only  difference  between  the  peace  and  the  war  for 
mation  of  the  army  ought  to  be  in  the  increased  magni 
tude  of  the  latter,  and  the  only  change  in  passing  from 
the  former  to  the  latter  should  consist  in  giving  to  it  the 
augmentation  which  will  then  be  necessary.  It  is  thus, 
and  thus  only,  the  dangerous  transition  from  peace  to 
war  may  be  made  without  confusion  and  disorder."  The 
staff  should  be  completely  formed  in  time  of  peace  and 
the  organization  of  the  line  such  that  when  hostilities 
begin  "the  force  may  be  sufficiently  augmented  without 
adding  new  regiments  or  battalions."  2 

In  these  documents,  so  remarkable  in  breadth  and 
foresight,  Calhoun  followed  to  some  extent  the  principles 
formulated  by  Scharnhorst  in  Prussia  after  the  battle  of 
Jena.  He  anticipated  by  more  than  a  generation  the 
system  of  expansion  in  war  which  has  since  been  adopted 
for  all  European  armies,  and  for  which  this  country  had 
to  wait  more  than  eighty  years,  during  the  greater  part 
of  which  these  principles  were  unsuccessfully  advocated 
by  army  officers,  until  the  genius  and  persistence  of  Mr. 
Root  persuaded  Congress  to  adopt  them  in  the  legislation 
of  1901-3. 

Upon  these  principles,  including  especially  "the  desire 
to  avoid  creating  new  regiments  with  raw,  inexperienced 

1  Burnside,  145.  2  Burnside,  146;  Upton,  149. 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    301 

officers  at  their  head  in  time  of  war,"  *  Calhoun  worked 

out  a  complete  scheme  of  organization  for  an  army  of        1820 

544  officers  and  6,391  men  in  peace,  to  be  augmented  to 

832  officers  and  18,200  men  in  war,  without  the  formation 

of  any  new  regiments.2 

His  wise  words  fell  on  deaf  ears.    Congress  was  then        1321 
in  the  midst  of  the  intensely  exciting  debate  which  re-  caihoun's  Re 
sulted  in  the  "  Missouri  Compromise."    Caihoun's  report  Adopted 
apparently  received  no  attention  in  Congress;  there  does  Feb.  27 
not  seem  to  have  been  any  debate  on  it;  McMasters 
makes  no  reference  to  the  subject;   von  Hoist  does  not 
mention  it  in  his  biography  of  Calhoun.    The  law,  as  March  2 
passed,  simply  reduced  the  army  to  4  regiments  of  artil 
lery,  7  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  certain  number  of 
staff  officers;  the  companies  were  small,  each  containing 
only  42  privates,  and  the  entire  authorized  force  was 
542  officers  and  5,642  men.3    No  provision  was  made  for 
augmenting  the  enlisted  strength  in  time  of  war  or  other 
emergency.    The  old  reliance  upon  militia  and  untrained 
levies  was  still  the  popular  idea. 

No  change  of  any  importance  was  made  in  the  army 
during  the  next  seventeen  years,  except  the  formation 
of  a  regiment  of  dragoons,4  now  the  1st  Cavalry.  The 
actual  strength  was,  however,  at  all  times  less  than  what 
the  law  authorized.  In  November,  1835,  the  author 
ized  strength,5  including  the  dragoons,  was  7,198  and 
the  actual  strength  3,888. 

In  1835  we  became  involved  in  the  Florida  war  against        1333 
the  Seminole  Indians,  which  proved  a  very  serious  affair,  The  Florida 
lasting  more  than  seven  years.    The  army  was  altogether 

1  Burnside,  146.  2  Burnside,  157. 

3  Ibid.,  217.  *  Mil.  Laws,  329;  Upton,  161. 

6  Upton,  162. 


302    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


1833 
March  3 


1836 
May  23 
1838 

July  5 


1837 

The  Florida 
War 


insufficient  in  numbers  to  cope  with  it;  instead  of  aug 
menting  its  enlisted  strength,  as  Calhoun  had  advised, 
the  Florida  militia  was  called  out  and  Colonel  Clinch, 
commanding  the  few  hundred  regulars  on  duty  in  Flor 
ida,  was  authorized  to  call  on  the  governors  of  South 
Carolina,  Georgia  and  Alabama  for  the  militia  of  those 
States.  The  President  was  "authorized  l  to  accept"  vol 
unteers  not  exceeding  10,000  men  "to  serve  six  or  twelve 
months."  The  regular  army  was  subsequently2  increased 
by  one  more  regiment  of  infantry  and  an  addition  of 
16  privates  to  every  company  of  artillery  and  of  38 
privates  to  every  company  of  infantry.  This  increased 
the  authorized  strength  to  12,5393  and  the  actual  strength 
to  perhaps  9,000. 

The  greatest  number  of  men  in  the  field  at  any  one 
time  was  in  November,  1837,  when  they  numbered  5,025 
regulars  and  4,454  volunteers  and  militia.4  The  rolls 
of  the  Pension  Office  show  that  during  the  seven  years 
of  this  war  the  total  number  of  men  in  service  was 
61,269 5  of  whom  the  greater  number  served  for  three 
months  or  less.  It  was  a  repetition  on  a  smaller  scale  of 
the  methods  of  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of  1812;  and 
it  should  be  remembered  that  the  Indian  warriors  against 
whom  these  60,000  or  more  men  went  out  for  a  few  days 
numbered  only  about  1,200.8  The  waste  and  extrava 
gance  of  such  methods  are  in  sharp  contrast  with  the 
effective  work  done  by  the  small  but  well-trained  army 
in  the  Indian  campaigns  after  the  Civil  War. 

The  jealousy  of  a  standing  army  was  still  a  living 
principle,  and  Andrew  Jackson  undoubtedly  expressed 


1  Mil.  Laws,  336;  Upton,  168. 
3  Burnside,  219. 
5  Upton,  190. 


3  Mil.  Laws,  341;  Upton,  181-183. 

4  Upton,  175. 
6  IUd.t  194. 


POPULAR  FAITH  IN  AN  UNTRAINED  MILITIA    303 

the  opinions  of  a  majority  of  his  countrymen  when  in  1335 
his  seventh  annual  message  as  President,  in  December,  Jackson's 
1835,1  he  spoke  of  "the  necessity  of  an  efficient  organiza 
tion  of  the  militia,"  and  defined  our  military  policy  in 
these  words:  "To  suppress  domestic  violence  and  to  repel 
foreign  invasion,  should  these  calamities  overtake  us,  we 
must  rely  in  the  first  instance  upon  the  great  body  of  the 
community  whose  will  has  instituted  and  whose  power 
must  support  the  government.  A  large  standing  mili 
tary  force  is  not  consonant  to  the  spirit  of  our  institu 
tions  nor  to  the  feelings  of  our  countrymen,  and  the 
lessons  of  former  days  and  those  also  of  our  own  times 
show  the  danger  as  well  as  the  enormous  expense  of  these 
permanent  and  extensive  military  organizations."  In 
the  message  of  1836,2  however,  his  views  were  slightly 
modified.  "While  the  necessities  existing  during  the  pres 
ent  year  for  the  service  of  militia  and  volunteers  have 
furnished  new  proof  of  the  patriotism  of  our  fellow- 
citizens,  they  have  also  illustrated  the  importance  of  an 
increase  in  the  rank  and  file  of  the  regular  army.  .  .  . 
In  this  connection  it  is  also  proper  to  remind  you  that 
the  defects  in  our  present  militia  system  are  every  day 
rendered  more  apparent." 

His  successor,  President  Van  Buren,  in  his  message  of 
1837,3  spoke  of  "the  necessity  of  increasing  our  regular  v 

,     ,,  ' *.  „  ,.       Opinions 

forces;  and  the  superior  efficiency,  as  well  as  greatly 
diminished  expense  of  that  description  of  troops,  recom 
mend  this  measure  as  one  of  economy  as  well  as  of 
efficiency."  But  he  hastened  to  add:  "It  is  not,  how 
ever,  compatible  with  the  interests  of  the  people  to  main 
tain  in  time  of  peace  a  regular  force  adequate  to  the 

1  Mess.  Presidents,  III,  170.  2  Ibid.,  Ill,  254. 

3  Ibid.,  Ill,  390. 


304    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1837  defence  of  our  extensive  frontiers.  In  periods  of  danger 
and  alarm  we  must  rely  principally  upon  a  well-organized 
militia,  and  some  general  arrangement  that  will  render 
this  description  of  force  more  efficient  has  long  been  a 
subject  of  anxious  solicitude." 

In  subsequent  messages1  Van  Buren  referred,  with 
diminishing  interest,  to  the  necessity  of  an  efficient  or 
ganization  of  the  militia;  but  nothing  was  done.  The 
subject  excited  no  popular  interest  until  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  with  Mexico. 

When  the  Seminole  war  ended  in  1842  the  army  was 
Aug' 23  reduced  from  12,539  to  8,613 2  men.  the  reduction  being 

1846 

made  in  the  number  of  enlisted  men  in  a  company,  and 

War  with  .  . 

Mexico  it  so  remained  until  1846. 

1  Mess.  Presidents,  III,  497,  537.          a  Mil.  Laws,  358;  Upton,  193. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR 

ARMY 

SEVENTY  years  had  thus  passed  in  which  we  had  had        1846 
two  wars  with  Great  Britain  and  numerous  campaigns 
against  the  Indians.    Throughout  this  period  the  popular 
faith  in  an  untrained  militia  remained  unshaken. 

When,  however,  it  became  necessary  to  make  prepa 
rations  for  the  war  with  Mexico,  slightly  different  ideas 
began  to  prevail.    The  President  was  authorized,  by  suc 
cessive  acts  of  Congress,  for  the  first  time,  to  "call  for/'  as 
well  as  to  " accept,"  volunteers,  the  number  not  to  exceed 
50,000,  and  the  term  of  service  to  be  twelve  months  "or 
to  the  end  of  the  war";  "to  employ"  the  militia  for  not  May  is 
exceeding  six  months;  to  increase  the  number  of  privates 
in  any  company  to  100  men;  to  organize  a  company  of 
engineers;   to  raise  a  regiment  of  mounted  riflemen;   to  May  ie 
raise  a  regiment  of  dragoons  and  nine  more  regiments  of  May  19 
infantry,  to  serve  during  the  term  of  the  war  and  no        1847 
longer.1    These  various  laws  provided  for  an  authorized  Feb.  a 
strength  of  30,890  regulars  and  50,000  volunteers.    The 
volunteers  first  enlisted  claimed  their  discharge  at  the 
end  of  twelve  months,  and  a  new  force  had  to  be  en 
listed;    so   that   the   total   number   of  volunteers  was 
73,532.    The  rolls  of  the  Pension  Office  show  a  total  of 
regulars  and  volunteers  of  104,284.    The  greatest  num- 

1Mil.  Laws,  367-379;  Upton,  203-206. 
305 


306     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


1847 

War  with 
Mexico 


1848 
July  19 

1850 
June  17 

1855 
March  3 


ber  at  any  time  under  Scott's  command  was  13,500  and 
under  Taylor,  7,000.  These  figures1  compare  favorably 
with  the  corresponding  figures  in  the  Revolution  and  in 
the  War  of  1812.  They  show  that  the  army  in  the  field 
was  nearly  one-sixth  of  the  total  number  of  enlistments, 
whereas  in  the  previous  wars  it  had  been  only  one-eleventh 
or  one-twentieth.  Considering  the  results  accomplished, 
the  number  of  men  called  out  during  the  Mexican  War 
was  much  smaller  than  in  the  previous  wars.  The  benefit 
of  military  training  was  beginning  to  be  felt,  and  the 
small  armies  of  Scott  and  Taylor  were  very  efficient. 
The  Military  Academy  at  West  Point  had  sent  out, 
from  1802  to  1847,  no  less  than  1,368  graduates,2  and  of 
these  523  served  in  the  regulars  and  36  in  the  volunteers3 
with  the  armies  in  Mexico.  Scott,  who  had  had  personal 
experience  of  the  wretched  results  due  to  untrained 
troops  in  the  War  of  1812  and  the  Florida  war,  gener 
ously  attributed  his  success  in  Mexico  to  these  West 
Point  graduates,  stating  his  " fixed  opinion"  that  but  for 
them  the  war  would  have  lasted  four  or  five  years,  with 
more  defeats  than  victories,  whereas  with  their  help 
complete  victory  had  been  obtained  "in  less  than  two 
campaigns."  4 

The  close  of  the  war  brought  the  usual  reduction — to 
10,320  men  :5  but  the  army  was  soon  increased 6  by  add 
ing  to  the  number  of  privates  in  each  company,  equiva 
lent  for  the  whole  army,  about  4,400  men;  and  later  by 
two  regiments  of  cavalry  and  two  of  infantry,  about 
4,000  men,  carrying  the  authorized  total  to  18,349.  At 
no  time,  however,  did  the  actual  strength  exceed  15,000.7 

1  Upton,  209,  215,  216.  2  Cullum,  II,  206. 

3  Centennial  of  the  U.  S.  M.  A.,  629-630. 

4  Cullum,  I,  XI;  Upton,  222.  6  Mil.  Laws,  223,  393. 
6 Upton,  223  'Upton,  224. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  307 

With  these  exceptions  there  was  no  additional  legislation 
until  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War. 
The  magnitude  of  this  struggle  was  not  underestimated.  President's 

oc;  Proclamation, 

As  in  previous  wars  the  militia  was  first  called  out;  April  15 
75,000  men  for  three  months.     As  soon  as  Congress 

convened  this  was  supplemented  by  two  laws,  each  cal-  The  civu  war 

ling  for  500,000  volunteers,  and  a  third  law  adding  to  Juiy22 

the  regular  army  9  regiments  of  infantry,  1  of  cavalry  July  25 

and  1  of  artillery.    These  laws  l  were  all  under  debate  July  29 

at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  were  passed  July  21 
under  its  influence.    The  enlistment  of  volunteers  in  a 
few  months  exceeded  700.000.2  about  one  in  six  of  the 


Volunteers 

able-bodied  male  population.  It  was  a  magnificent  ris 
ing  in  mass  of  the  Northern  population.  Had  this  vast 
host  possessed  military  training,  the  rebellion  might 
possibly  have  been  quickly  suppressed.  But  the  "well- 
regulated"  militia  of  the  Constitution,  uniformly  armed 
and  accoutred,  trained  and  disciplined,  as  Washington 
had  advised,  and  possessed  of  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
the  military  art,  did  not  exist.  The  training  and  knowl 
edge  had  to  be  gained  as  the  war  progressed. 

Enlistment  in  the  regular  army  was  not  popular.  Its 
total  strength  never  reached  26,  000,  3  or  two-thirds  of 
what  was  authorized,  and  of  these  a  large  number  were 
stationed  in  the  fortifications  and  on  the  Western  frontier. 
The  force  available  for  the  field  was  probably  less  than 
10,000,  and  most  of  these  served  in  the  "regular  divis 
ion/7  forming  part  of  the  5th  Army  Corps.  They  formed 
an  inconsiderable  part  of  the  great  army  by  which  the 
war  was  carried  on. 

The  strength  of  the  volunteer  army  on  January  1, 

1  War  Records,  3,  V,  606;  Mil.  Laws,  466,  471,  473. 

2  Ibid.,  3,  IV,  1264.  8  Upton,  257. 


308    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


1362 


July  1 
1363 

Resort  to 
Conscription 

March  3 
1864 

Feb.  24 
1865 


Number  of 
Men  in 
Service 


1862, l  was  about  528,000  men.  The  War  Department 
in  December,  1861,  had  directed  that  no  more  regi 
ments  be  raised  unless  specially  authorized,  and  on  April 
3,  1862,  had  discontinued  all  recruiting.2  This  was 
resumed  by  order  of  June  6,  1862,  and  it  was  soon  evi 
dent  that  large  numbers  of  men  must  still  be  raised  in 
order  to  make  up  for  the  losses  in  the  field.  The  gov 
ernors  of  eighteen  States  thereupon  joined  in  a  letter  to 
the  President  suggesting  that  he  call  for  additional  men, 
and  on  July  1  Lincoln  made  a  call  for  300,000  men. 
More  than  420,000 3  were  furnished.  As  the  war  went  on 
further  calls  became  necessary,  the  draft  or  conscription 
was  authorized  4  and  finally  the  President  was  empow 
ered  5  to  call  for  such  numbers  of  men  as  the  military 
service  required.  There  were  in  all,  between  April,  1861, 
and  December,  1864,  eleven  successive  calls;  six  for  vol 
unteers  for  three  years  or  the  war;  four  for  militia  for 
three  to  nine  months,  and  one  for  regulars  for  five  years. 
The  total  number  called  for  was  2,763,670,  and  the  num 
ber  furnished  was  2.,778,304.6  There  were  a  great  many  re- 
enlistments,  so  that  it  is  difficult  to  say  how  many 
individuals  enlisted.  The  number  was  probably  in  ex 
cess  of  2,100,000.  The  enrollment  of  April,  1865,7  showed 
2,245,063  able-bodied  men  at  their  homes.  From  this  it 
would  appear  that  the  number  of  men  available  for 
military  service  in  the  Northern  States  was  something 
more  than  4,300,000  and  of  these  about  2,100,000,  or 
nearly  one-half,  were  enlisted. 

The  national  government  was  victorious,  at  a  fearful 
sacrifice;    the  Confederacy  was  annihilated.    That  the 

1  War  Records,  3,  I,  775.  3  Ibid.,  3,  V,  608. 

3  Ibid.,  3,  IV,  1265.  *Ibid.,  3,  V,  611. 

8  Ibid.,  3,  V,  636.  •  Ibid.,  3,  IV,  1269. 
7  Ibid.,  3,  V,  620. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  309 

struggle  would  have  been  shortened  and  the  loss  in  lives 
and  treasure  reduced  if  we  had  had  a  larger  trained  army 
at  the  beginning  has  often  been  asserted  by  military 
writers.  This  is  at  least  open  to  doubt;  for  in  such  case 
the  South  would  have  had  almost  the  same  relative  ad 
vantage  as  the  North.  The  nature  of  the  struggle  was 
such  that  it  could  only  be  ended  by  the  absolute  destruc 
tion  of  the  military  strength  of  the  Confederacy,  and  this 
could  only  be  accomplished  by  the  use  of  almost  the  en 
tire  strength  of  the  loyal  States.  On  the  other  hand,  it  Defects  of  the 
is  not  open  to  dispute  that  the  strength  of  the  govern-  temin^he78 
ment  was  not  employed  to  the  best  advantage,  but  was 
misapplied,  with  accompanying  waste  and  extravagance 
almost  equal  to  those  of  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of 
1812.  The  same  defects  appeared:  short  service,  enor 
mous  bounties  and  grants  of  land  and  a  gigantic  pension 
roll *  destined  probably  to  endure  till  the  last  quarter  of 
the  twentieth  century. 

It  is  believed  that  at  no  other  time  in  the  history  of 
the  world  have  so  many  as  2,000,000  men  been  brought 
into  the  military  service  by  a  single  nation  in  the  space 
of  four  years.  The  failure  to  realize  the  full  value  of  so 
numerous  a  force,  composed  for  the  most  part  of  such 
superb  material,  was  chiefly  due  to  the  constant  raising 
of  new  regiments  of  raw  recruits  and  inexperienced 
officers  instead  of  keeping  the  old  regiments  filled  up 
to  their  full  strength.  The  maximum  force  under  arms 
at  any  time  was  about  970,000  2  men,  or  the  equivalent 
of  970  regiments.  But  the  total  number  of  organiza 
tions  raised  during  the  war  was  1,952  3  regiments,  36 

1  The  pension  bills  of  recent  years — more  than  forty  years  after  Appo- 
mattox— have  been  about  $155,000,000,  of  which  about  $146,000,000  are 
paid  to  the  Civil  War  pensioners. 

2  War  Records,  3,  V,  137,  1029.  *  Ibid.,  3,  V,  1029. 


310    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1865  battalions  and  900  independent  companies;  this  gives  a 
total  equivalent  of  2,050  regiments,  or  more  than  twice  as 
many  as  were  needed.  Had  the  quota  assigned  to  each 
State  been  a  certain  number  of  regiments,  squadrons 
and  batteries,  instead  of  a  certain  number  of  men,  with 
a  requirement  that  these  organizations  be  kept  up  to 
their  maximum,  and  that  the  appointment  of  officers  be 
limited  to  men  who  had  seen  at  least  six  months  of  active 
service  in  the  ranks,  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  final 
result  would  have  been  accomplished  in  less  time  and 
with  a  smaller  number  of  men  than  2,000,000.  This 
method  was  frequently  advocated  during  the  progress  of 
the  war,  but  always  rejected  on  the  ground  that  troops 
could  not  be  raised  except  for  new  organizations  and 
with  new  officers.  We  had  to  come  to  conscription  in 
the  middle  of  the  war,  and  enforce  it  relentlessly  for  the 
remaining  two  years,  and  we  shall  doubtless  have  to 
do  the  same  if  we  are  ever  again  engaged  in  a  war  last 
ing  more  than  two  years.  A  conscription  law  will  be 
no  more  odious,  if  it  contains  these  salutary  provisions 
which  have  received  the  approval  of  our  greatest  soldiers.1 
comparison  It  must  be  noted  that  there  was  a  great  improvement 

with  Previous  .        ~.    .,  TTT  .  ,  ,      .  ., 

wars  in  the  Civil  War  over  any  previous  war  in  the  relation  of 

the  number  of  troops  in  the  field  at  any  one  time  to  the 
total  number  of  enlistments.    We  have  seen  that  in  the 

1  In  a  series  of  marginal  notes  made  by  General  Sherman  on  an  article 
by  the  author,  published  in  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  in 
1883,  he  says:  "There  is  no  doubt  that  reinforcing  by  new  regiments  was 
bad  in  every  sense,  and  that  recruits  should  be  sent  to  old  regiments." 
The  same  opinion  was  more  than  once  expressed  by  General  Grant  and  by 
General  Sheridan  in  conversations  with  the  author.  See  also  Sherman's 
Memoirs,  Vol.  II,  388:  "I  believe  that  500  new  men  added  to  an  old 
and  experienced  regiment  were  more  valuable  than  1,000  men  in  the  form 
of  a  new  regiment,  for  the  former,  by  association  with  good,  experienced 
captains,  lieutenants  and  non-commissioned  officers,  soon  became  veterans, 
whereas  the  latter  were  generally  unavailable  for  a  year." 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  311 

Revolution  and  the  War  of  1812  this  ratio  was  one  in 
twenty,  and  in  the  war  with  Mexico,  one  in  six;  in  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion  it  was  one  in  four.  The  enlistments 
were  2, 778,304; l  in  May,  1864,  there  were  970,710  in 
service,  of  which  662,345 2  were  present  for  duty,  in  the 
field. 

The  return  of  the  volunteer  army  to  the  occupations 
of  peace  has  no  parallel  in  history.  The  muster  out 
began  within  three  weeks  of  Lee's  surrender,  and  by 
August,  1865,  640,806  had  been  discharged;  by  Novem 
ber,  800,963;  by  January,  1866,  918,722;  by  November, 
1866,  1,023,021.3 

The  regular  army  had  an  authorized  strength  in  April,        isee 
1865,4  of  47,806.    It  was  reorganized  5  so  as  to  consist  of  July  23 

10  regiments  of  cavalry; 

5  regiments  of  artillery; 

41  regiments  of  infantry; 

4  regiments  of  veteran  reserves; 
1  battalion  of  engineers; 

and    the    various    staff    corps.    The    total    authorized 
strength  was  80,258,  but  the  actual  strength  was  54,581 .6 
In  1869  7  the  infantry  regiments  were  reduced  from  45 
to  25,  bringing  down  the  authorized  strength  to  55,618  March  3 
and  the  actual  strength  to  37,383.8 

In  1870  the  number  of  enlisted  men  was  reduced  to 
30,000,  and  in  1874  to  25,000.9    There  were  no  changes, 
of  any  importance  in  the  organization  or  strength  of        mo 
the  army  until  the  war  with  Spain,  twenty-four  years  July  is 
later. 

1  War  Records,  3,  IV,  1269.  2  Ibid.,  3,  V,  497. 

3  Ibid.,  3,  V,  517,  1012.  *  Army  Register,  1865,  106a. 

5  Army  Register,  1867,  144a.  « Army  Register,  1866,  150c. 

7  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  540.  8  Army  Register,  1869,  235a. 

8  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  187;  Burnside,  102. 


312    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1874  During  the  years  1874  to  1878  the  question  of  the 

June  i?  permanent  organization  of  the  army  was  studied  by 
successive  committees  of  Congress;  and  a  large  amount 
of  testimony  was  taken  which,  however,  resulted  in  no 
legislation  except  the  reduction  to  25,000  men.  In 
1878  a  committee  was  formed  of  three  senators  and  five 
representatives,  to  whom  was  referred  "the  whole  sub 
ject-matter  of  reform  and  reorganization  of  the  army." 
1878  The  report  of  this  committee1  is  a  veritable  mine  of  in- 
Dec.  15  formation  on  every  essential  fact  connected  with  the 
history  of  the  army  during  the  preceding  100  years. 
General  Burnside,  then  senator  from  Rhode  Island, 
was  its  chairman.  All  of  its  members  had  served  in 


the  Civil  War,  one  of  them  (Senator  M.  C.  Butler,  of 
South  Carolina)  as  a  major-general  in  the  Confederate 
army.  General  Garfield,  then  leader  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  soon  afterward  President,  contrib 
uted  two  very  thoughtful  and  instructive  papers  for  its 
consideration.  Prominent  survivors  of  the  Civil  War, 
Hancock,  McDowell,  McClellan,  Terry,  Pope,  Ord,  Hazen, 
Hunt  and  others,  were  called  upon  to  submit  their  views 
accompanied  by  a  draft  of  a  bill  to  carry  them  into 
effect.  The  chiefs  of  staff  departments,  Humphreys, 
Meigs,  Townsend,  Benet,  Marcy,  Alvord  and  McFeely, 
contributed  exhaustive  histories  of  their  several  depart 
ments  and  recommendations  as  to  their  proper  organiza 
tion  and  their  relations  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
commanding  general.  Most  important  of  all,  General 
Sherman,  then  general-in-chief,  submitted  a  history  of 
the  army  from  1776  to  1876,  accompanied  by  elaborate 
statistical  data,  extracts  from  the  writings  of  Wash 
ington  and  the  reports  of  Knox,  Dearborn,  Calhoun, 

1  45th  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  Senate  report,  555. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  313 

Cass  and  other  secretaries  of  war,  and  of  committees  of        1878 

Congress;   and  finally  his  own  matured  views  as  to  our 

military  policy  and  the  proper  organization  of  the  army 

to  carry  it  into  effect.    At  that  time  General  Emory 

Upton,  one  of  the  brilliant  group  of  officers  who  attained 

the  rank  and  command  of  a  major-general  within  a  few 

years  of  graduation  from  West  Point  in  1861,  had  just 

returned  from  a  trip  around  the  world,  undertaken  for 

the  purpose  of  studying  foreign  military  systems,  and 

had  written  his  book  on  "The  Armies  of  Asia  and  Europe," 

to  which  the  committee  gave  full  consideration.    He 

was  then  engaged  upon  his  "Military  Policy  of  the  Upton's  ;•  Mm. 

United  States,"  which  was  not  published  until  Mr.  Root 

was  Secretary  of  War  in  1904,  but  the  voluminous  data 

which  it  contains  were  available  to  the  committee  as  well 

as  his  views  upon  the  proper  method  of  organizing  our 

military  strength,  and  the  best  system  of  tactics,  or  drill 

regulations. 

These  two  documents,  the  report  of  the  Burnside  Bumside 
committee  in  1878  and  Upton's  book  on  military  policy, 
contain  an  encyclopaedia  of  military  information,  ex 
tracted  from  hundreds  of  volumes  of  state  papers  and 
other  archives  not  readily  accessible.  Nowhere  else  is 
there  to  be  found  so  much  original  information  relating 
to  the  army  condensed  into  such  comparatively  small 
space.  Full  use  has  been  made  of  these  volumes  in  pre 
paring  this  chapter,  and  I  desire  to  express  my  grateful 
acknowledgment  of  them  and  to  refer  all  students  to 
them  for  fuller  details. 

The  bill  *  which  the  committee  reported  followed  the 
recommendations  of  the  distinguished  soldiers  who  had 
given  the  committee  their  advice,  in  certain  essential 

1  Burnside,  1. 


314    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

features,  as  to  which  these  latter  were  substantially  in 
accord,  viz.,  a  regiment  of  three  battalions  in  each  of  the 
arms,  infantry,  artillery  and  cavalry;  the  staff  depart 
ments,  instead  of  being  officered  by  permanent  appoint 
ments,  were  to  be  filled  by  detail  of  officers  from  the  line, 
who  would  return  to  the  line  after  the  expiration  of  their 
detail,  thus  giving  to  line  officers  a  knowledge  of  staff 
duties  and  to  staff  officers  familiarity  with  the  needs  of 
the  army.  The  number  of  enlisted  men  in  a  company 
was  to  vary  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  services  as 
determined  by  the  President,  subject  to  appropriations 
by  Congress,  thus  providing  a  flexible  system  with  small 
companies  in  time  of  peace  capable  of  immediate  and 
large  expansion  in  time  of  war;  and  there  was  to  be  a 
" general  staff,"  of  somewhat  limited  functions,  such  as 
those  hitherto  performed  by  the  adjutant-general's  and 
inspector-general's  departments. 

Report  not  These  wise  provisions,  and  others,  were  enacted  into 
law  more  than  twenty  years  later.  The  Burnside  bill 
of  1878  failed  to  pass,  and  the  elaborate  labors  of  the 
committee,  based  upon  the  experience  and  advice  of  the 
successful  leaders  in  the  greatest  war  of  modern  times, 
and  upon  a  careful  study  of  the  military  systems  of 
Europe,  apparently  went  for  naught.  The  reason  was 
not  far  to  seek.  There  was  no  popular  interest  in  the 
subject.  Without  that  no  measures  can  be  enacted  in 
Lack  of  this  country.  The  discharged  soldiers,  North  and  South, 
Fnterest  more  than  2,000,000  in  number,  and  constituting  about 
one  in  four  of  the  entire  voting  population,  were  weary 
of  the  name  of  war;  they  were  engaged  in  building  up 
the  industries  of  the  country,  in  laying  the  foundations 
of  that  material  development  which  in  the  succeeding 
thirty  years  has  astonished  the  world;  they  fondly  hoped 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  315 

that  we  would  never  again  be  engaged  in  war.  Many  of 
the  statesmen  of  the  period,  discarding  the  lessons  of 
history,  did  not  hesitate  to  predict  with  entire  confidence 
that  there  never  would  be  another  war  in  this  country, 
that  we  should  never  have  occasion  to  attack  another 
nation,  and  no  other  nation  would  ever  dare  attack  us. 
They  could  see  no  need  for  an  army  outside  of  a  small 
force  to  protect  the  settlers  against  the  Indians  on  the 
ever-advancing  Western  frontier.  As  to  its  organization 
they  were  indifferent,  considering  it  a  matter  of  very 
minor  importance  as  compared  with  the  development 
of  railways,  the  silver  question,  the  Chinese  problem,  the 
disfranchisement  of  the  negroes  and  other  public  ques 
tions  then  pressing  for  solution. 

The  final  effort  of  the  Burnside  committee,  the  cul 
mination  of  more  than  twelve  years7  discussion  about 
the  army,  having  resulted  in  no  action,  the  subject  was 
dropped.  The  only  point  upon  which  the  legislators, 
representing  public  opinion  as  they  always  do,  were 
agreed  was  that  the  army  should  not  exceed  25, 000 l  men 
in  numbers,  and  this  was  inserted  as  a  proviso  in  the 
appropriation  bill,  re-enacted  in  succeeding  years  and 
then  incorporated  in  the  "Revised  Statutes,"  as  the  per 
manent  law. 

Twenty  years  later  war  came  suddenly  and  almost 
out  of  a  clear  sky,  although  its  cause — the  discontent  of  The  war 
Cuba  under  Spanish  rule — had  been  in  existence  for  two 
generations  and  had  more  than  once  brought  our  rela 
tions  with  Spain  close  to  the  breaking-point.  The  gen 
eration  of  the  Civil  War  had  practically  passed  away,  its 
passions  had  been  largely  forgotten,  there  were  new 
leaders  in  Congress,  new  men  coming  to  the  front  in  the 

1  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  187;  Rev.  Stat.  of  1878. 


316     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

less  army.  Its  faithful  service  under  great  hardship,  its  suc 
cess  in  settling  the  Indian  question,  the  aid  it  had  ren 
dered  in  building  up  the  Great  West,  its  thorough  effi 
ciency  and  the  studious  attainments  of  its  officers  had 
made  for  it  a  host  of  friends  which  it  had  never  possessed 
at  the  outbreak  of  any  previous  war.  When  the  law  for 
raising  troops  to  carry  on  the  war  came  up  in  Congress, 
Apia  22  the  latter  did  not  hesitate  to  declare1  that  "The  regular 
army  is  the  permanent  military  establishment,  which  is 
maintained  both  in  peace  and  war  according  to  law." 
The  law  further  provided  that  "The  volunteer  army 
shall  be  maintained  only  during  the  existence  of  war,  or 
while  war  is  imminent  .  .  .  that  all  enlistments  for  the 
volunteer  army  shall  be  for  a  term  of  two  years,  unless 
sooner  terminated,  and  that  all  officers  and  men  corn- 
war  *ith  posing  said  army  shall  be  discharged  from  the  service  of 
the  United  States  when  the  purposes  for  which  they  were 
called  into  service  shall  have  been  accomplished,  or  on 
the  conclusion  of  hostilities." 

March  s  This  and  other  laws2  expanded  the  enlisted  strength 

Apra  26  from  25,000  to  63,116,  by  adding  2  regiments  of  artil 
lery,  making  all  regiments  to  consist  of  3  battalions 
and  12  companies,  and  the  companies  to  have  106  en 
listed  men  in  the  infantry,  200  in  the  heavy  artillery, 
173  in  the  light  artillery  and  100  in  the  cavalry. 
April 20  In  the  joint  resolution3  which  demanded  that  Spain 

relinquish  its  government  of  Cuba,  the  President  was 
"directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States  and  to  call  into  the 
actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of  the 
several  States,  to  such  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to 
carry  these  resolutions  into  effect."  This  was  substan- 

1  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  184.        3  Sec.  War,  1898, 1, 252-262.        3  Ibid. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  317 

tially  according  to  precedent  in  previous  wars.    In  the 
law  passed  two  days  later  there  was  a  more  specific  war  with 
direction1  and  one  entirely  novel:    "When  it  becomes  Spa11 
necessary  to  raise  a  volunteer  army,  the  President  shall 
issue  his  proclamation  stating  the  number  of  men  de 
sired,  within  such  limits  as  may  be  fixed  by  law."    The 
law  then  specified  in  detail  how  such  volunteers  were  to 
be  organized.    It  also  authorized  another  novelty,  the 
raising  of  volunteer  troops,  "possessing  special  qualifica 
tions,"  not  from  the  States  but  "from  the  nation  at  large," 
not  exceeding  3,000  men  in  all,  the  officers  to  be  ap 
pointed  under   "regulations  to   be   prescribed   by  the 
Secretary  of  War."    A  little  later  this  was  expanded  so  May  11 
as  to  provide  for  "a  volunteer  brigade  of  engineers  from 
the  nation  at  large,"  and  "an  additional  volunteer  force 
of  not  exceeding  10,000  enlisted  men  possessing  immu 
nity  from  disease  incidental  to  tropical  climates,"  the 
officers  of  these  troops  to  be  appointed  by  the  President 
and  not  by  the  governors  of  States.    The  President's 
first  call    for  volunteers  was  for  125,000  men,  and  in  April  23 
order  to  be  sure  of  getting  enough  men  while  the  en 
thusiasm  was  still  warm,  this  was  followed  by  a  second  May  25 
call 3  for  75,000  men. 

The  President  of  the  United  States,  William  McKinley, 
had  in  his  youth  trudged  through  the  long  marches  and 
fought  in  many  battles  of  the  Civil  War;  the  Secretary 
of  War,  R.  A.  Alger,  had  also  served  in  the  same  war; 
the  adjutant-general,  Henry  C.  Corbin,  had  not  only  had 
the  same  experience,  but  was  a  man  of  rare  executive  and 
administrative  ability  and  of  tireless  energy.    They  used  Mistakes  of 
their  utmost  efforts,  and  with  success,  in  persuading  Con-  Repeated 
gress  so  to  legislate  that  the  mistakes  of  the  Civil  War 

1  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  192.  '  Sec.  War.,  1898,  I,  259. 


318    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1898  and  our  previous  wars  might  not  be  repeated.  It  will  be 
noticed  that  there  was  no  limit  except  the  President's 
discretion  to  the  number  of  men  to  be  called  for;  that 
national  volunteers,  officered  by  the  President  under 
regulations  prescribing  examinations  as  to  their  military 
qualifications,  were  provided  for.  Therefore,  when  the 
second  call  for  volunteers  was  made,  the  rule  was  estab 
lished  and  rigidly  enforced  that  the  recruits  should  be 
sent  to  fill  up  existing  regiments  from  every  State,  and 
no  new  regiments  were  formed  until  this  had  been 
done. 

The  laws  passed  and  the  regulations  established  for 
carrying  them  into  effect  in  1898  are  models  for  similar 
occasions  hereafter.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that 
the  able-bodied  population  was  then  about  13,000,000, 
and  the  number  of  men  called  for,  about  250,000,  was 
only  one  in  fifty,  instead  of  one  in  two  as  in  the  Civil  War. 
It  may  be  a  question  whether  the  principles  established 
in  1898  can  be  carried  out  in  a  war  making  such  a  de 
mand  on  our  military  strength  as  did  the  Civil  War. 
There  seems  to  be  no  ground  to  doubt  that  they  can  be, 
if  the  number  of  volunteers  in  the  first  call  is  sufficiently 
large,  and  if,  in  case  volunteers  do  not  respond,  the  con 
scription  is  immediately  applied. 

prompt  There  was  no  such  difficulty  in  1898.    The  number 

called  for  was  ample,  and  the  response  was  instantaneous, 
not  only  for  the  volunteer  but  also  for  the  regular  army. 
Within  a  month  the  regulars  were  increased  to  44,125, 
and  the  volunteers  to  124,804;  within  ninety  days, 
regulars  to  56,258  and  volunteers  to  212,094.'  These 

war  with        troops  were  all  organized,  armed,  equipped  and  in  the 
field  within  the  dates  named.     When  the  peace  protocol 

1  Sec.  War,  1898,  I,  257,  260. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  319 

was  signed,  on  August  12,  recruiting  was  stopped;  there  1898 
were  then  274,717  men  in  the  field,  of  which  approxi 
mately  59,000  were  regulars,  16,000  United  States  vol 
unteers,  and  200,000  State  volunteers.  The  army  had 
numbered  only  28,183 l  on  April  1.  The  number  of  Span 
ish  regular  troops  surrendered  at  Santiago  was  13,006 
and  at  Manila  about  13,500;  15,000  were  dispersed  at 
Santiago,  and  over  70,000  2  were  sent  home  from  Ha 
vana  as  a  result  of  the  Santiago  campaign.  To  have 
increased  our  military  force  by  1,000  per  cent,  and  to 
have  defeated,  captured  or  dispersed  the  armies  op 
posed  to  us — all  within  a  period  of  about  four  months 
— shows  what  can  be  accomplished  with  our  latent 
military  strength  when  it  is  judiciously  applied. 

While  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain 
was  pending  the  insurrection  broke  out  in  the  Philippines. 
Under  the  law  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  required  the  Apru  22 
reduction  of  the  regular  army  to  its  previous  strength  of 
about  28,000  men  and  the  discharge  of  the  entire  vol 
unteer  force.    This  was  done.    Congress  then  enacted        1899 
that  the  regular  army  might  be  maintained  at  not  ex-  March  2 
ceeding  65,000  3  men,  and  that  35,000  volunteers  should 
be  raised  " from  the  country  at  large."    These  new  troops        1898 
were  raised  in  the  course  of  a  few  months,  and  all  the  National 
volunteers  and  a  large  part  of  the  regulars  sent  to   the 
Philippines.    The  field  officers  were  selected  from  the 
regular  army  on  their  efficiency  records,  and  the  com 
pany  officers  were  chosen,  under  rigid  examination  as  to 
their  service  and  qualifications,  solely  from  those  who 
had  served  in  the  war  against  Spain.    These  volunteers 
took  their  part  side  by  side  with  the  regulars  in  suppress- 

JSec.  War,  1898,  I,  253-260.     2  Sargent,  Campaign  of  Santiago,  III,  1. 
3  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  190,  200. 


320    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


1899 

Philippine 
Insurrection 


Elihu  Root  as 
Secretary  of 
War 


ing  the  Philippine  insurrection.  That  they  were  the 
most  efficient,  the  best  disciplined  and  most  thoroughly 
trained  volunteers  that  were  ever  mustered  into  our 
service  is  generally  conceded.  The  individuals  had  the 
same  excellent  qualities  as  the  volunteers  of  the  Civil 
War,  but  these  "  volunteers  from  the  nation  at  large " 
were  organized  on  a  system  immensely  superior.  It  is 
not  likely  that  this  experience  will  be  forgotten  the  next 
time  there  is  occasion  to  call  for  volunteers.  It  is  true 
that  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  we  discarded  the 
experience  of  our  previous  wars  and  repeated  the  same 
mistakes.  No  other  system  had  then  ever  been  tried 
and  proved.  Now  that  a  better  system  has  been  actually 
used,  and  the  precedent  established,  it  is  probable  that 
we  shall  adhere  to  it  in  similar  emergencies  hereafter. 

The  organized  force  of  insurgents  was  defeated  and 
dispersed  by  midsummer  of  1900;  a  guerilla  warfare  con 
tinued  for  nearly  a  year  longer,  but  practically  ceased 
with  the  capture  of  Aguinaldo  in  March,  1901.  Under 
the  law1  the  army  was  to  be  reduced  in  strength  to  what 
it  had  been  prior  to  April,  1898,  and  all  the  volunteers 
were  to  be  discharged  prior  to  July  1,  1901. 

In  the  meantime,  in  August,  1899,  Elihu  Root  had 
become  Secretary  of  War.  During  the  five  years  of  his 
administration  the  army  obtained  those  measures  of  re 
form  and  advancement  for  which  its  chief  officers  had 
been  begging  in  vain  for  three  generations;  and  the  coun 
try  at  last  saw  its  military  establishment  placed  on  a 
footing  for  which  a  few  of  its  most  far-sighted  states 
men,  Washington,  Calhoun,  Cass  and  others,  had  argued, 
equally  without  success.  Congress  finally  adopted  these 
measures  chiefly  in  consequence  of  four  successive  annual 

1  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  190. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  321 

reports,  1899  to  1902  inclusive,1  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  1399 
which  for  clearness  of  thought,  brevity  and  lucidity  of 
statement,  have  probably  never  been  excelled  in  our  state 
papers.  Mr.  Root  had  never  had  any  military  training 
or  experience,  even  in  a  militia  company;  but  he  sur 
rounded  himself  with  the  best  military  advisers,  officers 
fresh  from  the  experience  of  Cuba,  the  Philippines  and 
China,  and  thoroughly  familiar  with  our  military  his 
tory  and  the  defects  of  our  military  system  in  the  past. 
Having  absorbed  their  ideas,  weighed  them  and  clarified 
them,  rejecting  some  and  accepting  others,  he  then  pre 
sented  the  subject  to  Congress  in  documents  which  read 
like  the  arguments  in  a  great  cause  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States. 

It  fell  to  Mr.  Root's  lot  to  formulate  and  put  into  1901 
operation  a  permanent  scheme  of  government  for  the 
Philippines  and  for  Porto  Rico,  and  a  temporary  govern 
ment  for  Cuba,  which  was  followed  by  evacuation  on 
conditions  which  provided  for  our  intervention  in  case 
of  mishap  (which  happened  within  a  few  years),  all  in 
accordance  with  a  general  plan  of  which  the  outlines 
only  had  been  suggested  by  President  McKinley.  The 
organization  of  this  civil  government  was  constructive 
statesmanship  of  the  highest  order,  and  the  instruments 
for  carrying  his  plans  into  effect  were  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  army.  Simultaneously  with  the  development  and 
solution  of  these  insular  problems,  he  took  up  the  needs 
of  the  army  and  secured,  between  1901  and  1903,  the 
reorganization  of  the  army,  the  formation  of  the  general 
staff  and  the  establishment  of  a  " well-regulated"  militia. 
He  obtained  the  necessary  appropriations  for  completing 
and  arming  our  sea-coast  fortifications,  the  construction  projects  s 

1  Sec.  War,  1899-1903,  328-352. 


322    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1903  of  which  had  begun  in  1888;  he  amplified  and  system 
atized  the  plan  of  education  at  the  schools  for  infantry, 
cavalry  and  light  artillery  which  had  been  established 
by  Generals  Sherman  and  Sheridan  several  years  before, 
and  enlarged  the  scope  of  instruction  at  the  pre-existing 
schools  for  the  heavy  artillery  and  engineers;  he  founded 
the  War  College  at  Washington  for  advanced  instruction 
of  a  limited  number  of  officers;  and  finally,  he  organized 
the  Army  Medical  School.  He  persuaded  Congress  to 
appropriate  nearly  $7,000,000  to  rebuild  and  enlarge  the 
historic  Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  but  for  whose 
existence  during  three-quarters  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  military  art  in  this  country  would  have  been  lost; 
and  he  procured  an  increase  in  the  number  of  cadets 
from  384  to  481. 

The  arguments  in  the  annual  reports,  by  which  these  re 
sults  were  accomplished,  are  themselves  so  condensed  that 
any  summary  of  them  is  impossible.  The  key-note  is  the 
proposition,  in  the  report  for  1899,  "that  the  real  object  of 
having  an  army  is  to  provide  for  war" — a  truism  which 
singularly  enough  had  been  disregarded  for  many  years. 

Reorganization      With  this  object  in  view  it  was  provided  1  that  the 
army  should  consist  of  30  regiments  of  infantry,  15  of 

Feb.  2  cavalry,  1  of  engineers,  a  corps  of  artillery  (of  size  equal 

to  13  regiments)  and  the  staff  departments.  The  artil 
lery  was  divided  into  two  branches,  the  coast  artillery 
and  the  field  artillery,  with  a  chief  of  artillery  in  charge 
of  both.2  The  number  of  officers  was  fixed  at  3,996  3 

1  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  1048. 

3  By  the  act  of  January  25,  1907,  the  field  artillery  was  transferred  to 
the  line  of  the  army  and  organized  into  six  regiments;  the  coast  artillery 
became  a  corps,  under  its  chief,  charged  with  the  care  and  use  of  coast 
fortifications,  including  torpedoes  and  submarine  mines. 

3  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  1048-1060. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  323 

and  the  enlisted  strength  was  left  to  the  discretion  of  1003 
the  President,  between  60,000  and  100,000.  The  ad 
vantage  and  economy  of  this  flexible  system  have  been 
fully  utilized  by  successive  executive  orders,  fixing  the 
enlisted  strength  according  to  the  necessities  of  the  year 
and  the  appropriations  of  Congress;  it  has  varied  from 
59,866  to  78,782.1 

As  to  the  staff  departments,  it  was  provided  2  that 
when  a  vacancy  occurred  in  the  position  of  chief  of  the 
corps  or  department,  it  should  be  filled  by  detail  of  any 
officer  in  the  army,  not  below  the  rank  of  lieutenant- 
colonel,  for  a  period  of  four  years;  and  as  to  the  other 
officers,  those  then  holding  permanent  appointments  were 
to  retain  them  and  be  promoted  according  to  seniority, 
but  as  vacancies  occurred,  they  were  to  be  filled  by  de 
tails  from  the  line,  for  a  period  of  four  years,  under  such 
system  of  examination  as  the  President  should  prescribe. 
From  these  provisions  the  engineer,  judge-advocate  and 
medical  departments,  for  obvious  reasons,  were  excepted ; 
but  as  to  all  others  the  rule  of  details  and  consequent 
interchangeability  of  service  in  the  staff  and  line  was  to 
prevail.  The  system  has  now  been  in  operation  for 
nearly  ten  years,  more  than  fifty  per  cent  of  the  officers 
in  the  seven  other  staff  departments  are  detailed  from 
the  line  and  several  hundred  officers  have  already  served 
their  detail  in  the  staff  and  returned  to  the  line.  The 
eternal  bickering  and  mutual  complaints  between  the 
staff  and  line  which  filled  the  air  for  thirty  years  prior 
to  the  passage  of  this  law  are  no  longer  heard.  The 
army  is  a  homogeneous  body,  each  part  understanding 
and  in  touch  with  the  others. 

The  law  also  provided  for  the  organization  of  battalions, 

1  Army  Registers,  1903-1910,  'Mil.  Laws,  1907,  1061. 


324    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1903  of  which  there  are  now  seven,  of  Philippine  scouts,  with 
majors  and  captains  detailed  from  the  army  and  lieu 
tenants  appointed  from  officers  and  enlisted  men  who 
had  served  in  the  war  with  Spain;  also  for  a  Porto  Rico 
regiment,  with  field  officers  detailed  from  the  army  and 
captains  and  lieutenants  appointed  from  veterans  of  the 
war  with  Spain  or  citizens  of  Porto  Rico — the  latter  for 
four  years,  but  with  provision  for  reappointment  and  pro 
motion  if  found  qualified.  There  are  now  ten  native 
officers  in  this  regiment. 

Feb.  14  The  establishment  of  the  general  staff  is  a  landmark  in 

our  military  history.  Its  purpose  was  to  prevent  the 
recurrence  of  such  confusion  in  the  transport  and  supply 
departments  as  had  accomplished  the  assembling  of 
troops  at  Tampa  in  1898,  which  was  then  fresh  in  the 
public  mind  but  was  by  no  means  unprecedented.  The 
law1  provided  for  the  selection  by  the  President  of  one  of 
the  general  officers,  to  be  called  chief  of  staff,  and  4 
colonels,  6  lieutenant-colonels,  12  majors  and  20  cap 
tains,  all  for  the  period  of  four  years,  unless  sooner  re 
lieved.  The  chief  of  artillery  was  to  be  an  additional 
member  of  the  staff. 

General  staff  The  duties  of  the  general  staff  are  briefly  but  clearly 
defined  in  the  law:2  "To  prepare  plans  for  the  national 
defence  and  for  the  mobilization  of  the  military  forces  in 
time  of  war;  to  investigate  and  report  upon  all  questions 
affecting  the  efficiency  of  the  army  and  its  state  of  prep 
aration  for  military  operations;  to  render  professional 
aid  and  assistance  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  to  general 
officers  and  other  superior  commanders,  and  to  act  as 
their  agents  in  informing  and  co-ordinating  the  action  of 
all  the  different  officers  who  are  subject  under  the  terms 

1  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  1290.  *IUd.,  1907,  1291. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  325 

of  this  act  to  the  supervision  of  the  chief  of  staff;  and  1903 
to  perform  such  other  military  duties  not  otherwise  as 
signed  by  law  as  may  be  from  time  to  time  prescribed  by 
the  President."  The  officers  " subject  to  the  supervision 
of  the  chief  of  staff"  are  those  of  all  troops  of  the  line 
and  of  the  ten  different  staff  departments — the  entire 
army,  in  fact.  The  chief  of  staff  is  also  required  to  per 
form  such  duties  as  hitherto  had  been  assigned  by  law 
to  the  commanding  general  of  the  army.  They  were 
only  two  in  number,  membership  in  the  Board  of  Forti 
fications  and  the  commissioners  of  the  Soldiers'  Home. 
The  anomaly  of  a  commanding  general  in  time  of  peace 
attempting  to  exercise  actual  command,  whereas  the 
Constitution  makes  the  President  commander-in-chief 
and  the  statute  designates  the  Secretary  of  War  as  his 
agent,  thus  disappeared,  and  with  it  the  cause  of  endless 
misunderstanding  and  resulting  inefficiency.  It  was  suc 
ceeded  by  an  efficient  system  under  which  one  of  the 
generals  is  selected  as  chief  military  adviser  to  the  Presi 
dent  and  holds  the  position  at  the  pleasure  of  the  latter. 
The  merit  of  this  law  was  soon  tested.  In  September, 
1906,  it  became  necessary1  to  send  a  force  of  6,000  men 
to  intervene  in  Cuba.  Plans  for  such  a  contingency  had 
been  prepared  long  in  advance.  They  were  carried  out 
with  the  smoothness  and  regularity  of  a  drill  on  parade. 
The  contrast  to  the  confusion,  extravagance  and  lack 
of  efficiency  in  previous  movements  of  our  troops  in  an 
emergency  was  most  striking.2 

Deport  War  Dept.,  House  Documents,  Vol.  2,  1906,  458-459. 

2  While  these  pages  are  going  through  the  press  a  still  larger  movement 
has  been  carried  out;  20,000  men  have  been  concentrated  in  Texas,  with 
out  previous  notice,  in  a  period  of  nine  days.  Detailed  reports  are  as  yet 
lacking,  but  apparently  the  operation  has  shown  great  efficiency  on  the 
part  of  the  general  staff. 


326    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

iocs  It  is  the  business  of  the  general  staff  to  be  prepared 

for  similar  contingencies,  which  to  the  general  public 
seem  unexpected  and  improbable.  All  the  world  knows 
what  the  general  staff  did  for  Prussia  in  1870.  Our 
own  general  staff  differs  from  that  of  the  European  armies 
in  many  particulars,  but  it  is  believed  that  it  is  adapted 
to  our  own  requirements  and  will  perform  equally  valuable 
service  for  us  if  a  similar  contingency  should  arise. 

Of  its  many  but  important  minor  duties  it  is  impossible 
to  speak  here  in  detail.  They  are  fully  set  forth  in  regu 
lations1  prepared  by  Mr.  Root  under  date  of  August  3, 
1903. 

Act  of        The  law2  "to  promote  the  efficiency  of  the  militia" 
directed  that  the  organization,  armament  and  discipline 
Jan.  21  of  the  militia  should  be  the  same  as  in  the  regular  army, 

and  provided  the  funds  to  make  this  effective.  For  the 
first  time  in  all  our  history  the  militia  now  has  the  same 
arms,  equipment,  uniforms  and  drill  as  the  regular  army, 
and  is  equipped  with  tents,  cooking  apparatus  and  other 
material  necessary  to  take  the  field  at  a  moment's  notice. 
The  law  further  authorized  the  President  in  time  of  war 
or  other  specified  emergency  to  call  forth  any  part  of  the 
militia  for  a  period  not  exceeding  nine  months;  and  he 
is  not  required  to  call  upon  the  governor  of  a  State,  but 
he  may  "  issue  his  orders  for  that  purpose  to  such  officers 
of  the  militia  as  he  may  think  proper."  Every  officer 
and  enlisted  man  thus  called  forth  shall  be  mustered  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States,  and  for  failure  to  present 
himself  for  such  muster  there  are  heavy  penalties.  In 
other  words,  when  the  emergency  arises,  the  President 
may  order  any  colonel  to  report  on  a  fixed  date  with  his 
regiment,  and  all  its  arms  and  equipment  (which  remain 

1  Sec.  War,  1899-1903,  483.  2  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  1249. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  327 

at  all  times  the  property  of  the  United  States),  to  a  mus-        1903 
tering  officer,  and  forthwith  that  regiment  becomes  a 
part  of  the  volunteer  army,  as  defined  and  provided  for 
in  the  law  of  1898. 

The  militia  law1  also  requires  a  certain  number  of 
drills  every  year,  provides  for  annual  encampments  and 
manoeuvres  in  conjunction  with  regular  troops,  author 
izes  the  detail  of  officers  of  the  army  for  duty  with  it, 
affords  safeguards  for  the  issue  and  proper  care  of  the 
arms  and  other  property  of  the  United  States  which  are 
furnished  to  it  and  permits  the  attendance  of  any  of  its 
officers  at  any  of  the  army  schools,  except  West  Point, 
with  a  view  to  their  becoming  officers  of  the  army. 

Encampments  and  joint  manoeuvres  have  been  held 
under  this  law  every  year  since  1904,  with  manifest  ad 
vantage  not  alone  to  the  militia  but  also  to  the  army. 

The  law  goes  to  the  utmost  limit  in  carrying  out 
the  constitutional  requirement  of  a  well-regulated  militia. 
Its  only  danger  is  that  it  may  have  gone  so  far  as  to 
discourage  recruiting  in  the  organized  militia,  commonly 
called  the  National  Guard,  the  strength  of  which  is  about 
120,000  men.  Officers  of  the  army  as  well  as  the  general 
public  are  apt  to  forget  the  full  significance  of  the  fact 
that  the  National  Guard  receives  no  pay,  that  its  only 
material  compensation  is  exemption  from  jury  duty, 
that  its  drills  are  habitually  carried  on  at  night  after  the 
day's  work  is  over,  that  all  its  members  are  engaged  in 
other  avocations  in  which  they  gain  their  living,  and 
that  their  military  duties  are  necessarily  subordinate 
to  the  chief  occupation  of  their  lives.  All  that  the  ser 
vice  has  to  offer  them  is  the  occasional  use  of  armories 
for  athletic  or  social  purposes,  the  physical  advantages 

1  Mil.  Laws,  1907,  1249-1250. 


328    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1903  of  military  drill,  the  pleasure  of  handling  fire-arms  and 
becoming  proficient  in  their  use  and  the  applause  of  the 
Miiitia  Act  of  public  at  parades.  As  against  this  they  are  liable  to  be 
called  away  from  their  families,  and  their  business,  per 
haps  losing  their  employment,  as  many  did  in  1898,  on  the 
President's  order  for  service  for  any  period  not  exceeding 
their  term  of  enlistment  and  at  any  point  within  or  with 
out  the  United  States.  To  remedy  this  it  has  been  sug 
gested  that  service  in  the  militia  be  paid.  But  this  is  of 
doubtful  expediency,  for  many  of  the  best  and  oldest 
regiments  in  the  National  Guard  have  existed  for  several 
generations  solely  from  pride  and  esprit-de-corps.  To 
convert  them  into  paid  organizations  would  be  to  destroy 
their  traditions  and  change  the  whole  character  of  their 
personnel. 

It  probably  will  work  out  in  practice  that  in  the  sea- 
coast  cities,  where  about  one-half  of  the  older  National 
Guard  regiments  are  to  be  found,  they  will  prove  to  be 
a  most  satisfactory  support  to  the  coast  artillery.  Even 
with  the  present  organization  of  the  army  we  have  less 
than  half  the  number  of  instructed  men  necessary  to 
man  the  guns  already  in  position.  To  serve  in  the  forts 
at  the  guns,  or  to  be  stationed  near  the  forts  to  defend 
them  from  a  land  attack,  will  not  take  the  men  far  from 
their  homes.  Already  several  of  the  National  Guard  or 
ganizations  have  been  changed  from  infantry  regiments 
to  coast  artillery  companies.  They  have  their  designated 
stations  at  certain  of  the  ten-inch  or  twelve-inch  guns 
in  a  fort  within  a  few  hours7  ride  by  trolley-car  or  boat 
from  their  armories,  and  they  have  been  drilling  at  these 
identical  guns  every  summer  for  several  years.  That 
fort  and  their  particular  gun  are  as  familiar  to  them 
as  their  own  armories.  That  they  could  render  ad- 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  329 

mirable  service  there  in  time  of  war  does  not  admit  of 
doubt. 

The  other  half  of  the  National  Guard,  located  at  points 
distant  from  the  seaboard,  would  probably  respond  to 
an  order  for  active  service  with  less  loss  than  the  regi 
ments  in  the  larger  cities.  It  is  equipped  as  infantry, 
and  except  in  case  of  extraordinary  emergency  would 
probably  not  be  kept  away  from  its  home,  involuntarily, 
for  any  great  length  of  time. 

The  scheme  formulated  in  Mr.  Root's  report  for  1902 l  Mr.  Root's 

,  Plan 

embraced 

1.  A  regular  army  of  from  60,000  to  100,000  men; 

2.  A  militia,  trained  and  fully  armed  and  equipped 
and  subject  to  the  President's  order,  of  from  120,000  to 
150,000  men; 

3.  A  first  volunteer  reserve,  composed  of  such  portions 
of  the  organized  militia  as  might  volunteer  for  a  longer 
period  than  nine  months; 

4.  A  second  volunteer  reserve,  composed  of  officers 
and  men  who  have  had  previous  military  service; 

5.  Volunteers  organized  by  the  States,  as  in  the  Civil 
War. 

He  estimated  the  number  available  for  immediate  ac 
tion,  in  the  first  four  classes  at  250,000  to  300,000  men, 
and  stated  that  the  number  of  the  fifth  class  "has  no 
limit,  except  the  possibility  of  transportation  and  sup 
ply." 

No  legislation  has  yet  been  enacted  in  regard  to  the 
three  classes  of  volunteers  above  referred  to,  although  an 
act  has  been  drafted 2  under  the  direction  of  the  general 
staff,  and  has  been  pending  in  Congress  since  1909.  This 


1  Sec.  War,  1899-1903,  286. 

2  61st  Congress,  2d  Session,  Senate  bill  4003. 


330    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1903  act  is  intended  to  provide  in  advance  for  the  organiza 
tion  of  the  volunteer  army,  so  that  when  war  is  imminent 
it  would  only  be  necessary  for  the  President  to  state  in  his 
proclamation  the  number  of  men  desired  in  each  arm  or 
corps.  The  act  provides  how  they  shall  be  organized 
and  how  many  general  and  staff  officers  shall  be  ap 
pointed  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  men  called  for. 
Briefly,  the  law  contains  the  following  essential  provisions, 
viz.,  the  period  of  service  is  to  be  for  the  war,  unless 
sooner  discharged;  all  officers  of  every  grade  are  to  be 
appointed  by  the  President;  the  men  received  into  ser 
vice  are  to  be  taken  as  far  as  practicable  from  the  several 
States  and  Territories  in  proportion  to  population;  the 
organization,  arms  and  equipment  are  to  be  identical 
with  those  in  the  regular  army;  all  volunteer  organiza 
tions  are  to  be  maintained  as  nearly  as  possible  at  their 
maximum  strength  by  means,  of  recruiting  depots  es 
tablished  for  that  purpose;  regular  officers  are  to  be 
assigned  to  all  organizations  not  exceeding  five  to  one 
regiment;  and  officers  and  men  in  the  volunteer  army 
are  to  be  on  the  same  footing  as  those  in  the  regular 
service. 

That  these  provisions  are  justified  and  demanded  by 
our  experience  in  previous  wars  does  not  admit  of  doubt, 
from  the  professional  military  stand-point.  It  is  equally 
true  that  they  run  counter  to  various  political  considera 
tions  and  to  many  deep-seated  prejudices  in  favor  of 
rights  previously  exercised  by  the  governors  of  States. 
Whether  these  latter  can  be  overcome  to  the  extent 
necessary  to  enact  these  laws  remains  to  be  seen, 
system  of  One  other  question,  brought  forward  by  Mr.  Root  in 

his  first  report  of  1899,1  is  still  pending  in  Congress;  that 

1  Sec.  War,  1899-1903,  61. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  331 

is,  the  system  of  promotion.  In  every  other  military  ser-  1903 
vice  in  the  world,  and  in  every  great  corporate  organi 
zation  employing  large  bodies  of  men,  the  promotion  of 
officers  is  based  on  relative  merit  and  fitness  determined 
by  some  specified  board  or  other  agency.  In  our  army, 
below  the  grade  of  general  officers,  promotion  is  deter 
mined  solely  by  seniority.  Mr.  Root  proposed  that  one 
vacancy  in  three  should  be  filled  by  selection  under  care 
fully  guarded  regulations  so  as  to  prevent  favoritism. 
The  great  majority  of  officers  opposed  this  so  vigorously 
that  for  eleven  years  they  have  defeated  it.  As  an  alter 
native  proposition  the  general  staff  has  drafted  a  law, 
which  has  been  pending  in  Congress  for  two  years,  based 
upon  the  principle  of  " elimination."  If  vacancies  are 
less  than  a  certain  number  in  any  grade  during  a  certain 
number  of  years,  then  a  definite  number  of  officers  in  that 
grade  are  to  be  eliminated  by  retirement,  the  selections 
for  elimination  to  be  made  by  a  board  of  officers  under 
proper  regulations.  Such  a  measure  would  stimulate 
promotion,  but  would  not  accomplish  the  purpose  of 
selecting  the  best  men  for  command.  When  war  comes 
and  men's  lives  depend  every  day  and  every  hour  on  the 
skill  of  the  officers  in  command,  then  the  rule  of  strict 
seniority  is  thrown  to  the  wind;  the  purpose  then  is  to 
select  the  best  man,  and  no  claim  of  vested  right  to  pro 
motion  is  considered  or  tolerated.  The  same  principles 
should  apply  when,  in  time  of  peace,  the  army  is  prepar 
ing  for  war. 

This  chapter  has  already  exceeded  its  intended  length,  summary 
and  it  only  remains  to  summarize  it.     It  has  been  my 
endeavor  to  show  that  our  forefathers  were  imbued  with 
an  intense  prejudice  against  a  standing  army  in  time  of 


332    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1903  peace  and  a  supreme  reliance  upon  untrained  militia; 
that  these  prejudices  resulted  in  enormous  waste,  ex 
travagance  and  inefficiency  in  the  Revolution  and  the 
War  of  1812,  and  to  a  minor  extent  in  the  Mexican  War, 
the  Civil  War  and  the  war  with  Spain;  that  neverthe 
less  a  standing  army  was  found  to  be  necessary  and  has 
existed  since  the  First  Congress,  gradually  increasing  in 
numbers  and  efficiency,  and  slowly,  step  by  step,  gain 
ing  the  confidence  of  the  people;  that  the  strength  of 
the  army  has  varied  from  50  to  120  per  100,000  of  the 
population,  or  from  1  per  cent  to  2J  per  cent  of  the 
"  able-bodied  male  population/'  and  its  annual  cost,  ex 
clusive  of  pensions,  has  been  less  than  1  per  cent  of  our 
national  wealth;  and  that  finally,  in  this  135th  year  of 
our  independence,  we  have  an  efficient  army,  and  a 
militia  with  uniform  arms,  equipment,  organization  and 
drill,  both  respectable  in  numbers,  though  small  as 
modern  armies  are  counted,  and  both  subject  to  the 
instant  call  of  the  President.  We  have  built  proper 
fortifications  on  our  sea-coasts  and  have  placed  in  them 
a  reasonable  number  of  modern  high-powered  guns. 

More  progress  has  been  made  in  the  improvement  of 
our  army  during  the  last  ten  years  than  in  all  its  pre 
vious  history.  The  war  with  Spain,  so  brief  in  point  of 
time,  so  slight  as  regards  loss  of  life,  has  changed  com 
pletely  our  relations  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  has 
brought  us  into  close  touch  and  sharp  competition  with 
the  nations  of  Europe  on  one  side  and  of  Asia  on  the 
other;  and  with  this  competition  the  prospect  of  foreign 
war,  which  thirty  years  ago  seemed  so  remote  as  to  be 
negligible,  is  now  a  contingency  that  must  be  kept  always 
in  mind.  Abuse  of  a  disciplined  regular  army  and  praise 
of  a  patriotic  untrained  militia  are  no  longer  the  popular 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  333 

cries  with  which  demagogues  in  politics  strive  to  catch  1903 
votes.  Measures  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  army 
and  to  put  the  country  in  a  proper  state  of  defence  and 
keep  it  so  are  no  longer  approved  in  the  abstract  and 
neglected  in  the  concrete,  but  they  receive  the  serious 
consideration  of  Congress,  and  this  consideration  leads  to 
actual  legislation. 

Our  military  policy  still  remains,  and  is  likely  to  remain, 
somewhat  different  from  that  of  the  nations  of  Europe. 
Enormous  armies,  conscription  and  universal  military 
service  seem  not  to  be  necessary  with  us.  We  still  rely 
upon  voluntary  service;  but  universal  liability  to  ser 
vice  is  the  law  of  the  land,  and  conscription  is  in  the 
background  if  volunteers  are  not  sufficient.  Above  all, 
public  opinion  is  beginning  to  appreciate  the  fact  that 
untrained  patriotism  is  not  sufficient  and  that  our  chief 
reliance  must  be  upon  a  military  force  trained  in  advance 
in  time  of  peace  for  the  immensely  complex  problems  of 
war. 

It  would  be  a  mistake  on  the  part  of  our  legislators  to  possibility 
attempt  to  blink  or  dodge  the  fact  that  among  the  con 
ditions  of  our  national  life  at  the  present  time  is  the 
possibility  of  war  with  one  or  another  great  nation 
possessing  a  trained  army  of  from  300,000  to  1,000,000 
men,  with  ample  transport  facilities  for  crossing  the 
oceans  which  bound  our  coasts,  and  a  powerful  navy  to 
protect  such  transports.  If  such  a  war  comes,  the  attack 
on  our  coasts  will  probably  precede  the  declaration  of  war. 

It  is  a  fallacy  to  argue  that  these  oceans  isolate  and 
protect  us  from  other  nations.  That  might  have  been 
true  when  Washington  gave  his  wise  advice  against  en 
tangling  alliances;1  although  England  crossed  the  At- 

1  Sparks,  XII,  231,  232. 


334    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1903  lantic  with  30,000  men  in  1776,  the  allies  sent  60,000 
men  through  the  Mediterranean  in  1854  and  we  moved 
12,600  men  across  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  in  1847.  In  two 
of  these  expeditions  the  troops  were  carried  in  sailing 
ships,  moving  with  uncertain  speed,  from  50  to  100  miles 
in  a  day,  and  each  carrying  from  200  to  250  soldiers. 
Now  they  would  be  carried  in  great  steamers,  with  3,000 
to  5,000  troops  on  each,  travelling  at  a  certain  speed  of 
400  miles  or  more  every  day.  More  than  one  great  na 
tion  can  assemble  and  embark  an  army  much  larger 
than  our  own  in  10  days  and  cross  the  Atlantic  in  10 
days  more,  or  the  Pacific  in  20  days.  While  our  prin 
cipal  cities  are  protected  by  modern  fortifications,  yet 
there  are  long  stretches  of  beach  and  several  harbors  on 
both  coasts  where  a  landing  is  feasible  unless  we  have  a 
mobile  army  strong  enough  to  prevent  it. 

These  are  not  theories,  but  the  actual  conditions 
which  confront  us  in  this  twentieth  century.  That  we 
should  ultimately  prevail  in  any  such  contest,  owing  to 
our  enormous  resources,  our  mechanical  ingenuity,  our 
fertility  in  expedients  and,  above  all,  the  dominant 
character  of  our  race,  seems  probable — unless  our  race 
is  decadent,  and  if  that  be  true  then  we  shall  perish. 
The  race  which  came  out  victorious  from  the  Civil 
War  will  not  probably  be  subdued;  but  if  it  wins 
it  will  be  at  the  end  of  a  sacrifice  which  cannot  be 
measured. 

Such  a  contingency  is  among  the  possibilities  under 
any  circumstances;  it  goes  with  the  conditions  of  our 
national  life.  If  we  are  not  prepared  for  it,  it  becomes 
not  alone  a  probability  but  almost  a  certainty;  for  we 
are  competing  with  all  the  world  for  the  trade  of  the 
Orient  and  of  South  America,  and  we  must  so  compete. 


GRADUAL  GROWTH  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  335 

If  we  abandon  the  competition  our  prosperity  will  come 
to  an  end.  It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  we  shall  abandon 
it,  but  rather  that  the  trade  rivalry  for  foreign  markets 
which  has  recently  begun  will  rapidly  increase  in  the 
next  few  years.  In  such  rivalry  the  potential  causes  of 
war  are  numerous  and  frequent. 

The  Venezuelan  incident  has  shown  that  the  ties  which 
bind  us  to  Great  Britain  are  so  strong  that  war  with  that 
country  is  improbable  even  under  extreme  provocation. 
But  it  is  idle  to  deny  that  there  are  other  nations  which 
are  jealous  of  our  phenomenal  growth.  Their  attitude 
toward  us,  however  friendly  it  may  have  been  in  the 
past,  is  now  by  no  means  cordial,  and  at  times  seems  like 
thinly  veiled  hostility.  It  is  well  to  remember  what 
Washington  wrote  in  1778:1  "It  is  a  maxim,  founded 
on  the  universal  experience  of  mankind,  that  no  nation 
is  to  be  trusted  further  than  it  is  bound  by  its  interest; 
and  no  prudent  statesman  or  politician  will  venture  to 
depart  from  it." 

Some  people  say  that  the  expression  of  such  views  inadequate 
provokes  war.  The  teachings  of  history  prove  that  this  tot  warU° 
is  not  true,  and  that  war  comes  to  the  nation  that  is  not 
prepared  for  it.  Especially  is  this  true  of  a  very  rich 
nation,  with  abundant  resources — unorganized.  We  have 
always  been  unprepared  for  war,  and  we  have  been  at 
war  one  year  in  every  seven  since  we  declared  our  inde 
pendence.  We  have  a  more  efficient  army  and  a  more 
highly  organized  militia  now  than  at  any  previous  time 
in  our  history;  but  compared  with  the  possibilities  that 
confront  us  and  the  conditions  which  have  resulted  from 
the  use  of  steam  and  electricity,  we  are  about  as  unpre 
pared  now  as  at  any  previous  time. 

1  Sparks,  VI,  110. 


336    MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

Necessity  It  would  seem  to  be  incumbent  upon  those  who  are 

Definite          responsible  for  our  national  legislation  to  study  these 

poiicyry          facts,  to  forget  the  traditions  which  our  Puritan  and 

Cavalier  ancestors  brought  over  from  England  nearly 

three  hundred  years  ago,  to  realize  that  what  was  wise 

in  the  days  of  the  Stuart  tyranny  has  no  application  in 

this  twentieth  century  and  to  frame  a  military  policy 

suited  to  the  conditions  under  which  we  are  now  living. 


APPENDIX 

THE  Medical  Department  can  justly  claim  an  equal  share 
with  the  Ordnance  Department  and  the  Corps  of  Engineers 
in  the  valuable  contributions  to  the  advancement  of  science 
made  by  the  army  in  the  last  ninety  years,  and  particularly 
since  the  Civil  War.  Among  them  is  the  suppression  of 
yellow-fever  in  the  tropics,  which  is  solely  due  to  the  efforts 
of  the  army  surgeons,  one  of  whom  lost  his  life  in  the  process. 
Aside  from  the  loss  of  life,  the  paralysis  of  business  throughout 
the  Mississippi  Valley  and  the  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
which  was  an  incident  to  such  epidemics  as  that  of  1878  at 
Memphis,  produced  financial  loss  many  times  greater  than 
the  entire  cost  of  the  war  with  Spain  and  the  resulting  acqui 
sition  of  the  Philippines.  From  such  financial  losses  and  the 
appalling  loss  of  life  from  yellow-fever,  we  are  henceforth, 
apparently,  immune. 

Moreover,  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  but  for  this  great 
achievement  of  the  Army  Medical  Corps  and  the  sanitation 
introduced  by  Colonel  Gorgas  on  the  Isthmus,  we  should  not 
have  been  able  to  construct  the  Panama  Canal.  Had  we  had 
such  proportionate  loss  of  life  among  the  45,000  or  more 
laborers  now  working  on  the  canal  as  attended  the  construc 
tion,  by  a  much  smaller  force,  of  the  Panama  Railroad  from 
1849  to  1855  (where,  as  the  phrase  goes,  a  laborer  was  buried 
under  every  tie),  or  such  loss  of  life  as  befell  the  French  during 
their  unsuccessful  attempt  to  build  the  canal  between  1883 
and  1892,  there  is  little  doubt  that  this  would  have  created 
an  adverse  public  sentiment  sufficiently  strong,  when  added  to 
the  sentiment  against  building  the  canal  on  other  grounds,  to 
have  led  to  the  abandonment  of  the  entire  project. 

337 


338  APPENDIX 

General  Wood,  chief  of  staff,  has  kindly  caused  to  be  pre 
pared  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  R.  Kean,  Medical  Corps 
U.  S.  A.,  a  condensed  statement  of  the  facts  in  regard  to  the 
suppression  of  yellow-fever  and  the  connection  of  the  mos 
quito  therewith.  As  the  matter  is  one  of  world-wide  im 
portance,  and  has  a  distinct  bearing  on  the  enforcement  of 
any  military  policy  that  the  United  States  may  decide  upon, 
the  statement  is  published  in  full,  as  follows: 

THE  CONQUEST  OF  YELLOW-FEVER 

The  military  occupation  of  Cuba  brought  the  army  in  con 
frontation  with  yellow-fever,  a  foe  which  had  before  been  de 
structive  to  many  invading  expeditions  in  the  Antilles  and 
which  at  Santiago  gave  General  Shafter's  army  a  severe 
demonstration  of  its  fatal  and  demoralizing  power.  Upon  the 
recommendation  of  the  surgeon-general,  a  commission  was  sent 
to  Havana  to  study  the  question  of  its  cause  and  prevention,  a 
task  upon  which  many  distinguished  scientists  had  labored  in 
vain.  Major  Walter  Reed,  Surgeon,  U.  S.  A.,  who  was  placed 
at  its  head,  had  recently  overthrown  the  claim  of  the  dis 
tinguished  bacteriologist,  Sanarelli,  to  have  discovered  the 
bacillus  of  yellow-fever,  by  demonstrating  that  this  organism 
was  a  common  one  in  the  United  States  and  having  no  causa 
tive  relation  to  that  disease.  The  other  members  of  the  com 
mission  were  Acting  Assistant  Surgeons  James  Carroll,  Jesse 
W.  Lazear  and  A.  Agramonte,  the  latter  a  Cuban  by  birth 
and  the  only  member  of  the  commission  who  had  clinical 
experience  with  yellow-fever  and  was  immune  to  it.  The 
time  was  most  opportune  for  such  investigation,  as  the  disease 
was  at  that  time  prevalent  both  in  Havana  and  in  the  town 
of  Marianao  near  the  camp  of  the  American  troops,  and  it 
had  become  plainly  evident  that  the  energetic  measures  of 
the  American  military  government  to  clean  up  the  towns, 
disinfect  and  enforce  other  sanitary  measures  were  without 
effect  in  preventing  the  spread  of  this  mysterious  disease. 


APPENDIX  339 

The  transmission  of  malaria  by  a  certain  species  of  mos 
quito  had  recently  been  demonstrated  by  the  English  military 
surgeon,  Major  Ronald  Ross.  Dr.  Carlos  Finlay,  of  Havana, 
had,  since  1881,  stoutly  maintained  that  yellow-fever  was  a 
mosquito-borne  disease  and  had  fixed  accurately  upon  the 
species  which  was  responsible,  but  his  numerous  experiments 
had  failed  to  demonstrate  the  truth  of  his  hypothesis,  and  it 
therefore  received  no  more  attention  or  acceptance  from  the 
scientific  world  than  the  vast  number  of  other  theories  which 
had  at  one  time  or  another  been  advanced  with  regard  to  this 
peculiar  and  dreaded  disease.  Dr.  H.  R.  Carter  had  observed 
that  when  a  non-immune  person  went  into  an  infected  house 
he  became  sick  in  5  days  or  less,  but  that  15  or  20  days  elapsed 
before  a  house  became  infected  after  a  patient  sick  with  yellow- 
fever  was  carried  into  it  and  secondary  cases  appeared.  Carter 
drew  no  inferences  from  this  observation,  but  to  Reed's  mind  it 
suggested  that  the  difference  between  the  period  of  incubation 
and  that  required  to  infect  a  building  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  infective  agent  had  to  pass  through  a  stage  of  devel 
opment  in  some  biting  insect  as  an  intermediate  host,  and 
he  determined  to  investigate  the  mosquito  theory  of  Finlay. 
The  first  attempts  were  tried  secretly  on  Carroll  and  Lazear 
and  other  persons  at  the  hospital  of  Columbia  Barracks,  but 
were  failures  owing  to  the  same  cause  that  had  rendered  neg 
ative  Finlay's  numerous  and  intelligent  experiments  on  human 
beings,  namely,  that  two  conditions  have  to  be  satisfied  for 
the  transmission  of  yellow-fever:  the  mosquito,  in  order  to 
become  infected,  must  bite  a  patient  during  the  first  three 
days  of  the  disease,  and,  second,  the  insect  must  be  kept  at 
least  twelve  days  before  it  can  transmit  the  infection.  Mean 
while,  during  a  temporary  absence  of  Reed  in  the  United  States, 
mosquitoes  in  which  both  conditions  were  fulfilled  were  ap 
plied  to  Dr.  Carroll  and  to  a  cavalry  soldier,  both  of  whom 
came  down  with  yellow-fever,  Carroll's  case  being  very  severe. 
These  cases  convinced  Reed,  but  they  were  not  sufficient  to 
convert  the  scientific  world,  and  it  was  evident  that  a  series 


340  APPENDIX 

of  fully  observed  and  controlled  cases  was  necessary  to  con 
firm  and  define  the  conditions  of  this  momentous  discovery. 
He  went,  therefore,  to  General  Leonard  Wood,  the  Military 
Governor  of  Cuba,  to  ask  permission  to  conduct  such  danger 
ous  experiments  on  human  beings  and  for  a  sum  of  money  to 
reward  volunteers  who  should  offer  themselves  for  this  perilous 
experience.  General  Wood  promptly  granted  both  with  a  ready 
appreciation  of  the  importance  of  the  matter  which  entitles 
him  to  no  small  share  of  the  glory  of  the  discovery.  Havana 
was  at  that  time  full  of  Spanish  laborers  who  had  come  to 
Cuba  seeking  employment,  and  who  all  anticipated  sooner 
or  later  an  attack  of  yellow-fever,  an  expectation  in  which  they 
were  not  usually  deceived.  It  was  found  easy  to  induce  these 
men  to  submit  to  the  bite  of  infected  mosquitoes,  although 
the  consequences  were  carefully  explained  to  them.  They 
concurred  in  the  opinion  of  the  board  that  their  chances  of 
recovery  were  far  better  with  the  skilful  care  and  good  nursing 
of  an  army  hospital  than  if  the  disease  were  contracted  in  the 
usual  way  amid  the  squalor  and  neglect  of  their  accustomed 
surroundings.  American  soldiers  of  the  hospital  corps  also 
came  forward  in  abundance,  so  that  it  was  no  longer  necessary 
for  other  members  of  the  commission  to  offer  themselves  for 
experiment.  Lazear,  however,  the  member  who  had  charge 
of  the  infecting  of  the  mosquitoes,  was  bitten  while  so  doing  in 
the  yellow-fever  hospital  in  Havana  and  died  of  malignant 
yellow-fever.  In  the  fall  of  1900,  after  Lazear 's  death,  a  camp 
named  after  him  was  established  about  a  mile  from  Columbia 
Barracks  for  the  conduct  of  a  series  of  experiments  which, 
by  precision  of  detail  and  rigidness  of  control,  would  admit 
of  no  uncertainty  of  interpretation  and  would  be  a  perfect 
demonstration  carrying  conviction  to  every  scientific  and  un 
prejudiced  mind.  Camp  Lazear  was  established  November  20 
and  the  subjects  for  experiment  were  kept  there  under  rigid 
regulations  to  exclude  infection  in  any  way  except  experi 
mentally.  As  soon  as  taken  sick  the  cases  were  taken  to  the 
isolation  hospital  of  the  barracks.  One  building  was  con- 


APPENDIX  341 

structed  for  mosquito  experiments.  It  was  carefully  screened 
and  contained  a  large  room  entirely  divided  across  its  centre 
by  a  partition  of  wire  gauze  which  permitted  circulation  of 
air  but  not  the  passage  of  mosquitoes.  In  one  side  of  this 
screen  infected  mosquitoes  were  let  loose,  and  the  individuals 
who  went  into  that  side  were  bitten  and  infected.  On  the  other 
side  of  the  screen,  breathing  the  same  air,  slept  and  lived 
non-immunes  who  remained  uninfected.  This  demonstrated 
that  the  mosquito,  not  the  air,  carried  the  infection.  At  some 
distance  away  another  building  was  constructed  into  which 
were  carried  bedclothes  and  shirts  worn  by  yellow-fever 
patients,  some  even  soiled  with  black  vomit  and  other  dis 
charges.  In  this  room,  of  which  the  air  was  kept  warm  and 
moist,  slept  and  lived  6  non-immune  American  soldiers  for 
periods  of  ten  days  each  during  a  period  of  two  months. 
Acting  Assistant  Surgeon  R.  P.  Cook  underwent  this  re 
pulsive  experience  with  the  first  2  soldiers,  and  although  they 
daily  handled  and  even  slept  in  this  presumably  infected  cloth 
ing,  none  of  them  contracted  yellow-fever.  Three  of  them 
afterward  demonstrated  their  susceptibility  by  contracting 
the  disease  by  the  bites  of  infected  mosquitoes.  In  these  ex 
periments  14  cases  of  yellow-fever  were  caused  by  infected 
mosquitoes  of  the  genus  Stegnomyia,  5  by  injections  of  blood 
of  patients  in  the  first  three  days  of  their  illness  and  3  by  in 
jections  of  filtered  blood  serum,  22  cases  in  all,  of  which  15 
were  Americans  and  7  were  Spaniards.  No  deaths  occurred 
except  that  of  Dr.  Lazear  above  mentioned.  In  a  series  of 
10  experimental  cases  at  Havana,  however,  conducted  in  1901 
by  Gorgas  and  Guiteras,  3  proved  fatal,  2  being  Spaniards 
and  1  an  American  trained  nurse,  Miss  Clara  Louise  Maas. 
These  experiments  demonstrated  that 

1.  Bacillus  Ictervides  of  Sanarelli  does  not  cause  yellow-fever. 

2.  Yellow-fever  is  carried  by  the  mosquito,  genus  Stegnomyia. 

3.  That  this  mosquito  cannot  convey  the  disease  until  the 
twelfth  day  after  biting  the  patient,  and  then  retains  the  in 
fective  power  for  the  rest  of  its  life. 


342  APPENDIX 

4.  Patients  can  transmit  yellow-fever  to  the  mosquito  only 
during  the  first  three  days  of  the  disease. 

5.  Yellow-fever  is  not  communicable  by  clothing,  etc. 
Application  was  at  once  made  of  this  knowledge  by  Major 

W.  C.  Gorgas,  Health  Officer  of  Havana,  in  February,  1901, 
and  this  dread  disease  was  stamped  out  of  Havana  and  Cuba 
for  the  first  time  in  nearly  two  centuries.  Between  the  years 
1853  and  1900  it  has  caused  35,952  deaths  in  the  city  of  Havana 
alone.  The  application  at  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  of  the 
same  knowledge,  together  with  the  administrative  methods 
worked  out  in  Havana,  has  enabled  Gorgas  to  make  healthy  one 
of  the  most  pestilential  countries  in  the  world,  and  so  make 
possible  the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal.  This  same 
discovery  has  been  applied  with  equal  success  in  other  centres 
of  infection,  such  as  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Vera  Cruz,  so  that 
there  is  now  a  good  prospect  of  the  extermination  of  this  dis 
ease  in  the  western  hemisphere. 

J.  R.  KEAN, 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  Medical  Corps,  U.  S.  A. 

BOOKS  OF  REFERENCE 

1.  Dr.  William  Osier:   "JSquanimitas"  and  other  addresses.     Pp.  118. 
P.  Blakiston's  Son  &  Co. 

2.  Dr.  Howard  A.  Kelly:  "Walter  Reed  and  Yellow  Fever."     McClure, 
Phillips  &  Co.,  New  York. 

3.  "Major  Walter  Reed  and  the  Yellow  Fever  Commission."     A  com 
pilation  prepared  by  authority  of  the  surgeon-general  and  published  as  a 
Senate  Document. 

4.  Major  J.  R.  Kean:  "The  Scientific  Work  and  Discoveries  of  the  Late 
Major  Walter  Reed."     Senate  Doc.  No.  118,  57th  Congress,  2d  Session. 

5.  Also  Senate  Docs.  No.  10,  59th  Congress,  2d  Session,  and  No.  520, 
Gist  Congress,  2d  Session. 


INDEX 


Abercrombey  at  Ticonderoga,  1758,  102. 

Adams,  John,  14,  61,  99;  endorses  Gates, 
99. 

Adams,  Samuel,  3;  writes  to  Congress 
endorsing  Gates,  99,  149. 

Agnew,  General,   mortally  wounded,  92. 

Allen,  Colonel  Ethan,  6;  captured  and 
sent  to  England,  23,  102. 

Andre",  Major,  meets  Arnold,  167;  capt 
ure  of,  168;  death  of,  169. 

Anspach  regiment  sent  by  transports 
feared  desertion,  141. 

Arbuthnot,  Admiral,  sails  for  Newport, 
173;  with  Clinton  at  Charleston,  208. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  21,  22;  plans  to  invade 
Canada,  22;  arrives  at  Quebec,  24, 
25;  wounded,  26;  might  have  suc 
ceeded,  27;  defeated  by  Carleton, 
54;  at  Ridgefield,  80;  defeats  St. 
Leger,  108;  joins  Gates,  115;  at 
tacks  Eraser,  116;  in  battle  with 
out  command,  124;  compared  to 
Lee,  145;  gets  command  at  West 
Point,  166;  meets  Andre",  167;  es 
capes  to  British  ship,  168;  subse 
quent  career  of,  169;  sent  South  to 
reinforce  Cornwallis,  227. 

Ashe  defeated  at  Briar  Creek  and  court- 
martialled,  195. 

Augusta,  siege  of,  249. 

Balcarras,  Earl,  at  Bemis'  Heights,  124. 

Barren  Hill,  skirmish,  140. 

Baume,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  at  Benning- 
ton,  110;  warns  Burgoyne,  111; 
death  of,  113. 

Baxter,  Colonel,  58;  mortally  wounded, 
59. 

Beaufort,  action  at,  193. 

Bennington,  battle  of,  113. 

Boston,  besieged,  3;  garrison  of,  4;  works 
completed,  5;  evacuation  of,  19. 

Boyd,  Colonel,  at  Kettle  Creek,  194. 

Brandy  wine,  battle  of,  85. 

Brant  with  St.  Leger,  107. 

Breyman,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  at  Ben 
nington,  112-113;  death  of,  124. 

Briar  Creek,  battle  of,  195. 

British  army,  139,  163. 

British  fleet,  arrival  at  New  York,  33. 

British  plans  for  dividing  the  Colonies, 
182. 

Brown,  Colonel,  raids  Burgoyne's  com 
munications,  119. 

Browne,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  defends  Au 
gusta,  250. 


Brunswick  Dragoons  at  Bennington, 
110. 

Brunswick,  Duke  of,  28. 

Bunker  Hill,  Gage's  plan  of  attack,  7; 
Howe's  formation  for  assault,  9; 
American  retreat,  10. 

Burgoyne,  in  command  of  reinforce 
ments,  26;  resented  being  shut  up 
in  Boston,  30;  reasons  for  the  loss 
of  his  army,  31;  selected  to  com 
mand  two  expeditions  from  Can 
ada,  77;  his  plan  to  reach  Albany, 
78;  his  force,  96;  arrives  at  Quebec, 
100;  advances  from  Crown  Point, 
103;  captures  Ticonderoga  and  pur 
sues  Long  up  the  lake,  104,  106; 
takes  Fort  Edward,  109;  starts  for 
Bennington,  110;  position  precari- 
out,  114;  at  Freeman's  Farm,  116; 
at  Bemis'  Heights,  123;  negotiates 
for  surrender,  125;  signs  terms,  127; 
goes  to  England  on  parole,  130,  139. 

Burnside's  report,  312-313;  not  adopted, 
314. 

Burr,  Aaron,  23. 

Cadwalader,  Colonel  John,  with  Magaw 
at  New  York,  58;  letter  to,  from 
Washington,  66,  67;  occupies  Bor- 
dentown,  69;  ordered  to  join  Wash 
ington,  70. 

Calhoun's  reports,  299;  not  adopted, 
301. 

Camden,  battle  of,  218. 

Campbell,  Captain,  messenger  to  Bur 
goyne,  117;  Colonel,  sent  to  attack 
Fort  Montgomery,  121. 

Campbell,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Archibald, 
sent  to  Georgia,  189;  at  Savannah, 
191;  killed  at  Eutaw  Springs,  255. 

Carleton,  Sir  Guy,  Governor  of  Canada, 
at  Montreal,  22;  escapes  in  a  small 
boat,  23;  learns  of  Arnold's  ap 
proach,  24;  at  Quebec,  25;  fails 
to  attack  Arnold,  26;  reinforced  by 
Burgoyne,  31;  at  Crown  Point,  54; 
renders  Burgoyne  every  assistance, 
100. 

Carlisle,  Earl  of,  heads  peace  commis 
sion,  138. 

Carrington,  quartermaster-general  of 
Greene's  army,  226;  meets  Morgan 
with  boats,  233,  234. 

Chad's  Ford,  battle  of,  84. 

Charleston,  preparations  for  the  defence 
of,  184;  result  of  the  victory,  188; 


343 


344 


INDEX 


unsuccessful  attack  of  Prevost,  197; 
its  siege  by  Clinton,  209;  its  sur 
render,  210. 

Cbarlestown  set  on  fire,  9. 

Chew,  Chief  Justice,  91. 

Civil  War,  the,  307;  call  for  volunteers, 
307;  resort  to  conscription,  308; 
number  of  men  in  service,  308;  de 
fects  of  military  system,  309;  com 
pared  with  previous  wars,  310;  dis- 
bandment  of  the  volunteers,  311. 

Clarke,  Colonel,  defeats  Dunlap,  214;  at 
siege  of  Augusta,  250. 

Clary,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  49. 

Clinton,  Fort,  captured,  121. 

Clinton,  General  George,  49;  hastens 
to  the  relief  of  his  brother,  121-138. 

Clinton,  General  James,  61;  commander 
Forts  Clinton  and  Montgomery,  121. 

Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  at  Bunker  Hill,  10; 
failure  at  Charleston,  31;  arrives  at 
New  York,  33;  attacks  Sullivan  on 
Long  Island,  38;  lands  at  Kip's 
Bay,  46;  sent  to  Newport,  62; 
notifies  Burgoyne  of  intention  to 
attack  Fort  Montgomery,  117;  his 
message  to  Burgoyne,  118;  moves 
up  Hudson,  120;  fails  Burgoyne, 
122;  in  supreme  command,  134; 
attempts  to  capture  Lafayette,  140; 
evacuates  Philadelphia,  141;  at 
Monmouth,  144;  escapes,  147; 
arrives  at  Newport,  154  ;  captures 
Stony  Point,  156;  reoccupies  Stony 
Point,  159;  sends  marauding  ex 
pedition  up  the  Chesapeake,  161; 
corresponds  with  Arnold,  167;  ap 
peals  for  Andre",  169;  sails  for  New 
port,  173;  returns  to  New  York, 
174,  176;  at  Charleston,  185;  his 
expedition  South,  206;  lands  near 
Charleston,  207;  sends  reinforce 
ments  South,  223;  sends  7,500  men 
to  Cornwallis,  261;  instructions  to 
Cornwallis,  266;  goes  to  relieve 
Cornwallis,  273;  superseded  by 
Carleton,  278. 

Continental  army,  17;  movement  to 
New  York,  31-54,  162;  ineffective 
plans  for  recruiting,  175;  origin  of, 
288. 

Continental  Congress,  appoints  Washing 
ton  commander-in-chief,  13,  75; 
adjourns  to  York,  Pa.,  89;  sends 
committee  to  Valley  Forge,  134;  in 
effective  resolutions  of,  289;  mili 
tary  powers  of,  295. 

Conway,  Cabal,  134;  wounded  in  a  duel, 
makes  abject  apology  to  Washing 
ton,  135. 

Conway's  brigade,  90. 

Cornwallis,  reinforces  Clinton  at  Charles 
ton,  31;  arrives  at  New  York,  33; 
sent  to  Flatbush,  35;  at  the  Cor- 
telyou  house,  39;  lands  at  Kip's 


Bay,  46;  at  Harlem  Heights,  49; 
at  Fort  George,  58;  at  Fort  Lee, 
59,  60;  captures  Lee,  65;  his  at 
tempt  to  turn  Washington's  flank, 
66,  rejoins  his  command,  70; 
marches  toward  Princeton,  71,  72; 
in  battle  of  the  Brandywine,  84  et 
SPQ.;  hurrying  with  reinforcements, 
92;  attacks  Fort  Mercer,  94,  163; 
with  seven  regiments  at  Cape  Fear 
River,  184;  goes  South  with  Clinton, 
206;  defeats  Gates  at  Camden,  219; 
retreats  to  South  Carolina  after 
King's  Mountain,  224;  burns  his 
baggage  to  pursue  Morgan,  232; 
gives  up  the  chase,  235;  he  defeats 
Green  at  Guilford,  240;  retreats  to 
Wilmington,  242;  his  perplexity  at 
Wilmington,  259;  arrives  at  York- 
town,  267;  surrender,  275;  returns 
to  England,  278. 

Cowpens,  battle  of  the,  229. 

Crown  Point,  capture  of,  6. 

Cruger,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  sent  to  Geor 
gia,  189;  commands  defence  of 
Ninety-Six,  250. 

Cuba,  occupation  of,  338. 

Dearborn,  Henry,  23. 

De  Grasse,  announces  his  co-operation, 
270;  arrives  at  Cape  Henry,  272; 
his  naval  battle  with  the  English 
fleet,  273. 

De  Kalb,  Baron,  sent  South  by  Wash 
ington,  214;  mortally  wounded  at 
Camden,  218. 

De  Lancey,  Colonel,  sent  to  Georgia,  189. 

Delaware,  Washington  crosses  the,  6C; 
forts  destroyed,  93. 

Dillon,  Count,  at  Savannah,  203. 

Donop,  General,  lands  at  Kip's  Bay,  46; 
at  Harlem  Heights,  49;  on  the  Dela 
ware,  66;  retreats  to  Amboy,  69; 
death  of,  94. 

Dorchester  Heights  seized,  18. 

Duer,  William,  64. 

Duportail  stationed  on  coast  to  commu 
nicate  with  d'Estaing,  171. 

Edward,  Fort,  109. 

Estaing,  Comte  d',  arrives  with  French 
fleet,  149;  fails  to  attack,  150;  sails 
for  Newport,  150;  fails  to  land  his 
troops,  151;  abandons  allies  at  New 
port,  152;  sails  for  Martinique,  154; 
movements  of,  171;  returns  with 
three  expeditions,  200;  after  fiasco 
at  Savannah,  sails  for  France,  205. 

Eutaw  Springs,  battle  of,  255. 

Ewing,  Colonel,  68. 

Fellow's  brigade  at  Saratoga,  125. 
Ferguson  killed  at  King's  Mountain,  224. 
Fleury    receives  medal  from   Congress, 
159. 


INDEX 


345 


Florida  war,  301. 

Francis  killed,  104. 

Fraser's  brigade,  at  Ticonderoga,  103;  at 

battle  of  Hubbardton,  104;  mortally 

wounded,  124. 

Freeman's  Farm,  battle  of,  116. 
French  alliance,  132. 

Gadsden,  Colonel,  at  Charleston,  185. 

Gage,  Major-General  Thomas,  command- 
er-in-chief  at  Boston,  4;  issues  in 
sulting  proclamation,  7;  assaults 
American  works  in  front,  8;  recalled 
in  disgrace,  11. 

Gansevoort,  Colonel,  sent  to  Fort  Stan- 
wix,  106,  108. 

Gates,  Horatio,  appointed  adjutant-gen 
eral,  16;  called  in  council,  17;  at 
Ticonderoga,  54;  joins  Washington, 
65;  relations  with  Schuyler,  97; 
elected  to  command  the  Northern 
army,  99;  his  strength  at  surrender 
of  Burgoyne,  106;  relieves  Schuyler, 
114;  refuses  to  reinforce  Arnold, 
116;  jealous  of  Arnold,  118;  not 
on  field  at  Bemis'  Heights,  124; 
surrounds  Burgoyne,  125;  grants 
armistice  until  sunset,  128,  137;  re 
tires  from  army,  166;  sent  South 
by  Congress  to  command  army,  215; 
defeated  at  Camden,  218. 

George  III,  arranges  to  buy  soldiers  for 
cash,  28;  endorses  Burgoyne's  plan, 
78;  plan  that  the  king  disliked,  131. 

Georgetown,  capture  of,  253. 

Georgia,  conquest  of,  192. 

Gerard,  guest  of  d'Estaing,  154,  171. 

Germain,  Lord  George,  76;  had  failed  to 
give  Howe  instructions,  119;  incom 
petence  of,  264. 

Germantown,  battle  of,  90;  panic  of,  92. 

Gist,  Major,  captured,  39. 

Glover,  Colonel  John,  regiment  of  Marble- 
head  fishermen,  42,  43;  his  regi 
ment  to  man  the  boats  at  the  cross 
ing  of  the  Delaware,  67;  brigade 
sent  to  Schuyler,  105;  at  Newport, 
153. 

Granby,  Fort,  capture  of,  249. 

Grant,  Major-General,  takes  over  Corn- 
wallis's  command,  66;  rallies  his 
troops,  92;  at  Barren  Hill,  140. 

Graves,  Admiral,  4;  arrives  with  fleet, 
173. 

Great  Bridge,  battle  of,  183. 

Greene,  Christopher,  23;  gallant  defence 
of  Fort  Mifflin,  94;  in  command  of 
Rhode  Island  negroes  at  Newport, 
153. 

Greene,  General  Nathanael,  appointed 
brigadier-general,  15;  a  great  sol 
dier,  16;  in  council  of  war,  17;  at 
Boston,  19;  ordered  to  Brooklyn 
Heights,  32;  at  New  York,  34,  35; 
illness  at  the  battle  of  Long  Island, 


41;  advocates  evacuation  of  New 
York,  45;  his  division  posted  after 
retreat  to  Harlem  Heights,  47;  at 
battle  of  Harlem  Heights,  48;  in 
command  of  troops  at  Forts  Lee  and 
Washington,  52,  54;  reports  the 
passage  of  British  ships  up  the 
river,  55;  crosses  river  to  Fort 
Washington  with  Washington,  Put 
nam  and  Mercer,  57;  brings  off  the 
garrison  of  Fort  Lee,  60;  on  march 
to  Trenton,  67;  in  the  attack  on 
Trenton,  68;  advises  pushing  on  to 
Princeton,  69;  gets  one  of  the  five 
new  divisions,  76;  selects  position  at 
Middlebrook,  80;  in  pursuit  of 
Howe  with  three  brigades,  81;  on 
reconnoissance  with  Washington 
and  Lafayette,  83;  his  batteries  at 
Brandy  wine,  85;  halts  British  ad 
vance,  86;  nearing  the  battle  of 
Germantown,  90;  fighting  his  way 
along  Lime-kiln  road,  91;  ap 
pointed  quartermaster-general,  136; 
organization  at  Valley  Forge,  140; 
at  Monmouth,  146;  at  Newport, 
153;  his  loss  at  battle  of  Spring 
field,  165;  resigns  as  quartermaster- 
general,  166;  president  of  Andre* 
court-martial,  169;  appointed  to 
command  Southern  army,  220;  his 
successful  retreat,  234;  receives 
reinforcements,  236;  marches  to 
South  Carolina,  244;  abandons 
siege  of  Fort  Ninety-Six,  251;  re 
treats  from  Eutaw  Springs,  256. 

Grey,  General,  attacks  Wayne,  88,  140. 

Gridley,  Colonel  Richard,  chief  engineer 
at  Boston,  5;  sends  guns  to  Cam 
bridge  from  Ticonderoga,  6;  builds 
square  redoubt  at  Breed's  Hill,  7; 
amazes  Howe  by  night  work  on 
Dorchester  Heights,  18. 

Guilford,  battle  of,  238. 

Hale,  Nathan,  absent  at  his  own  request, 
47. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  52;  nearing  his 
twentieth  birthday,  68;  sent  to  wel 
come  Comte  d'Estaing,  149;  sent  to 
capture  Arnold,  168,  stationed  on 
Jersey  coast  to  meet  d'Estaing,  171; 
leads  the  assault  at  Yorktown,  274. 

Hamilton,  General,  in  council  of  war  with 
Burgoyne,  125. 

Hancock,  John,  3;  at  head  of  7,000  New 
England  militia,  150. 

Hand,  Colonel,  at  Trenton,  68;  his  regi 
ment  at  Princeton,  71. 

Harlem  Heights,  battle  of,  49. 

Haslet,  Colonel,  52;  killed  at  Princeton, 
71. 

Heath,  William,  appointed  brigadier- 
general,  14;  in  council  of  war,  17; 
stationed  with  Spencer  and  Stirling, 


346 


INDEX 


32;  commands  one  of  the  five  divi 
sions,  34;  after  reorganization  com 
mands  one  of  the  three  divisions,  44; 
commands  Greene's  division  during 
his  illness,  47;  arrives  at  White 
Plains,  52;  head -quarters  at  Peeks- 
kill,  54;  might  have  been  captured, 
61;  ordered  to  Morristown,  69;  goes 
into  winter  quarters,  72. 

Henry,  Patrick,  Washington's  appea  Ito, 
as  Governor  of  Virginia,  138;  his 
eloquence  fires  the  Southern  Colo 
nies,  183. 

Herkimer,  General,  106;  at  battle  of 
Oriskany,  107;  death  of,  108. 

Herrick,  Colonel,  at  Bennington,  113. 

Hesse-Cassel,  Landgrave  of,  28. 

Hessians,  engagement  with,  by  England, 
28;  at  battle  of  Long  Island  with 
Cornwallis,  35;  loss  at  White  Plains, 
53;  they  attack  Fort  Washington, 
58;  at  Trenton,  67;  they  advance 
to  Chad's  Ford,  84;  at  battle  of 
Brandywine,  85. 

Hinman,  Colonel,  22. 

Hobkirk's  Hill,  battle  of,  246. 

Hopkins,  Commodore  Ezek,  33. 

Howe,  Lord,  93;  at  Sandy  Hook  to 
meet  French  fleet,  149;  at  New 
port,  154. 

Howe,  Major-General  Robert,  quells  mu 
tiny  of  New  Jersey  line,  177,  189; 
at  Savannah,  190;  tried  by  court- 
martial,  192. 

Howe,  Sir  William,  sent  out  from  Eng 
land,  5;  in  command  at  Bunker 
Hill,  8;  leaves  Boston,  20;  arrives 
at  New  York,  33;  at  battle  of  Long 
Island,  37;  lands  in  New  York,  46; 
flanking  movement  through  West- 
chester,  51;  at  battle  of  White 
Plains,  52;  sends  Cornwallis  in  pur 
suit  of  Washington,  59;  captures 
Fort  Washington,  60;  goes  into 
winter  quarters,  62;  withdraws  from 
New  Jersey,  72;  sails  for  Chesa 
peake,  82;  at  Chad's  Ford,  82;  at 
battle  of  Brandywine,  85;  captures 
Philadelphia,  88;  attacks  Washing 
ton,  93;  returns  to  Philadelphia,  95; 
resignation  of,  134;  sails  for  Eng 
land,  141. 

Hubbardton,  battle  of,  104. 

Hutchinson,  Colonel,  27;    Fort,  43. 

Jackson's  opinions,  303. 
Jamestown,  battle  of,  263. 
Jay,  John,  64. 
Johnson,  Sir  John,  97,  107. 
Jones,  Brigadier-General,  4. 

Kettle  Creek  engagement,  194. 
King's  Mountain,  battle  of,  223. 
Kip's  Bay,  British  land  at,  46. 
Knowlton,  Colonel  Thomas,  ordered  to 


reconnoitre  with  his  "  Rangers,"  47; 
ordered  to  get  in  rear  of  the  British, 
48;  death  of,  49. 

Knox,  Henry,  drajrs  cannon  through  the 
snow  from  Ticonderoga,  18;  guns 
placed  under  direction  of,  32;  his 
guns  outclassed  by  British  fleet,  33; 
his  letter  of  December  28,  67;  direct 
ing  the  artillery  at  Trenton,  68. 

Knyphausen,  Lieutenant-General,  53; 
his  attack  at  Fort  Washington,  58; 
Magaw  surrenders  to,  59;  sustained 
three-fourths  of  the  losses  at  Fort 
Washington,  60;  at  Brandywine, 
85;  Wayne  unable  to  resist  his 
advance,  87;  in  charge  of  Clinton's 
baggage,  143;  at  Monmouth,  144; 
expeditions  into  Jersey,  163;  left  in 
command  in  New  York,  206. 

Kosciusko,  fortifies  Bemis'  Heights,  115; 
engineer  of  Greene's  Southern  army, 
226;  sent  to  throw  up  trenches,  234; 
opens  first  parallel  at  Ninety-Six, 
250. 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  arrival  of,  83; 
wounded,  86;  commands  a  division, 
140;  sent  to  Providence  with  two 
brigades,  150;  sails  for  France,  154; 
member  of  Andre"  court-martial, 
169;  returns  from  France,  171;  sent 
to  confer  with  Rochambeau,  172; 
had  gathered  a  few  hundred  militia, 
261;  retreats  from  Richmond  before 
Cornwallis,  262;  returns  to  France, 
278. 

Laurens,  Colonel  John,  aide-de-camp, 
sent  to  receive  Comte  d'Estaing, 
149;  sent  to  France  to  raise  money, 
178. 

Learned's  brigades  at  Saratoga,  125. 

Lee,  Charles,  appointed  major-general, 
14;  in  council  of  war,  17;  sent  to 
New  York,  31;  reports  situation  in 
New  York,  32;  reaches  White 
Plains,  52;  at  North  Castle  with 
5,000  men,  54;  might  have  been 
prevented  from  crossing  Hudson, 
61;  Washington  gives  him  orders 
in  writing,  63;  his  dilatory  march, 
64;  capture,  65;  a  prisoner  in 
Howe's  hands,  77;  gives  traitorous 
information  to  Howe,  78;  his  dis 
grace  at  Monmouth,  145;  his  court- 
martial,  148;  sent  to  Charleston,  185. 

Lee,  Major  Henry,  captures  Paulus  Hook, 
1 59 ;  sent  to  defend  Vauxhall  bridge, 
165;  stationed  on  Jersey  coast  to 
meet  d'Estaing,  171;  captures  Fort 
Granby,  249;  hastens  to  join  Greene 
at  Ninety-Six,  250 

Leitch,  Major,  wounded.  49. 

Leslie,  General,  52;  sent  South  to  rein 
force  Cornwallis,  225. 

Lincol-n,  General,  goes  into  winter  quar- 


INDEX 


347 


ters  at  Morristown,  72;  commands 
one  of  the  five  divisions  of  new 
troops,  76;  sent  by  Washington  to 
organize  the  New  England  militia, 
111;  brings  troops  to  Gates's  camp, 
119;  at  Beaufort,  193;  takes  the 
offensive,  194;  defeated  at  Stono 
Ferry,  198;  joins  d'Estaing  at  Sa 
vannah,  201;  raises  siege,  205;  de 
feated  at  Charleston,  210. 

Livingston,  Colonel  James,  23. 

Long  retreats  before  Burgoyne,  105. 

Long  Island,  battle  of,  35;  Howe's  plan 
of  battle,  37;  arrival  of  Washing 
ton,  39;  responsibility  for  the  de 
feat,  40;  withdrawal  from,  42. 

McDougall,  General,  raises  the  first  New 
York  regiment,  43;  retreats  bringing 
off  the  guns  at  White  Plains,  53; 
with  Greene  at  Germantown,  90; 
fails  to  attack  Verplanck's  Point, 
157. 

Magaw,  Colonel  Robert,  commander  at 
Fort  Washington,  56;  commands 
three  regiments,  58 ;  opposes  Howe's 
fourth  attack,  59. 

Mahan,  Captain,  criticises  Comte  d'Es 
taing,  150. 

Marion,  on  lower  Pedee,  225;  was  hiding 
in  the  Pedee  swamps,  244;  capt 
ures  Fort  Motte,  248;  captures 
Georgetown,  253. 

Marjoribanks,  Major,  sortie  at  Eutaw 
Springs,  256. 

Mawhood  attacks  Mercer's  brigade,  70. 

Maxwell's  brigade,  92. 

Mercer,  Fort,  94 

Mercer,  General,  reported  to  have  ar 
rived  at  Long  Island  as  the  retreat 
began,  43;  offered  to  stay  at  Fort 
Washington,  57;  death  of,  71. 

Mexican  War,  306. 

Mifflin,  Fort,  94. 

Mifflin,  Thomas,  quartermaster-general, 
16;  left  to  man  the  works  on  retreat 
from  Long  Island,  43;  withdrawn 
under  cover  of  fog,  44;  sent  to  Phila 
delphia  to  take  charge  of  the  stores, 
63;  militia  raised  by  his  exertions 
at  Philadelphia,  69;  ordered  to  join 
Washington  after  Trenton,  70;  in 
Con  way  Cabal,  resigns  from  army, 
135. 

Military  policy,  origin  of,  284;  necessity 
of  a  definite  one,  336. 

Militia,  popularity  of,  in  England,  287; 
popularity  of,  in  American  Colonies, 
288;  act,  296;  refusal  to  furnish, 
1814,  298;  act  of  1903,  326. 

Mischianza,  the,  141. 

Monckton,  Colonel,  killed,  146. 

Moncrieff,  Colonel,  engineer  at  siege  of 
Charleston,  209. 

Monmouth,  battle  of,  144. 


Monroe,  Lieutenant  James,  68. 
Montcalm    at     Ticonderoga     in     1758, 

102. 

Montgomery,  Fort,  captured,  121. 
Montgomery,  Richard,  appointed  briga 
dier-general,  14;  captures  Montreal. 

23;  joins  Arnold,  24;  death  of,  25. 
Montreal,  capture  of,  23. 
Moore,  General,  in  command  at  battle 

of  Moore's  Bridge,  183. 
Moore's  Bridge,  battle  at,  183. 
Morgan,  ranger,  defeats  Carleton,  230; 

retreats  to  the  Catawba,  231. 
Morgan's    riflemen,    sent    to    Schuyler, 

105;   attack  Fraser,  116;   at  battle 

of  Bemis'  Heights,  123;  in  pursuit  of 

Burgoyne,  125. 
Morris  House,  Washington  gallops  from, 

46;  the  42d  Highlanders  attack,  59. 
Moultrie,  Fort,  surrenders,  210. 
Moultrie,  64;    in  defence  of  Charleston, 

185;    won  the  battle  at  Sullivan's 

Island,  186;    records   his    opinion, 

202. 

Muhlenberg,  86;  at  Stony  Point,  157. 
Murray,  Mrs.,  detains  Howe. 
Musgrave,  Colonel,  places  five  companies 

in  the  Chew  house,  90. 

Nash,  General,  mortally  wounded  at  Ger 
mantown,  92. 

New  Jersey  line  mutineers,  177. 

New  London  massacre,  170. 

Newport,  attack  on,  150;  evacuated  by 
the  British,  174. 

New  York,  defence  of,  31;  fortifications 
of,  33;  disposition  of  troops,  34. 

Nicholls,  Colonel,  at  Bennington,  113. 

Ninety-Six,  siege  of,  250;  evacuated, 
252. 

Nixon's  brigade  sent  to  Schuyler,  105. 

O'Hara  at  Guilford,  241. 
Orangeburg,  capture  of,  249. 

Paoli  massacre,  88. 

Parker,  Admiral,  31;  arrives  at  Charles 
ton,  185;  defeated,  withdraws,  187. 

Parker,  Commodore  Hyde,  sent  to  Geor 
gia,  189. 

Paulus  Hook,  capture,  160. 

Peace  Commission,  138. 

Pell's  Point,  51. 

Pennsylvania  line,  mutiny  of,  176. 

Penobscot  expedition,  161. 

Percy,  Earl,  his  brigade  in  garrison  of 
Boston,  4;  to  attack  Dorchester 
Heights,  19;  left  in  New  York,  51; 
Howe  reinforced  by  two  brigades  of 
his  division,  53;  attacks  Washing 
ton  Heights,  58. 

Philippine  insurrection,  320. 

Phillips's  brigade  seizes  Mount  Hope, 
103;  Phillips  takes  possession  of 


348 


INDEX 


Fort  George,  109;  in  council  of  war 
with  Burgoyne,  125. 

Pickens,  Colonel  Andrew,  at  Kettle  Creek, 
194;  on  familiar  ground,  244; 
hastens  to  join  Greene  at  Ninety- 
Six,  250;  returns  to  his  old  recruit 
ing-ground,  253. 

Pigott,  Brigadier-General,  4;  attacks  at 
Lexington,  10;  at  Newport,  153. 

Pomeroy,  Seth,  8;  appointed  brigadier- 
general,  14. 

Poor,  Colonel,  71;  after  Bennington, 
115;  at  Bemis'  Heights,  123;  his 
brigade  helps  to  surround  Burgoyne, 
125. 

Potter,  Colonel,  killed,  71. 

Prescott,  Colonel,  fortifies  Bunker  Hill, 
7;  completes  his  breastworks  at 
Bunker  Hill,  8;  retains  the  com 
mand,  9. 

Preston,  Major,  commanding  at  St.  John, 
23. 

Prevost,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  at  Briar 
Creek,  195. 

Prevost,  General,  at  Savannah,  190;  sum 
mons  Charleston  to  surrender,  196; 
withdraws,  197;  retires  to  Savannah, 
199. 

Princeton,  battle  of,  70. 

Pulaski,  92;  at  Charleston,  197;  mortal 
ly  wounded  at  Savannah,  204. 

Putnam,  Israel,  appointed  major-gen 
eral,  14;  called  in  council  of  war, 
17;  given  one  of  the  five  divisions  at 
New  York,  34;  takes  command  on 
Long  Island,  35;  failure  as  com 
manding  general,  40;  Washington's 
letter  to,  41 ;  commands  one  of  three 
divisions,  44;  in  the  retreat  from 
New  York,  46;  his  division  posted 
on  the  heights,  47;  meets  Washing 
ton  on  the  retreat,  48;  in  action  at 
Harlem  Heights,  49;  leaves  White 
Plains  with  Washington,  57;  sent 
to  fortify  Philadelphia,  63;  at  Peeks- 
kill,  76;  reports  from,  82;  out-gen- 
eralled  by  Clinton,  120;  retreats  up 
the  river,  122;  opposition  to  Wash 
ington,  137. 

Pyle,  colonel  of  tories,  defeated,  236. 


Quebec,  siege  of,  25;    retreat  from,  26. 

Rail,  Colonel,  attacks  with  Knyphausen, 
58;  in  command  at  Trenton,  66; 
rudely  awakened,  67;  tries  to  form 
his  troops,  68;  his  death,  69. 

Rawdon,  Lord,  at  Charleston,  210;  de 
feats  Greene  at  Hobkirk's  Hill,  246; 
evacuates  Camden,  248;  comes  to 
the  relief  of  Fort  Ninety-Six,  250; 
captured  at  sea  by  Count  de  Grasse, 
252. 

Rawlings'  regiment,  58,  60. 

Reed,    Adjutant-General    Joseph,    had 


been  with  Knowlton,  48;  in  action 
at  Washington  Heights,  49;  won 
ders  if  Washington  was  such  a  great 
man  as  he  had  been  thought,  64. 

Revolution,  nearly  exhausted,  174;  waste 
and  extravagance  of,  291. 

Riedesel,  at  battle  of  Hubbardton,  104; 
anxious  to  mount  Duke  of  Bruns 
wick's  dragoons,  1 10;  council  of  war 
with  Burgoyne,  125. 

Rochambeau,  168;  arrives  with  six 
French  regiments,  172;  at  Hart 
ford,  174. 

Root,  Elihu,  as  Secretary  of  War,  320;  his 
projects,  321 ;  his  plan  for  army,  329. 

St.  Clair,  selected  for  service  at  Ticon- 
deroga,  99;  his  force,  100;  garrison 
of,  102;  evacuates  Ticonderoga,  103; 
watches  Castleton,  104;  sent  by 
Washington  to  stop  Pennsylvania 
mutineers,  177. 

St.  Leger,  commences  expedition  from 
Oswego,  96;  advancing  on  Stanwix, 
100;  his  papers  captured,  107;  de 
feated  by  Arnold,  108. 

Saratoga,  surrender  of  Burgoyne,  125; 
controversy  about  terms  at,  128. 

Savannah,  capture  of,  191;  defence  of, 
201;  siege  of,  202. 

Schuyler,  Fort,  siege  of,  108. 

Schuyler,  Philip,  appointed  major-gener 
al,  14;  to  command  Northern  army, 
22;  sick  with  fever,  23;  Arnold's 
letter  to,  delivered  to  Carleton,  24; 
Washington  calls  on  him  for  troops, 
64;  reports  from,  led  Washington  to 
think  Howe  intended  to  move  up 
the  Hudson,  82;  his  difference  with 
Gates,  97;  reprimanded  by  Con 
gress,  98,  100;  reinforcements  for, 
105;  calls  council  of  war,  108;  re 
treats  to  Still  water,  109. 

Scott,  Captain,  third  message  to  Bur 
goyne,  118. 

Second  war  with  Great  Britain,  298. 

Skenesborough,  battle  of,  104. 

Small  wood,  General,  90. 

Smith,  Colonel,  death  of,  at  Fort  Mifflin, 
94. 

South  Carolina,  defence  of,  193. 

Spain,  war  with,  316;  mistakes  of  Civil 
War  not  repeated,  317;  prompt  or 
ganization,  318. 

Spencer,  Joseph,  appointed  brigadier-gen 
eral,  15;  called  in  council,  17; 
stationed  just  outside  New  York, 
32;  commands  one  of  the  five 
original  divisions,  34 ;  after  reorgan 
ization  commands  one  of  the  three 
divisions,  44;  his  division  at  about 
147th  St.,  47;  along  the  hills  behind 
the  Bronx,  51. 

Springfield,  battle  of,  164. 

Standing  army,  hatred  of,  286;  opposi 
tion  to,  291;  ibid.,  296. 


INDEX 


349 


Stark,  General  John,  at  Bennington,  re 
fuses  to  obey  orders,  111;  receives 
thanks  of  Congress,  112. 

Stephen,  General,  in  command  of  divi 
sion,  76;  his  division  fires  into 
Wagner's  division,  91;  court-mar- 
tialled  and  dismissed,  92. 

Steuben,  Baron,  appointed  inspector- 
general,  137;  organization  prepared 
by,  175;  second  in  command  to 
Greene  in  the  Southern  army,  220; 
on  the  James,  261. 

Stewart,  with  Wayne  at  Stony  Point, 
receives  medal  from  Congress,  159. 

Stewart,  Colonel,  of  the  Guards,  killed 
at  Guilford,  241. 

Stewart,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  reinforces 
Rawdon,  252;  commanded  British 
force  at  Eutaw  Springs,  254. 

Stirling,  General  Lord,  stationed  just 
outside  New  York,  32;  his  heroic 
attack,  38;  capture  of,  39;  fought 
splendidly  at  Long  Island,  40;  his 
division  reaches  White  Plains,  52; 
gets  one  of  the  five  original  divisions; 
76;  driven  back  by  Howe,  81;  sent 
to  cross  the  Hudson  at  Peekskill,  82, 
made  the  most  stubborn  resistance 
at  Brandy  wine,  86;  his  division 
formed  the  reserve  at  battle  of  Ger- 
mantown,  90;  gets  one  of  the  four 
divisions  at  Valley  Forge,  140;  at 
Monmouth,  161. 

Stono  Ferry,  battle  of,  198. 

Stony  Point,  capture  of,  156;  recapture, 
157;  evacuation,  159. 

Sullivan,  John,  appointed  brigadier- gen 
eral,  14;  in  council  of  war,  17;  to 
attack  Boston  Neck,  19;  ordered 
to  supersede  Thomas,  26;  not  equal 
to  an  enterprise  like  expedition  to 
Quebec,  27;  driven  back  at  Quebec, 
29;  had  brought  back  his  regiments 
from  Ticonderoga,  34;  sent  to  take 
Greene's  place,  35;  captured,  38; 
unjust  to  hold  him  responsible  for 
the  battle  of  Long  Island,  40;  ar 
rives  at  White  Plains,  52;  guarding 
fords  of  the  Delaware,  66;  68,  70,  71, 
76,  80,  82,  85,  86,  90,  91 ;  at  Provi 
dence,  150. 

Sullivan's  Island,  battle  at,  186. 

Sumter,  244;  captures  Orangeburg,  249, 
253. 


Tarleton,  with  Clinton  at  Charles 
ton,  209;  his  cavalry  at  Camden, 
218. 

Taylor,  Sergeant,  hung  as  spy,  117. 

Ternay,  de,  arrival  with  second  French 
fleet,  172;  at  Hartford,  174. 

Thomas,  John,  appointed  brigadier-gen 
eral,  14;  called  in  council,  17;  oc 
cupied  Dorchester  Heights,  18;  re 


inforcement  of  2,000  men  ordered 
for,  19;  given  command  at  Quebec 
and  dies  of  small-pox,  26;  not  equal 
to  the  conquest  of  Quebec,  27. 

Thompson,  Colonel,  at  Sullivan's  Island, 
185. 

Throg's  Neck,  51. 

Ticonderoga,  captured  by  Ethan  Allen, 
6;  topography  of,  100;  previous  op 
erations  at,  102;  evacuation  of,  103. 

Tompkins,  Daniel  D.,  145. 

Trenton,  battle  of,  67. 

Trumbull,  Jonathan,  21,  138. 

Tryon,  Governor,  raid  into  Connecticut. 
80. 


United  States  army,  origin,  297;  growth 
of,  305;  reorganization  of,  311,  322; 
general  staff,  324. 

Upton's  "  Military  Policy,"  313. 

Valley  Forge,  132. 

Van  Buren's  opinions,  303. 

Varnum's  Rhode  Island  regiments  at 
Newport,  153. 

Vaughan  attacks  Fort  Clinton,  121. 

Vergennes's  opinion  of  Laurens's  diplo 
macy,  178. 


War,  possibility  of,  333;  inadequate  prep 
aration  for,  335. 

Ward,  Artemas,  appointed  commander- 
in-chief,  4;  his  regiments  construct 
field  works,  5;  sends  Prescott  rein 
forcements,  8;  created  major-gen 
eral,  14;  in  council  of  war,  17;  left 
in  command  in  Boston  when  Wash 
ington  went  to  New  York,  20. 

Warner's  regiment  at  battle  of  Hubbard- 
ton,  104;  Warner,  113. 

Warren,  Joseph,  President  of  Provincial 
Congress,  8;  death  of,  10. 

Washington,  appointed  commander-in- 
chief,  13;  arrives  at  Cambridge,  16, 
reaches  New  York,  33;  arrival  at 
battle  of  Long  Island,  39;  retreat 
from  Long  Island,  43;  disposition 
of  troops  in  New  York,  44;  tries  to 
rally  retreating  brigades  at  Kip's 
Bay,  46;  arrives  on  Harlem  Heights, 
47,  48;  disappointed  in  Fort  Wash 
ington,  51;  White  Plains,  52;  re 
treats  to  North  Castle,  53,  60;  re 
treats  to  the  Delaware,  62,  64;  he 
crosses  the  Delaware,  66;  at  Tren 
ton,  67;  recrosses  the  Delaware,  70; 
arrives  at  Morristown,  72;  raising 
new  army,  75;  moves  to  Middle- 
brook,  80;  marches  south  through 
Philadelphia,  83;  returns  to  Chad's 
Ford,  84;  fights  battle  at  Brandy- 
wine,  86. 

Washington,  General,  at  Germantown, 


350 


INDEX 


90;  at  Valley  Forge,  133;  writes 
two  letters  to  Congress,  134;  brings 
Continentals  to  Valley  Forge,  137; 
leaves  Valley  Forge,  142;  mutiny 
with  Lee  at  Monmouth,  145;  goes 
to  White  Plains,  148;  in  camp  at 
Middlebrook,  155;  retires  to  winter 
quarters  at  Morristown,  162;  Wash 
ington  approves  Andre's  sentence, 
169;  threatens  New  York  to  draw 
Clinton  from  Newport,  173;  goes  to 
Hartford,  174;  sends  Greene  to  com 
mand  Southern  army,  220;  he 
meets  Rochambeau  at  Hartford, 
267;  starts  for  Yorktown,  270; 
boldness  of,  271;  strategy  compared 
to  Napoleon's,  272;  joins  Lafayette, 
273;  returns  to  New  York,  278. 

Washington,  George,  his  ability  as  a  sol 
dier,  279;  dictator,  290;  his  opin 
ions,  292. 

Washington,  Captain  William,  68;  with 
Greene's  army  South,  226;  came 
up  with  his  cavalry,  229;  at  Guil- 
ford  Court  House,  238;  wounded 
and  captured  at  Eutaw  Springs, 
255. 


Washington,  Fort,  to  be  completed,  45, 
50;  loss  of,  57;  results  of  loss,  60. 

Watson,  Fort,  capture  of,  245. 

Wayne,  Anthony,  86;  at  Brandy  wine, 
87;  at  Germantown,  90;  his  division 
fired  into,  91;  gets  one  of  the  four 
divisions  formed  at  Valley  Forge, 
140;  at  Monmouth,  146;  at  Stony 
Point,  157;  mutiny  of  his  division, 
176;  hangs  three  emissaries  from 
Clinton,  177;  at  York,  Pa.,  261; 
joins  Lafayette,  263. 

Weedon,  Colonel,  with  Sullivan,  86. 

Wharton,  Thomas,  governor  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  138. 

White  Plains,  battle  of,  52. 

Willett,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  at  Fort 
Stanwix,  106;  ordered  to  make  a 
sortie  at  Oriskany,  107;  sent  to 
ask  aid  from  Schuyler,  108. 

Wooster,  David,  appointed  brigadier- 
general,  15;  arrival  at  Quebec,  26, 
27;  mortally  wounded,  80. 

Yellow-fever,  conquest  of,  338. 
Yorktown,  siege  of,  274;    surrender  of, 
275. 


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